Monday recap. Same mess, new week. A sketchy dev tool got people pwned, old bugs came back from the dead, and security products somehow needed protecting from themselves. A bunch of companies spent the week checking old boxes and forgotten servers they should've patched years ago. Good times. Phishing crews are getting smarter too - less obvious scam junk, more targeted stuff that actually
Cybersecurity News and Vulnerability Aggregator
Cybersecurity news aggregator
Updated: 6:40 pm
J/K Navigate / Search S Save V Open Link
— or
treemd <(curl -sL https://allsec.sh/md) (as Markdown) Top Cybersecurity Stories Today
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added a recently patched critical security flaw impacting Drupal Core to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-9082 (CVSS score: 6.5), an SQL injection vulnerability affecting all supported versions of Drupal Core. "Drupal Core
U.S. and Canadian authorities arrested and charged a Canadian man with operating the KimWolf distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) botnet, which infected nearly two million devices worldwide. [...]
Anthropic appears to be preparing for the public rollout of the Mythos model, which was announced in April as a restricted model that poses major security risks to private and public software. [...]
Authorities in the Netherlands have arrested the co-owners of two related Internet hosting companies for operating IT infrastructure used by Russia to carry out cyberattacks, influence operations and disinformation campaigns inside the European Union. The two men were the focus of a 2025 KrebsOnSecurity story about how their hosting companies had assumed control over the technical infrastructure of Stark Industries Solutions , an Internet service provider sanctioned last year by the EU as a frequent staging ground for cyber mischief from Russia’s intelligence agencies. An investigator with the Tax Intelligence and Investigation Service (FIOD), the Dutch financial crimes agency, during the raid. Image: FIOD. The Dutch daily news outlet de Volkskrant reports that the Dutch financial crime agency FIOD on May 18 arrested a 57-year-old from Amsterdam and a 39-year-old from The Hague, charging them with violating sanctions law by directly or indirectly making economic resources available to EU-sanctioned ent
Latest
Monday, May 25
# The Problem AI reached a level of code analysis sophistication where it can find software vulnerabilities in seconds. Developer and content creator Theo (t3.gg) explains the problem in vivid detail: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M\_HxHr7du5M](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M_HxHr7du5M). The short version: three assumptions that kept software security working for decades are now dead. **The first assumption:** only well-paid experts could find exploits. This was always what limited the number of attackers. AI killed this barrier entirely. Anyone with enough compute and a model can now find vulnerabilities in real software in a matter of minutes. **The second assumption:** the 90-day coordinated disclosure window was long enough. When a vulnerability was found, maintainers had 90 days to patch, distribute, and get most users updated before public disclosure. This relied on the first assumption. Without it, the window collapses. Two independent researchers found the same massive Linux kernel exploit within 9 hours of each other. **The third assumption:** going from a patch to a working exploit was difficult. Maintainers used to quietly merge security fixes with nondescript commit messages, buying time before attackers figured out what was being patched. AI ended this too. Feed a four-line code diff to any major AI model and ask if it looks like a security patch. Two out of three major models get it right from the diff alone, without even reading the commit message. The pipeline from patch to working exploit is now automatable. The result: every piece of software, and especially open-source software, is now exposed to zero-day attacks at a speed and scale the industry has never seen before. Further AI improvement will only make this worse. The speed of vulnerability discovery keeps rising. The speed of patching stays roughly constant. The gap between them is widening every month. # Why Conventional Responses Are Not Enough **Patching Faster** The most obvious response is patching faster. If AI can find vulnerabilities faster, use AI to patch them faster too. This helps at the margins. But it does not change the fundamental dynamic: the attack surface stays the same size. Every patch closes one vulnerability. AI scanners immediately move to the next one. Patching faster is running harder on a treadmill, not getting off it. **Getting Rid of Open-Source** A more drastic option: end open-source. If source code is not public, AI cannot analyze it directly. In the very short term this might slow things down. It would not stop AI for long. Without source code, AI can reverse-engineer binaries. Obfuscation can slow that down, but then we are in a perpetual race between AI obfuscating code and AI deobfuscating it, with no clear winner. If software runs only on the backend and is never distributed at all, the attacker’s last resort is probing the backend through its public interface with specially crafted requests. AI is extremely good at this too. We all love open-source. It is one of the most productive forces in the history of software. Closing it would be a massive sacrifice with limited security gain. The answer is no. # The Root Cause: Too Much to Attack Patching faster and hiding source code both try to win the same race against AI. Neither addresses why the race is so difficult to win in the first place. The real problem is the size of the attack surface. A typical production application imports hundreds of third-party libraries. Each library imports dozens more. The total code surface available for AI to scan is orders of magnitude larger than the code the developer actually wrote. Most of it has never been read, much less audited, by anyone on the development team. It is all publicly available, continuously scanned, and growing with every npm install. Attackers are not primarily targeting code developers wrote. They are targeting code developers trusted. The 84 Tanstack packages recently compromised in a supply chain attack, the CopyFail exploit distributed through Python libraries, the CI pipeline attacks: all of them exploited the dependency supply chain, not the application logic. If we cannot win the race by running faster, the answer is to shrink what we are racing to protect. # Making Software Easier to Patch: The Visual Programming Direction One practical step is making applications easier to patch by splitting them into small, independently replaceable components. Plugin architectures do this. Smaller components have smaller attack surfaces and can be patched without touching the whole system. This helps, but it has limits. Plugins still depend on third-party libraries, so the attack surface does not actually shrink. And plugin systems carry their own costs: cognitive overhead, compatibility management between plugin versions, and debugging complexity that grows with the number of components. Visual programming languages (VPLs) are the logical extreme of this idea, and they solve the problems plugin architectures create. In a VPL, every block on a diagram is effectively its own independently replaceable component. But unlike text-based plugin systems, a VPL provides full transparency: the logic of the program is the diagram. Any developer can look at it and understand what the program does without reading code. Replacing a block requires no recompilation. It only needs to be compatible with the blocks immediately connected to it. In terms of patching speed and ease, drag-and-dropping a new block into place is as good as it gets. The same independence that makes blocks easy to replace also makes them easy to isolate. If a component is found to be compromised, the affected block can be disconnected or disabled immediately and interactively without recompilation, limiting the impact to the rest of the application while a fix is prepared. Transparency also matters for security beyond patching. In a text-based system, the logic connecting components is itself code that must be read to understand. In a visual program, the connection logic is the diagram. It cannot hide. There is no ambiguity about what connects to what. **Composable Blocks and the Visual Hierarchy** A well-designed VPL goes further than a flat diagram of blocks. Blocks are composable: any block can contain other blocks inside it, forming a hierarchy of arbitrary depth. High-level business logic sits at the top. Each block can be opened to reveal its internal workflow. The hierarchy goes all the way down to the bottom level, where blocks contain no further sub-blocks. These are called leaf blocks, and they are the only place in the hierarchy where code lives. This composability is what makes a VPL suitable for large, complex applications rather than toy examples. The top-level diagram stays clean and readable. Complexity is encapsulated inside blocks. Any level of the hierarchy is independently replaceable without touching the rest. # The VPL Security Model: Shrinking the Attack Surface **Third-Party Libraries as Visual Workflows** The conventional assumption is that a visual application replaces all third-party libraries with AI-generated code. This is unrealistic. Libraries contain too much accumulated functionality to regenerate from scratch. The realistic model is different: third-party libraries are themselves visual workflows. A library in the VPL ecosystem is a visual workflow with a thin layer of code at the leaf blocks for OS interaction. The application is a mix of its own visual workflows and the visual workflows of the libraries it uses. This changes the security picture dramatically. When a vulnerability is found in a third-party library, the developer has two options. The first: go directly into the library’s internal visual workflow and fix or isolate it in-place. The library is fully transparent as it is built using VPL, so the problematic location is immediately visible and the change is auditable. The second: wait for the library maintainer to release a patched version, then update by dragging and dropping the new block into place. No recompilation, no regression risk in unrelated code. Either way, the process is faster, more transparent, and more controlled than patching text-based library dependencies where the internals are opaque and touching one thing risks breaking another. **The Leaf Code Layer: Where Vulnerability Lives** At the bottom of the visual hierarchy sit the leaf blocks. This is where code lives rather than sub-blocks. Leaf code is responsible for low-level operations: interacting with the operating system, reading files, opening network connections. This is the only place in a visual application where text code is strictly necessary. Leaf code can call third-party text libraries, as any code can. But developers should minimize these dependencies wherever practical. The thinner and simpler the leaf code, the smaller the attack surface. The first level of dependency reduction is AI code generation. If a potential third-party dependency is simple enough, AI can generate the equivalent code directly rather than importing an external library. This eliminates that dependency entirely: the generated code is purpose-built and never publicly available, giving AI scanners nothing to analyze. The second level, as AI capabilities grow, is direct visual workflow generation. Rather than generating text code, AI will be able to generate complete visual workflows with a thin leaf code layer. This makes dependency self-production an even more attractive option: the generated component is not just functional but transparent, composable, and fully auditable as a visual workflow. Where third-party dependencies are unavoidable, developers should prefer VPL-based libraries over text-based ones. A VPL-based dependency is itself a transparent visual workflow, patchable by drag-and-drop. Its attack surface is significantly smaller than an opaque text library of equivalent functionality. When all these practices are applied together, the application approaches the ideal state: no or minimum third-party library dependencies and maximum use of VPL-based libraries, with the attack surface reduced to the operating system or close to it. # Why Pipe Is the Right VPL **The Gap No Existing VPL Has Closed** Visual programming languages are not new. LabVIEW has dominated engineering for four decades. Simulink is standard in aerospace and automotive. Node-RED is widely used in industrial IoT. Unreal Blueprints works for game development. None of them can serve as the general security architecture described above. They are either domain-specific, too limited for production software, or both. A VPL that can meaningfully reduce the attack surface of production applications must satisfy two requirements at the same time: general-purpose to be applicable to any domain, and sophisticated enough for real-world production code. [Pipe](https://pipelang.com/) (pipelang.com) is a general-purpose visual programming language designed from the ground up to satisfy both requirements simultaneously. It is a VPL built to be both general-purpose and sophisticated enough for production-level software across any domain. Seven years of architecture development and ten provisional USPTO patent applications underpin this design. The complete language specification is freely available at [pipelang.com](https://pipelang.com/). **How Pipe Implements Block Interfaces: Domains and Overlaps** In Pipe, each block input is analogous to an independent API endpoint. The interface of that endpoint is defined by a domain: a hierarchical data structure, a tree where each node can have both a value and children, similar to JSON but more expressive. Domains are assigned to block inputs and outputs. When two connected Pipe blocks have different domains, Pipe resolves this through overlaps: it finds matching tree paths between the output domain and the input domain, and transfers only data where paths match. Unmatched nodes take explicitly defined or implicitly assumed default values. The result is that almost any two Pipe blocks can be connected regardless of interface mismatch (with some exceptions such as data type compatibility between source and destination domain nodes). The domain overlap mechanism provides the flexibility of connectivity that makes Pipe practical at scale. And because Pipe enforces this at the structural level, no developer validation code is needed at block boundaries. The interface contract is guaranteed by Pipe itself. **Addressing the Drawing Effort Concern** A common concern about visual programming is that drawing diagrams takes more effort than typing code. This is worth addressing directly. Pipe diagrams are more compact and expressive by design. A block requiring multiple input parameters does not need a separate connection for each one. Each block input is a single domain connection that carries all relevant parameters together. A block with seven input parameters still has one input connection, not seven - the domain provides all seven values through that single connection. The diagram stays clean even as the underlying logic grows. Beyond compactness, Pipe diagram modifications can leverage AI directly. Workflow changes - adding blocks, rerouting connections, restructuring logic - can be expressed in natural language, typed or spoken, and applied to the diagram without manual drawing. The effort of diagram maintenance converges toward the effort of describing what you want, which is not fundamentally different from writing text code. # The Security Spectrum Not every application can immediately adopt Pipe with thin leaf code. But every step toward that architecture is a genuine security improvement. * **Step 1. Open-source text code with libraries:** entire source code and all dependency sources available for AI analysis. Maximum attack surface. * **Step 2. Closed-source text code with libraries:** source hidden but binaries reverse-engineerable, APIs probeable. Libraries still fully exposed. * **Step 3. Pipe with some traditional text libraries:** attack surface dramatically reduced. Remaining text code libraries still represent risk. * **Step 4. Pipe with visual library workflows and thin leaf code:** no or minimum third-party library dependencies, only VPL-based dependencies where they are present. Attack surface reduced mostly to the OS. The last step is the target state. It is not necessary to reach it immediately or completely. Moving partway toward Pipe with thin leaf code is a meaningful structural improvement over a conventional text-based architecture. # Conclusion AI made vulnerability discovery fast, cheap, and accessible to anyone. Patching faster helps but is not a structural solution. Getting rid of open-source would be a sacrifice not worth the limited gain. The real answer is to reduce the attack surface itself. Pipe, with third-party libraries also represented as visual workflows and a thin leaf code layer for OS interactions, achieves this. It makes the logic of the program transparent and auditable at every level. It makes isolation immediate, and patching faster and safer. It eliminates third-party library supply chain risk. And it shifts the remaining vulnerability to the OS layer, where it is maintained by the OS vendor. As AI generates more code faster, the need for VPLs such as Pipe will grow. The goal is not to eliminate all vulnerability. The goal is to make software structurally harder to exploit. When the only attack surface left is the operating system, that goal has been achieved.
[https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/ai/2026/05/researchers-left-ai-agents-alone-in-a-virtual-town-and-watched-it-all-unravel](https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/ai/2026/05/researchers-left-ai-agents-alone-in-a-virtual-town-and-watched-it-all-unravel) If the aim was for AI to replicate humans, maybe the creators did too good of a job.
Anthropic appears to be preparing for the public rollout of the Mythos model, which was announced in April as a restricted model that poses major security risks to private and public software. [...]
I’ve been analyzing **CVE-2026-3102**, a remote command injection vulnerability in ExifTool (up to v13.49) running on macOS. The flaw resides in the PNG parser's SetMacOSTags function (MacOS.pm), where uncleaned metadata arguments like DateTimeOriginal are passed directly into a system shell command execution block. Please share your feedback on this article and suggest improvement points.
Ciaran Martin says Reform UK leader’s allegation over Guardian report on £5m gift ‘entirely unsubstantiated’ Nigel Farage’s claim that a Russian hack was behind a Guardian report on the £5m gift he received from a crypto billionaire has been described as “without any merit” by a former head of the National Cyber Security Centre. Ciaran Martin, founding chief executive of the agency, which is part of GCHQ, said Farage’s allegation, if true, would have major implications for UK policy towards Russia but that the Reform UK leader had yet to provide “a shred of evidence”. Continue reading...
Been working on a small side project called Signal. It's basically a 60-second daily puzzle where you pick the suspicious signal/log/message out of a few options. Wanted to make something lightweight and habit-forming instead of another huge training platform. Still early MVP stage, but would genuinely love feedback from people here on whether the format feels interesting or completely pointless 😅 [https://signal-gaming.vercel.app/](https://signal-gaming.vercel.app/)
Secrets management is one of those boring enterprise topics that suddenly becomes very interesting once something gets hacked. Crypto4A just launched QxVault, a new “quantum-safe” platform designed to compete with tools like AWS Secrets Manager and Azure Key Vault, while also pushing the idea of sovereign infrastructure outside the control of U.S. hyperscalers. There is definitely some buzzword overload here, but the broader shift toward post-quantum cryptography and hardware-backed security is very real.
I published a write-up on CVE-2021-21735 in the ZTE ZXHN H168N V3.5. The bug was treated as an information disclosure, but the exposed data was not harmless telemetry. Wizard routes leaked `PPPoE` and `WLAN` material, and in some ISP deployments the `PPPoE` identifier could map into the hidden admin credential model. That changes the practical impact from “data leak” to possible router admin compromise and Wi-Fi compromise. The write-up walks through the redacted evidence, firmware routing logic, affected/fixed versions, disclosure timeline, and why the **ZTE 3.5** Low rating and **NVD 6.5** Medium rating tell different stories.
Monday recap. Same mess, new week. A sketchy dev tool got people pwned, old bugs came back from the dead, and security products somehow needed protecting from themselves. A bunch of companies spent the week checking old boxes and forgotten servers they should've patched years ago. Good times. Phishing crews are getting smarter too - less obvious scam junk, more targeted stuff that actually
Bumblebee is a read-only inventory collector for package, extension, and developer-tool metadata on macOS and Linux developer endpoints. It answers a narrow supply-chain response question: when an advisory names a package, extension, or version, which developer machines show a match in their on-disk metadata right now? SBOMs help answer what shipped, and EDR helps answer what ran or touched the network, but supply-chain response often needs a different view: messy local state across lockfiles, package-manager metadata, extension manifests, and supported developer-tool configs. Bumblebee turns that scattered on-disk state into structured NDJSON component records and, when given an exposure catalog, flags exact matches for fast, read-only exposure checks when responders already know what they are looking for.
Authorities in the Netherlands have arrested the co-owners of two related Internet hosting companies for operating IT infrastructure used by Russia to carry out cyberattacks, influence operations and disinformation campaigns inside the European Union. The two men were the focus of a 2025 KrebsOnSecurity story about how their hosting companies had assumed control over the technical infrastructure of Stark Industries Solutions , an Internet service provider sanctioned last year by the EU as a frequent staging ground for cyber mischief from Russia’s intelligence agencies. An investigator with the Tax Intelligence and Investigation Service (FIOD), the Dutch financial crimes agency, during the raid. Image: FIOD. The Dutch daily news outlet de Volkskrant reports that the Dutch financial crime agency FIOD on May 18 arrested a 57-year-old from Amsterdam and a 39-year-old from The Hague, charging them with violating sanctions law by directly or indirectly making economic resources available to EU-sanctioned ent
The FBI is warning about the Kali365 phishing-as-a-service platform (PhaaS) that is used to hijack Microsoft 365 accounts by abusing OAuth device code authentication to steal session tokens and bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA). [...]
Threat actors are exploiting a recently disclosed critical security flaw in Ghost CMS to inject malicious JavaScript code with an aim to fuel ClickFix attacks. According to QiAnXin XLab, the activity involves the exploitation of CVE-2026-26980 (CVSS score: 9.4), an SQL injection vulnerability in Ghost's Content API that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to read arbitrary data from the
Threat Intel: ShinyHunters Leaks 9.4GB Database of 7-Eleven Franchisee Systems Post-Extortion Refusal
**Overview**: On May 24, 2026, the data breach notification service Have I Been Pwned (HIBP) integrated a dataset originating from an April 2026 extortion campaign targeting 7-Eleven. The breach, attributed to the threat actor group ShinyHunters, compromised 185,300 unique accounts and resulted in a 9.4GB cleartext data dump following the organization's refusal to comply with ransom demands. **Attack Vector & Targeted Infrastructure** The initial compromise occurred on or around **April 8, 2026**. Forensic indicators and lateral movement tracking indicate the threat actors did not target point-of-sale (POS) networks or central customer-facing databases. Instead, the breach was localized to external cloud-managed systems - specifically infrastructure dedicated to corporate **franchisee document management and onboarding portals**. The vector aligns with recent ShinyHunters operational methodology involving targeted credential harvesting, session hijacking, and the exploitation of permissive API keys within integrated third-party identity management providers. **Data Profile & Exfiltrated Schemas** Following a failed extortion deadline set by the actors between April 17 and April 21, the full 9.4GB archive was leaked to the public internet. The schema validation confirms that the compromised database contains: * **Primary PII:** Full names, verified email addresses, mobile and landline telephone numbers, and residential physical addresses. * **Sensitive Administrative Records:** Dates of birth and corporate filing metadata. * **Vetting Documentation:** A subset of the leaked files contains sensitive background check documentation, including Social Security Numbers (SSNs) and state-issued identification numbers submitted during the franchise application phase. **Operational Timeline** * **2026-04-08:** Detection of unauthorized access to the franchisee document storage cluster. * **2026-04-17:** ShinyHunters list 7-Eleven on their public Tor leak site, establishing a 4-day payment window. * **2026-04-22:** Following 7-Eleven's administrative refusal to negotiate or pay the extortion fee, the actors published the complete unencrypted archive. * **2026-05-24:** Complete data ingestion, de-duplication, and formal verification completed by HIBP. **Technical Analysis & Core Metrics** The incident highlights a persistent trend where threat actors deliberately target non-production, administrative, or third-party adjacent business environments to bypass hardened perimeter controls protecting primary consumer data.
Ask a cybersecurity pro about Network Detection and Response (NDR) and you might still hear "Noisy," "Too much data." But ask the teams running NDR that includes agentic AI capabilities and you'll hear they're actually using it to catch threats earlier, triage faster, and chase fewer false positives. The old complaint lingers in part because reputations are sticky, and because NDR has evolved
As attackers ramp up their AI exploit development, the search for software vulnerabilities is changing rapidly.
Cybersecurity researchers have shed light on a cross-platform malware called RemotePE that has been put to use by the North Korea-linked Lazarus Group in attacks targeting financial and cryptocurrency organizations. RemotePE, per NCC Group subsidiary Fox-IT, is part of a multi-stage attack chain that involves two loaders tracked as DPAPILoader and RemotePELoader. "DPAPILoader decrypts and
To reduce the amount of noise from questions, we have disabled self-posts in favor of a unified questions thread every week. Feel free to ask any question about reverse engineering here. If your question is about how to use a specific tool, or is specific to some particular target, you will have better luck on the [Reverse Engineering StackExchange](http://reverseengineering.stackexchange.com/). See also /r/AskReverseEngineering.
Sunday, May 24
Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite Well, that didn't last long! Recording this on Saturday morning my time, I observed ShinyHunters having gone quiet since the massive haul that would have been the Instructure ransom. It was two weeks almost to the hour since I'd first heard rumour of payment being made, and I posited that groups like this often go quiet after they feel the heat, only to emerge shortly after, the drug that is hacking being too strong to ignore. Anyway, here we now are: ShinyHunters Claims 3 New Victims https://t.co/v8Wf457Gbp : U.S.-based dental benefits administrator and oral health company. Charter Communications, Inc.: U.S. telecommunications and cable company best known for Spectrum internet, TV, mobile, and phone services. … pic.twitter.com/epWcVVGRHa — Dark Web Informer (@DarkWebInformer) May 22, 2026 DentaQuest has since been removed, but their website is currently returning "Access Denied", which isn't a great look. Obviously, the broken website doesn&apos
Saturday, May 23
A supply chain attack targeting the Laravel Lang localization packages has exposed developers to a sophisticated credential-stealing malware campaign after attackers abused GitHub version tags to distribute malicious code through Composer packages. [...]
Italian authorities have dismantled a piracy ecosystem centered around the CINEMAGOAL app that provided access to various streaming platforms, including Netflix, Disney+, and Spotify. [...]
Silver Fox is another example of how AI is lowering the barrier for phishing and malware operations. When campaigns can scale personalization, payload generation, and social engineering at machine speed, traditional detection and user awareness start losing ground.
Plus: Google publishes a live exploit for an unpatched flaw, the feds arrest two men accused of creating thousands of nonconsensual deepfake nudes, and more.
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a fresh software supply chain attack campaign that has targeted multiple PHP packages belonging to Laravel-Lang to deliver a comprehensive credential-stealing framework. The affected packages include - laravel-lang/lang laravel-lang/http-statuses laravel-lang/attributes laravel-lang/actions "The timing and pattern of the newly published tags
A maximum-severity security vulnerability impacting LiteSpeed User-End cPanel Plugin has come under active exploitation in the wild. The flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-48172 (CVSS score: 10.0), relates to an instance of incorrect privilege assignment that an attacker could abuse to run arbitrary scripts with elevated permissions. "Any cPanel user (including an attacker or a compromised account) may
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added a recently patched critical security flaw impacting Drupal Core to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-9082 (CVSS score: 6.5), an SQL injection vulnerability affecting all supported versions of Drupal Core. "Drupal Core
Friday, May 22
Just added an interactive security map to my project NoEyes showing exactly what the server sees (and doesn't)
repo : [https://github.com/Ymsniper/NoEyes](https://github.com/Ymsniper/NoEyes)
Authorities in Europe and North America have announced the dismantling of a criminal virtual private network (VPN) service used by criminal actors to obscure the origins of ransomware attacks, data theft, scanning, and denial-of-service attacks. Codenamed Operation Saffron, the disruption of First VPN Service was led by France and the Netherlands, with several other nations supporting the
Lawmakers in both houses of Congress are demanding answers from the U.S. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) after KrebsOnSecurity reported this week that a CISA contractor intentionally published AWS GovCloud keys and a vast trove of other agency secrets on a public GitHub account. The inquiry comes as CISA is still struggling to contain the breach and invalidate the leaked credentials. On May 18, KrebsOnSecurity reported that a CISA contractor with administrative access to the agency’s code development platform had created a public GitHub profile called “ Private-CISA ” that included plaintext credentials to dozens of internal CISA systems. Experts who reviewed the exposed secrets said the commit logs for the code repository showed the CISA contractor disabled GitHub’s built-in protection against publishing sensitive credentials in public repos. CISA acknowledged the leak but has not responded to questions about the duration of the data exposure. However, experts who reviewed the now-defunct Private-CISA archive said it was originally created in November 2025, and that it exhibits a pattern consistent with an individual operator using the repository as a working scratchpad o
The Belarus-aligned threat actor known as Ghostwriter (aka UAC-0057 and UNC1151) has been observed using lures related to Prometheus, a Ukrainian online learning platform, to target government organizations in the country. The activity, per the Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA), involves sending phishing emails to government entities using compromised accounts. It's been
Harvard and \~140 other compromised legitimate sites are now spreading ClickFix malware. hxxps://hir.harvard.edu/israel-and-international-football-a-breaking-point/ hxxps://hir.harvard.edu/a-better-way-forward-an-interview-with-paul-ryan/ Both contain a remote load script in it's HTML that reverses it's C2 `sj.ssc/ipa/orp.eralfduolccitats` to original form and then displays the ClickFix box from it. C2: hxxps://staticcloudflare.pro AnyRun identifies the loading pattern well: * [https://app.any.run/tasks/2ac73567-8bdf-41b0-999e-08057deb3dd3](https://app.any.run/tasks/2ac73567-8bdf-41b0-999e-08057deb3dd3) * [https://app.any.run/tasks/8362c5f5-11ab-4b34-b7a5-8e2fb2d6355c](https://app.any.run/tasks/8362c5f5-11ab-4b34-b7a5-8e2fb2d6355c) Sandbox detonation of one of the ClickFix payloads: [https://app.any.run/tasks/bf4b5c8d-f76d-4398-b465-9a1d8ec899bb](https://app.any.run/tasks/bf4b5c8d-f76d-4398-b465-9a1d8ec899bb) Original post and more discovered compromised URL's: [https://x.com/rifteyy/status/2057842147630411877](https://x.com/rifteyy/status/2057842147630411877)
Two former executives of a call-tracking and analytics company pleaded guilty to concealing a years-long tech support fraud scheme that victimized individuals worldwide. [...]
"When performing security assessments on HTTP-based applications, whether web, mobile, APIs, or thick clients, the standard workflow is straightforward: put Burp Suite in the middle, and you’re good to go. Most of the time, that’s all you need. Every now and then, though, you run into a small but significant class of applications where that workflow breaks down. Custom protocols, payload encryption, request signatures, replay protection, non-standard encoding, these are the scenarios where you can no longer work manually the way you’re used to, and where Burp’s automated tools (Intruder, Scanner) stop being useful because they’re operating on data they can’t meaningfully read or modify. In this talk I took one of these complexities as example, additional payload encryption**,** and used it as a vehicle to explore advanced approaches based on **custom Burp extensions** to restore full testability: working manually in Proxy and Repeater, running automated tools like Intruder and Scanner, and even driving external tools like SQLMap through Burp, all as if the complexity simply weren’t there."
Japanese cybersecurity software company Trend Micro has addressed an Apex One zero-day vulnerability exploited in attacks targeting Windows systems. [...]
Fraud losses don't stop at chargebacks. False declines, account takeovers, and abuse also damage revenue and trust. IPQS breaks down why fraud teams need broader visibility into risk and customer impact. [...]
Ubiquiti has released security updates to patch three maximum severity vulnerabilities in UniFi OS that can be exploited by remote attackers without privileges. [...]
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a new automated campaign called Megalodon that has pushed 5,718 malicious commits to 5,561 GitHub repositories within a six-hour window. "Using throwaway accounts and forged author identities (build-bot, auto-ci, ci-bot, pipeline-bot), the attacker injected GitHub Actions workflows containing base64-encoded bash payloads that exfiltrate CI
1 Introduction This article provides a technical analysis of how many Windows kernel mode drivers can be interacted with from user mode without the hardware they were developed for. This work was motivated by driver-oriented vulnerability research and the need to evaluate the exploitability of individual findings, which frequently affect code whose reachability is hardware-gated. The
In March 2026, attackers exploited a pull_request_target misconfiguration in the aquasecurity/trivy-action GitHub Action to exfiltrate organization and repository secrets, then used those credentials to backdoor LiteLLM on PyPI (see Trivy’s post-mortem for the full timeline). zizmor is a static analyzer that GitHub Actions users run to catch exactly these misconfigurations before they ship. When GitHub Actions added support for YAML anchors in September 2025, a small but high-value slice of the ecosystem started writing workflows that zizmor could only analyze on a best-effort basis. Over the past three months, Trail of Bits collaborated with the zizmor maintainers to bring zizmor ’s anchor support up to full coverage. First, we fixed parsing bugs that caused crashes, produced wrong-location findings, and silently mishandled aliased values. Second, we surfaced deserialization edge cases that broke zizmor on otherwise valid workflows. Finally, we helped align zizmor ’s expression evaluator with GitHub’s own Known Answer Tests . We validated all of this against a new corpus of 41,253 workflows from 6,612 high-value open-source repositories. The result: 20 filed issues, 15 merged pull requests. Building the test corpus To u
U.S. and Canadian authorities arrested and charged a Canadian man with operating the KimWolf distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) botnet, which infected nearly two million devices worldwide. [...]
Cisco has rolled out updates for a maximum-severity security flaw impacting Secure Workload that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to access sensitive data. Tracked as CVE-2026-20223 (CVSS score: 10.0), the vulnerability arises from insufficient validation and authentication when accessing REST API endpoints. "An attacker could exploit this vulnerability if they are able to send
GreyNoise compared 119,842 malicious IPs against 11 major threat feeds. The average coverage: just 2%, exposing the limits of static blocklists.
Thursday, May 21
Three firms will pay nearly $1 million for selling “Active Listening” technology that they claimed tapped people’s phones for advertising. The FTC alleges the “tech” was just pricey email lists.
durabletask (Microsoft's Python Durable Task client) compromised by TeamPCP | same Mini Shai-Hulud payload as last week's TanStack wave
We've been tracking TeamPCP since March. This is the fifth major package in the same campaign. Full chronology: * **Mar 19** — Trivy compromised. CI/CD secrets harvested downstream. * **Mar 24** — LiteLLM 1.82.7/1.82.8 to PyPI via credentials stolen through Trivy. \~95M monthly downloads. \~1,000 cloud environments in a 3-hour window. * **Mar 27** — Telnyx Python SDK 4.87.1/4.87.2 to PyPI. WAV steganography for payload delivery. \~670K monthly downloads. * **April** — Bitwarden CLI, SAP npm packages, PyTorch Lightning. * **May 11** — 84 malicious versions across \~170 packages (@tanstack/*, guardrails-ai,* u/mistralai*/*, OpenSearch). First SLSA Build Level 3 provenance bypass. OpenAI hit downstream. * **May 20** — durabletask 1.4.1/1.4.2/1.4.3. Reads Vault, 1Password, Bitwarden, SSH keys, Docker creds. Propagates via AWS SSM and kubectl exec. We wrote on the LiteLLM chain in March when this started. Same TTPs, different package: [https://www.bluerock.io/post/litellm-supply-chain-protection](https://www.bluerock.io/post/litellm-supply-chain-protection)
Key Takeaways Vulnerabilities Report Offers Key Industry Benchmarks How does your MTTR hold up against the industry average? And does your organization encounter more high/critical vulnerabilities than others in your industry? Those are just a few questions that our 2026 State of Vulnerabilities Report answers. The report analyzes more than 11,000 vulnerabilities surfaced through the […] The post The 2026 State of Vulnerabilities Report: Industry Insights appeared first on Synack .
Google has accidentally leaked details about an unfixed issue in Chromium that keeps JavaScript running in the background even when the browser is closed, allowing remote code execution on the device. [...]
Today, we are extending Cloudflare’s cloud access security broker (CASB) to support the Claude Compliance API . Security and compliance teams can now monitor Claude usage directly in the Cloudflare dashboard. No endpoint agents required. Enterprise security teams have long struggled to see how users interact with sanctioned and unsanctioned applications. The rapid adoption of AI applications has made this harder. Employees spend significant time in these new surface areas, and their interactions differ from traditional SaaS: users upload files, share freeform prompts, and providers generate content that may contain sensitive data. Cloudflare CASB helps solve this problem. One API integration gives you out-of-band visibility and control over the applications your organization uses. This integration builds on our existing support for AI governance , extending coverage over the most common tools security teams now manage. The fast path to safe AI adoption AI adoption has outpaced security governance. While IT and security teams raced to enable AI tools for productivity, the controls lagged behind. Most organizations today operate with partial visibility: they may block unauthorized AI tools at the network layer, but they cannot see what happens inside sanctioned ones. This matters because AI tools are not like traditional SaaS applications. They are conversational, persistent, and deeply integrated into workflows through APIs and agent frameworks. An employee might paste customer da
CVE-2026-34474 covers a pre-auth credential disclosure in ZTE ZXHN H298A 1.1 and H108N 2.6 router web interfaces. The short version: an ETHCheat branch returns credential-bearing HTML before authentication. The captured fields include the admin password, WLAN PSK, and ESSID, and a companion wizard endpoint exposes serial data. The writeup keeps the PoC output redacted and focuses on the response behavior, affected scope, and disclosure trail.
Apple revealed that it blocked over $11 billion in fraudulent App Store transactions over the last six years, more than $2.2 billion in potentially fraudulent App Store transactions in 2025 alone. [...]
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a new Linux malware dubbed Showboat that has been put to use in a campaign targeting a telecommunications provider in the Middle East since at least mid-2022. "Showboat is a modular post-exploitation framework designed for Linux systems, capable of spawning a remote shell, transferring files, and functioning as a SOCKS5 proxy," Lumen
Modern crypto drainers don't hack wallets. They trick users into approving malicious transactions. Flare explores how the Lucifer DaaS platform scales wallet theft through phishing and automation. [...]
Hello all, The past few months I really got into Malicious Browser Extensions. During the creation of my project I started an automation that collects malicious browser extensions. During my thesis as a student I struggled to find CRX files.. so I created my own database of them. Here is the github for it: [https://github.com/GherardoFiori/MaliciousBrowserExtensions](https://github.com/GherardoFiori/MaliciousBrowserExtensions) Here is more info about the automation behind it: [https://buio.me/n8n](https://buio.me/n8n) I hope this can help someone with their own research around this subject. Since I really struggled to get my hands on crx files when it came to "malware" or "malicious"
I built 99 adversarial PE fixtures to stress‑test parsers — here’s what they reveal about malformed binaries
I just wrapped a 99‑fixture adversarial PE corpus for IOCX — deterministic, spec‑aware, malformed‑but‑parseable binaries, each isolating a single structural anomaly. The whole thing is only 250 KB and it already helped tighten up an unreleased validator. IOCX now walks even the most pathological PEs with confidence. Honestly, this is the most fun I’ve had with PE internals in years. Happy to share details if anyone’s curious. Github: [https://github.com/iocx-dev/iocx](https://github.com/iocx-dev/iocx)
GitHub is just the latest victim of TeamPCP, a gang that has carried out a spree of software supply chain attacks that has impacted hundreds of organizations.
France is already moving on from Zoom and Microsoft Teams in favor of homegrown alternatives. Other countries are quickly following suit.
A look at how Kubernetes CVE-2021-25740 allows users with EndpointSlice access to redirect traffic via shared ingress and load balancer services.
A new SonicWall scanning surge mirrors the pattern that preceded CVE-2026-0400. GreyNoise details the activity and what defenders should watch.
Wednesday, May 20
Overview A privilege escalation vulnerability, nicknamed "Dirty Frag," has been discovered in the Linux kernel versions 4.10 and later. This vulnerability is a result of chaining together two previously discovered vulnerabilities, xfrm-ESP Page-Cache Write CVE-2026-43284 and the RxRPC Page-Cache Write CVE-2026-43500 . This vulnerability was publicly disclosed on May 07, 2026. Description Dirty Frag is a Linux kernel vulnerability affecting the IPv4/IPv6 fragmentation and reassembly subsystem. The issue stems from improper handling of overlapping or malformed fragment offsets during the reassembly process. An attacker capable of sending crafted network packets to a vulnerable host can exploit the flaw to trigger memory corruption conditions. The publicly documented proof of concept demonstrates that fragmentation logic can be manipulated such that the kernel processes inconsistent fragment states, enabling a controlled write out-of-bounds scenario. When successfully exploited, this can result in local or remote denial of service (kernel panic) and, depending on configuration and kernel build options, may create a primitive for more advanced memory manipulation. The vulnerability arises from insufficient validation of fragment metadata during reassembly, specifically around: Incorrect or incomplete enforcement of fragment boundary checks Acceptance of overlapping fragments in unsafe sequences Inadequate cleanup when transitions occur between valid and invalid fragment states The fragment queue logic in affected kernels does not fully verify that fragment offsets, sizes, and overlap
Attorney John Scola is representing a police officer who is suing over injuries allegedly sustained while working security at an MSG property in 2025.
After my last post on the death of the 90-day window ([https://blog.himanshuanand.com/2026/05/the-90-day-disclosure-policy-is-dead/](https://blog.himanshuanand.com/2026/05/the-90-day-disclosure-policy-is-dead/)), the loudest critique I got was: 'Great complaint, what's the proposal?' This is the proposal. It is an informal RFC on how we actually have to change engineering architecture when LLM-assisted bug hunting means the exploit lands before the patch. No magic vendor tools, just strict egress rules, ephemeral infrastructure (burning containers every 12 hours) and rootless runtime sandboxing. Curious to hear where you think this approach breaks down.
A new study finds AI companies, defense firms, and dating apps are among 38 data collectors allegedly using manipulative design to confuse users while collecting their data.
Tuesday, May 19
Key Takeaways What AI Pentesting Means for Continuous Security Validation Every CISO conversation I’ve had this quarter circles back to the same problem: AI produces more vulnerability findings than security teams can read in a week, and it clouds their understanding of which findings are connected to real business risk. This week’s Wall Street Journal […] The post AI Can Find More Vulnerabilities. Humans Still Decide What Matters. appeared first on Synack .
Starting May 19, tech platforms in the US will have to comply with the Take It Down Act. Here’s how more than a dozen major platforms are handling takedown demands for your nonconsensual nudes.
Monday, May 18
Until this past weekend, a contractor for the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) maintained a public GitHub repository that exposed credentials to several highly privileged AWS GovCloud accounts and a large number of internal CISA systems. Security experts said the public archive included files detailing how CISA builds, tests and deploys software internally, and that it represents one of the most egregious government data leaks in recent history. On May 15, KrebsOnSecurity heard from Guillaume Valadon , a researcher with the security firm GitGuardian . Valadon’s company constantly scans public code repositories at GitHub and elsewhere for exposed secrets, automatically alerting the offending accounts of any apparent sensitive data exposures. Valadon said he reached out because the owner in this case wasn’t responding and the information exposed was highly sensitive. A redacted screenshot of the now-defunct “Private CISA” repository maintained by a CISA contractor. The GitHub re