Cybersecurity News and Vulnerability Aggregator

Cybersecurity news aggregator

Top Cybersecurity Stories Today

Bleeping Computer 10h ago

U.S. and Canadian authorities arrested and charged a Canadian man with operating the KimWolf distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) botnet, which infected nearly two million devices worldwide. [...]

The Hacker News 1h ago

Authorities in Europe and North America have announced the dismantling of a criminal virtual private network (VPN) service used by criminal actors to obscure the origins of ransomware attacks, data theft, scanning, and denial-of-service attacks. The disruption of First VPN Service was led by France and the Netherlands, with several other nations supporting the investigation since December

The Hacker News 3h ago

The Belarus-aligned threat actor known as Ghostwriter (aka UAC-0057 and UNC1151Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council) has been observed using lures related to Prometheus, a Ukrainian online learning platform, to target government organizations in the country. The activity, per the Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA), involves sending phishing emails to government

Latest

Friday, May 22
r/blueteamsec Just now

Hi r/blueteamsec, I'm a DevRel at KubeArmor (open source CNCF runtime security project). We're hosting an AI security CTF from June 17-22, and while it's an offensive exercise, I think blue teamers get a lot of value from understanding these attack paths firsthand. Free, browser-based, no setup. $1,000+ prizes. **The three tracks map to real defensive concerns:** 1. **Prompt Injection Lab** \- If your org is deploying LLM-powered features, these are the exact attacks your guardrails need to handle: system prompt override, persona drift, multi-turn memory manipulation, indirect injection via context documents, keyword filter bypass 2. **Agent Workflow Hijack** \- For anyone building or securing agentic AI systems: tool misuse through prompt manipulation, search result poisoning, approval gate bypass, agent memory as an injection surface, multi-tool chain exploitation 3. **Hidden API & Guardrail Bypass** \- The classic "your safety layer isn't as airtight as you think": debug endpoint exposure, safety mode parameter tampering, export feature abuse, pre-redaction response interception, weak token replay Playing through these gives you a concrete mental model of what to test for and defend against when your team ships AI features.

r/cybersecurity Just now

https://www.guessthepassword.online/ Built this app, needs improvements

The Hacker News 1h ago

Authorities in Europe and North America have announced the dismantling of a criminal virtual private network (VPN) service used by criminal actors to obscure the origins of ransomware attacks, data theft, scanning, and denial-of-service attacks. The disruption of First VPN Service was led by France and the Netherlands, with several other nations supporting the investigation since December

Krebs on Security 3h ago

Lawmakers in both houses of Congress are demanding answers from the U.S. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) after KrebsOnSecurity reported this week that a CISA contractor intentionally published AWS GovCloud keys and a vast trove of other agency secrets on a public GitHub account. The inquiry comes as CISA is still struggling to contain the breach and invalidate the leaked credentials. On May 18, KrebsOnSecurity reported that a CISA contractor with administrative access to the agency’s code development platform had created a public GitHub profile called “ Private-CISA ” that included plaintext credentials to dozens of internal CISA systems. Experts who reviewed the exposed secrets said the commit logs for the code repository showed the CISA contractor disabled GitHub’s built-in protection against publishing sensitive credentials in public repos. CISA acknowledged the leak but has not responded to questions about the duration of the data exposure. However, experts who reviewed the now-defunct Private-CISA archive said it was originally created in November 2025, and that it exhibits a pattern consistent with an individual operator using the repository as a working scratchpad or synchronizati

The Hacker News 3h ago

The Belarus-aligned threat actor known as Ghostwriter (aka UAC-0057 and UNC1151Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council) has been observed using lures related to Prometheus, a Ukrainian online learning platform, to target government organizations in the country. The activity, per the Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA), involves sending phishing emails to government

r/Malware 3h ago

Harvard and \~140 other compromised legitimate sites are now spreading ClickFix malware. hxxps://hir.harvard.edu/israel-and-international-football-a-breaking-point/ hxxps://hir.harvard.edu/a-better-way-forward-an-interview-with-paul-ryan/ Both contain a remote load script in it's HTML that reverses it's C2 `sj.ssc/ipa/orp.eralfduolccitats` to original form and then displays the ClickFix box from it. C2: hxxps://staticcloudflare.pro AnyRun identifies the loading pattern well: * [https://app.any.run/tasks/2ac73567-8bdf-41b0-999e-08057deb3dd3](https://app.any.run/tasks/2ac73567-8bdf-41b0-999e-08057deb3dd3) * [https://app.any.run/tasks/8362c5f5-11ab-4b34-b7a5-8e2fb2d6355c](https://app.any.run/tasks/8362c5f5-11ab-4b34-b7a5-8e2fb2d6355c) Sandbox detonation of one of the ClickFix payloads: [https://app.any.run/tasks/bf4b5c8d-f76d-4398-b465-9a1d8ec899bb](https://app.any.run/tasks/bf4b5c8d-f76d-4398-b465-9a1d8ec899bb) Original post and more discovered compromised URL's: [https://x.com/rifteyy/status/2057842147630411877](https://x.com/rifteyy/status/2057842147630411877)

r/netsec 4h ago

"When performing security assessments on HTTP-based applications, whether web, mobile, APIs, or thick clients, the standard workflow is straightforward: put Burp Suite in the middle, and you’re good to go. Most of the time, that’s all you need. Every now and then, though, you run into a small but significant class of applications where that workflow breaks down. Custom protocols, payload encryption, request signatures, replay protection, non-standard encoding, these are the scenarios where you can no longer work manually the way you’re used to, and where Burp’s automated tools (Intruder, Scanner) stop being useful because they’re operating on data they can’t meaningfully read or modify. In this talk I took one of these complexities as example, additional payload encryption**,** and used it as a vehicle to explore advanced approaches based on **custom Burp extensions** to restore full testability: working manually in Proxy and Repeater, running automated tools like Intruder and Scanner, and even driving external tools like SQLMap through Burp, all as if the complexity simply weren’t there."

r/InfoSecNews 6h ago

Microsoft Defender zero-days always get attention because of the level of trust organizations place in endpoint security tooling. When the tools designed to reduce risk become part of the attack surface, defenders are forced to rethink their assumptions around visibility and trust.

Bleeping Computer 6h ago

Fraud losses don't stop at chargebacks. False declines, account takeovers, and abuse also damage revenue and trust. IPQS breaks down why fraud teams need broader visibility into risk and customer impact. [...]

The Hacker News 7h ago

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a new automated campaign called Megalodon that has pushed 5,718 malicious commits to 5,561 GitHub repositories within a six-hour window. "Using throwaway accounts and forged author identities (build-bot, auto-ci, ci-bot, pipeline-bot), the attacker injected GitHub Actions workflows containing base64-encoded bash payloads that exfiltrate CI

The Hacker News 7h ago

1 Introduction This article provides a technical analysis of how many Windows kernel mode drivers can be interacted with from user mode without the hardware they were developed for. This work was motivated by driver-oriented vulnerability research and the need to evaluate the exploitability of individual findings, which frequently affect code whose reachability is hardware-gated. The

Trail of Bits 8h ago

In March 2026, attackers exploited a pull_request_target misconfiguration in the aquasecurity/trivy-action GitHub Action to exfiltrate organization and repository secrets, then used those credentials to backdoor LiteLLM on PyPI (see Trivy’s post-mortem for the full timeline). zizmor is a static analyzer that GitHub Actions users run to catch exactly these misconfigurations before they ship. When GitHub Actions added support for YAML anchors in September 2025, a small but high-value slice of the ecosystem started writing workflows that zizmor could only analyze on a best-effort basis. Over the past three months, Trail of Bits collaborated with the zizmor maintainers to bring zizmor ’s anchor support up to full coverage. First, we fixed parsing bugs that caused crashes, produced wrong-location findings, and silently mishandled aliased values. Second, we surfaced deserialization edge cases that broke zizmor on otherwise valid workflows. Finally, we helped align zizmor ’s expression evaluator with GitHub’s own Known Answer Tests . We validated all of this against a new corpus of 41,253 workflows from 6,612 high-value open-source repositories. The result: 20 filed issues, 15 merged pull requests. Building the test corpus To u

r/cybersecurity 8h ago

# Threat Summary |**Package(s)**|**Ecosystem**|**Severity**|**CVE**|**Vulnerability**| |:-|:-|:-|:-|:-| |u/cap-js`/sqlite`, `postgres`, `db-service`|npm|**CRITICAL**|CVE-2026-46421|Credential harvesting / Self-propagation| |u/beproduct`/nestjs-auth`|npm|**CRITICAL**|CVE-2026-46412|Mini Shai-Hulud worm payload| |`guardrails-ai`|PyPI|**CRITICAL**|CVE-2026-45758|Supply chain compromise| |`PenPot MCP REPL`|npm|**HIGH**|CVE-2026-45805|Unauthenticated RCE| |`Diffusers`|ai-ml|**HIGH**|CVE-2026-45804|TOCTOU Remote Code Execution| |`lmdeploy`|ai-ml|**HIGH**|CVE-2026-46517|Unsafe remote-code load path| |u/libp2p`/gossipsub`|npm|**HIGH**|CVE-2026-46679|Memory DoS (Subscription flood)| |u/libp2p`/kad-dht`|npm|**HIGH**|CVE-2026-45783|Disk exhaustion (Unvalidated PUT)| |`Crawlee for Python`|PyPI|**HIGH**|CVE-2026-46497|SSRF via sitemap-derived URLs| |`SillyTavern`|ai-ml|**HIGH**|CVE-2026-46372|SSRF in SearXNG Search Proxy| |`samlify`|npm|**HIGH**|CVE-2026-46490|XML Injection / Privilege Escalation| |`js-cookie`|npm|**HIGH**|CVE-2026-46625|Prototype hijack / Cookie injection| |`SQLFluff`|PyPI|**HIGH**|CVE-2026-46374|DoS via Resource Exhaustion| |`pymdownx.snippets`|PyPI|**HIGH**|CVE-2026-46338|Path traversal bypass| # CRITICAL Alerts (Immediate Action Required) **1.** u/cap-js **ecosystem compromise (CVE-2026-46421)** * **Threat:** Compromised versions of u/cap-js`/sqlite`, u/cap-js`/postgres`, and u/cap-js`/db-service` were published to harvest credentials and self-propagate. * **Action:** Upgrade immediately (`sqlite` \>= 2.4.0, `postgres` \>= 2.3.0, `db-service` \>= 2.11.0). *Assume all local credentials are compromised if you installed the malicious versions.* **2.** u/beproduct**/nestjs-auth worm (CVE-2026-46412)** * **Threat:** Malicious versions containing payloads from the Mini Shai-Hulud npm supply-chain worm campaign were published. * **Action:** Remove and reinstall dependencies. Audit for signs of compromise if installed during the affected window (v0.1.2 - 0.1.19). **3. guardrails-ai compromise (CVE-2026-45758)** * **Threat:** A malicious version of `guardrails-ai` (0.10.1) was published to PyPI. It has been quarantined. * **Action:** Uninstall `guardrails-ai==0.10.1` and reinstall a known good version. # HIGH Severity Highlights * **Remote Code Execution (RCE):** Both **Diffusers** (CVE-2026-45804) and **lmdeploy** (CVE-2026-46517) in the AI/ML ecosystem have vulnerabilities allowing for unsafe remote code execution via `trust_remote_code` bypasses. **PenPot MCP** (CVE-2026-45805) exposes an unauthenticated `/execute` endpoint. * **Denial of Service (DoS):** Heavy hitters include u/libp2p**/gossipsub** (Heap exhaustion), u/libp2p**/kad-dht** (Disk exhaustion), and **SQLFluff** (Parser resource consumption). Update to patched versions to prevent node crashing. * **SSRF & Injection:** **Crawlee for Python** and **SillyTavern** both suffer from SSRF vulnerabilities requiring configuration updates. **samlify** is vulnerable to XML injection leading to privilege escalation in signed SAML assertions. *Automated daily digest, created via* [*https://github.com/Deam0on/wakellm*](https://github.com/Deam0on/wakellm) *- feedback welcome. Stay safe out there!*

Bleeping Computer 10h ago

U.S. and Canadian authorities arrested and charged a Canadian man with operating the KimWolf distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) botnet, which infected nearly two million devices worldwide. [...]

The Hacker News 13h ago
CVE

Cisco has rolled out updates for a maximum-severity security flaw impacting Secure Workload that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to access sensitive data. Tracked as CVE-2026-20223 (CVSS score: 10.0), the vulnerability arises from insufficient validation and authentication when accessing REST API endpoints. "An attacker could exploit this vulnerability if they are able to send

Thursday, May 21
r/netsec 23h ago

We've been tracking TeamPCP since March. This is the fifth major package in the same campaign. Full chronology: * **Mar 19** — Trivy compromised. CI/CD secrets harvested downstream. * **Mar 24** — LiteLLM 1.82.7/1.82.8 to PyPI via credentials stolen through Trivy. \~95M monthly downloads. \~1,000 cloud environments in a 3-hour window. * **Mar 27** — Telnyx Python SDK 4.87.1/4.87.2 to PyPI. WAV steganography for payload delivery. \~670K monthly downloads. * **April** — Bitwarden CLI, SAP npm packages, PyTorch Lightning. * **May 11** — 84 malicious versions across \~170 packages (@tanstack/*, guardrails-ai,* u/mistralai*/*, OpenSearch). First SLSA Build Level 3 provenance bypass. OpenAI hit downstream. * **May 20** — durabletask 1.4.1/1.4.2/1.4.3. Reads Vault, 1Password, Bitwarden, SSH keys, Docker creds. Propagates via AWS SSM and kubectl exec. We wrote on the LiteLLM chain in March when this started. Same TTPs, different package: [https://www.bluerock.io/post/litellm-supply-chain-protection](https://www.bluerock.io/post/litellm-supply-chain-protection)

Synack May 21

Key Takeaways Vulnerabilities Report Offers Key Industry Benchmarks How does your MTTR hold up against the industry average? And does your organization encounter more high/critical vulnerabilities than others in your industry? Those are just a few questions that our 2026 State of Vulnerabilities Report answers. The report analyzes more than 11,000 vulnerabilities surfaced through the […] The post The 2026 State of Vulnerabilities Report: Industry Insights appeared first on Synack .

r/netsec May 21

CVE-2026-34474 covers a pre-auth credential disclosure in ZTE ZXHN H298A 1.1 and H108N 2.6 router web interfaces. The short version: an ETHCheat branch returns credential-bearing HTML before authentication. The captured fields include the admin password, WLAN PSK, and ESSID, and a companion wizard endpoint exposes serial data. The writeup keeps the PoC output redacted and focuses on the response behavior, affected scope, and disclosure trail.

The Hacker News May 21

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a new Linux malware dubbed Showboat that has been put to use in a campaign targeting a telecommunications provider in the Middle East since at least mid-2022. "Showboat is a modular post-exploitation framework designed for Linux systems, capable of spawning a remote shell, transferring files, and functioning as a SOCKS5 proxy," Lumen

The Hacker News May 21

This week starts small. A token leaks. A bad package slips in. A login trick works. An old tool shows up again. At first, it feels like the usual mess. Then you see the pattern: attackers are not always breaking in. They are using the parts we already trust. That is what makes it worrying. The danger is in normal things now - updates, apps, cloud buttons, support chats, trusted accounts. AI

r/Malware May 21

Hello all, The past few months I really got into Malicious Browser Extensions. During the creation of my project I started an automation that collects malicious browser extensions. During my thesis as a student I struggled to find CRX files.. so I created my own database of them. Here is the github for it: [https://github.com/GherardoFiori/MaliciousBrowserExtensions](https://github.com/GherardoFiori/MaliciousBrowserExtensions) Here is more info about the automation behind it: [https://buio.me/n8n](https://buio.me/n8n) I hope this can help someone with their own research around this subject. Since I really struggled to get my hands on crx files when it came to "malware" or "malicious"

The Hacker News May 21

Microsoft has disclosed that a privilege escalation and a denial-of-service flaw in Defender has come under active exploitation in the wild. The former, tracked as CVE-2026-41091, is rated 7.8 on the CVSS scoring system. Successful exploitation of the flaw could allow an attacker to gain SYSTEM privileges. "Improper link resolution before file access ('link following') in Microsoft Defender

The Hacker News May 21

Consider a cached access key on a single Windows machine. It got there the way most cached credentials do - a user logged in, and the key stored itself automatically. Standard AWS behavior. No one misconfigured anything or violated a policy. Yet that single key, which was easily accessible to a minor-league attacker, could have opened a path to some 98% of entities in the company's cloud

r/Malware May 21

I just wrapped a 99‑fixture adversarial PE corpus for IOCX — deterministic, spec‑aware, malformed‑but‑parseable binaries, each isolating a single structural anomaly. The whole thing is only 250 KB and it already helped tighten up an unreleased validator. IOCX now walks even the most pathological PEs with confidence. Honestly, this is the most fun I’ve had with PE internals in years. Happy to share details if anyone’s curious. Github: [https://github.com/iocx-dev/iocx](https://github.com/iocx-dev/iocx)

The Hacker News May 21
CVE

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a vulnerability in the Linux kernel that remained undetected for nine years. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-46333 (CVSS score: 5.5), is a case of improper privilege management that could permit an unprivileged local user to disclose sensitive files and execute arbitrary commands as root on default installations of several major

The Hacker News May 21

GitHub on Wednesday officially confirmed that the breach of its internal repositories was the result of a compromise of an employee device involving a poisoned version of the Nx Console Microsoft Visual Studio Code (VS Code) extension. The development comes as the Nx team revealed that the extension, nrwl.angular-console, was breached after one of its developers' systems was hacked in the

Wednesday, May 20
The Hacker News May 20
CVE

Microsoft has unveiled two new open-source tools called RAMPART and Clarity to assist developers in better testing the security of artificial intelligence (AI) agents. RAMPART, short for Risk Assessment and Measurement Platform for Agentic Red Teaming, functions as a Pytest-native safety and security testing framework for writing and running safety and security tests for AI agents, covering

r/netsec May 20

After my last post on the death of the 90-day window ([https://blog.himanshuanand.com/2026/05/the-90-day-disclosure-policy-is-dead/](https://blog.himanshuanand.com/2026/05/the-90-day-disclosure-policy-is-dead/)), the loudest critique I got was: 'Great complaint, what's the proposal?' This is the proposal. It is an informal RFC on how we actually have to change engineering architecture when LLM-assisted bug hunting means the exploit lands before the patch. No magic vendor tools, just strict egress rules, ephemeral infrastructure (burning containers every 12 hours) and rootless runtime sandboxing. Curious to hear where you think this approach breaks down.

The Hacker News May 20

Microsoft on Tuesday said it disrupted a malware-signing-as-a-service (MSaaS) operation that weaponized the company's Artifact Signing system to deliver malicious code and conduct ransomware and other attacks, compromising thousands of machines and networks across the world. The tech giant attributed the activity to a threat actor it calls Fox Tempest, which it said offered the MSaaS scheme

The Hacker News May 20

Cybersecurity researchers have flagged fresh activity from a China-aligned threat actor known as Webworm in 2025, deploying custom backdoors that employ Discord and Microsoft Graph API for command-and-control (C2 or C&C) communications. Webworm, first publicly documented by Broadcom-owned Symantec in September 2022, is assessed to be active since at least 2022, targeting government agencies

The Hacker News May 20

New Industry Data Just Released Suggests Not. On May 19th, 2026, Orchid Security released the results of our Identity Gap: Snapshot 2026. Among the findings, "identity dark matter" (the unseen, unmanaged elements of identity) now overshadows the visible elements 57% vs. 43%. And it couldn't have occurred at a worse time, with enterprises embracing Agent AI with both arms (and unfortunately, as

The Hacker News May 20

AI-generated lookalike domains are now embedded inside the third-party scripts running on your web properties. Here's why your current stack can't see them, and what detection actually requires. Download the CISO Expert Guide to Typosquatting in the AI Era → TL;DR Typosquatting is no longer a user problem. Attackers now embed lookalike domains inside legitimate third-party scripts.

r/netsec May 20

In my day job I do pentest almost everyday and now we are actually using AI agents against real targets like banks, fintech, and saas those are behind paid waf and multilayered infra still just a LLMloop was breaking everything, and the raise of opensource agents are autonomously doing all the pentest without any intervention tools like strix, CAI, hexStrix, people just buy tokens and run pentest now a day even i made a mobile agent loop for my office work. Even the waf methods became old now a simple block won’t stop AI agents from bypassing or trying on other routes even spa application are victim in both blackbox and greybox assessment. So I have built and open sourced it which is called veilgate where it will not block rather have three diff modes observe(scoring each req), challenge(proof of work) and trapit(honeypot) it won’t block any req rather keep on loop and feeding fake vulnerabilities.

Tuesday, May 19
Synack May 19

Key Takeaways What AI Pentesting Means for Continuous Security Validation Every CISO conversation I’ve had this quarter circles back to the same problem: AI produces more vulnerability findings than security teams can read in a week, and it clouds their understanding of which findings are connected to real business risk. This week’s Wall Street Journal […] The post AI Can Find More Vulnerabilities. Humans Still Decide What Matters. appeared first on Synack .

Monday, May 18
Krebs on Security May 18

Until this past weekend, a contractor for the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) maintained a public GitHub repository that exposed credentials to several highly privileged AWS GovCloud accounts and a large number of internal CISA systems. Security experts said the public archive included files detailing how CISA builds, tests and deploys software internally, and that it represents one of the most egregious government data leaks in recent history. On May 15, KrebsOnSecurity heard from Guillaume Valadon , a researcher with the security firm GitGuardian . Valadon’s company constantly scans public code repositories at GitHub and elsewhere for exposed secrets, automatically alerting the offending accounts of any apparent sensitive data exposures. Valadon said he reached out because the owner in this case wasn’t responding and the information exposed was highly sensitive. A redacted screenshot of the now-defunct “Private CISA” repository maintained by a CISA contractor. The GitHub re

r/computerforensics May 18
CVE

Hello. I've shared feedback and blog posts before —some of you may remember-. For some time now, I've been developing a project related to the industry (CS & DFIR/IR), and thanks to the valuable feedback I've gathered from you, I've made significant progress. I'm now in the phase of pre-MVP validation and gathering expert opinions. Thank you in advance, and I apologize if I've caused any inconvenience. Question: The artifact is generated from existing security records and public fixture data. It includes source summaries, reliability reasons, limitation statements, manifests, hash lists, and package verification output. Scope boundaries: - it does not claim legal admissibility; - it does not prove original source truth; - it is not a SIEM, DFIR lab tool, threat detector, or forensic acquisition tool; - it focuses on ingestion-onward integrity and handoff clarity. The question is not "would you buy this product?" The question is whether this kind of package would help during IR, audit, insurance, legal, or internal investigation handoff. Specific feedback I am looking for: 1. Are source reliability and limitations clear enough? 2. Does the artifact separate package integrity from upstream source trust? 3. What uncertainty is still hidden? 4. What would make this misleading or unusable in practice? Artifact repo: https://github.com/tracehound/tracehound-pre-mvp-feedback-artifact Virustotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/dbdbf56e71c39fcfd158babdbb11b57037fa53b333efa27de619ce919278e66e?nocache=1

CERT/CC May 18

Overview Three vulnerabilities have been discovered in the SGLang project, two enabling remote code execution (RCE), and one regarding a path traversal vulnerability. In order for an attacker to exploit these vulnerabilities, the multimodal generation mode must be enabled, and an attacker must have network access to the SGLang service. No patch is available at this time, and no response was obtained from the project maintainers during coordination. Description SGLang is an open-source framework for serving large language models (LLMs) and multimodal AI models, supporting models such as Qwen, DeepSeek, Mistral, and Skywork, and is compatible with OpenAI APIs. Three vulnerabilities have been discovered within the tool and are tracked as follows: CVE-2026-7301 The multimodal generation runtime scheduler's ROUTER socket contains a sink that calls pickle.loads() on incoming messages, enabling RCE when exposed to the internet. This vulnerability is distinct from CVE-2026-3060 and CVE-2026-3059, which would be open to the Internet via the ZMQ broker, which automatically binded to all network interfaces without user awareness. CVE-2026-7301 is exposed to the internet by default through the scheduler host, which binds to 0.0.0.0 by default. CVE-2026-7302 The multimodal generation runtime is vulnerable to an unauthenticated path traversal vulnerability, allowing an attacker to write arbitrary files anywhere the server process has write access, by including ../ sequences in the upload filename when sent to specific endpoints. CVE-2026-7304 The multimodal generation runtime is vulnerable to unauthenticated remote code execution when the

r/Malware May 18

Came across this really interesting analysis of a pirated Android movie streaming APK called NetMirror and honestly didn’t expect it to go this deep. At first glance the app looked completely normal: clean UI, React Native based, movies streamed properly. But the analysis found: * emulator/sandbox detection for Genymotion, Nox, BlueStacks, VirtualBox, etc. * Base64-encoded infrastructure domains hidden inside the Hermes JS bundle * staged permission handling for SMS and call log access * WebView credential interception hooks * native libraries containing the same tracking infrastructure references The most interesting part was how it bypassed automated analysis. Hybrid Analysis apparently marked it as “safe” because most of the suspicious logic wasn’t in the Java layer scanners usually inspect — it was hidden inside the React Native Hermes bundle and native libraries. Pretty solid example of how modern Android malware is starting to exploit analysis blind spots in cross-platform frameworks. Worth the read: [https://medium.com/@Espress0/the-free-movie-app-that-was-robbing-you-blind-eeefe9c5e65c](https://medium.com/@Espress0/the-free-movie-app-that-was-robbing-you-blind-eeefe9c5e65c) greatly broken down and presented

Troy Hunt May 18

Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite It's a hot topic, the old "pay or don't pay" for hackers not to leak your data. Since recording this a few days ago, we've had Grafana go with the "no pay" approach , and I've seen a raft of commentary around other companies reaching "agreements", which is a much politer way of saying "we paid extortionists a ransom". I'm concerned about the normalisation of ransom payments, and using language that deflects from the criminal nature of it is a big part of that. Instructure's exact words were that they "reached an agreement with the unauthorised actor involved", which really waters down the severity of the whole thing. It looks like, for the time being, "pay or leak" is the new norm... along with nonsensical statements like "the data was returned to us" 路‍♂️

Saturday, May 16
The Guardian May 16

Businesses are advised against paying – but many are prepared to deal to protect users’ privacy After a week of outages, hundreds of millions of students’ data stolen, delayed assignment due dates and school login pages being defaced by hackers, the US tech firm Instructure – which operates the education platform Canvas, used by education providers worldwide – announced it had “reached an agreement with the unauthorised actor” behind the ransomware attack. Experts read the careful language as a sign that a ransom has been paid. The company has not confirmed this. Continue reading...

Friday, May 15
r/Malware May 15

After months of work, I’m excited to finally share [Brovan](https://github.com/AdvDebug/Brovan), my user-mode binary emulator. Brovan can emulate: \* PE binaries \* ELF binaries \* Memory dumps \* Even partially unknown or unrecognized binaries The goal is to make binary analysis, malware analysis and general binary research more flexible by giving full control over execution, memory, and runtime behavior in a contained environment. Building this involved a lot of work around emulation, syscall handling, memory management, binary loading and parsing, and there’s still much more to improve, but it’s finally at a stage where I’m happy to share it.

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