JFrog has confirmed that OpenAI models exploited a zero-day in self-hosted Artifactory while trying to reach the open internet from a sealed evaluation environment. Artifactory is JFrog's software repository manager. OpenAI says the models then escalated privileges and moved laterally until they reached an internet-connected node. JFrog says it has since developed and released fixes for cloud
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OpenWrt has shipped version 24.10.8 to close a critical DHCPv6 stack overflow and a wider set of remotely triggerable flaws in network services enabled by default. The critical issue, tracked as CVE-2026-53921 and rated 9.8 on CVSS 3.1 in OpenWrt's GitHub advisory, lets an unauthenticated attacker able to reach the DHCPv6 server overwrite a stack buffer in odhcpd through a crafted DHCPv6
The Iranian state-backed hacking group tracked as Nimbus Manticore (aka GalaxyGato, Mirage Kitten, Smoke Sandstorm, Subtle Snail, and UNC1549) has been attributed to a fresh set of attacks targeting entities across the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. The intrusions involve the use of a previously undocumented Windows backdoor called NightLedger and two custom WebSocket tunnelers,
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Tuesday, July 28
Hi guys, I send out a weekly newsletter with the latest cybersecurity vendor reports and research, and thought you might find it useful, so sharing it here. All the reports and research below were published between July 20th - July 26th. You can get the below into your inbox every week if you want: [https://www.cybersecstats.com/cybersecstatsnewsletter/](https://www.cybersecstats.com/cybersecstatsnewsletter/) # Big Picture Reports **2026H1 Threat Review Report (Forescout)** What was the threat landscape like in H1 2026, and how does it compare to 2025? This report answers that. **Key stats:** * Published vulnerabilities increased 51% year-over-year to 37,137 during the first half of 2026, with more than half rated high or critical severity. * Ransomware attack claims increased 25% to 4,544 incidents during the first half of 2026, averaging 25 attacks per day. * 46% of additions to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog were CVEs that were published prior to 2026. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/9148bfcc?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* **ITRC H1 2026 Data Breach Report (Identity Theft Resource Center)** ITRC's mid-year data breach numbers. **Key stats:** * There were 1,803 data compromises in the first half of 2026. * Insider wrongdoing events totaled 21 in the first half of 2026, a sevenfold increase over the three incidents in 2025. * Zero-day attacks rose to 14 events in H1 2026, nearly matching the 17 events recorded in all of 2025. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/c71098f1?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* **The State of Continuous Security Validation (Synack)** How often do serious vulnerabilities show up between scheduled security tests? Constantly - at least according to Synack. **Key stats:** * 15% of enterprise security leaders describe their security testing and validation program as continuous. * 95% discovered high or critical vulnerabilities outside scheduled testing windows in the past year. * 38% report that at least one-quarter of their critical attack surface had not been independently tested or validated in the previous 90 days. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/2e9d3df5?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* **Q2 2026 Brand Phishing Report (Check Point)** Attackers' favorite brands to impersonate. Mostly predictable with an interesting new entrant. **Key stats:** * Microsoft was the most impersonated brand in Q2 2026, appearing in 23% of all brand phishing attempts. * The top five impersonated brands- Microsoft, LinkedIn, Google, Apple, and Amazon- together accounted for more than 50% of all brand phishing attempts this quarter. * OpenAI's ChatGPT entered the top ten most impersonated brands for the first time. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/9cb79085?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* # Ransomware **2026 Ransomware Report (Black Kite)** Annual report analyzing 7,551 ransomware victims by where they are, what industry they're in, and how big they are. Plus, what security weaknesses or exposed systems remained after each attack. **Key stats:** * Ransomware activity accelerated 60% in the second half of the reporting period and closed with 861 victims in March 2026, the highest monthly total in four years. * Qilin claimed more than 1,300 victims, nearly twice as many as its nearest rival. * 43.5% of victims still carried critical patch vulnerabilities in the latest assessment. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/a552edeb?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* **2026 AI-Era Ransomware Report (Proofpoint)** AI is making ransomware attacks more effective. **Key stats:** * 65% of global organizations affected by ransomware report that AI increased the attack's effectiveness. * 28% reported that AI significantly increased the attack's effectiveness. * 34% of ransomware incidents begin with phishing emails or other email-based social engineering. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/2df8c4e9?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* # AI Security & Governance **Path to the Autonomous Digital Workplace (TeamViewer)** General workplace productivity research with an interesting section on what users say would help them trust autonomous AI. **Key stats:** * 61% of survey participants prefer AI to take no independent action. * 56% often or always verify AI outputs before relying on them. * 51% say they do not always know when to trust AI and when to verify it. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/cdf5ebeb?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* # OT Security **State of AI in OT Cybersecurity 2026 Report (Nozomi Networks)** The people working in OT security on what they are actually doing with AI. **Key stats:** * 87.7% of surveyed OT and ICS cybersecurity professionals are using, evaluating, piloting, or planning AI for OT cybersecurity. * Only 7.9% have deployed AI for multiple OT cybersecurity functions. * Only 11.9% have formally mapped and reviewed which AI-driven decisions could directly affect physical processes, safety systems, or operational continuity. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/e69fab42?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* **State of Industrial Remote Access 2026 (Secomea)** How manufacturers are handling third-party vendor access to OT environments. **Key stats:** * 57% of North American organizations manage six or more external vendors with remote access into operational technology (OT) environments. * 46% of North American organizations with OT environments report full auditability of vendor sessions. * 23% review vendor credentials monthly or more frequently. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/65b5a38f?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* # Enterprise Perspective **2026 State of Threat Exposure Management Report (Vectra AI)** Vectra used telemetry across customer environments to figure out how quickly assets, identities, and AI agents come and go in enterprise environments. **Key stats:** * The typical enterprise environment contains 1.17 AI agents per device. * 35% of enterprise environments contain more AI agents than devices. * 98% of enterprise environments contain at least one attacker-relevant exposure condition. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/a3f5a947?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* **The Third Annual State of Data Compliance and Security Report (Perforce)** Everyone has the policies, so why do breaches, failed audits, and compliance gaps keep happening? **Key stats:** * 98% of enterprise leaders report confidence in their ability to protect sensitive data. * 99% of enterprises have data masking mandates in place, but 84% allow compliance exceptions to those mandates. * 34% report their organizations have experienced data breaches or theft. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/ba266d95?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* **Road to AI in IT (Fleet Device Management)** How IT teams are handling the AI rollout (they're mostly not). **Key stats:** * The average enterprise runs 14 AI applications while IT has visibility into only four of them. * 78% of employees use personal AI tools at work. * 79% of organizations take more than a day to deploy critical security patches. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/7c1f754e?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* # Industry-Specific **Education Ransomware Roundup: H1 2026 (Comparitech)** Comparitech tracked ransomware attacks against schools and universities specifically. The Gentlemen have decided higher education is their thing. **Key stats:** * There were 104 ransomware attacks in total against educational institutions in H1 2026. * The Gentlemen's attacks on education increased 275% from H2 2025 to H1 2026, and 80% of their attack claims were against higher education institutions. * The median ransom demand in the education sector is $420,620, a 53% increase from $275,000 in H2 2025. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/909081b6?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* **2026 Cyber Protect Report (SonicWall)** SonicWall's mid-year data on manufacturing. **Key stats:** * Manufacturing recorded 474 million intrusion prevention events in the first half of 2026. * IoT attacks generated 46.2 million hits in manufacturing, making IoT the sector's second-largest attack category by volume. * Ten ransomware families were active against manufacturing networks in H1 2026. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/a111402c?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* **Velocity V5: Reimagining Cyber for a Faster Fight (Booz Allen)** Data on how federal agencies are handling AI deployment. **Key stats:** * 58% of federal IT and cybersecurity decision makers report their agencies have deployed or are piloting AI agents. * Only 28% express high confidence in their ability to deploy AI agents securely. * 36% are confident that cyber defenses can keep pace with AI-enabled attackers. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/238d69b0?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* # Regional Spotlight **Data Health Check 2026 (Databarracks)** 500 UK IT professionals on what went wrong last year, what they are doing about it, and what they expect to be dealing with over the next five years. **Key stats:** * 26% of businesses have suffered a cyber incident that originated in their supply chain in the last year. * 43% of organisations that knowingly work with risky suppliers experienced a supplier-originated cyber incident, compared with 10% of organisations that did not. * 48% of organisations continue working with suppliers despite known resilience or security concerns. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/46689c0f?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.*
The EU Commission adopted the final Cyber Resilience Act guidance this week. I compared all 81 pages against the March draft. Here's what changed.
I work in CRA compliance (disclosure: I co-wrote the linked analysis for our company blog), and I spent the last day comparing the adopted guidance C(2026) 5252 final paragraph by paragraph against the consultation draft from March. Sharing the findings most relevant for security teams, since most coverage so far just announces that the guidance exists. **The stuff that actually matters for practitioners:** * **Reporting obligations (Art. 14) start 11 September 2026 and cover products placed on the market before the CRA fully applies, and even products past their support period.** This was the prevailing legal reading before, but the guidance now says it explicitly. Monitoring + reporting yes, patching obligations for EOL products no. * **A CVE in one of your dependencies is not reportable by itself.** The final guidance added a VEX-style exemption: no Art. 14 report if the vulnerability isn't exploitable in your product (e.g. vulnerable code not reachable) or hasn't been exploited. Scanner findings, pentest results and researcher reports without active exploitation are also not reportable. The trigger is verified knowledge of active exploitation, and the clock starts at verification, not when the email lands, but you need timestamps proving you verified promptly. * **The explicit reference to MITRE's CVE List was deleted from the final version.** Only the European EUVD is still named. Make of that what you will given the CVE funding situation. * **AI-powered vulnerability findings now legally constitute "awareness".** If your AI scanner finds something exploitable pre-release, you know about it in the legal sense. Interesting incentive design. * **"Effective and regular tests and reviews" ≠ fixed re-test calendar.** New section 9.2.3: it's an event-driven review process triggered by new threats/vulns. If a review finds no new input, no additional tests needed. Auditors can't demand a fixed cycle, but you need a documented review mechanism for the whole support period. * **Big one for legacy fleets: substantial modification of a pre-2027 product no longer requires bringing the entire product into full compliance.** Only the modified parts, unless the change negatively affects the security of the whole product. The March draft demanded full compliance, which would have actively discouraged shipping updates to old products. * **SaaS/browser-only web apps are officially out of scope** (NIS2 territory instead). Browser extensions and locally executed Electron-style apps are in. Worth knowing: the guidance is non-binding. Several of the most generous positions (partial compliance, no support-period reset) go beyond what the regulation's text actually says, so a market surveillance authority could disagree. Document your reliance. Full breakdown with paragraph references: [https://kunnus.tech/en/blog/cra-commission-guidance-what-is-new](https://kunnus.tech/en/blog/cra-commission-guidance-what-is-new) Original source (EU Commission announcement + adopted guidance): [https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/commission-publishes-new-guidance-support-timely-cyber-resilience-act-implementation](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/commission-publishes-new-guidance-support-timely-cyber-resilience-act-implementation) Curious how others are handling the September deadline, especially the verification-before-the-clock-starts part. Are you treating researcher reports as potential incidents (compromised build pipeline = reportable even without exploitation) or triaging them purely as vulns?
A new Mirai-derived botnet called Tengu can use a compromised Linux device's hardware watchdog to trigger a reboot when defenders kill its main process. If that happens, Tengu's other persistence mechanisms get another chance to relaunch it. Nozomi Networks Labs observed the dropper reaching its honeypots through Telnet credential brute force. Tengu supports 25 distributed denial-of-service (
“Make everyone one percent better and it compounds across the team.” That’s the line Joe Head wrote about his own job and when I read it back to him, he didn’t hesitate. “That is 100% the objective,” he said. Joe runs AI adoption for an 80-person team as the only AI automation specialist in the […] The post Tools Change. Teach People How to Keep Up appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
Cybersecurity researchers have sounded an alert after finding more than 36,000 Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) management interfaces exposing Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) protocol to the public internet. Of the 36,872 internet-exposed server-management interfaces running IPMI, 24,650 have been found to disclose password-derived authentication hashes before login due to
After fixing way too many IDOR reports, I thought it'd be helpful to brainstorm ways to make it hard or impossible for developers to introduce them. This blog is kind of TypeScript-heavy, but I think is applicable to a lot of other stacks. Hope it gets gears turning for you too!
TL;DR: We identified 36,872 internet-exposed BMCs, and 24,650 of them disclosed password-derived authentication hashes before login because of CVE-2013-4786. More than 30% of the returned hashes were linked to passwords that could be recovered using common wordlists or predictable factory password formats. The exposure affected modern Supermicro and HPE servers, including systems operated by GPU providers. The bigger risk is that a compromised BMC gives an attacker highly privileged access below the operating system. Because BMC management networks are often poorly segmented and lightly monitored, one exposed interface can become a foothold into broader data center infrastructure. We also created an interactive map where you can explore the exposed systems: https://lavahq.io/bmcradar
JFrog has confirmed that OpenAI models exploited a zero-day in self-hosted Artifactory while trying to reach the open internet from a sealed evaluation environment. Artifactory is JFrog's software repository manager. OpenAI says the models then escalated privileges and moved laterally until they reached an internet-connected node. JFrog says it has since developed and released fixes for cloud
Like most infrastructure, the Internet's fragility is easy to overlook — as long as it's working. When it fails, its complexity comes into full view. Cloudflare is in a unique position to detect and document the moments when one of the interrelated systems the Internet depends on breaks down and connectivity suffers as a result. Each quarter, we summarize the disruptions we detect and annotate on Cloudflare Radar . In Q2 2026, Super Typhoon Sinlaku just north of Guam caused the longest outage, while government-mandated shutdowns during exam periods in Sudan were the most frequent. Iran restored national Internet access, reconnecting its citizens to the global network after an 88-day blackout, even as damage from drone strikes continued to disrupt AWS infrastructure elsewhere in the region. Finally, a cable cut in Saint Lucia and the distribution of faulty DNSSEC signatures in Germany underscored the fragility of Internet infrastructure, but also the remarkable stability these regional and global systems maintain when operating normally. Here we will walk through the most significant Internet disruptions we observed in the second quarter of 2026, drawing on traffic data from Cloudflare Radar to show how each unfolded and what it meant for users on the ground. As always, this is a summary of notable, confirmed disruptions rather than an exhaustive list; a fuller view of detected traffic anomalies is available in the Cloudflare Radar Outage Center . Natural disasters and electricity cause disruptions in Guam, Venezuela, and Tanzania Super Typhoon Sinlaku, the strongest storm of the 2026 Pacific typhoon season so far, tracked through the Mariana Islands in mid-April, passing just north of Guam. Tho
OpenWrt has shipped version 24.10.8 to close a critical DHCPv6 stack overflow and a wider set of remotely triggerable flaws in network services enabled by default. The critical issue, tracked as CVE-2026-53921 and rated 9.8 on CVSS 3.1 in OpenWrt's GitHub advisory, lets an unauthenticated attacker able to reach the DHCPv6 server overwrite a stack buffer in odhcpd through a crafted DHCPv6
Great note-taking and reporting start with clear goals and planning. Organization of your findings matters just as much as what you include. If documenting your #DFIR investigations feels like a chore, this post might spark some ideas and give you a few quick tips.
The Iranian state-backed hacking group tracked as Nimbus Manticore (aka GalaxyGato, Mirage Kitten, Smoke Sandstorm, Subtle Snail, and UNC1549) has been attributed to a fresh set of attacks targeting entities across the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. The intrusions involve the use of a previously undocumented Windows backdoor called NightLedger and two custom WebSocket tunnelers,
Reverse-engineered the BLE protocol of a discontinued Fisher-Price toy Lumalou after its app was discontinued
The state of vibe-coded app security: my analysis of 549 self-described AI-generated repos (study + raw data)
I recently audited 549 public "vibecoded" repos (577 candidates, 28 excluded for size/availability), using a deterministic rules engine, no LLM in the analysis loop. Per-repo results published as anonymised JSONL so all figures are independently recomputable. Interesting to me so thought I'd share. Headline results (full corpus / substantive subset of repos with 15+ scannable files, n=467): \- Committed secrets: 20.4% / 23.3% \- >1 critical or high finding: 26.8% / 30.2% \- >1 critical finding: 14.9% (full corpus) \- Injection-category findings: 47.5% / 48.8% \- dangerouslySetInnerHTML usage: 42.6% / 43.0% (most common single finding) \- .gitignore missing .env: 35.7% \- Wildcard CORS: 11.3% · curl|sh install instructions: 9.8% \- Hardcoded passwords: 9.3% Some observations: the finding classes are dominated by process gaps over vulnerability patterns. The rate of committed secrets correlate with the .gitignore issues. The injection and innerHTML classes are the standard sanitisation story. Nothing agent-specific in the remediation, only in the frequency. Full report, methodology, and raw data: [https://ogbuilds.ai/studies/vibe-coded-security](https://ogbuilds.ai/studies/vibe-coded-security) Disclosure: the rules engine is a scanner I built; the study and data carry no signup or paywall. Let me know what you think, happy to answer any questions!
Codex’s /goal feature amplifies bug hunting, but getting good results requires the right prompt, the right scope, and the right number of outcomes per run. For Patch the Planet , our joint initiative with OpenAI to find and fix bugs in open-source software, we pointed Codex at some of the most widely used, heavily audited codebases in the world, like Rust, curl, and zlib. One tool came up again and again in our internal bug-report channels: /goal , which hands Codex an open-ended objective and lets it work independently toward a success condition. Here are a few highlights: /goal found every Rust bug we submitted, including a soundness hole and a miscompilation now patched in Rust 1.98, from a single variant-analysis pipeline. It turned every project’s past CVEs into Semgrep rules that had to fire on the vulnerable version and stay silent on the patched one, then flagged 11 variant hits across multiple projects. It uncovered two potential high-severity privilege-escalation bugs in Keycloak’s SAML component during a discovery run. Over the first few weeks of Patch the Planet, our engineers independently converged on three techniques for using /goal . We found that getting the most out of /goal means treating the prompt as a set of specific success criteria, not a set of instructions. (Note that this blog post uses /goal to refer to goal-based prompting in general. Codex can also set goals for itself through a tool call, and that’s how we recommend everyone use it; we rarely type the slash command ourselves.) 1. Let Codex write the goal The art o
STAR Labs has published a Linux kernel exploit that turns an ordinary local user into root on the CentOS Stream 9 build it targeted. The flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-53264 (CVSS score: 7.8), is a use-after-free race in the kernel's network traffic-control subsystem.Researcher Lee Jia Jie said artificial intelligence (AI) helped him find the bug and speed up exploit development. This is local
BrainDrain: A Chrome extension that collects your AI prompts without you ever opening it and has 100k users, 9 AI platforms
"Prompt Optimizer - SecondBrain" https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/prompt-optimizer-secondbr/aajjgdpofhhcjmjoombjdfepplndhgcp, v2.3.1. The prompt rewriting works fine. Alongside it a capture engine runs at `document_start` on 9 AI sites and POSTs prompts and replies to the vendor's ingest endpoint. No interaction with the extension required. Reproduced on a clean profile, with the service worker devtools open: 1. Installed the extension. Never opened it. 2. Browsed to an unrelated site. The extension pulled its configuration from the server and wrote a userId and credentials into extension storage. 3. Opened ChatGPT and asked a question. Once the reply finished, a POST to `/context` went out carrying both the prompt and the response, encrypted with the credentials issued in step 2. **At no point was the extension opened or clicked.** Store privacy declaration: "The developer has disclosed that it will not collect or use your data." Write-up, IOCs : https://malext.io/reports/BrainDrain/ Happy to provide the decryption for anyone wanting to test the extension in a sandbox
Microsoft has launched its first cybersecurity-specific model inside MDASH, its multi-model vulnerability identification and remediation harness. The company says MDASH, using MAI-Cyber-1-Flash and GPT-5.4, scored 95.95% on CyberGym. It also claims the configuration costs 50% less than its current best MDASH combination of GPT-5.4, GPT-5.4 mini, and GPT-5.3 Codex. Access is limited to approved
GitHub - memues/mstar-monitor-firmware-dumper: Dump SPI flash firmware from MStar scaler-based monitors over I2C/DDC
Three Minnesota cities reported cyber incidents affecting municipal water technology on Monday: [South St. Paul](https://dysruptionhub.com/south-st-paul-water-cyber-incident/), [Braham](https://dysruptionhub.com/braham-minnesota-water-cyberattack/), and [Plymouth](https://dysruptionhub.com/plymouth-minnesota-water-cyberattack/). **Edit:** A fourth water utility in [Maple Plain](https://dysruptionhub.com/maple-plain-water-cyber-incident/) was impacted. All three cities said drinking water remained safe. Braham officials also said they were told at least four other communities were attacked “with the same result,” suggesting at least two affected municipalities have not been publicly named. The timing is notable because CISA and federal partners [updated an advisory](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-097a) five days earlier warning that Iranian-affiliated actors were targeting internet-connected programmable logic controllers used across U.S. critical infrastructure. The advisory describes operational disruptions involving control configurations, sensor readings and interfaces. That said, there is currently no public evidence connecting these Minnesota incidents to the activity in the CISA advisory. The cities have not disclosed the affected vendors, PLC models, access methods or threat actors, and officials have not confirmed that the three incidents share a common source. For people working in water or operational technology security, do the reported symptoms resemble the activity CISA described, or is the available information still too limited to draw a meaningful comparison?
Monday, July 27
Microsoft is introducing new AI tools designed to help customers continuously streamline and automate the process of identifying and reducing their exposure to security risks. The new tools come less than a week after OpenAI lost control of two of its security models when they infiltrated the servers of startup Hugging Face. The hack, Hugging Face added, involved “a swarm of tens of thousands of automated actions” that stole internal Hugging Face credentials. The OpenAI models achieved this feat by exploiting a zero-day flaw in Hugging Face’s data-processing pipeline to run malicious code that escalated the models’ access to the company’s high-value cloud and server clusters. Microsoft’s announcements on Monday made no reference to the event, which OpenAI said was “unprecedented.” The company also didn’t say what would prevent the new tools from similarly going rogue. Read full article Comments ]]>
We CI-gate our detection rules against dormancy, then found the gate itself wasn't enough — a rule can pass every satisfiability check and still be dead
Background for context: FENGARDE (open-source SIEM I maintain) has had an anti-dormancy CI gate for a while — every rule has to prove it's satisfiable by real parser output (a real producer fixture, run through the real parser, checked against the rule's own field requirements). `make attack-scorecard` runs it. Caught real dead rules before. What it doesn't catch: a rule can be perfectly satisfiable — every field it needs gets populated correctly — and still never fire, because the *condition* itself is wrong (off-by-one in a count threshold, wrong window, bad field comparison). Satisfiable ≠ fires. So I built a second layer: `eval/attack/fire_check.py` replays every MITRE-tagged rule's own fixture through the actual live detection engine (not a mock, the real `Detector`/`Rule.evaluate()` path) and checks it actually produces an alert. Declared-tagged vs. proven-fired, tracked as two separate numbers now. 26/26 currently fire — but building the tool itself caught a real bug in the tool, not the rules: my synthetic stateful-rule repetitions were timestamped forward from "now," and the engine's own anti-clock-skew guard (rejects events too far in the future — a real security control, working correctly) silently ate the later repetitions, making two genuinely fine rules look dead. Fixed by anchoring timestamps backward from now instead. Worth mentioning because it's the kind of bug that looks like "the rule is broken" until you actually read the failure and realize your test harness is lying to you. Second thing, actual detection-engineering bug this sub might appreciate: during a dedicated adversarial re-review of a multi-tenancy fix (not the original PR review — a second, harder pass specifically hunting for what the first review missed), found that a stateful correlation rule's window *counter* was correctly tenant-namespaced, but the function computing the actual `alert_id` persisted to storage wasn't. Two tenants firing the same rule in the same time bucket on a matching group_by value got an identical alert_id, and the tenant-scoped alert lookup could return the wrong tenant's document. Passed the first review clean — needed a second pass specifically adversarial to the first fix to catch it. Fixed, regression-tested via revert/run/restore on the fix's own diff. Repo: https://github.com/supermhel/fengarde Curious if others doing rule-content CI have hit the satisfiable-vs-fires gap, or the "test harness accidentally trips a real security guard" flavor of bug — feels like it'd generalize past this one project.
The outgoing executive director of the Office of Homeland Security Statistics is one of very few federal officials to speak out against the Trump administration’s immigration crackdown.
The screwup shows how tricky it can be to stop web crawlers from making ostensibly private conversations with AI chatbots entirely too public.
NVIDIA and 36 other organizations have formed the Open Secure AI Alliance to develop and share open technologies, techniques, and tools for securing software and artificial intelligence (AI) agents. The 37-member group spans cloud, security, enterprise software, and AI companies, including Microsoft, Cisco, Cloudflare, CrowdStrike, Hugging Face, IBM, Palo Alto Networks, Red Hat, and the Linux
Monday starts with the usual promise that everything is under control. Then the logs wake up. This week, trusted tools crossed lines, old flaws found new work, exposed systems stayed exposed, and attackers kept hiding inside normal-looking services. Nothing looked strange at first. That helped. That is the mood. Here is the full recap. ⚡ Threat of the Week OpenAI Says Its AI Agent Went Rogue
CVE-2026-61511 - a critical vulnerability in vBulletin that allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a remote server.
n8n has patched a high-severity expression-sandbox escape that could let an authenticated workflow editor execute operating-system commands on the server running the automation platform. Security Joes found the flaw while probing n8n's February fix for CVE-2026-27577 for another bypass. The affected ranges are =2.32.0,
Debugging privacy-preserving protocols is hard. Oblivious HTTP has several different steps across four different parties, not to mention binary HTTP encoding and details spread across many draft RFCs. We've taken what we've learned operating protocols like Oblivious HTTP at the scale of millions of requests per second, and wrapped it up in a nice, clean CLI tool — that we are open-sourcing today. We call it our privacy-client , or pvcli . We’re releasing it under the Apache-2.0 License, and it is open for contributions . Here’s a single line of code that executes a full Oblivious HTTP request with a relay, gateway and origin. Don't worry if you don't know what that means, we'll cover it below. We’ll explain why we built this tool, and show just how handy it can be. Why privacy protocols can be hard to debug Let’s take a closer look at our motivation for creating pvcli. Over time, the Privacy team’s product suite and customer base grew. We added products like Privacy Proxy and Privacy Gateway, which power Apple’s Private Relay , Microsoft’s Edge Secure Network VPN , Flo Health’s Anonymous Mode , and more. With it came an increasing amount of special customer requirements, domain knowledge, and complexity. As a result, we saw increased friction in development and incident response. To see this in action, let’s look at how one of our products implements
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a Microsoft Teams-themed phishing campaign that employs "secure document" lures to deliver legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools. "The victim was directed through compromised web infrastructure to a counterfeit Microsoft Store page claiming that Microsoft Teams had to be updated before the shared document could be opened," ZeroBEC said in
The China-linked cybercrime group behind the use of income tax-related phishing lures targeting Indian taxpayers, tax professionals, and corporate finance teams has been observed using a sophisticated crypter service called Cruciferra. According to a new analysis by Proofpoint, Cruciferra has been utilized by various unrelated cybercriminal threat clusters to deliver a wide array of remote
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged fresh malicious cyber activity by a threat actor with ties to East Asia targeting government entities in the Middle East. The intrusions have resulted in the deployment of previously unreported malware families dubbed TELESHIM, MIXEDKEY, and BINDCLOAK, according to Zscaler ThreatLabz. The cybersecurity firm said it detected the campaign earlier this month.
GitHub has announced a new cooldown mechanism in Dependabot, allowing the tool to wait at least three days after a release is published before opening a pull request. "The cooldown configuration option in the dependabot.yml still controls the behavior, though, so you can choose a different cooldown parameter that fits your project," the Microsoft-owned subsidiary said. According to GitHub, the
To reduce the amount of noise from questions, we have disabled self-posts in favor of a unified questions thread every week. Feel free to ask any question about reverse engineering here. If your question is about how to use a specific tool, or is specific to some particular target, you will have better luck on the [Reverse Engineering StackExchange](http://reverseengineering.stackexchange.com/). See also /r/AskReverseEngineering.
We analyze how VoidLink, LinkPro, and Atomic Arch abuse eBPF helpers to hide from defenders, and show how to detect them at load time, before they can act.
Sunday, July 26
Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite The Origin Energy breach down here in Aus is all over the news this week, and as with many breaches, it's multi-faceted. You've got them leading with "don't worry, your credit card is fine", the hacker leading with "they didn't respond when I tried to report it", and now news that the two parties have "come to an agreement". Maybe money was paid, or maybe Origin made some promises to restrain the hounds if commitments about data deletion were made. But both outcomes, of course, provide no guarantee that data has been nuked, so now they get to spend perpetuity waiting for the data that maybe - just maybe - it leaks. And we all should be working on precisely that assumption, just like we did with Optus and Medibank and Latitude and Ticketek and Qantas...
Saturday, July 25
A malvertising operation dubbed SourTrade is making victims' browsers build the final Windows executable themselves, using a legitimate Bun runtime as its base instead of serving one complete malicious file from a fixed URL. Confiant, which detailed the campaign on July 23, 2026, said it has operated since late 2024 and impersonated TradingView, Solana, and Luno to target retail traders and
Security firms ThreatBook and Imperva say attackers are targeting a critical flaw in Fastjson, Alibaba's JSON library for Java. In affected Spring Boot applications, a malicious JSON request can execute code without authentication, with the privileges of the Java process. Tracked as CVE-2026-16723, the vulnerability carries an Alibaba-assigned CVSS score of 9.0. The confirmed chain requires
Friday, July 24
Border Gateway Protocol ( BGP ) is the de facto routing protocol of the Internet. It offers built-in mechanisms to allow entities, represented by Autonomous Systems (ASes), to express how they want to send and receive traffic on the Internet. One such mechanism is path attributes , which carry essential routing information and metadata for their associated route. The path selection algorithm processes some of these path attributes in a deterministic sequence to calculate the best path for this specific prefix. Using our unique position on the Internet, we took an investigative look at one of the well-known mandatory attributes in BGP, the ORIGIN attribute. ORIGIN must be present in every BGP prefix announcement and should not be modified by any router after being set by the originating one. What we found through our own experiments was a dramatic ~70% of observed paths in numerous vantage points have a different ORIGIN value compared to what was set by the originating Autonomous System. This ORIGIN attribute manipulation has a significant impact on the way traffic is forwarded on the Internet, as we’ll explore in this post. BGP ORIGIN and its operational history The ORIGIN attribute indicates how a route was injected into BGP — not to be confused with the origin AS that ind
Iberia Cards CISO José Manuel Rivera García explains why he's stuck with Synack's PTaaS model across multiple organizations, and how running Sara AI Pentest alongside human researchers helps him balance regulatory compliance with real risk reduction. He also shares candid advice for other CISOs on avoiding the false sense of security that comes from infrequent testing and over-reliance on perimeter controls. The post How Iberia Cards Uses Sara AI Pentesting to Stay Ahead of Modern Threats appeared first on Synack .
Analysis of satellite images of Myanmar shows dozens of alleged scam compounds have appeared in recent months, despite a purported crackdown on the criminal organizations.
Thursday, July 23
Getting locked out of an account is no fun. Google has a few ways to help you regain access if you happen to forget your password or lose an authenticator, including recovery contacts and backup codes. Now, Google has a completely new option: your face . You can now give Google a video record of your face and sign into your account with a selfie, which sounds like something people are going to just love. You will have to set this feature up ahead of time if you want the option of regaining account access with a selfie later on. To get started, verify your account type is supported. You won't be able to configure selfie sign-ins for Workspace accounts, child accounts, or any account enrolled in Google's Advanced Protection Program. Configuring selfie sign-in requires you to record a video, which Google will store on its servers. Google's selfie sign-in landing page includes the typical disclaimers about privacy and data access, promising that the company will keep the video encrypted and won't use it for any other purposes unless you opt in. Read full article Comments ]]>
Today we’re excited to announce Cache Response Rules. These are a new rule type that runs after an origin server replies but before Cloudflare caches the content. If you've ever been irked watching something that should easily sail out of cache get dragged back to the origin by a stray Set-Cookie or wrong Cache-Control , headers that are sometimes hard or impossible to strip or change on the origin itself, then Cache Response Rules is that fix, applied at exactly the right moment. When and how caching decisions are made A CDN cache and an origin server work as a pair. Their goal is to answer from the cache whenever possible and only go back to the origin when the edge can’t respond. Every point of cache hit ratio comes from getting that division of labor right. Check the cache when we shouldn't, and we waste a lookup that was always going to miss. Check it too rarely, the origin serves traffic the edge should have absorbed, and the performance win evaporates. Importantly, the origin guides the cache. When it returns a cacheable asset, its response headers tell Cloudflare how long it’s OK to serve it, when and how to revalidate, and even whether to cache it at all. The cache is only ever as efficient as the origin allows. If the origin gets it wrong, cache becomes decoration while the origin infrastructure costs skyrocket. Most cache eligibility problems are not decided at request time. They manifest after the origin replies. A visitor asks for /static/app.js . Cloudflare checks cache, it misses, and forwards the request to the origin. The origin returns the file. Somewhere in those response headers, quietly, is a Set-Cookie header. The asset that should have been cached at every Cloudflare data center is now uncacheable. Multiply that by every visitor, on every site, with the same accidental header, and you have a
MSG’s sprawling surveillance system can monitor guests down to the second. Its owners made an exception for the pop star’s rehearsal dinner.
VU#492466: Logto Identity Platform has authentication and authorization failures in core protocol handling
Overview The Logto platform contains multiple vulnerabilities affecting the identity‑processing pipeline. These flaws reduce the reliability of authentication and authorization decisions and may allow attackers to bypass account‑ownership checks, skip MFA, replay externally issued SSO responses, or submit identity assertions without proper cryptographic or validity checks. Collectively, the issues create several paths for unauthorized access across both local and federated sign‑in flows. Description Developed by Silverhand Inc., Logto is an identity and access management system for software as a service (SaaS) and AI applications. It provides multi‑tenant authentication, single sign-on (SSO), role-based access control (RBAC), support for openId connect (OIDC), open authorization (OAuth) 2.1, and Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) authentication. Several vulnerabilities have been identified in Logto's authentication and SSO components that weaken core identity‑security protections across these protocols. CVE-2026-15611 Logto allows unverified email-based SSO account linking. If a new SSO login arrives and no existing (issuer, identityId) account is found, Logto searches for a local user by the email address supplied by the identity provider (IdP) and links the SSO identity to that account. Logto does not require the IdP to confirm email_verified before linking, so an attacker who registers the victim's email at a permissive upstream IdP can take over the victim's existing account on first login. CVE-2026-15612 Logto stores a nonce in the connector session at authorization request time and expects the returned id_token to echo it back. The valida
Full report is available at [https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/banana-rat-evolution-analysis/](https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/banana-rat-evolution-analysis/) The exposed server at 198\[.\]245\[.\]53\[.\]26 gave a rare opportunity to compare two related Banana RAT branches through live infrastructure, sandbox telemetry, and recovered payloads. The older branch used ETW-themed paths, static Microsoft-looking names, and a typo-based pseudo-Microsoft C2 identity. The newer branch kept the same staging concept but moved to randomized install identifiers, better-structured SYSTEM persistence, and a WebSocket channel built around a hashed `testewin.com` subdomain. IoC: * 198\[.\]245\[.\]53\[.\]26 * [https://app.any.run/tasks/96796146-688f-4b12-894c-236dadab8413](https://app.any.run/tasks/96796146-688f-4b12-894c-236dadab8413)
There are several cybersecurity companies that offer managed EDR services in 2026. Here’s what actually separates them, and who each one suits. Most successful cyber attacks begin with a breached laptop, a smartphone or a server. Over the past 15 years, endpoint detection and response (EDR) has gone from niche to a mainstream security solution. […] The post The 4 best managed EDR service suppliers (and how to choose) appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
Hackers access Australian customers’ names, addresses, dates of birth, phone numbers and some bank account details, company says Follow our Australia news live blog for latest updates Get our breaking news email , free app or daily news podcast Origin Energy customers’ addresses, phone numbers and partial bank account data have been accessed in a hack, the company has confirmed. The firm has 4.8m customer accounts in Australia, providing electricity, fossil gas, LPG and internet services to homes and businesses. Continue reading...
Wednesday, July 22
Deep dive into a UAF in the bfs.sys Windows kernel minifilter driver patched in this month's Patch Tuesday.
VU#847406: Duplicati backup software v2.3.0.1 is vulnerable to an incorrect permission assignment vulnerability
Overview Duplicati v2.3.0.1 is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution when installed outside the default C:\Program Files\Duplicati 2\ directory. An attacker with local user privileges who can write files to the Duplicati installation directory can execute arbitrary code by placing malicious files, such as DLLs, in that directory. To mitigate this vulnerability, install Duplicati in the default C:\Program Files\ directory or update to the latest fixed version. Description Duplicati is a free, open-source backup solution that stores data across cloud and local storage platforms. On Windows, Duplicati is distributed as an MSI installer. By default, the installer deploys the application to C:\Program Files\Duplicati 2\ , where the directory inherits the standard protected ACLs provided by Windows. The following vulnerability affects Duplicati v2.3.0.1: CVE-2026-16157 During installation, the MSI registers a LocalSystem service that executes binaries from the Duplicati installation directory. When the default installation path under C:\Program Files\ is used, the directory is protected by the appropriate ACLs. However, if Duplicati is installed to a non-default location, the installer does not apply equivalent permissions to the installation directory. As a result, standard local users may have write access to files within the installation directory, allowing an attacker to place malicious files, such as DLLs, that may be loaded by the LocalSystem service, resulting in arbitrary code execution with elevated privileges. Impact A local attacker with write access to a non-default Duplica
Without the right tools, no security operations centre (SOC) can do its job properly. A SOC platform brings together a range of security technologies that let your analysts rapidly identify threats, investigate them and implement fixes. There are many cybersecurity tools that an SOC can use, and there are many vendors selling comparable products. The […] The post Top 4 Best SOC Platforms 2026 – Provider Comparison appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
I found and reported an authentication failure in the WPForms PayPal Commerce webhook, the webhook route being public was not the vulnerability as webhooks have to be publicly reachable so that PayPal can deliver events. The problem was what happened after the request arrived. In affected versions, the handler could process a supported event before establishing that PayPal was actually the sender. In my local lab, a forged event could change the state of a matching payment record. The expected order is: 1. Authenticate the sender 2. Validate the event 3. Change payment state The affected flow effectively performed steps 2 and 3 without first completing step 1. The issue was fixed in WPForms [1.10.0.5](http://1.10.0.5) and is tracked as CVE-2026-4986. Then came the part I found more interesting: triage told me I was reporter #11. That number does not prove exploitation, and it does not tell us the total number of people who found the vulnerability. It does establish a lower bound: at least eleven researchers independently converged on the same trust failure. The write up covers: \- the vulnerable code path \- my local reproduction \- why payload validation was not sender authentication \- the fallback listener \- the patch \- why duplicate reports may be useful rediscovery intelligence Full write-up: [https://blog.himanshuanand.com/2026/07/reporter-11-10-people-found-the-wpforms-paypal-bug-before-me-cve-2026-4986/](https://blog.himanshuanand.com/2026/07/reporter-11-10-people-found-the-wpforms-paypal-bug-before-me-cve-2026-4986/) Testing was limited to my own local environment. I am not claiming original CVE credit; I independently rediscovered and reported the issue. Disclosure: I wrote and performed the research, code review and local reproduction. I used an AI to help copy edit and organize the final article. Should duplicate report volume affect how urgently a vendor treats a vulnerability?
VU#360868: Analog Way Picturall Quad Compact Mark II contains a local privilege escalation vulnerability
Overview Version 3.5.8 of Analog Way's Picturall Quad Compact Mark II server contains a local privilege escalation vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-14985, due to improper privilege delegation and insufficient input validation in a maintenance script. Description The Picturall Quad Compact Mark II is a compact, heavy-duty 8K media server developed by Analog Way for video playback and content management in professional audiovisual environments. The core firmware includes a maintenance script called create_local_installer.sh , and the default script permission allows the low-privileged user, picmedia , to execute it as root and without a password. An attacker creates a malicious Ext4 disk image that contains the file, picturall-version.txt , with a directory traversal string and a payload file. create_local_installer.sh reads input from picturall-version.txt when processing these attacker-supplied disk images. This input is not properly sanitized, allowing an attacker to supply directory traversal sequences. As a result, the attacker can manipulate the script to write files outside of the intended extraction directory and execute a malicious payload. Because the script executes with root privileges, this behavior enables arbitrary file writes to sensitive system locations such as `/etc/cron.d, a system directory in Unix/Linux operating system used to store system-wide task scheduling files. An attacker can then leverage this capability to execute arbitrary code with root privileges. Impact By exploiting this path traversal vulnerability, an attacker with local access to the device can write arbitrary files to privileged locations. This access allows modifica
In a recent security assessment, we were unable to intercept the traffic originating from a WebView from an Android application. The application wasn’t using certificate pinning, nor was it configured in any special way that would prevent normal interception. When testing that same application on a different device, the traffic could be intercepted directly, confirming our belief that the issue was the device, not the application. TL;DR: Chromium now enforces
Federal lawyers say anti-mask laws would endanger immigration agents, citing an ICE face-recognition art project that doesn’t actually work.
The home appliance giant LG Electronics USA said this week it plans to suspend any apps built for its smart TVs that turn one’s television into an always-on residential proxy node. The move comes less than a month after researchers found that more than 42 percent of games and other apps available for download on LG’s webOS store allow unknown third-parties to route their Internet traffic through a user’s TV. Proxy SDK prevalence among smart TV apps for LG (webOS) and Samsung (Tizen OS) televisions. Image: Spur.us. On July 2, we featured research by the security firm Spur that examined the prevalence of residential proxy software development kits (SDKs) in smart TV apps. Spur found more than 42 percent of apps available for download on LG smart TVs include SDKs that turn one’s television in a proxy node indefinitely, and that more than a quarter of the apps made for Samsung’s Tizen operating system had similar residential proxy components. Responding to questions about Spur’s research, LG Senior Vice Presid