Overview The OpenCart v4.2.0.0 extension installer contains a directory traversal vulnerability. The extension installation process extracts uploaded .zip files then uses the zip entry filenames as filesystem paths, without validating that the resolved path stays inside the intended directory. This vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-18412. Description OpenCart is a free, open‑source e‑commerce solution designed to help businesses build and manage online stores. OpenCart extensions are uploaded as zip files with .ocmod.zip extensions. Upon installation, the OpenCart v4.2.0.0 extension installer extracts these zip files, but does not validate that the extracted paths stay inside the intended extraction directory. An attacker can craft a malicious extension containing file path traversal sequences, such as ../ . With this vulnerability, an attacker can write files, such as a PHP web shell, into the webroot directory. Impact If a user with valid admininistrator credentials installs a malicious extension, it could allow a user to remotely execute code with the same privileges that OpenCart has on the target server. This includes the potential creation of a web shell, which could further enable remote execution of system-level commands. The vulnerability was confirmed against version 4.2.0.0, but other 4.x versions of OpenCart may be affected. Solution Unfortunately, OpenCart could not be reached to coordinate this vulnerability, and a patch is not available at the time of this writing. The CERT/CC recommends that OpenCart users update to the latest version and avoid installing extensions from unknown or untrusted sources. Additionally, OpenCart should be configured to run
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Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a malicious Microsoft Visual Studio Code (VS Code) extension named Solidity Pro ("solidity-pro") that has been observed delivering a browser wallet and credential stealer. The names of the extensions are below - helper-beeps.solidity-pro web3devtoolsx.solidity-pro Although neither of the extensions is now available on Open VSX, the GitHub repository
The Internet isn’t a single lane of traffic. For a long time, the rule of thumb in web security was that bots are bad, while humans are good. Of course, we’re far past this generalization. Humans can be fraudulent, and bots can be helpful at different levels. Site owners actively want some automated traffic to interact with our sites to make the Internet functional and discoverable. To complicate things further, the line between "human" and "bot" is blurring more and more. Now, we have a type of “hybrid” traffic where a single session shifts from human to agentic and back again. (Think of a user browsing a store, and then handing off the checkout process to an automated shopping assistant.) So, how do website owners manage this kind of complexity? What matters here is assessing behaviors . Is this behavior abusive? Malicious? What’s the risk presented here, and can I trust this visitor based on their actions? Solving this requires moving beyond static, point-in-time checks. It requires analyzing continuous behaviors to evaluate Trust. In this post, we’ll share an inside look into the strategy of the Web Integrity & Trust team (covering the bots and fraud problem spaces) around detecting and analyzing good and bad behaviors, providing tools to help site owners tackle emerging challenges in the shifting Agentic Internet. We’ll also share findings around agentic traffic since the launch of Precursor , and a simulation where you can see how your own cursor movements would be assessed as human or bot — plus some exciting launch updates to expect in the near future. Defining Risk and Trust Let’s talk about the distinction between Risk and Trust , the way we discuss it within the teams at Cloudflare who work in bot detection. These are often viewed as polar
At the Black Hat security conference, the AI giant revealed new details about how its agents went rogue, hacked several other companies—and did it all right under the company’s nose.
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Today, we moved to a new GPG signing subkey used to sign certain Firefox and Thunderbird artifacts (namely Linux tarballs, RPM packages, checksums files) after an unencrypted copy of the previous subkey was inadvertently committed to a private GitHub repository. Our review of available audit records found no evidence that the key was accessed by an unauthorized party while it was present in the repository. Access to the repository was limited to a small group within Mozilla, all of whom already had authorized access to the key through other means. We have revoked the previous signing key and added safeguards to prevent similar issues in the future. For most users, no action is required. There are two cases where you may need to take action: If you manually verify our GPG signatures, you will need to import the new signing key and the revocation for the old key. If you use Firefox RPM packages, some manual intervention may be required. See the instructions below for details. Thunderbird does not provide official RPM packages, so there is no RPM-specific action required. RPM Users Different RPM package management tools deal with GPG key rotations and revocations differently. See the sections below for what action (if any) you need to take to ensure you continue to receive the latest Firefox updates. Fedora 43 and later No special action needed. During the next update, dnf will download the updated key and you just need to confirm the import. Make sure the shown fingerprint matches 827E 6586 0867 9618 CD34 9F93 678E 455D 7676 7AA3 before accepting. Fedora 42 and older, RHEL/Rocky/Almalinux Dnf on these releases cannot replace the key on its own. Updates will fail with “Import of the key didn’t help, wrong key?” or “The GPG keys listed for the mozilla repository are already installed but they are not correct for this pack
At the beginning of Agents Week, Rita shared that agents represent the next evolution of computing: not only as a new application of AI but also as a new class of software that’s shaping how people interact with technology, and how software interacts with the Internet. Over the last year or so, we set out to explore what this shift means for developers and customers building AI-native apps and the infrastructure needed to support them. As agents become more capable and autonomous, the challenges extend beyond the models themselves — to identity, communication, orchestration, memory, observability, and security. Over the past week we’ve shared how we’re bringing those pieces together across the Cloudflare platform to serve an Agentic Internet. Each day we presented new tools, products, and ideas toward building for an Internet where humans and agents cooperate instead of collide . Monday, August 3 Monday focused on the foundations for building and running intelligent, autonomous apps — the runtime and infrastructure agents rely on. Tuesday, August 4 Tuesday introduced the Agent Development Lifecycle (ADLC) and the primitives that take agentic software from prototype to production. Wednesday, August 5 Wednesday extended Zero Trust from users and devices to agents themselves — and we shared how we’re running it internally at Cloudflare. Thursday, August 6 Thursday defined the Agentic Internet, and how website owners, publishers, and agents can all contribute to an Internet that works for people and agents alike.
Found inside camview.tar.gz on an exposed server: a Docker project used to find, exploit, and stream internet-exposed IP cameras in a browser. The operator's own name for it, from the archive and README, is camview. It is not connected to any legitimate app of the same name. * Built with FastAPI and Uvicorn, Python 3.11 image with FFmpeg, nmap, and masscan baked in * FFmpeg transcodes the camera RTSP feed to MJPEG for display; nmap and masscan provide the initial scan layer * The audit feature is where the exploitation happens: cameras are fingerprinted across a dozen-plus brands, queried over ONVIF, tested against known CVEs, then brute-forced over HTTP and RTSP with a 3,811-entry username:password dictionary * Working credentials and stream URL patterns are written to disk and prioritized on later runs, so it improves per vendor * The exploitation itself is not custom. camview wraps Ingram, a public webcam scanner, mounted in from the host * On a second, unrelated directory, scripts named camworm.py and routerworm.py follow a compromise-then-proxy pattern and contain no actual worm functionality despite the naming We rebuilt the UI in a sealed test environment by running it with empty data. Full analysis in the post: [https://hunt.io/blog/russian-speaking-operator-ukrainian-camera-toolkit](https://hunt.io/blog/russian-speaking-operator-ukrainian-camera-toolkit)
Writeup on two open directories we recovered, with a defender-focused breakdown of the camera and router compromise techniques and the network behavior their proxy tooling produces. Detection and mitigation angles worth pulling out: * Edge devices opening outbound connections on port 4444 (chisel reverse tunnels) is a strong compromise signal * Sequential ONVIF and RTSP discovery and repeated hits on camera ports show up better at the network boundary than in camera logs, which are usually shallow or absent * Credential guessing was the primary access path before any CVE was tried, so default and weak creds on cameras and routers are still the main exposure * Exploited camera CVEs are years old and long patched (Hikvision, Dahua); TP-Link Archer and MikroTik were the router targets * Every targeted device answered directly from the internet, so pulling cameras and routers behind a VPN or onto isolated VLANs removes most of this Outcomes against the government and military sites in the operator's bash history are not confirmed from the files. Full mitigations and ATT&CK mapping in the post: [https://hunt.io/blog/russian-speaking-operator-ukrainian-camera-toolkit](https://hunt.io/blog/russian-speaking-operator-ukrainian-camera-toolkit)
Microsoft has disclosed that Storm-1175, a financially motivated threat actor linked to China, has deployed a previously undocumented ransomware strain called StormEncryptor. The use of StormEncryptor marks a shift from the adversary's previous use of Medusa ransomware, the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Team said. "StormEncryptor is written in C++ and appends the file name extension .encrypted
Hi everyone, our latest post explores the practical considerations of AI-assisted source code analysis, evaluating the pros and cons of frontier and locally-hosted models while using a variety of harness orchestration designs. [https://blog.includesecurity.com/2026/08/web-app-pentesting-in-the-ai-era/](https://blog.includesecurity.com/2026/08/web-app-pentesting-in-the-ai-era/)
A lot of security problems still begin with someone doing a completely normal thing. Cloning a repo. Answering a call. Leaving a box exposed. Trusting the default. That pretty much covers the mood this week. Old bugs are back, supply chains are getting stranger, and some exploit paths are so short you wonder what was supposed to stop them in the first place. That’s only part of it. Here’s
Overview The OpenCart v4.2.0.0 extension installer contains a directory traversal vulnerability. The extension installation process extracts uploaded .zip files then uses the zip entry filenames as filesystem paths, without validating that the resolved path stays inside the intended directory. This vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-18412. Description OpenCart is a free, open‑source e‑commerce solution designed to help businesses build and manage online stores. OpenCart extensions are uploaded as zip files with .ocmod.zip extensions. Upon installation, the OpenCart v4.2.0.0 extension installer extracts these zip files, but does not validate that the extracted paths stay inside the intended extraction directory. An attacker can craft a malicious extension containing file path traversal sequences, such as ../ . With this vulnerability, an attacker can write files, such as a PHP web shell, into the webroot directory. Impact If a user with valid admininistrator credentials installs a malicious extension, it could allow a user to remotely execute code with the same privileges that OpenCart has on the target server. This includes the potential creation of a web shell, which could further enable remote execution of system-level commands. The vulnerability was confirmed against version 4.2.0.0, but other 4.x versions of OpenCart may be affected. Solution Unfortunately, OpenCart could not be reached to coordinate this vulnerability, and a patch is not available at the time of this writing. The CERT/CC recommends that OpenCart users update to the latest version and avoid installing extensions from unknown or untrusted sources. Additionally, OpenCart should be configured to run
PerspectiveGraph: Attack-path engine that measures how wrong it is - published calibration (Brier/ECE) against recorded red-team verdicts
I designed and built an engine that computes end-to-end routes from internet exposure to sensitive assets, ranking them by a composite priority that weighs what the route can reach and how exposed the entry point is. What that gives you operationally, so far: * Runtime-confirmed routes (Falco): "this route is being walked right now", not in theory. * KEV on path, and MITRE ATT&CK mapping per hop, with each hop's probability. * Closed-loop verification: before you open a ticket, the engine simulates removing the edge and tells you how many routes actually disappear. * Suppression board with reason, owner and expiry: an accepted route has a name against it, and comes back when the acceptance lapses. * OSCAL export for GRC and NDJSON for SIEM. I'm posting it here for one reason in particular, besides looking for contributors, especially on the calibration side, every engine of this kind emits probabilities without telling you how much to trust them. This one grades itself: it records red-team/BAS verdicts on the routes it surfaced, computes Brier and ECE, and draws the reliability diagram, ending on an explicit verdict (underconfident, overconfident, well-calibrated). That is how I found a real false positive of my own. Using AWS iam:SimulatePrincipalPolicy as an oracle, the comparison revealed that the engine had been treating an IAM permission boundary as if it granted permissions. A boundary caps to the intersection and never grants and "bounded" does not mean "safe": a boundary carrying AdministratorAccess does nothing at all. It is not a scanner, nor a CNAPP, and it does not replace either. It is very much under active development, and technical criticism is welcome. Repo: [PerpsectiveGraph - GitHub repository](https://github.com/luiacuaniello/perspectivegraph)
North Korea's state hackers are no longer content to type prompts into public chatbots. One of the country's main espionage groups has begun running artificial intelligence (AI) offline on its own servers, connecting document-search tools to files in its possession, and collecting the software parts needed to build AI into its malware. South Korean security firm Genians says it uncovered the
Serving the most critical missions: Cloudflare for Government achieves FedRAMP Class D (High) Certified status
We believe the Internet must be a force for good, and that it requires a foundation of trust. Nowhere is that trust more critical than in public service. Government agencies are the stewards of a nation’s most sensitive data. They protect national security, critical infrastructure , and the personal information of every citizen. Cloudflare’s mission is to help build a better Internet. A key part of that mission is giving public sector agencies the best technology to stay secure, fast, and reliable. That means meeting the highest possible standards. Today, we are proud to announce a major milestone: Cloudflare for Government has achieved FedRAMP Class D (High) certification status . We are honored to take this step with our sponsoring agency, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, whose global mission demands the highest level of security. We are also very excited to announce that we are using the new systems we developed for FedRAMP High as the foundation of our commitment to pursuing U.S. Department of Defense Impact Level 4 (DoD IL4) authorization. IL4 is the department’s cybersecurity standard for systems handling controlled, unclassified data. We are confident that bringing our global network to this space will change the pace of innovation in the defense community. What is FedRAMP, and why does being “certified” matter? The Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) is a U.S. government-wide program that provides a rigorous, standardize
Three separate research efforts last week demonstrated ways to defeat passkey protections without breaking the cryptography they rest on. Passkeys are designed to replace reusable passwords and resist phishing. The attacks instead reused signed authentication material that Windows had exposed, abused a cloud-synced passkey system from malware already on the victim's machine, and used a
I've seen that cert online and I want to learn Thick Client Pentesting. What do you guys think about that cert? Does it worth 63 pounds? Cert Link: [https://pentestingexams.com/certifications/professional/certified-desktop-application-pentester/](https://pentestingexams.com/certifications/professional/certified-desktop-application-pentester/)
The threat actor known as Head Mare has been observed weaponizing security flaws in unpatched TrueConf servers once again in attacks targeting Russian companies spanning instrumentation, electronics, transport, energy, IT, and software development sectors. Russian cybersecurity vendor Kaspersky said it detected the attacks in July 2026. The activity involves exploiting a vulnerability chain
i got tired of switching between windbg ida and x64dbg so i built an orchestrator to control them all
Hello everyone! I have noticed a strange and continuous flow of connections from my Synology NAS to Russian IP addresses. Do you have any ideas? Could it be a genuine process from Synology's applications? I have attached my log showing a prevention block towards the Russian Federation. Thank you in advance!
Kimi K3, the latest AI model from Beijing-based Moonshot AI, exited an isolated cybersecurity testing environment during an evaluation, cheated the assigned task by retrieving the answer from GitHub, and did so without hacking any outside system.
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a malicious Microsoft Visual Studio Code (VS Code) extension named Solidity Pro ("solidity-pro") that has been observed delivering a browser wallet and credential stealer. The names of the extensions are below - helper-beeps.solidity-pro web3devtoolsx.solidity-pro Although neither of the extensions is now available on Open VSX, the GitHub repository
To reduce the amount of noise from questions, we have disabled self-posts in favor of a unified questions thread every week. Feel free to ask any question about reverse engineering here. If your question is about how to use a specific tool, or is specific to some particular target, you will have better luck on the [Reverse Engineering StackExchange](http://reverseengineering.stackexchange.com/). See also /r/AskReverseEngineering.
OpenAI has announced that it's pausing some "internal activities" involving its upcoming artificial intelligence (AI) model Astra after an internal evaluation found it had made significant advancements in agentic coding and cybersecurity. In response to the discovery, the AI upstart said it's implementing security controls for higher-capability models and associated activities, such as isolated
AI coding agents store full conversation history as plaintext on endpoints. Open source scanner for the credentials sitting in them.
Every AI coding CLI keeps its conversation history as plaintext JSONL on disk. Claude Code under `~/.claude/projects/`, Codex under `~/.codex/sessions/`. Anything a developer pastes while debugging stays there indefinitely: AWS keys, .env contents, database URLs. This is a credential store that most endpoint policies do not know exists. It is not shell history, it holds full context. Malicious npm and PyPI packages already scan common paths on postinstall. I wrote agentsweep to find and redact it. 201 detection rules, 31 agents supported, fully offline with zero network calls. It redacts values in place while keeping the JSONL byte for byte, and prints the revocation URL per provider so rotation is not guesswork. Limits, stated plainly: it does not undo what the provider already received. If you pasted a key into a cloud agent, that key transited their servers before it hit disk. It removes the local attack vector only. Some agent storage paths are marked experimental and may under-report until confirmed against a real install. MIT, Python 3.11+. https://github.com/Ishannaik/agent-sweep
HANDLE Duplication internals : What happens behind the scenes when you call kernelbase! DuplicateHandle( )
I am making a Emulator Bypass of a Lame Game "Free Fire" it works perfectly and not give any type of Ban/Blacklist in Casual modes Games but as soon as i start a Ranked match it triggers blacklist ! I have a Safe Bypass DLL ! I have attached the DLL link. Someone Recreate it i will pay !
[Tool/Writeup] ALPC-Enumerator: A dynamic, userland C++ tool to enumerate ALPC ports and detect ALPC spoofing
Evil Fonts deceive a viewer by rendering a different letter than is actually on the disk. Evil Fonts can poison HTML, DOCX, PDFs, and anywhere else you can bring your own fonts. Works great in Windows corporate networks for bypassing security tooling, initial access through JavaScript free click fix (beats mitm web security tooling), and leaving traps around the network to harvest shells. Imagine thinking you are copying whoami but what is actually on the disk is rm -rf \\\~ Demos: (Use desktop) https://doctoreww.github.io/EvilFontTool/ For the demos, copy and paste the HTML/DOCX to a notepad to remove the evil fonts. For the AI ones imagine your security tooling inspects the benign text on disk, but shows the obviously malicious extortion to the user. Labs: https://github.com/DoctorEww/EvilFontTool/blob/main/labs%2FREADME.md Lab Walkthrough: https://github.com/DoctorEww/EvilFontTool/blob/main/labs%2Fwalkthrough.md Some evil font uses: Tamper homework to make it so students poison AI queries Poison help desk documentation Bypass email filters Clickfix Beat resume AI filters
I recently analyzed a multi-stage PowerShell payload delivery chain involving heavily obfuscated PowerShell loaders and remotely hosted payloads. The analysis covers PowerShell deobfuscation, hidden execution, Base64/XOR decoding, a decoy “Verification complete!” prompt, payload delivery, and IOCs. Initial indicators: `203[.]188[.]171[.]166` `dorenzaa[.]com`
Plus: A judge rules cell tower dumps unconstitutional, water utility hacks spread to a dozen states, a phishing email opens a missile-parts supplier’s inbox, and a ransomware boss gets 16 years.
Two security researchers bought cheap domains—including noreply.net and deleteduser.com—and set up email listening services. Hundreds of companies are sending them corporate secrets.
Write once, shell everywhere. Sun Microsystems didn't mean it like this. Talk from today at DEF CON's Bug Bounty Village. Full technique catalog graded for distroless containers, an errno path oracle for black-box target fingerprinting, and three minimal-guessing techniques: bash fd/255, Rails schema\_cache.yml deserialization, and a Node.js worker path overwrite without process restart.
Attacker-controlled instructions can make Atlassian's Rovo assistant collect Jira or Confluence data that a signed-in user can access, then send it to an outside server. Two security firms found that behavior independently, by different routes. Only one of those routes is confirmed closed. PromptArmor, an AI security firm, hid the instructions in content Rovo reads. It said an uploaded file was
New research shows content inside an email can escape its message boundary and interfere with the webmail interface. Across attack chains spanning Outlook, Gmail, Fastmail, Proton Mail, Yahoo Mail, and AOL Mail, the techniques can capture passwords, take over third-party accounts, leak tokens, hijack trusted UI actions, and manipulate AI tools that read email. PortSwigger researcher Gareth
Metabase has warned that a maximum-severity security flaw impacting its business intelligence and data visualization software package has been exploited in the wild as a zero-day. The vulnerability (CVSS score: 10.0), which does not carry a CVE identifier, allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to inject arbitrary SQL into the Metabase application database, enabling them to gain
N-able has released a fresh round of hotfixes for N‑central as part of its investigation into ongoing exploitation of a recently disclosed security flaw in the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) product. "We are proactively expanding protections in response to ongoing monitoring of threat actors as they evolve their attack techniques," the company said. "This is not a duplicate of our
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Friday added a critical-severity security flaw impacting Progress Kemp LoadMaster to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, following reports of active exploitation in the wild. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-8037 (CVSS score: 9.6), is a command injection flaw that could be weaponized to achieve arbitrary
Windows tcpip.sys ICMP Timestamp Bug: EnableICMPTimestampRep=0 Registry Bypass & RFC 792 Violation | Kernel RE
A cluster of nearly 800 malicious packages has been published to the npm registry as part of a new campaign designed to deliver cross-platform malware targeting Windows, Mac, and Linux systems. "These packages appear to use AI slop squatted, or randomly generated typo-squatting package names, but all of them deliver a powerful RAT and infostealer payload," OpenSourceMalware researcher Paul
A recent wave of cyber attacks targeting financial services, private equity, and professional services has been attributed to a data extortion group known as UNC6671. "UNC6671 continues to rely on voice phishing (vishing) to target enterprise employees, posing as IT help desk staff facilitating mandatory, urgent security migrations. Significantly, the threat actor often contacts employees via
ByteRay researchers have published a blog on a set of vulnerabilities they are calling TrustFall, and the findings land hard for any company that treats the Trusted Execution Environment as the part of a device you do not have to worry about. OP-TEE is the walled-off Secure World that phones, TVs, cars, and industrial gear lean on to guard keys, DRM, and identity, and the whole point of paying for that hardware isolation is the promise that even a compromised operating system cannot reach inside. TrustFall shows that promise was not as solid as buyers assumed. The researchers found several flaws that let the untrusted side reach into or knock over the Secure World, which is exactly the outcome the design exists to prevent. The bugs have since been fixed upstream, so patched builds are available, but the uncomfortable takeaway for vendors is that the vault they were told to trust had a way in, and "it runs in the TEE" is no longer an answer on its own.
The Internet isn’t a single lane of traffic. For a long time, the rule of thumb in web security was that bots are bad, while humans are good. Of course, we’re far past this generalization. Humans can be fraudulent, and bots can be helpful at different levels. Site owners actively want some automated traffic to interact with our sites to make the Internet functional and discoverable. To complicate things further, the line between "human" and "bot" is blurring more and more. Now, we have a type of “hybrid” traffic where a single session shifts from human to agentic and back again. (Think of a user browsing a store, and then handing off the checkout process to an automated shopping assistant.) So, how do website owners manage this kind of complexity? What matters here is assessing behaviors . Is this behavior abusive? Malicious? What’s the risk presented here, and can I trust this visitor based on their actions? Solving this requires moving beyond static, point-in-time checks. It requires analyzing continuous behaviors to evaluate Trust. In this post, we’ll share an inside look into the strategy of the Web Integrity & Trust team (covering the bots and fraud problem spaces) around detecting and analyzing good and bad behaviors, providing tools to help site owners tackle emerging challenges in the shifting Agentic Internet. We’ll also share findings around agentic traffic since the launch of Precursor , and a simulation where you can see how your own cursor movements would be assessed as human or bot — plus some exciting launch updates to expect in the near future. Defining Risk and Trust Let’s talk about the distinction between Risk and Trust , the way we discuss it within the teams at Cloudflare who work in bot detection. These are often viewed as polar
Since launching in 2020, Cloudflare Radar has provided one-of-a-kind insight into Internet traffic on a global scale. The open data that Radar publishes from our global network is used by a variety of experts in different domains: human rights advocates, journalists, academic researchers, network operators, and more. Today, as part of Agents Week , Radar is beta-launching a new tool: Radar Researcher. Now, if you want to answer a question with Radar’s data, you can just ask in plain language and get an answer back with real, interactive charts, all built on Cloudflare's developer platform. You no longer need to find the right page, choose the right filters, or read the API documentation to write a query. Why we built Radar Researcher Over the past six years, the Radar team has worked to provide clear, accessible, reliable data visualizations of complex datasets. This is not without its challenges: our user base is vast and ranges from curious novices to technical network experts. Even so, we publish as much insight into the Internet as seen from our network as we can: DNS queries from our public resolver 1.1.1.1 , HTTP traffic from across our global network, network quality data collected from Cloudflare Speed Test , and so much more. We also believe in the power of open, public data, which is why everything you see in Radar’s data visualizations is available via our free API . Every year we make more and more of the Internet visible. But as Rad
As a platform for helping build a better Internet, Cloudflare helps turn ideas into real products and experiences around the world. Across communities and backgrounds, developers build with Cloudflare using the tools they love, shaping what comes next for the Internet while inspiring, collaborating with, and teaching others. The community is where some of Cloudflare’s best moments happen. Students show their friends how to deploy Workers for the first time. Discord users answer questions from other developers via working code samples, instead of links to documentation. Open-source contributors build novel solutions to solve their own problems, then share them with the world. Organizers host events that give builders from all backgrounds the space to start building their dream project. All of these represent a community at its best: people helping other people build. This spirit of community is an exciting and vital part of helping to build the Internet. Those who step up to educate and support others, or to invent, build, or maintain tools shared across the ecosystem, make lasting contributions to the health and potential of the Internet. We want to have their backs. That's why today we’re announcing an improved community program, designed to better support, recognize, and empower the people getting involved, while working with them to shape what comes next. The program has two main tracks: Cloudflare Ambassadors: Bringing Cloudflare to their own communities. Cloudflare Community Engineers: Contributing to open-source projects that improve the Internet. We’re launching a new home for the program where you can learn more and get involved: cloudflare.com/community . Cloudflare Ambassadors Cloudflare Ambassadors are people who bring Cloudflare into their own communities. You can probably think
AI Gateway and Workers AI first started as distinct products, but over time, we noticed our users were converging. With AI Gateway, you can proxy requests to any model provider and get built-in observability, logging, access, and security. On Workers AI, we host models on the GPU infrastructure that we manage, exposing an API endpoint you can leverage to access inference-as-a-service. The architecture of these products looks different, but to an end user, it achieves the same goal: connecting you to models with a sophisticated control plane. Today, we're excited to share our plans on how these products converge into one unified path, so you can connect to any model provider (including Workers AI), while managing things like observability, billing, security, and logging from a single control plane. It’s the next step toward some big plans we have — read on to learn what a unified control plane means for the future of model routing. Merging the binding and API We've been hinting at the fact that these products are becoming more unified through our entrypoints: the Workers binding and the REST API. We have an AI binding that you can use to call AI Gateway and Workers AI. There's no concept of a separate AI Gateway and Workers AI binding: it all goes through the same path. We shipped the idea of a “default” gateway a few months ago, so that if you have never set up an AI Gateway before, you could still automatically inherit the AI Gateway observability and logging. Of course, you can still specify your own gateway if you'd like to split up applications into multiple projects. Here's what the binding call looks like, if you are calling Workers AI via AI Gateway: We’ve also announced a single unified REST API — the /ai/ endpoint that allows you to make similar calls to Workers AI via AI Gateway. Doing this allows us to unify the entrypoi
WordPress has fixed a pre-authentication reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) flaw in its login screen that affects every version of the content management system. pwn.ai demonstrated how the flaw can be chained into PHP code execution on the server when a logged-in administrator interacts with an attacker-controlled page. Tracked as CVE-2026-64638 (CVSS score: 8.9), the high-severity
Open Source had a great childhood. For two decades it got to be a kid. It ran around barefoot, gave everything away, trusted strangers, and never once thought about who was watching. It ran the kind of lemonade stand that took IOUs from anyone who wandered up — take what you need, pay me back whenever, no need to leave a name. It was idyllic. It was also, in retrospect, a little feral. Then,
A use-after-free bug in Linux's SCTP networking code can be turned into full root on a host, and Tencent researchers say they used it to escape a container and reach the machine underneath. The flaw has existed since 2008. The fix already shipped: stable kernels 7.1.6, 6.18.42, 6.12.101 and 6.6.148, released August 3, close it. Anyone running an older kernel with SCTP reachable should update.
Security researcher Malcolm Stagg has disclosed a new attack class called NatJack that manipulates network address translation (NAT) connection state to hijack active TCP sessions, spoof DNS responses, expose mapped ports, and exhaust NAT tables. Presented at Black Hat USA 2026, the research found affected behavior across independently developed implementations, including Windows and
Security researchers tracked and eavesdropped on a WIRED reporter using vulnerabilities in a pink plastic smartwatch. It’s just one piece of a deeply insecure supply chain of GPS-enabled gadgets.
Abusing the trust boundary in Claude Code for RCE. Trust is never broken and that opens up a few avenues for abuse. Simply opening claude code on a PR can be enough to silently trigger attacker payloads.
VU#487613: Alinto SOGo v5.12.7 vulnerable to cross-site scripting via malformed ICS calendar invitations
Overview A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Alinto SOGo v5.12.7 allows attackers to achieve remote code execution by embedding malicious SVG (Scalable Vector Graphics) objects in ICS (iCalendar) invitations. The vulnerability has been actively exploited in the wild, as confirmed by VirusTotal sightings. Description Alinto SOGo is an open-source webmail and groupware platform for email, calendars, contacts, and shared scheduling. It is primarily used by organizations seeking a self-hosted interface solution for existing mail infrastructure. CVE-2026-8496 The vulnerability exists in SOGo’s handling of ICS files, where the DESCRIPTION field is rendered without proper sanitization or Content Security Policy (CSP) enforcement. When a calendar invite contains an SVG payload, such as <animate onrepeat='...'> , with JavaScript event handlers, the browser executes the script in the context of the SOGo webmail interface. This occurs during normal calendar view rendering (e.g., when a user opens or previews the calendar tab), even without explicit interaction. Impact Once an attacker delivers a malicious ICS file via email, any user who views the calendar will execute the embedded XSS payload, granting the attacker full read access to the victim's mailbox. This enables: Credential theft through forced logout/login phishing Password manager autofill hijacking Full exfiltration of email messages, folder contents, and metadata Extraction of contact lists and calendar data Solution Users are recommended to upgrade to SOGo v5.12.8 or newer. v5.12.8 addresses this
A 26-year-old Canadian man once described as one of the most consequential cybercrime threat actors of 2024 has pleaded guilty to computer fraud and conspiracy to hack and extort more than 165 organizations that used the cloud provider Snowflake . Connor Riley Moucka , of Kitchener, Ontario, also admitted to stealing call and text history records of more than 100 million AT&T customers. A surveillance photo of Connor Riley Moucka, a.k.a. “Judische” and “Waifu,” dated Oct 21, 2024, 9 days before Moucka’s arrest. This image was included in an affidavit filed by an investigator with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The U.S. Justice Department said between February and October 2024, Moucka and co-conspirators used stolen login credentials to steal cloud-hosted data belonging to at least 165 customers of a U.S.-based software-as-a-service company. The hackers targeted stolen credentials for Snowflake customer accounts that did not enforce multi-factor authentication, and extorted or attempted to extort a host of well-known companies, including TicketMaster, Lending Tree, Advance Auto Parts and Neiman Marcus. Snowflake responded to the data thefts by increasing password complexity requirements and enforcing multi-factor authentication. Moucka
Most of the cyber incidents landing on our desks these days start with someone believing a lie. It’s not a brilliant piece of code that causes most breaches. A convincing email, a confident phone call, and a fake sense of urgency can make people hand over exactly what the attacker needs. Last week I talked […] The post The risk awareness radar. A superpower every MSP needs to train appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
Today, we’re excited to announce a few developer experience improvements to Cloudflare AI Search to make it easy to manage a search solution out of the box. Previously, you had to stitch together components of the Cloudflare primitives (Workers AI, AI Gateway, Vectorize, R2, Browser Run) but now, AI Search can do this automatically, and better. Our goal is to give your agents their own search engine, where they can easily find data to provide better answers for themselves and their humans. We’re also sharing an early preview of pricing for customers of AI Search so you can learn how this scales. We modeled pricing in a way that makes it predictable and scalable: embedding and reranking are free when you use the default models, so no need to worry about predicting token count. In AI Search, users can now: Index a collection of data for your agent: Make structured and unstructured data easily accessible for your agent to build with, from individual files to websites you own. (Today, it must be a zone on your Cloudflare account, but with more ways to verify ownership coming soon.) Skip the sitemap for your websites: Previously, AI Search required that websites have a sitemap to use the website integration. Now you can select the “Discover” parsing option to add a website without a sitemap as a source. Get a single public endpoint for searching across a namespace: When you enable public URLs on your namespace, you can get a /search and /mcp endpoint that can search through multiple instances or websites at once without authentication, so you can share easily with your customers. Put your own custom domain over public endpoints: You can now add your own domains over your public URLs, so you can brand your /search
Over the last year and a half, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) has become the universal standard for how agents interact with external services. But one of the main criticisms of MCP was that the protocol required a stateful connection between Client and Server. This evolved from MCP’s origins and the first STDIO transport, designed for local applications . When MCP Servers went remote, it translated the stateful connection that worked so well locally and transposed it onto web infrastructure. Building a well-behaved MCP Server meant managing request routing to sticky sessions, holding open streams, message replay, and generally more overhead and complexity than a traditional web server. This changes now. The latest MCP 2026-07-28 specification was released last week, together with updated TypeScript, Python, Go, and C# SDKs. MCP is now a fully stateless protocol. The specification, interaction model and SDKs have all been rewritten to leverage this new protocol and simplify usage. This means that MCP servers can now run in just a Worker, no stateful infrastructure needed, and customers benefit from the operational simplicity and reduced cost of less moving parts. A new MCP At Cloudflare, our journey with MCP goes back to the very beginning. In March 2025, we released our McpAgent primitive for building MCP servers with Cloudflare Agents SDK . Two months later, we ran an MCP Demo Day s
Your next customer may not find you through a search engine. Instead, they'll ask an AI assistant: "how do I do X?"; "which option is best for someone like me?"; "just handle it for me" and an agent will find the answer, weigh the options, and act on their behalf. Increasingly, the moment that determines whether a customer chooses you happens inside a model's response — before a human ever sees your homepage. This agentic audience is already here: by our count, fewer than half of all HTML page requests now come from a human . Not all of those machines are agents acting for a person, but that share is growing fast, and answer engines, shopping assistants, and research tools will shape which businesses are found and recommended. Discoverability used to mean ranking on a results page. Now it means being found, read, and confidently recommended by the agents that guide your customers. The old metrics, human clicks and page views, no longer paint the full picture. We spent time talking to site owners who were staring at access logs full of AI bots, completely blind to whether those bots were capable of using their site or recommending their products and services to their users. We heard two main questions: Can agents actually use my site? Am I getting recommended? To help site owners answer these questions, we have integrated our previous work on Agent Readiness into the Cloudflare dashboard, and added our new Answer Engine Optimization (AEO) tool as well. These tools treat agents as a core user base for your site, showing you how an agent will see it, and how often you get recommended. The opportunity is big, and the bar is low, because most sites aren't built fo
Should we build our own browser? This is one of those questions that has come up every few months internally at Cloudflare for years. Unsurprisingly, it’s the kind that triggers long threads with multiple reasons and persuasive arguments on why we should do it. The browser is obviously the most important software we use every day on our computers; it’s arguably the operating system of the Internet. We’re a company on a mission to help build a better Internet — who wouldn’t want to take on the challenge of building a new browser? But we never quite found the balance between the technical difficulty of such an endeavour and the unique problems we’d be solving by doing it. And so, the idea was shelved, over and over again. Until now. Something magical happened: we reached a tipping point where a series of powerful technical advancements in our Developer Platform became a reality, while the advent of AI agents and the demand for a new kind of browser became critical at the same time. Running WebAssembly (Wasm) in Workers is now very mature. Primitives like dynamic workers , SQLite-based Durable Objects , Worker-to-worker RPC , service bindings , higher
Today we are launching a developer preview of WebMCP on Cloudflare. Switch it on and browser agents can start working with your site, with no code and nothing changed at your origin. Cloudflare adds a small bridge to your pages, which registers a set of tools for a visitor’s agent to use. The web was built on the assumption that there is a person on the other end: someone to read the page, click buttons, and fill in the forms. But now more and more visits come from AI agents instead, to an Internet made for humans. The usual approach has been crawlers, which copy content back to a server and, too often, give the original site none of the traffic and little of the credit. There is a better way, and it does not involve scraping. WebMCP is a new browser standard, shipping experimentally in Chrome 146, that shows up in the page as document.modelContext . A site can choose to expose a set of tools for agents running in the browser, meaning agents no longer have to guess their way through a page built for humans. This enables agents to have a different browsing experience from the user and use tokens on tasks, not navigation. The catch: the site has to implement it. Cloudflare has been building both ends of this. BrowserRun , our remote browser, already added WebMCP support, so an agent can discover and call the tools a site exposes. Cloudflare Radar will soon offer WebMCP tools of its own. This preview is about the other side: a way to give any site on Cloudflare those tools with a single switch, and no code. A developer preview of WebMCP on Cloudflare Implementing WebMCP by hand is a small project: design the tools to expose, wire them into your interface, and keep them working as the standard evolves. We wanted it to be simple
At the Black Hat security conference, the AI giant revealed new details about how its agents went rogue, hacked several other companies—and did it all right under the company’s nose.
For nearly two years, researcher Vangelis Stykas has maintained access to North Korean hackers’ servers. His work shows they pulled off intrusions in a shocking number of systems across the globe.
Researchers at security firm Zenity found more than a dozen flaws in AI browsers—and managed to get OpenAI’s Atlas to make an unauthorized Amazon purchase.
We're honored to announce that Cloudflare is the only vendor that has been recognized as a Visionary in both the 2026 Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for SASE Platforms and the 2026 Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for Security Service Edge reports. To us, this validates our architectural choices and, more importantly, reflects the trust our customers place in us to navigate an increasingly complex security landscape. To every customer who shared feedback with Gartner, discussed your roadmap challenges with our team, and pushed us to build better solutions: thank you. This recognition belongs to you as much as it does to us. The SASE (Secure Access Service Edge) and SSE (Security Service Edge) markets are at an inflection point. Many organizations started with the SSE as the “security half” of SASE to tackle their remote work challenges during the pandemic. More recently, SASE has grown more prominent given the rise in return-to-office work mandates. Now, as AI agents, post-quantum threats, and the sprawl of shadow apps reshape enterprise security, organizations need platforms that can adapt at the speed of change, not vendors locked into yesterday's architecture. That’s exactly where Cloudflare One, our agile SASE platform, comes in. The market gap and where SASE is heading next It’s no secret that most SASE vendors haven't adapted to the architectural realities of modern enterprises. In fact, when customers migrate to Cloudflare, we hear some of the exact same challenges time and time again: Fragmented architectures: When SASE platf
A lawsuit accuses Homeland Security of violating protesters’ free-speech rights—but the agency is using it to try to get access to the plaintiffs’ encrypted communications.
Security researcher James Kettle tried to push the limit of AI’s hacking abilities—and discovered how effective it can be when combined with human expertise.
Homeland Security told immigrants that leaving the US would wipe out fines it claims they owe. Now it wants private investigators to find them in their home countries and collect.
More than 50 offending image and video ads were published across Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, or Threads, according to Meta’s ad library data. Some ran as recently as this week.
Synack Red Team researcher Malcolm Stagg takes the stage at Black Hat USA 2026 on August 6 to present three years of independent research on a new class of network infrastructure attacks. Here's who he is and why the talk belongs on your calendar. The post From DARPA to Black Hat: An SRT Researcher’s Next Chapter appeared first on Synack .
To hear both sides of the build vs buy debate around AI pentesting solutions, we spoke with Dow's cyber engineering team lead Dan Lacher and Synack's CTO Mark Kuhr. From Dow's perspective, Synack served as a force multiplier for a small internal red team. Meanwhile, building the Synack Autonomous Red Agent (Sara) from scratch definitely had some trial and error. The post Build vs. Buy AI Pentesting: Why Dow Chose to Partner With Synack appeared first on Synack .
A use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel bridge (net/bridge) Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) implementation. A bridge that is administratively down while kernel STP is enabled, together with a port driven into the LEARNING state, arms periodic STP timers without an IFF\_UP guard. The teardown path taken by dellink never synchronously deletes those timers, so the backing net\_device (which embeds struct net bridge as private data) is freed with a timer list still queued on a per-CPU timer base. The result is a slab use-after-free in the kmalloc-cg-8k cache.
EtherRAT off a The Gentlemen staging server. C2 resolution is the fun part: no hardcoded domains. The sample holds an Ethereum contract address + call selector and pulls the active C2 from the contract via public RPC endpoints. Every operator rotation is a contract write, so the full history is recoverable, five domains here. Tasking has no fixed command set. Any response over ten chars is thrown into a new async function with require, process, Buffer, etc. in scope, so arbitrary JS in the user context. Polls use random file-like paths (png/css/ico) to blend in, tell is a custom X-Bot-Server header. MSI drops a Node bootstrapper + XOR-encrypted backdoor, decoder writes plaintext and sets a Run key relaunching via headless conhost. Full write-up with hashes and IOCs: [https://hunt.io/blog/the-gentlemen-etherrat-ethereum-smart-contract-c2](https://hunt.io/blog/the-gentlemen-etherrat-ethereum-smart-contract-c2)
Facing a growing drone threat, the Pentagon is poised to sign a first-of-its-kind contract for “Enduring High Energy Lasers”—and make directed energy weapons an official part of the Army’s kit.
Technical analysis of Parivahan App ( shared on ScamIndia by /u/ImpressiveYouth3990 couple of days back )
# Fake mParivahan : Malware Analysis Report # 422 Users are affected by it till now ( I was able to get the attackers admin panel ) **Classification:** Critical : Android SMS / UPI spyware RAT **Method:** Static reverse engineering of dropper + payload; no-root payload extraction; StringFog decryption; read-only Firebase C2 IOC enumeration # 1. Executive summary Marketed as **“M Parivahan”** is a **two-stage Android malware** operation: 1. **Dropper** (`com.ioaheishsbsb.ljgcdfhm`) : NP Manager–packed installer with a fake VPN / WebView UI that decrypts and sideloads an embedded APK (`output.apk`). 2. **Payload** (`com.veaheishsbsb.kekskks`) : Sketchware-style SMS/call spyware with **Firebase Realtime Database** command-and-control and **Telegram** first-run alerts. The payload steals SMS and device telemetry, can forward SMS and calls, and can send SMS from the victim’s SIM (commonly abused for UPI / OTP fraud). At the time of analysis the Firebase panel was r**everse engineered too** and contained **422** client device IDs. # 2. Sample identification |Field|Stage 1 (Dropper)|Stage 2 (Payload)| |:-|:-|:-| |Package|`com.ioaheishsbsb.ljgcdfhm`|`com.veaheishsbsb.kekskks`| |Related / alias|`com.mr_fox.bhai`|Label: “M Parivahan”| |Application class|NP Manager shell|`np.protect.assets.ShellApplication`| |Protection|NP Manager (`libnp_protect_res.so`, xhook)|NP Manager + StringFog XOR| |UI|Fake VPN + `file:///android_asset/main_ui.html`|Permission / settings-style UX| |Embedded artifact|Logical asset `output.apk` (encrypted on disk)|—| |SDK|—|minSdk 21, targetSdk 28, compileSdk 33| |Build leftover|—|Synthetic names: `dApp-binance-Trading-Signals`| **Related package queried by dropper:** [`com.avejfhdhd.android`](http://com.avejfhdhd.android) # 3. Infection chain Victim sideloads fake “mParivahan” APK │ ▼ Dropper (NP Manager) decrypts embedded payload │ ▼ Writes temp_info.apk / temp_install.apk → installs com.veaheishsbsb.kekskks │ ▼ Payload requests SMS / phone permissions │ ▼ MyService enrolls device on Firebase + dumps ~50 SMS │ ▼ Telegram alert to operator bot/chat │ ▼ Listens on clients/<deviceId>/webhookEvent for remote commands **Extraction note:** Static decrypt of the packed dropper blob failed due to native crypto. Payload was recovered without device root by patching the unpack path to `getExternalFilesDir` and pulling `/sdcard/Android/data/com.ioaheishsbsb.ljgcdfhm/files/temp_info.apk`. # 4. Capabilities |Capability|Severity|Detail| |:-|:-|:-| |SMS theft|Critical|Intercepts inbound/outbound SMS; uploads to `messages/<deviceId>`| |SMS forward|Critical|Relays SMS to operator number (`SmsForwardTo`)| |Remote SMS send|Critical|Sends SMS from chosen SIM (`sendSms` webhook)| |Call forwarding|High|USSD `**21*<number>#` / `##21#`| |Device fingerprinting|High|Model, Android version, root, storage, CPU, carrier, public IP, SIMs, battery, MSISDN| |Telegram notify|High|First-run HTML report to admin bot/chat| |Persistence|High|Foreground service, boot/alarm receivers, restart in `onDestroy`| |Keylogger flag|Medium|`KeyLogger` webhook present; appears stubbed/partial| # 5. Remote command surface **Listener path:** `clients/<androidId>/webhookEvent/` |Command key|Fields|Action| |:-|:-|:-| |`callForward`|`from`, `to`, `isActive`|Activate/deactivate call forward via USSD| |`smsForward`|`from`, `to`, `isActive`|Toggle SMS forward preference| |`sendSms`|`from`, `to`, `message`, `isSended`|Send SMS from victim SIM| |`checkLiveness`|`text=ping`|Reply `pong` under webhook| |`KeyLogger`|`isActive`|Preference flag (partial implementation)| Presence uses `clients/<id>/status` with Firebase `.info/connected` \+ `onDisconnect`. # 6. C2 infrastructure & IOCs # 6.1 Firebase |Item|Value| |:-|:-| |RTDB URL|`REMOVED I HAVE IT, IF ANY OFFICAL IS READING IT, PLEASE REACH OUT ASAP`| |API key|`REMOVED I HAVE IT, IF ANY OFFICAL IS READING IT, PLEASE REACH OUT ASAP`| |App ID|`REMOVED I HAVE IT, IF ANY OFFICAL IS READING IT, PLEASE REACH OUT ASAP`| |Storage|`REMOVED I HAVE IT, IF ANY OFFICAL IS READING IT, PLEASE REACH OUT ASAP`| |Top-level nodes|`clients`, `messages`, `devices`, `deviceMessages`| |Clients observed|**422** (2026-08-04, shallow enumeration)| |Rules posture|Open / world-readable (IOC check succeeded without auth)| # 6.2 Firebase path map |Path|Purpose| |:-|:-| |`clients/<androidId>`|Device profile enrollment| |`clients/<androidId>/status`|Online/offline| |`clients/<androidId>/webhookEvent/*`|Command inbox| |`messages/<androidId>/<timestamp>`|Stolen SMS| |`.info/connected`|Connectivity watch| # 6.3 Telegram |Item|Value| |:-|:-| |Endpoint|`https://api.telegram.org/bot<token>/sendMessage`| |Bot token|`REMOVED I HAVE IT, IF ANY OFFICAL IS READING IT, PLEASE REACH OUT ASAP`| |Admin chat ID|`REMOVED I HAVE IT, IF ANY OFFICAL IS READING IT, PLEASE REACH OUT ASAP`| |Config source|Raw resource `Loda` (obfuscated APK path `ۦ/ۥ۟`)| { "chatIDs": ["REMOVED I HAVE IT, IF ANY OFFICAL IS READING IT, PLEASE REACH OUT ASAP"], "tokens": ["REMOVED I HAVE IT, IF ANY OFFICAL IS READING IT, PLEASE REACH OUT ASAP"], "workSuccess": 1 } Only **one** admin chat/token pair is embedded in the sample. # 7. Attacker / mule phone numbers **Not hardcoded in the APK.** Numbers are pushed via Firebase webhooks at runtime. From live `clients/*/webhookEvent` (`smsForward` / `sendSms` `to` fields), 2026-08-04: |Number|Hits|Observed role| |:-|:-|:-| |**8789**\*\*\*\*\*|**6**|**Primary SMS forward target (strongest IOC)**| |9279\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*|2|SMS forward + sendSms| |8340\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*|2|SMS forward| |9522\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*|2|sendSms| |9279\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*|1|sendSms (same line as 927\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* with country code)| |8712\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*|1 each|sendSms / UPI-style collect| |9211\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*|1 each|sendSms / UPI-style collect| |8291\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*|1|sendSms / UPI-style collect| |Others (one-offs)|1|Mixed sendSms destinations| **Primary SMS-intercept candidate:** `8789`\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* UPI collect destinations may be money-mule wallets rather than the panel operator’s personal line. # 8. Persistence & stealth # Components (payload) * Activities: `MainActivity`, `PermissionRequestActivity`, `DebugActivity` * Service: `MyService` (foreground; `FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MEDIA_PLAYBACK`) * Receivers: `SmsReceiver`, `BootReceiver`, `AlarmReceiver`, `MultiEventReceiver`, `BatteryLevelReceiver` * Persistent notification text: **“System Settings is Running…”** # Obfuscation / hardening * NP Manager resource and path mangling * StringFog (Base64 + XOR with key `UTF-8`) * Dropper encrypted asset (non-standard ZIP compression) * `usesCleartextTraffic="true"`, `allowBackup="true"` # 9. Dangerous permissions (payload) * `INTERNET`, `ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE`, `ACCESS_WIFI_STATE`, `CHANGE_*` * `READ_SMS`, `RECEIVE_SMS`, `SEND_SMS`, `DELETE_SMS`, `BROADCAST_SMS` * `CALL_PHONE`, `READ_PHONE_STATE`, `READ_PHONE_NUMBERS` * `RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED`, `WAKE_LOCK` * `FOREGROUND_SERVICE`, `FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MEDIA_PLAYBACK` * `REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS`, `POST_NOTIFICATIONS` # 10. Key payload classes |Class|Role| |:-|:-| |`MyService`|Core RAT: enroll, listen, process commands| |`SmsReceiver`|SMS intercept / forward / Firebase write| |`TelegramBotUtils`|HTTP Telegram `sendMessage`| |`AdminInfo`|Load bot token ↔ chat ID map| |`callForwardingUtility`|USSD call forward| |`SmsHelper` / `SMSRetriever`|Send SMS / dump inbox| |`DeviceInfoUtil` / `SimInfoUtil`|Fingerprint + public IP| |`SharedPrefManager`|`isFirst`, `isSmsForward`, `SmsForwardTo`, flags| |`BootReceiver` / `AlarmReceiver`|Keep-alive| # 11. MITRE ATT&CK (Mobile) mapping |ID|Technique|Evidence| |:-|:-|:-| |T1660|Phishing / fake app|mParivahan brand abuse| |T1406|Obfuscated files or information|NP Manager + StringFog| |T1624|Event triggered execution|`BOOT_COMPLETED`, `SMS_RECEIVED`| |T1517|Access notifications / SMS|SMS permissions + receivers| |T1437|Application layer protocol|Firebase + Telegram HTTPS| |T1636|Protected user data|SMS, MSISDN, SIM info| |T1428|Exploit via SMS / USSD|`sendSms`, `**21*`| |T1409|Stored application data|SharedPreferences C2 flags| |T1625|Hijack execution flow / packer|`ShellApplication` dropper|
Intro In 2024 I released the initial version of Pipeleek. At the time the tool was a simple GitLab CI/CD pipeline secrets scanner, not much more. Since then, it has evolved quite a bit: I’ve added support for new CI/CD platforms, integrated the Renovate security research published last year, and built a range of helper commands on top of the scanner. Today it’s time to release version 1.0 of Pipeleek! Features Secret Scanner Platform Additions At its core Pipeleek is still a secrets scanner for exposed credentials in CI/CD pipelines. While many products scan for secrets at the version control level, Pipeleek covers leaked credentials in pipeline logs and artifacts. With version 1, Pipeleek supports the following CI/CD platforms: GitLab GitHub Bitbucket Azure DevOps Gitea CircleCI Jenkins Pentest Helpers
On August 4, 2026, several popular npm packages, including 'keyv', were compromised to deliver malware.