A flaw in APT, the package manager for Debian and Ubuntu, allows an attacker who can modify package downloads to swap a checked package for their own. The attacker's code then runs as root, according to advisories that Debian, Ubuntu, and APT's developers published on November 4. The attack needs APT to retry failed downloads, which it does by default from Debian 12 and
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Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a now-patched vulnerability that could be exploited to bypass Lockdown Mode protections in OpenAI ChatGPT. Lockdown Mode was introduced by the artificial intelligence (AI) company in June 2026 as an optional setting to minimize data exfiltration risks arising from prompt injections. "The flaw could enable silent chat data theft, phishing,
Cloud penetration testing focuses on identity, configuration, and service-layer attack paths within the customer's side of the shared responsibility model, rather than the network perimeter a traditional test targets. Each major cloud provider sets its own rules for what testing is permitted without prior approval. Scope should be defined by accounts, identities, and services rather than IP ranges, since that is how risk concentrates in a cloud environment. In US government cloud environments, the provider's rules are only the first gate. Testing must also fit the system's authorization boundary and the agency's own rules of engagement. The post Cloud Penetration Testing Services for Enterprise AWS, Azure, and GCP Environments appeared first on Synack .
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Thursday, November 5
Barracuda Networks is your new best friend (Barracuda Email Security Gateway Pre-Auth Remote Root RCE CVE-2026-116606 / CVE-2026-111560)
Yes, that's right! Today we're at the aquarium. Welcome back to yet another watchTowr Labs blog post. You can begin preparing your comments now. What Is A Barracuda, And Why? Must We? Barracuda’s Email Security Gateway solution (ESG) is no stranger to love , for a couple of reasons: For many, it is the appliance that sits in front of an organization's mail and decides which messages are spam, which carry malware, and which are allowed through. For others, it’s the appliance that required physical replacement after UNC4841 (per Mandiant) exploited CVE-2023-2868 as a zero-day. Whoever you are, one thing will be consistent in your experience: it is yet another applianc
Attackers distribute a malicious updater that replaces CWP's legitimate cwpsrv web-server binary with a trojanized version. The backdoor remains dormant until attackers activate it through specially crafted HTTP requests containing encrypted commands. What makes this particularly dangerous is its stealth. CWPdoor suppresses logging of malicious requests, restores file timestamps, deletes evidence of installation, and encrypts communications to make detection more difficult. Researchers identified evidence suggesting real-world infections, although the number of compromised servers remains unknown. More than 340,000 CWP instances were observed exposed to the internet, but that does not mean 340,000 servers were infected. Compromised hosting control panels can give attackers access to websites, databases, email services and potentially other hosted infrastructure. Administrators should check for suspicious cwpsrv processes, the ngx\_http\_integrity\_helper socket, and X-Ngx-Integrity strings in the server binary. Confirmed compromises require replacing the malicious binary, updating the software, rotating credentials and investigating for additional malware.
AI Agents now act on the web for millions of people. To a Site, an Agent can take many forms. It may be indistinguishable from a human user carrying out a task, or it might look like one visitor carrying many Users. This removes the ability for the Site to recognize, serve, and hold accountable the user or users behind the Agent, and causes the Site to face the costs when something goes wrong. This post argues that in order for Sites to maximize the access they provide to Agents, the ecosystem must develop new mechanisms to preserve the relationship between Sites and Users. Traditionally, in Security and Fraud Prevention, that requires three things: Identity, Reputation, and Accountability, allowing Sites to answer: Is the person acting being truthful about who they are? Is that person trustworthy? And who answers for the action? “Personal AI Agents” (“Agents” for short) are automations that take instructions from a human (“User”) and pursue a goal by controlling a cloud computer or browser. They are usually hosted and maintained by an “Operator” as part of a managed service or consumer offering. Examples include Muse from Meta and dots from OpenAI, and more are launching all the time. Agents can potentially take any action online that their User could, without the limits that hold humans back. They don't tire, they run around the clock, they act in parallel, and they put up with friction no person would. Much of the web, from how Sites plan capacity to how they make money, assumes those limits. Fundamentally, remotely hosted Agents are intermediaries . An intermediary is anything that sits between a User and a Site, so the Site sees it instead of the User. Agents are the newest kind of intermediary, but intermediaries have existed for a long time. Cloud browsers (hosted browsers that software controls on a User's behalf) and Proxies (services that relay a User's traffic, including VPNs) are intermediaries too. What has
Attackers can log in to accounts that have no password, such as SSH key-only accounts, on some Alpine Linux servers running the standard openssh-server package. They need network access to the server, an account name, and a password between 257 and 1,024 bytes long. OpenSSH, which rates the flaw critical, released version 10.6p2 today to block it. Alpine has published fixed packages for every
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a now-patched vulnerability that could be exploited to bypass Lockdown Mode protections in OpenAI ChatGPT. Lockdown Mode was introduced by the artificial intelligence (AI) company in June 2026 as an optional setting to minimize data exfiltration risks arising from prompt injections. "The flaw could enable silent chat data theft, phishing,
How much damage can someone do without breaking much? Quite a lot, it seems. A stolen login can open doors across several systems. A trusted setting can be used to lock people out. Even a simple file copy can reach places it shouldn't. And while new tools are helping find security holes faster, some important systems are still taking months, sometimes over a year, to get patched. Not exactly a
Cloud penetration testing focuses on identity, configuration, and service-layer attack paths within the customer's side of the shared responsibility model, rather than the network perimeter a traditional test targets. Each major cloud provider sets its own rules for what testing is permitted without prior approval. Scope should be defined by accounts, identities, and services rather than IP ranges, since that is how risk concentrates in a cloud environment. In US government cloud environments, the provider's rules are only the first gate. Testing must also fit the system's authorization boundary and the agency's own rules of engagement. The post Cloud Penetration Testing Services for Enterprise AWS, Azure, and GCP Environments appeared first on Synack .
A cybersecurity development worth paying attention to today. According to a Reuters report published on November 5, India's CERT-In has identified an active hacking campaign called Crafty Falcon, targeting non-bank lenders, fintech companies, and cryptocurrency exchanges. What's interesting is how the attackers are reportedly using publicly available AI tools to automate parts of their operations. What do we know? CERT-In identified four tools associated with the campaign: \- ARTEX \- PentAGI \- Cairn \- CyberStrikeAI Researchers have linked at least two of these tools to China, although CERT-In has not publicly attributed the campaign to a specific country or state-sponsored group. How does the campaign operate? According to the reported advisory: \- Attackers use AI tools to automate intrusion activities. \- They target financial companies and their payment infrastructure. \- They reportedly abuse existing payment and disbursement systems to move money. \- Attacks are timed around weekends and holidays, when monitoring may be reduced. \- Some organizations were reportedly targeted again after incomplete remediation. Why should security professionals care? Three things stand out to me: 1. API security is critical Financial platforms depend on APIs to communicate with lenders, banks, and payment systems. Weak authorization or validation can have serious consequences. 2. AI changes the speed of attacks Automation can reduce the time and effort needed to conduct reconnaissance and execute parts of an intrusion. 3. Fixing a vulnerability isn't always enough CERT-In reportedly observed repeat attacks against organizations after incomplete remediation. Fixing the original weakness without verifying the entire attack path can leave systems exposed. My takeaway AI-assisted attacks aren't just a future concern. The important question for defenders is whether their monitoring, API authorization, incident response, and remediation processes can keep up with increasingly automated threats. Question for the community Do you think financial organizations are giving enough attention to API security and authorization testing, especially as attackers increasingly automate their operations with AI? Sources \- "Reuters – India flags AI tools in hacking campaign against financial firms (November 5, 2026)" (https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/india-flags-chinese-linked-ai-tools-hacking-campaign-against-financial-firms-2026-11-05/) \- "CERT-In – Official website" (https://www.cert-in.org.in/) \- "OWASP API Security Top 10" (https://owasp.org/API-Security/) This post summarizes reported cybersecurity developments. The campaign's attribution and the connection between individual financial incidents and Crafty Falcon have not been conclusively established publicly.
A critical finding can move through several security tools and still leave the organization exposed. The vulnerability has a severity score, and a ticket has reached the queue. Progress then depends on information the finding may lack: who owns the system, whether attackers can reach it, what protection exists, and how a change could affect the business. Each missing detail creates
OpenAI on Wednesday detailed a pipeline that employed an upcoming cyber-focused artificial intelligence (AI) model to validate and patch 948 local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in Linux for $1.2 million in API costs. "Our prototype identified and analyzed 2,308 candidate Linux kernel findings, dynamically reproduced 1,724 vulnerabilities, and produced 948 local privilege escalation (LPE)
October 2026 brought another wave of cyber threats targeting US businesses, with attackers exploiting trusted platforms, legitimate authentication processes, and everyday business workflows. For enterprises, these campaigns raise the stakes beyond individual security incidents, increasing the risk of financial losses, data breaches, and costly operational disruption. Below, we examine five
Apple has revealed that it plans to start checking public iCloud links for harmful content starting with iOS 27.3, iPadOS 27.3, macOS 27.3, and visionOS 27.3. The change specifically applies to scenarios where users share iCloud content, such as photos in iCloud Photos or files in iCloud Drive, by sharing a link and making it accessible to "Anyone with the link." When users choose this option,
The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) has disclosed that an artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted threat actor it tracks as Crafty Falcon is targeting organizations in the Banking, Financial Services, and Insurance (BFSI) sectors in the country. Describing the threat as active and ongoing, the activity involves the use of publicly-available AI-driven offensive security tools
I'm currently reading through the 2026 VulnCheck Exploit Intelligence Report and found the graphic on page 4 about exploited and weaponized CVEs. It talks about around 250 2025-CVEs (or CVEs with exploits?) being weaponized and around 420 2025-CVEs being exploited throughout the year 2025. Sorry for not providing a screenshot. I don't think I'm allowed to post the contents of the report directly. I can't make sense of what the difference between that should be. I'd greatly appreciate any and all ideas. Here is a link to the Reportpage: [https://wwv.vulncheck.com/2026-vulncheck-exploit-intelligence-report](https://wwv.vulncheck.com/2026-vulncheck-exploit-intelligence-report)
Zyxel GS1900 network switches that received the vendor's earlier fix for an actively exploited flaw are still open to the exploit attackers used, researchers at Binarly found. The exploit lets anyone who can reach a switch's web management interface run commands on it without logging in. Zyxel has released new firmware for 10 GS1900 models that closes the hole. The earlier fix is the 2.90
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Wednesday added a medium-severity security flaw impacting multiple Apple operating systems to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, following reports of active exploitation. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2024-27834 (CVSS score: 5.5), a case of improper authentication that could allow an attacker with
Several staffers at the White House are using computers or mobile devices equipped with residential proxy services that render their internet address available for others to rent, security experts warned today. One of the proxy services is a Russian company whose founder’s web hosting business was ground zero for cyberattacks against election systems in Arizona and Illinois in 2016. The security firm Layer3 Intel said it detected multiple residential proxy nodes beaconing out from the internet address network reserved for the Executive Office of the President ( AS2650 ). Layer3 said the proxy activity was relatively persistent between October 5 to November 3, and that a review of the proxies available from AS2650 showed they exited from the White House network 236 times during that period. The proxy tracking company Synthient said on Twitter/X that the activity it saw coming from AS2650 was related to multiple Windows 11 installations of a service called Infatica , a proxy program that is often integrated into “free” mobile and desktop applications . Infatica’s founder Vladimir Fomenko is a Russian man whose hosting firm King Servers was home to six of the eight internet addresses used by Russia’s state security services to compromise databases for election systems in Arizona and Illinois in 2016.
Wednesday, November 4
We just published our research on escaping Firecracker microVMs, coordinated with AWS. The interesting part is how a guest can end up accessing memory belonging to the Firecracker process running outside the VM. **The vulnerability:** When a microVM is restored from a snapshot using the File memory backend, a failed memory remapping operation can leave KVM referencing a stale host virtual address range. Firecracker may subsequently reuse that memory for its own data, while KVM still considers it guest memory. This allows a malicious guest to read or overwrite Firecracker VMM process memory, crossing the VM isolation boundary. Our research demonstrates an exploit chain from guest userspace to controlled code execution in the host. **Affected configurations:** Firecracker 0.23.0 - 1.16.1, when restoring snapshots with the File memory backend and a balloon or virtio-mem device. **Fixed:** Firecracker 1.16.2 and 1.17.0+. AWS advisory: [https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/2026-169-aws/](https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/2026-169-aws/) The write-up covers the vulnerability, the memory-management behavior behind it, and the exploitation process. We are from Coinspect, the team behind the research. Happy to answer technical questions here.
“Most of the risk is actually created by a couple of players building behind closed doors,” Clément Delangue said of the need for open source AI.
Black Ops II recompiled ahead of time from x86 to ARM64: Remill lifting, custom LLVM passes, D3D11 on Metal
A flaw in APT, the package manager for Debian and Ubuntu, allows an attacker who can modify package downloads to swap a checked package for their own. The attacker's code then runs as root, according to advisories that Debian, Ubuntu, and APT's developers published on November 4. The attack needs APT to retry failed downloads, which it does by default from Debian 12 and
SonicWall has warned of two vulnerabilities impacting end-of-life Global Management System (GMS) systems that it said will not be patched. Details of the security flaws, which affect SonicWall GMS 9.5.2 and earlier versions, are below - CVE-2026-109593 (CVSS score: 9.1) - An unauthenticated file read vulnerability that could allow an attacker with network access to read internal GMS files,
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of an OpenAI Codex jailbreak bundle that's designed to modify an artificial intelligence (AI) agent's trusted instructions to insert advertisements for a third-party AI gateway. The phenomenon has been codenamed prompt adware by Check Point Research. Called Haiou (meaning Seagull in Chinese), the jailbreak modifies OpenAI Codex's configuration
The Russia-linked threat actor known as APT29 is presumed to be behind a large-scale watering hole campaign targeting iOS and Android users through compromised websites, fake domains, and a supply chain attack involving a Ukrainian web analytics service called Plerdy SEO Tracker. "The injected JavaScript code collects browser and device attributes," Sekoia researchers Amaury-Jacques Garçon and
Personal agents are the intermediary between humans and the Internet, turning a person’s instructions into requests and actions on websites. A customer might ask a personal agent to compare products across your site, find support articles, or complete a purchase. To a site owner, all three interactions show up as automated traffic — and without a clear view of which agents are visiting and what they are doing, it can be difficult to know whether that traffic is helping your business or creating risk. Blocking agents altogether can feel like the safest choice, but it can mean losing customers. Better visibility into agent activity allows you to decide what access makes sense for your site. Today, we’re launching new analytics to help you understand how personal agents access your site on behalf of humans, along with more granular access policies to put those decisions into practice. Together, they let you welcome agents on your own terms, and in ways that support your business. See how agents access your site Knowing which agent is behind a request turns unexplained automated traffic into traffic you can act on with confidence. Cloudflare maintains the largest verified bot directory in the world, and we are now bringing that intelligence into your traffic details. In Security Analytics, the Bot Analysis chart now shows Personal Assistants as a new category, next to Verified Bot, Likely Human, Likely Automated, and Automated. Security teams can select it to see only personal agent traffic over time. In Top statistics, a new Personal Assistants widget lists which agents are visiting your site and how many requests each one sends. Filter on one agent and every other widget updates to show only its traffic details: the paths it requests, the status codes it receives, and the networks it comes from. At a gla
Nearly every agent security pitch now ends on the same promise: the product stops the bad action in real time. The promise holds for one kind of agent, the kind whose traffic passes through a gateway the enterprise owns. Most agents never touch one. One recent case shows what that gap looks like in practice. An employee asked an AI assistant to trigger a mass-email automation. The automation
A China-aligned threat actor known as SlippyNunchucks has been attributed to a Domain Name System (DNS) hijacking operation abusing insecure HTTP communications in Windows versions of Sogou Input Method as part of a surveillance campaign designed to deploy an implant called DarkVigil (aka FDMTP). The campaign, observed starting July 1, 2026, is assessed to have targeted organizations and
Russian authorities have arrested three suspected members of a threat group known as VasyGrek and dismantled its criminal infrastructure. Also known as Fluffy Wolf, the threat actor has a history of targeting Russian and international companies since 2016. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (MVD) said members of the group are "suspected of embezzling funds from the
I created this repo so you can automatically share your WASM game, and any other folders you’d like, with AI
Tuesday, November 3
Suspected North Korean attackers duped an engineer with a fake job interview and a malicious download to gain a foothold in the crypto firm’s system and steal billions, according to Binance.
Google's Threat Intelligence Group says it has shut down a massive botnet called x.cpe. At its height, x.cpe ran on more than 1.3 million Android TV devices, and unusually, these were Google-certified boxes. Google says its screening process missed the malware due to "obfuscation techniques" employed by Shenzhen-based Videostrong Technology. In a detailed blog post , the Threat Intelligence Group explains how the x.cpe botnet evolved quickly from a single-stage dropper into a modular three-stage malware platform that sold access to third parties. Manufacturers must have their devices certified if they want access to Google apps and branding, a process that is supposed to catch threats like this. However, Videostrong's compromised boxes, mostly sold under the MECOOL brand, evaded detection by using a backdoor to remotely install the malware after the devices were set up and online. After devices appeared online, a stub application called x.cpe or com.oemservice would phone home. This package did not have any malicious capabilities of its own, but it had the system-level permissions necessary to install malware modules at the operator's behest. It also disabled Play Protect, which would have otherwise flagged the silently installed packages as malicious. Read full article Comments ]]>
apkscope: stateless APK xrefs that return the Java line, plus a from-scratch decompiler (Rust, no JVM)
Overview Multiple vulnerabilities have been identified in the Android application, BaseChat – Audio Dating App, version 9.8.1, which ultimately compromise the privacy of users’ personal data and activity. Description BaseChat is an online dating platform built in Flutter and targeted toward users over 18. It facilitates anonymous, voice-first interaction between users. Three distinct vulnerabilities have been identified within the shipped Android application. VU#124705.1: The application fails open when validating TLS server certificates for connections to its backend API host. The application allows any self-signed certificate to bypass standard TLS security checks. VU#124705.2: Paid user accounts are mapped to a third-party RevenueCat subscriber database using raw MSISDNs (phone numbers), which are a guessable public identifier. Because the RevenueCat Software Development Kit (SDK) includes a public API key within the application’s Android Package Kit (APK), an attacker can query the RevenueCat’s API using predictable identifiers to retrieve individual user metadata. VU#124705.3: The application writes Personally Identifiable Information (PII) to Android system logs in its production build. During voice calls, the application logs the remote party’s MSISDN through unstripped debug statements, which allows an attacker to recovery phone numbers of callers who are intended to remain anonymous. Impact Impacts of successful exploitation vary by vulnerability. VU#124705.1: A network-positioned attacker can intercept and modify API communication, potentially leading to account takeover via session credential theft. VU#124705.2:
TL;DR: Our research team at Era uncovered **Greeter**, an attack framework targeting Flowise, an AI development platform with 55,000+ GitHub stars. We deployed seven honeypots and captured **4,972 "hello" messages**, each carrying malicious JavaScript through Flowise's `overrideConfig` parameter. The interesting part? **The malicious code never appeared in the saved workflow.** We reconstructed 4,000+ commands revealing: * Host reconnaissance and privilege checks * Searches for credentials, SSH keys, and secrets * AWS, Azure, and GCP metadata probing * Persistence attempts and fileless execution preparation We also identified **4,372 internet-exposed Flowise instances**, including 46 unauthenticated instances that appeared to match our vulnerable setup. The bigger concern is how a compromised AI application can become an entry point into the broader cloud environment. **Full technical breakdown:** [https://era.security/blog/greeter-flowise-ai-infrastructure-attack](https://era.security/blog/greeter-flowise-ai-infrastructure-attack)
You run security at your organization. It’s 7:00 am, and you’re having breakfast. You receive a ping: a new critical vulnerability has been disclosed. Your team scrambles to compare vendor advisories, read technical research, check which systems run the affected software, and answer familiar questions from the business: are we affected, and what are we doing about it? Another disclosure arrives before that work is finished. AI is changing both the volume and speed of critical vulnerability discovery. It can analyze large codebases at scale and surface deeply nested flaws that may have existed for years without being found through human review. That discovery momentum will put more pressure on security teams to understand the impact of each disclosure on their infrastructure. To help security teams prepare, today we’re introducing Zero Wire : a public vulnerability intelligence feed on Cloudflare Radar, bringing the clarity of a news wire service to critical security developments. It helps security leaders and practitioners understand significant vulnerabilities and decide what to do next. How it works Zero Wire lives inside Cloudflare Radar under the security section. Each briefing brings together a plain-language explanation of the vulnerability, who should investigate it, recommended actions, and links to the evidence and vendor guidance. The format is deliberately simple: an index card with what you need to know, without the drama. A CISO should be able to understand the issue quickly and ask the right questions. An engineer should be able to follow the same briefing to the technical guidance needed to investigate and remediate it. We also offer a pre-compiled prompt you can use with your agent to assess the impact on your infrastructure. Cloudflare contributes security research, observations from our network, and p
As millions of Americans vote in today’s U.S. midterms, most will use paper ballots, which are protected by strict chain-of-custody protocols and, in some cases, statistical audits. You may wonder why we still use paper for our elections and voting systems when tasks like banking, tax filing, and document signing have moved away from paper-based legacy systems and become fully electronic. The short answer: security. That may come as a surprise to some. After all, cryptography and other security advancements have enabled secure electronic systems for many applications. In fact, cryptography can be used to provide two essential safeguards in elections: keeping (1) individual votes secret while (2) making the final tally independently verifiable. This is exactly the approach of cryptographic protocols like Helios and ElectionGuard . However, Helios intentionally targets lower-risk and lower-coercion settings rather than high-stakes public elections. ElectionGuard, by contrast, is intended for public elections, but not as a replacement for a paper-based system; it is used as a cryptographic layer integrated with traditional voting infrastructure. In this blog post, we’ll explain how cryptographic techniques can help protect ballot secrecy and prevent manipulation in electronic voting systems, and explore the limitations of these systems. Although cryptography can strengthen election verifiability and have other strong security properties, it cannot fully replace the security and trust of existing paper ballot systems in general elections. The challenges of electronic voting The National Academy of Sciences’ excellent 2018 report on election security concludes that el
**tl:dr;** * Contrary to popular belief among vendors, system integrators, and asset owners: network authentication in TETRA mission-critical radio networks **does** ***not*** **provide authenticity & integrity** guarantees at the individual message level. * To make matters worse: **base stations don't require a re-authentication whenever a radio is roaming from one cell tower to the next.** * This allows for traffic injection attacks: both voice and data. The latter is particularly worrying for SCADA WAN scenarios or where voice & alarming functionality can disrupt operations at such as at airports, harbors, railway operators, and civil defense siren systems. * The 2026 attack on Taiwan High Speed Rail's TETRA network, leading to the emergency stop of several trains, shows a mild example of possible impact: [https://www.midnightblue.nl/blog/analyzing-the-taiwan-high-speed-rail-thsr-tetra-cyber-incident-part-1](https://www.midnightblue.nl/blog/analyzing-the-taiwan-high-speed-rail-thsr-tetra-cyber-incident-part-1)
With AI agents now running in many Microsoft 365 tenants, monitoring their activity has become part of the security team’s job. Microsoft Defender XDR monitors AI agents through its integration with Microsoft Agent 365, the control plane for agents in your tenant. This post covers what to enable, where the data lands, and how to respond when an agent goes wrong. We will also show you some interesting log sources, where useful information about the behavior of agents can be found.. The features listed in this article may not be visible or available without the proper license. You may need the “Agent 365” add-on for you actual license, or the new E7 license plan which includes everything (Agent 365, Microsoft 365 Copilot). Which agents Defender XDR can see Defender’s threat detection uses observability data from different cloud agent sources, plus agents running locally on endpoints. Agent type Examples Copilot Studio agents Low-code custom agents built by users Microsoft Foundry agents Pro-code agents in Azure Copilot Agent Builder agents Declarative agents built in Microsoft 365 Copilot Non-Microsoft agents Agents built with the Agent 365 SDK Local agents Coding and desktop agents on devices Each managed agent also gets a Microsoft Entra Agent ID : a directory identity with owners, sign-in logs and risk scoring. That identity i
GitHub - rjzak/malware-modeler-rs: Generate training data and ML models for benign vs. malicious files plus related tools.
Something I've been working on for a while: training lightweight machine learning models to determine if a file is benign or malicious based on raw byte sequences (n-grams). The goal is for anyone working with malware (and has goodware samples too) can train their own models, and this could be useful for resource-constrained environments of if you want a model for older systems not supported by typical AV vendors.
Google said today it worked with industry partners to dismantle a botnet made up of more than 1.3 million Android TV set-top boxes that ship with malicious software which secretly rents the user’s Internet connection out to strangers and conducts advertising fraud. Experts involved in the takedown say the action is likely to sever the botnet’s access to more than 10 million additional compromised systems, including other Internet of Things (IoT) products such as Android-based healthcare devices and karaoke machines. A report from the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) said Google has severed ties with Videostrong Technology Co. , a TV box manufacturer in China that GTIG and other industry experts concluded was responsible for including malware that enrolled more than 1.3 million set-top boxes in a botnet dubbed “ XCPE ” (named after one of the malware’s core code components). The global distribution of XCPE botnet infections. Image: Google Threat Intelligence Group. The report said the XCPE botnet loaded the user’s device with software that makes their Internet address available for resale by multiple “residential proxy” services, which allow customers to rent Internet addresses as a way to anonymiz
National Cyber Security Centre expects attacks on critical facilities such as power stations, airports and hospitals AI-powered malicious software is “highly likely” to be used in hacking attacks against the UK’s power stations, airports and hospitals by 2028, according to the state cybersecurity body. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) said AI will probably enable a ransomware attack against critical national infrastructure [CNI] between now and 2028. The UK’s definition of CNI covers a range of facilities and services across sectors including energy, transport, defence, food, health and finance. Continue reading...
Monday, November 2
Had a subscription in the past with them and received the following e-mail: Doesn't look like many sites have have picked up on this: >Dear cPGuard customers and partners, >An unidentified attacker targeted OPSSHIELD, gained unauthorized access to our licensing and update systems, and distributed a malicious script through the cPGuard update channel. \*\*We have stopped further distribution of the script and released cPGuard 5.88.25 to remove the known backdoor and files left by the script.\*\* >The script sent data to an endpoint on our licensing server under a compromised account. We secured that account as soon as we identified the breach and cleared our infrastructure credentials. We are investigating how the attacker gained access, which customer servers ran the script, and what data the attacker accessed. >\*\*Please take the following actions immediately.\*\* >1. \*\*Update every cPGuard server.\*\* Run \`cpgcli update --start\`. The corrective update removes the backdoor shell at \`/var/tmp/.cpg91511\_sh\` and the collection directory \`/var/tmp/.cpg91511\`, including the password hashes and credential archive (\`loot.tgz\`) staged there. 2. \*\*Verify the installed version.\*\* After the update completes, run \`cpgcli --version\` on each server and confirm it reports \*\*5.88.25\*\*. If the update fails or the server still reports an older version (between 5.88.12 and 5.88.19), contact OPSSHIELD Support immediately. 3. \*\*If you know or suspect the malicious script ran, reset passwords and revoke exposed credentials.\*\* The script targeted \`/etc/shadow\`. Reset passwords for root and all other password-enabled local accounts from a trusted recovery environment. From a trusted device, change any passwords reused elsewhere and rotate affected database passwords, S3 access keys, DigitalOcean tokens, and secrets recorded in root's shell history. Replace SSH private keys stored under \`/root/.ssh\` and remove the corresponding old public keys from every system that trusts them. Complete this step even if the update succeeds, because credentials copied before cleanup may still be usable. >We are sorry that this breach put your systems at risk. If you need help assessing a server, please contact OPSSHIELD Support through your usual support channel. We will share further findings as we verify them. >The OPSSHIELD Team
The Capytistas, a secretive group claiming more than $1.2 million in backing, started with Elon Musk and Tesla’s board. Members argue that those who buy political power deserve the scrutiny they’ll impose.
Overview INFINITT PACS installations using System Manager versions 3.0.11.3 and 3.0.11.5 contain vulnerabilities that may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. INFINITT Healthcare has remediated the issues in System Manager versions 3.0.12.3 and 3.0.12.5. Description INFINITT PACS is an enterprise web-based medical imaging platform that stores, retrieves, and displays patient scans. CVE-2026-16305 An improperly protected update manifest may allow a local attacker to execute commands with administrative privileges when an update is approved. SmartExecute.exe reads and runs commands from execlist.txt after an update. Because of insecure file permissions on execlist.txt , a low-privileged attacker can modify the file before it is processed to add arbitrary malicious commands. After SmartUpdate.exe launches, it runs SmartExecute.exe and the user can be prompted by User Account Control (UAC), which can allow the malicious command to execute with administrative privileges. CVE-2026-16306 An unsafe command dispatch through the registered imodular:// URI scheme may result in code execution. A vulnerability in IModular.exe allows an attacker to execute certain application functions by supplying a crafted imodular:// link. The application reads the cmd value from the link and executes the corresponding function without verifying that the command is permitted or safe. By convincing an end user to open a crafted imodular:// link, an attacker can cause IModular.exe t
When I last wrote about our DNS propagation pipeline in 2022 , the Zone Builder received about 250 DNS record changes per second. Today it receives about 700, nearly three times as many, plus about 100 other events, such as zone setting changes. However, the number of events was never the real problem. The problem was the kind of work some of those events needed, and how that work grows with the size of a zone. Some zones now hold more than 20 million records, and we expect them to keep growing toward hundreds of millions. Each event starts a clock that measures how long it takes us to turn that change into data our authoritative DNS servers can use. We call that work a build. A build reads the current database state, converts it into the format used at the edge, and writes any changes to Quicksilver . In 2022, per-record builds were 150 times faster than full builds on average. On a test zone with one million records, per-record builds were 4,250 times faster. We ended that post with the obvious next step: do the same thing for zone settings. Why doesn't the Zone Builder just rebuild the setting that changed? It should, and that is where we ended up. However, proving when it was safe took most of the work. A record event identifies what changed. A zone event can come from many Cloudflare products, may not say why the zone changed, and can alter data shared by several zones with the same name. Choosing too much work wastes capacity. Choosing too little can leave stale or incorrect DNS data at the edge. We built a targeted
Stable Linux releases lack existing security fixes because backporting them is time-consuming and often thankless work. We’re using Codex to reduce the backporting process time from days to hours per fix, empowering human patch reviewers to rapidly submit fixes for critical software like Ubuntu Long Term Support, Fedora, and the Linux kernel. By October 29, our project helped deliver fixes for 149 distinct CVEs into stable Linux kernel releases, and several fixes to Fedora and Ubuntu packages. Deploying fixes to older software requires multiple steps, including adapting fixes to older code, checking dependencies, and ensuring the fix did not introduce new bugs. A single task (like tracking down a bug in a bad commit) can take a week or more of effort that no one sees or appreciates. Our Codex workflow has reduced the human effort required to prepare and review fixes. Excluding project-specific initial setup, preparing and reviewing a straightforward backport takes about 30 minutes of human attention; a more involved case can take around three hours. The workflow’s approach is twofold: agents perform activities like identifying missing fixes, adapting patches, assembling validation evidence, running tests, and preparing submission packets, while engineers review the patches and submit them to maintainers. Those estimates only cover patch preparation and review; regression testing and maintainer acceptance remain essential. But the reduced human commitment makes a substantial class of neglected security work practical to undertake. The patch backlog is large, but we now
I’ve gotten nearly 2,000 campaign fundraising texts that were meant for someone else. I tried to find out why—and uncovered a labyrinth of politicians, data brokers, and shady tactics.
WIRED uncovered some 400 apps and websites linked to Chinese-language developers that look like regular AI tools but had secret features that let users create violent AI-generated images and video.
(May 2026) TL;DR: - an email address like atouch${IFS}/tmp/savane-rce-proof@attacker.example gave any registered user code execution on its backend. - From there, we made our account a superuser, - impersonated Bash’s maintainer, and confirmed we could add an SSH key with push access to the upstream Bash repository. - An unpatched kernel gave us root access and access to a GNU backup server. We reported it to the FSF on May 11, 2026. FSF incident report: https://static.fsf.org/nosvn/security/savannah-20260807.pdf
Sunday, November 1
Adding onto the post "Archived malware I found over the years pt1" BY: "u/Fickle_Plan_208" Effort post!!!!! read description.
LINK TO THEIR POST: [link.](https://www.reddit.com/r/malwares/comments/1tdfrsy/archived_malware_i_found_over_the_years_pt1/) LINK TO MY OTHER POST ON THIS: [Link](https://www.reddit.com/r/ExtremeArchive/s/CCzXpSShV3) All malware I found on the GitHub user LEMZzip and links to archived malware they made if found plus info and updated file! This post also includes a screenshot of their GitHub page at the bottom + other things like screenshot of their website or tools they made! SCAN LINKS IN ANYRUN: (:[SCAN 1](https://app.any.run/tasks/1b3a66c7-54c0-46c9-a944-e3012ff76d46/): [SCAN 2](https://app.any.run/tasks/381650b8-c79b-4992-9e59-8f0ec40eca68/):) VIRUS TOTAL SCAN LINKS I FOUND: (:[Love.exe](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e63cc912240af3b0e958f0617372876a3f0221e27c45ae5362963d72185e5d81), [Browser setup 1.2.exe](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/207b53a4aa0a36fbc52b0557c5b747640cb79dde37ea02c85240984065779a60):) MALWARE NAMES THAT WERE ARCHIVED: "tripop CD Defender Antivirus, Roblox Setup, Rec room modded, Recroom-white-main, DSBN wifi bypass!, love. Browser setup 1.2" MALWARE NAMES THAT AS OF NOW CAN'T BE ARCHIVED: "Recroom modded (NEW), blackhole, train-way! Setup, rusty., admin turnoff, makerpen, ultralemzx, spazz, Xholder. LEMZzip trojan maker 1.0" (Note: There may have been more I forgot to include!.") Possible same accounts on github: ([LEMZzip](https://github.com/Callmelemon82), [LEMZzipV2](https://github.com/LEMZzipV2)) Possible same user on reddit: ([LEMZzip](https://www.reddit.com/user/LEMZzip/)) Possible same user on archive web: ([LEMZzip](https://archive.org/details/@LEMZzip)) The website URL some of their malware opened I had to remove because if I did not my post would keep getting taken down! LEMZzip Malware archive V1.1: [Download!](https://www.mediafire.com/file/0jphz06ge3rgd5x/LEMZzip_Malware_archive_V1.1.zip/file) Inside it also has a description on what the malware does! Note: I will try to update this unlike them! Archived software I could not include yet but archived: "LEMZzip Trojan maker 1.1!, Divine Anti-spy V1.0 (Beta)" Screenshot below as well! *Processing img 1gidrwq4rlzh1...* *Processing img 51ro8m3wqlzh1...* *Processing img adnug3b2qlzh1...* *Processing img qkcfmlqp16zh1...* *Processing img wswxb9b5s4zh1...*
MalChela v4.4 adds Unpack, a static unpacker for PE, ELF, and Mach-O; maps findings across the toolkit to MITRE ATT\&CK v20 with an interactive Enterprise matrix; and moves every tool to the embedded YARA-X engine, removing the system YARA dependency. Also new: YARA Scan and IP reputation with GreyNoise.
Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite By pure timing coincidence, the Proton CEO's AI @ Proton, Engineering Manifesto made headlines around the same time as this week's video. The guy's management style and choice of language have really rubbed a lot of people up the wrong way, and deservedly so, IMHO. However... this section of his screed really resonated with me: Your job has fundamentally changed. It is no longer to write code, and LLMs are not here to help you write better code faster. Your job is to help the LLM write better code faster. Dev jobs as we know them are gone. Dead. And if you disagree, you're in for a shock in the very near future. But at the same time: I don't remember the last time tech has been this exciting. It's white hot right now. Anyone who loves technology and computers is probably having a great time right now. — Jack Rhysider ☠️ (@JackRhysider) October 30, 2026 Yes! This! Not handwriting code "old school" isn't something to lament; rather, our unprecedented ability to innovate, create and build things that are meaning
Using a fake DOB or leaving the field blank when making an online account can offer protection from identity theft You get a call from your bank saying there has been suspicious activity on your account. They read out your name, address and date of birth so you are happy it is a legitimate caller. But you are talking to criminals who have used your date of birth as part of a web of verifying information to convince you they are someone else. Continue reading...
Saturday, October 31
Named Volta-Autodoxer, the recently uncovered malware uses AI tools to collect troves of data about victims, from login credentials and credit card numbers to Discord sessions and UberEats receipts.
Friday, October 30
Thanks to a lucky break, flawed code in a tainted Claude extension prevented the attacker from fully worming their way into some 5,000 developer machines.
On October 19, 2026, we learned about eMudhra’s eight shockingly weak keys: where eMudhra was trusted to pick a 115-digit number for their virtual combination lock protecting the Internet, they picked the number 4. Not even four digits, just the number 4. The other seven keys were similarly weak: 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230 and 237. The next day, we wrote a blog post on the immediate action we took to mitigate this leak, and what customers needed to do on their end to stay secure. Now, we are sharing a more in-depth follow up on the evidence we’ve seen of exploitation, and the progress seen on visitors patching their systems. Let's start with the scale of the problem. A certificate authority (CA) with weak keys this serious is unprecedented, and the potential consequences are significant. While there have been plenty of compromised certification authorities in the past (such as DigiNotar , TÜRKTRUST , and TrustWave ), access to their keys has always been contained to a degree; these incidents gave a limited set of attackers or organizations the ability to issue fraudulent certificates. The eMudhra incident is fundamentally different; the affected intermediate private keys could be recovered almost instantly by anyone from the public certificates themse
David Gibson says the problem is that details of the flaw were revealed before it was fixed, while Charles MacKinnon notes that we are at the mercy of technology we don’t understand Chris Stokel-Walker may be right ( The internet has broken – again. Shouldn’t the tech firms that make billions from it pay to fix it?, 22 October ), but the real issue lies elsewhere. The bugs in the PHP programming language that were recently found by an AI tool have been present for a long time without anybody noticing and without any harm being done – they are extremely obscure. They were not found by hackers – they were found because an AI tool was used to check the PHP source code, which is a good use of AI. Continue reading...
Today, Cloudflare services for private origins is generally available. Point a proxied DNS record at a private IP, and Cloudflare reaches the origin over your existing Cloudflare One connection . Your origin stays private, while web application firewall ( WAF ), caching , bot management , and Workers work just as they do for public origins. In June, we launched this capability in closed beta to address a problem we kept hearing from customers: Their internal APIs, AI agent backends, MCP servers, and operational tools weren’t built to face the Internet, but those services still need to accept requests from partners, customers, or agents over the Internet. Before the beta, putting Cloudflare in front of these services meant exposing a public IP, opening a firewall port, or running cloudflared alongside the origin. Those requirements often left private applications without the same protections and controls they used for public applications, including WAF, bot management, rate limiting, caching, traffic acceleration, rewrites, and Workers. What is generally available today During the closed beta, eligible customers requested access through their account team. Today, we’re opening access beyond that beta group. Point a proxied A or AAAA record at
Multiple crypto-tracing firms say notorious North Korean hackers TraderTraitor may be behind the largest digital heist in history—with billions of crypto likely gone for good.