Two security flaws in Paperclip could let attackers execute commands on a network server or a developer's computer. Paperclip is an open-source control plane for teams of artificial intelligence (AI) agents, and both paths rely on importing a malicious agent and starting it. A third flaw could expose sensitive data and control-plane details through application programming interface (API) routes
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Sam Rhea is Cloudflare’s Chief Information Officer. I knew we had a problem about six months ago when a member of our sales organization reached out to me asking for API keys. Keys plural. They used AI to build what they described as a SuperApp that would transform our go-to-market teams. All they needed was production access to about a dozen systems of record at Cloudflare and admin permissions to a deployment pipeline to make it work. We had taken a fairly cautious approach to rolling out AI at Cloudflare during 2025. We deployed informational chat applications and tinkered with using AI to help write some boilerplate code, but we felt that the technology was not ready to change how we work. And then, over the course of a few days at the end of last year, better models and more powerful harnesses changed that calculus. AI agents could do things, and they could do them well. Hundreds of team members across Cloudflare, in technical and non-technical roles, spent the quieter weeks around the New Year experimenting with new tools that made it easier than ever to build. That sales team member building their SuperApp was just the first in an avalanche of people raising their hands to use these tools to transform how they get things done. We had an obligation to equip and enable them to do so. But we also had an obligation to keep our systems, internal data, and customer data safe. We have spent the last several months building a platform to do exactly that inside of Cloudflare. We call it Cloudflare OS. We started by stitching together off-the-shelf components from our Developer and Zero Trust platforms like Cloudflare Workers and Access . As we learned more about the challenge, we also created custom
A memory corruption flaw in the Linux kernel's Open vSwitch datapath gives ordinary local users a path to root on a broad set of default-configured distributions, and a public exploit ships with pre-built records for roughly 800 kernel builds. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-64531 (CVSS score: 7.8) and codenamed OVSwrap by its discoverer, was disclosed by security researcher Asim
An agent running Anthropic's Claude Mythos 5 spent 34 hours trying to get a malware dropper merged into a real open-source project during a cyber evaluation by the UK's AI Security Institute. When a bystander publicly warned that the code was malicious, the agent denied it, force-pushed a rewritten branch history to erase the evidence, and posted from a second account it controlled to vouch for
A credential-stealing npm worm that first appeared in keyv@6.0.0 spread beyond the Keyv and Cacheable namespaces into hundreds of packages across multiple organizations on August 4, 2026. SafeDep verified 353 poisoned versions across 79 package names in the npm registry. Its monitoring put the wider footprint at 442 versions across 353 names, while Aikido later reported at least 868 packages
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Wednesday, August 5
A lawsuit accuses Homeland Security of violating protesters’ free-speech rights—but the agency is using it to try to get access to the plaintiffs’ encrypted communications.
Hi guys, I send out a weekly newsletter with the latest cybersecurity vendor reports and research, and thought you might find it useful, so sharing it here. All the reports and research below were published between July 27th - August 2nd. You can get the below into your inbox every week if you want: [https://www.cybersecstats.com/cybersecstatsnewsletter/](https://www.cybersecstats.com/cybersecstatsnewsletter/) # Big Picture Reports **2026 Cost of a Data Breach Report (IBM)** IBM's annual breach cost report, with interesting data points on how much AI is now involved in attacks, and how much more expensive that makes breaches. **Key stats:** * 25% of malicious breaches were AI-enabled. * AI-enabled breaches cost an average of $6 million, roughly $1 million more than the global average of $4.99 million. * AI-enabled malicious breaches increased by 56% over the previous year. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/42d4e107?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* **IR Trends Q2 2026 (Cisco Talos)** Cisco Talos on what showed up in their incident response engagements this quarter. **Key stats:** * Phishing was the primary means of gaining initial access in over half of engagements this quarter, up from approximately one-third last quarter. * Authentication abuse was observed in 65% of engagements this quarter, up from 35% last quarter. * Insufficient logging and visibility was observed in 42% of engagements this quarter, up from 18% last quarter. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/0c72abdd?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* # Ransomware **Q2 2026 Ransomware Trends Report (BlackFog)** BlackFog's Q2 numbers on ransomware. **Key stats:** * 93 ransomware groups were active in Q2 2026, including 28 newly formed groups. * 97% of disclosed ransomware incidents in Q2 2026 involved data exfiltration, the highest rate recorded. * Undisclosed ransomware attacks increased 40% year on year to 2,027 attacks in Q2 2026 from 1,446 in Q2 2025. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/1b5113d5?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* **Ransomware Evolution Report Q2 2026 (Halcyon)** Halcyon's Q2 ransomware numbers. **Key stats:** * Q2 2026 recorded 1,988 ransomware attack claims from 89 groups across 101 countries. * The US accounted for 42.5% of ransomware claims, Canada for 5% and Germany for 4.8%. * Manufacturing (19.8%) was the most targeted industry, followed by construction (10.1%) and business services (9.0%). *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/5b19312c?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* # AI Governance **The AI Governance Gap Report (Pathlock)** If you were wondering whether AI governance is keeping up with how quickly AI agents are being embedded in business systems, this report has the answer. **Key stats:** * 38% of organizations allow AI agents to create and modify business records. * 51% are not confident they know all the AI agents operating in their systems. * 79% have no dedicated AI governance team or officer. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/584455ba?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* # AI Code Security **2026 GenAI Code Security Report (Veracode)** Veracode tested 11 AI coding models to see how often they write secure code. **Key stats:** * The average security pass rate for AI-generated code across tracked models was 56%. * AI-generated code fails security checks nearly 44% of the time when given no security-specific guidance. * The best model available (OpenAI's GPT-5.5, at 68%) still failed nearly one in three security tasks. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/efb179b6?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* # Credentials **Credential Risk Report (Enzoic)** How much do you care about stolen credentials? If you're like most orgs, probably a lot. But do you actually do anything about it? Again, if you're like most orgs, probably not. **Key stats:** * 85% of organizations view stolen credentials as a top threat. * Only 19% continuously monitor credential integrity and automatically remediate exposure. * 73% of organizations have found their workforce's credentials in breach, Dark Web, or infostealer data in the past year. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/cd978377?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* # Autonomous Defense **2026 State of Autonomous Defense Report (Kai)** Attackers are moving at machine speed. Defenders are… not. **Key stats:** * 89% of security leaders say their organization is prepared for AI-driven attacks, but only 28% describe themselves as very prepared. * 63% believe attackers currently have the advantage because of AI. * 52% identify lack of trust in automated decisions as the biggest barrier to broader automation adoption. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/6a134caa?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* **Action1 2026 Survey Report: AI Impact on Sysadmins (Action1)** An interesting survey of sysadmins about how much AI they're using versus how much they thought they'd be using by now. **Key stats:** * In 2024, 52% of sysadmins predicted full automation within two years. * In 2026, AI use is highest among sysadmins in log analysis (50%) and troubleshooting (47%). * 23% report never using AI professionally. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/8c64542f?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* # Vulnerability Management **VulnCheck State of Exploitation 1H-2026 (VulnCheck)** VulnCheck's mid-year look at what's actually getting exploited, how fast, and whether AI really is finding vulnerabilities faster than everyone else. **Key stats:** * The median time from CVE publication to KEV fell from 120 days in 2025 to 80 days in the first half of 2026. * In the first half of 2026, 23.43% of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities showed evidence of exploitation on or before the day the CVE was published. * Across Anthropic and Berkeley datasets, 1,061 vulnerabilities were attributed to AI-assisted discovery, but only 14 (1.3%) were confirmed as exploited in the wild. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/7ae8e988?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* # Infrastructure **State of CPS Security: Data Center Exposures (Claroty)** Scary research on how badly exposed data center physical infrastructure is. **Key stats:** * Nearly 1 in 5 data center CPS assets are one hop away from systems making outbound connections that could provide attackers a pathway. * 88% of building management systems in data centers are exposed via communication over insecure protocols. * More than 80% of OT control systems, power monitoring systems, and IoT systems in data centers communicate over legacy, insecure protocols such as BACnet and MODBUS. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/7071931f?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* # Enterprise Perspective **State of Enterprise AI Failures 2026 (ChatSee.ai)** What's going wrong with enterprise AI. **Key stats:** * Hallucination-related failures accounted for less than 10% of observed enterprise AI failure events. * Resolution and escalation breakdowns represented 31.1% of observed enterprise AI failures. * Action and execution failures increased by approximately 62% relative to the Q2 2024 baseline. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/de24c151?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* **The State of AI, Security and ERP (Onapsis)** A survey of cybersecurity leaders at large US organizations running SAP, Oracle, or Salesforce to see how fast AI is being pushed into ERP systems and how far behind the security is (very). **Key stats:** * 86% of organizations have already integrated, or will shortly integrate, AI directly into their ERP code. * 22% of organizations experienced a security incident in the last twelve months where bad actors used AI to exploit their critical business platforms. * 70.6% of senior cybersecurity leaders have only some or no trust in AI applications and agents to secure their organization's most business-critical data. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/93dc94b5?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* **2026 Global Mobile Threat Report (Zimperium)** A look at mobile attacks on enterprises. **Key stats:** * Phishing events detected on employee mobile devices have grown 380% since January 2025. * The number of mobile devices where employees clicked a malicious link grew 110% in 2025 compared to 2024. * AI adoption within mobile applications has grown 14x on Android and 7x on iOS. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/4c20dd18?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.* # Industry-specific **Global Automotive Threat Intelligence Report Q2 2026 (PCA Cyber Security)** Analysis of the automotive threat landscape for Q2 2026, tracking vulnerability data alongside underground forums, ransomware leak sites, and criminal marketplaces. **Key stats:** * 345 unique automotive vulnerabilities in Q2 2026, a 30% rise on Q1 and 220% up year on year. * High severity findings more than doubled, from 75 to 161. * Qilin ransomware listed a major Japanese Tier-1 automotive components manufacturer, hitting its European and North African subsidiaries. *Read the full report* [*here*](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/0d3d8182?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39)*.*
Security researcher James Kettle tried to push the limit of AI’s hacking abilities—and discovered how effective it can be when combined with human expertise.
A macOS ClickFix operation spanning more than 250 front-end domains now fingerprints visitors before deciding whether to show them a malware lure, a change Microsoft Threat Intelligence tracked on infrastructure it had been watching for weeks. The server-side gate hides the malicious page from crawlers and sandboxes while presenting selected Mac users with a fake software download. Microsoft
OpenAI said it disrupted a Cambodia-based scam operation that used its generative artificial intelligence (AI) chatbot ChatGPT to facilitate a wide range of investment, romance, gambling, and law enforcement impersonation schemes. To that end, it banned a coordinated network of ChatGPT accounts likely originating from Southeast Asia and operating from the city of Poipet, a region with extensive
Homeland Security told immigrants that leaving the US would wipe out fines it claims they owe. Now it wants private investigators to find them in their home countries and collect.
More than 50 offending image and video ads were published across Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, or Threads, according to Meta’s ad library data. Some ran as recently as this week.
Two security flaws in Paperclip could let attackers execute commands on a network server or a developer's computer. Paperclip is an open-source control plane for teams of artificial intelligence (AI) agents, and both paths rely on importing a malicious agent and starting it. A third flaw could expose sensitive data and control-plane details through application programming interface (API) routes
Synack Red Team researcher Malcolm Stagg takes the stage at Black Hat USA 2026 on August 6 to present three years of independent research on a new class of network infrastructure attacks. Here's who he is and why the talk belongs on your calendar. The post From DARPA to Black Hat: An SRT Researcher’s Next Chapter appeared first on Synack .
Django's admin auto-linked URLField values without validating the scheme — a stored javascript: value rendered as a live link. Fixed in 6.0.8 and 5.2.17.
HashiCorp, Veeam, and the Django Software Foundation have patched 11 vulnerabilities across Terraform MCP Server, Veeam Service Provider Console, and Django. The three most serious: An unauthenticated flaw in Veeam's console that hands over a managed agent's credentials, rated 9.5 A cross-tenant flaw in HashiCorp's MCP server that lets one user's Terraform token be reused for later users'
To hear both sides of the build vs buy debate around AI pentesting solutions, we spoke with Dow's cyber engineering team lead Dan Lacher and Synack's CTO Mark Kuhr. From Dow's perspective, Synack served as a force multiplier for a small internal red team. Meanwhile, building the Synack Autonomous Red Agent (Sara) from scratch definitely had some trial and error. The post Build vs. Buy AI Pentesting: Why Dow Chose to Partner With Synack appeared first on Synack .
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged an evolution of the EtherHiding blockchain-based command-and-control (C2) technique that conceals the C2 server IP address inside a made-up destination address of a completely empty Ethereum transfer. The new dead drop resolver approach, observed in two trojanized npm packages "bianira-ui" and "fluid-type-ui," has been codenamed NullReceiver by
For the last twelve years, enterprise security has moved away from trusting the network. BeyondCorp made the case that a request's origin, inside the corporate perimeter or on the open Internet, should not decide whether it is allowed. Identity and device health should. That model won: it now underpins much of Zero Trust. Google’s BeyondCorp assumed a specific principal: a human at a device, acting at human speed. Organizations are now deploying agents , software principals that reason, act, and reach into systems on our behalf. A task-scoped agent run is ephemeral. It ends when its work is done. A long-lived agent service may handle many such tasks and move data far faster than a person. The controls we built for humans do not fail loudly when we point them at agents. They fail quietly, by granting too much, seeing too little, and trusting for too long. This paper proposes an access model for agents: the Agent Access Model (AAM) . We describe the model and show how its components can be built. We then walk through a concrete example and separate the single-principal controls available today from the harder problem of multiplayer access control . Much of the current work tries to make each access decision smarter. AAM takes a different approach: make the agent's capability smaller, so there is less to judge in the first place. The shift A decade ago, the hard question in enterprise security was where is this request coming from, and do I trust that place? BeyondCorp's answer was that you should not trust the place at all. You authenticate the user, interrogate the device, and make an access decision for that specific request. Location became one signal among many, not a verdict. That reframing worked because the principal was legible. A human logs in each morning, carries a device or two, works at human speed, and generates a trickle of access decisions a s
Sam Rhea is Cloudflare’s Chief Information Officer. I knew we had a problem about six months ago when a member of our sales organization reached out to me asking for API keys. Keys plural. They used AI to build what they described as a SuperApp that would transform our go-to-market teams. All they needed was production access to about a dozen systems of record at Cloudflare and admin permissions to a deployment pipeline to make it work. We had taken a fairly cautious approach to rolling out AI at Cloudflare during 2025. We deployed informational chat applications and tinkered with using AI to help write some boilerplate code, but we felt that the technology was not ready to change how we work. And then, over the course of a few days at the end of last year, better models and more powerful harnesses changed that calculus. AI agents could do things, and they could do them well. Hundreds of team members across Cloudflare, in technical and non-technical roles, spent the quieter weeks around the New Year experimenting with new tools that made it easier than ever to build. That sales team member building their SuperApp was just the first in an avalanche of people raising their hands to use these tools to transform how they get things done. We had an obligation to equip and enable them to do so. But we also had an obligation to keep our systems, internal data, and customer data safe. We have spent the last several months building a platform to do exactly that inside of Cloudflare. We call it Cloudflare OS. We started by stitching together off-the-shelf components from our Developer and Zero Trust platforms like Cloudflare Workers and Access . As we learned more about the challenge, we also created custom
Let’s imagine the Case of the Endlessly Closing Tickets. The bug tickets start closing at noon. Nobody thinks much of it. Joe moved a few tickets to Done, and Joe is having a productive afternoon. Then the pace picks up. By 4 p.m., thousands of tickets have been closed, all by Joe. Joe is a good engineer. Joe is not a thousand-tickets-an-hour engineer. We learn that he has several background agents running across three concurrent sessions. It takes half an hour to find the one at fault: a cleanup task with a prompt that was a little too broad. Once we’ve stopped the agent, we need to repair the state of the ticketing system. Joe has also been legitimately closing tickets by hand that afternoon. The system records all those changes under Joe regardless of whether it was him or his agent, and the network logs do not distinguish one agent session from another. From the outside, the actions look identical. The example above is relatively low-stakes, but we can all imagine, or read about , much more destructive cases. An agent with access to contract software could amend an agreement. An agent wreaking havoc in a support queue could send hundreds of replies to customers. An agent with database access could drop entire tables. At Cloudflare, we knew we could not depend on every employee to configure every agent perfectly or watch every tool call. So before expanding write access across our own internal MCP servers, we built WriteGuard. We are now bringing those controls to Cloudflare MCP server portals through a private beta. MCP Fundamentals Before explaining WriteGuard, let’s review what an MCP server is and how it works with AI
When you look at your AI bill, it can be hard to tell if anything is amiss. You first need a baseline so you can see what has changed, whether it’s an agent that’s gone wild or an employee whose usage has spiked 10x. Being able to spot those shifts lets you start investigating, and so far, it’s been hard to see them. Knowing who is doing what with AI is one of the key challenges organizations are confronting right now. One report from Stanford University found that 59% of organizations said knowledge gaps were their biggest obstacle to responsible AI governance. This is a security problem as much as a financial one. Solving these issues takes two things: a verified identity on every request (so a spike has a name behind it), and a picture of what normal looks like for that identity. Today we're announcing both. Identity-aware AI Gateway with Cloudflare Access is now in open beta, and User Insights is generally available to every AI Gateway customer at no additional cost. Together they turn the traffic already flowing through AI Gateway into a behavioral baseline for every person and agent using it, and identify the ones that break from it. What is AI Gateway? AI Gateway is the central control plane for all of your AI usage. Instead of every app and team calling models on OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, or Workers AI directly, requests route through AI Gateway first, giving you one place to observe, secure, and govern all your AI usage. It works with the applications you build, and with the coding tools your developers already live in. Route agent harnesses like Claud
A memory corruption flaw in the Linux kernel's Open vSwitch datapath gives ordinary local users a path to root on a broad set of default-configured distributions, and a public exploit ships with pre-built records for roughly 800 kernel builds. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-64531 (CVSS score: 7.8) and codenamed OVSwrap by its discoverer, was disclosed by security researcher Asim
Kali365 is turning a legitimate Microsoft login into a gateway to corporate data. The phishing kit targets US organizations with attacker-controlled device codes that victims approve on Microsoft's real authentication page. Once access and refresh tokens are issued, attackers may retain access to email, documents, and cloud resources, creating a direct path to data exposure, financial fraud,
GitGuardian researchers found 321 n8n instances accepting API tokens exposed in public GitHub commits and demonstrated four ways attackers could use them to access sensitive data and downstream credentials without exploiting a software vulnerability. We scanned public GitHub commits for exposed n8n API tokens and identified 4,576 unique credentials associated with 1,255 hostnames. Of the 896
A cluster of 77 extensions on the Open VSX marketplace has been found to impersonate legitimate developer tools while transmitting information about the systems and development environments on which they were installed. The "evil twin" extensions were uploaded to the repository between July 26 and August 1, 2026, according to Manifold Security. The packages have been removed from Open VSX as of
A use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel bridge (net/bridge) Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) implementation. A bridge that is administratively down while kernel STP is enabled, together with a port driven into the LEARNING state, arms periodic STP timers without an IFF\_UP guard. The teardown path taken by dellink never synchronously deletes those timers, so the backing net\_device (which embeds struct net bridge as private data) is freed with a timer list still queued on a per-CPU timer base. The result is a slab use-after-free in the kmalloc-cg-8k cache.
An agent running Anthropic's Claude Mythos 5 spent 34 hours trying to get a malware dropper merged into a real open-source project during a cyber evaluation by the UK's AI Security Institute. When a bystander publicly warned that the code was malicious, the agent denied it, force-pushed a rewritten branch history to erase the evidence, and posted from a second account it controlled to vouch for
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), on August 5, 2026, added three flaws to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, citing evidence of active exploitation in the wild. The list of vulnerabilities is as follows - CVE-2026-9198 (CVSS score: 9.8) - A code injection vulnerability in Langflow that allows unauthenticated attackers to achieve full remote
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed what has been described as a "long-standing supply chain attack" on QuickFox, a virtual private network (VPN) and network acceleration tool designed for overseas Chinese users. According to Fortinet FortiGuard Labs, the supply chain attack has been ongoing since at least August 2025 and involves a trojanized version of the application to deliver FDMTP, a
Tuesday, August 4
Rogue AI agents from OpenAI and Anthropic have again been caught trying to disrupt servers and software—and leaving instructions for future bad behavior.
I wanted to post this in here because everyone’s saying that it was Wi-Fi that got hacked and it actually wasn’t. There’s a breakdown on this page about what actually happened.
EtherRAT off a The Gentlemen staging server. C2 resolution is the fun part: no hardcoded domains. The sample holds an Ethereum contract address + call selector and pulls the active C2 from the contract via public RPC endpoints. Every operator rotation is a contract write, so the full history is recoverable, five domains here. Tasking has no fixed command set. Any response over ten chars is thrown into a new async function with require, process, Buffer, etc. in scope, so arbitrary JS in the user context. Polls use random file-like paths (png/css/ico) to blend in, tell is a custom X-Bot-Server header. MSI drops a Node bootstrapper + XOR-encrypted backdoor, decoder writes plaintext and sets a Run key relaunching via headless conhost. Full write-up with hashes and IOCs: [https://hunt.io/blog/the-gentlemen-etherrat-ethereum-smart-contract-c2](https://hunt.io/blog/the-gentlemen-etherrat-ethereum-smart-contract-c2)
Now, it is possible to query phishing-suspect FQDNs through the free API, featuring database information on WHOIS, IP, Geolocation, and threat mapping [https://github.com/julioliraup/AT/wiki/REST-API-USE](https://github.com/julioliraup/AT/wiki/REST-API-USE) A frontend interface is also available: [https://julioliraup.github.io/AT](https://julioliraup.github.io/AT)
The commercial phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) toolkit known as Greatness has become the latest crimeware solution to add support for device code phishing, a rapidly growing cyber threat that abuses the legitimate OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant to bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and seize control of user accounts. "Greatness supports AiTM [adversary-in-the-middle] credential and
Facing a growing drone threat, the Pentagon is poised to sign a first-of-its-kind contract for “Enduring High Energy Lasers”—and make directed energy weapons an official part of the Army’s kit.
- [ChainDrop npm Worm: Bun-loaded CI/CD credential harvester with Ethereum dead-drop C2](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/chaindrop-npm-worm) - [Popular npm Packages in the keyv and Cacheable Namespaces Compromised in Active Supply Chain Attack](https://socket.dev/blog/popular-npm-packages-in-the-keyv-and-cacheable-namespaces-compromised-in-active-supply-chain) - [npm Worm Poisons 400+ Packages Across Nine Organisations](https://safedep.io/keyv-npm-supply-chain-compromise/)
A credential-stealing npm worm that first appeared in keyv@6.0.0 spread beyond the Keyv and Cacheable namespaces into hundreds of packages across multiple organizations on August 4, 2026. SafeDep verified 353 poisoned versions across 79 package names in the npm registry. Its monitoring put the wider footprint at 442 versions across 353 names, while Aikido later reported at least 868 packages
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of an active, multi-wave campaign that employs social engineering lures themed around Adobe and Zoom software updates, business document reviews, and system maintenance utilities to stealthily deploy Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) programs like ConnectWise ScreenConnect. The campaign has been codenamed SMOKE#SCREEN by Securonix Threat
Engineering managers spent the past few decades figuring out ways for many programmers to work together on a shared codebase. This work dates all the way back to the “Systems Development Lifecycle” ( RAND, 1975 ) - today commonly referred to as the “Software Development Lifecycle” (SDLC), which defines the following phases: Plan Design Implement Test Deploy Maintain Retire AI has made the step that was previously the slowest and most expensive — implementation — the fastest and cheapest. That, in turn, has had an impact downstream: overwhelming the people responsible for all the other steps in the SDLC. This ranges from open-source maintainers bombarded with thousands of pull requests and issues, to production engineers trying to save production from falling over as the rate of software delivery increases orders of magnitude. We are all trying to save our systems, our customers, and ourselves from slop. The answer — paradoxically — is to empower agents to do more. It’s only fair! You’d never let an engineer on your team write code, expect someone else to validate it, merge it, deploy it, hold the pager in production, and triage incoming bugs. But that’s what most companies are doing right now with agents. Models have improved remarkably, and agents are running over longer time horizons, able to take on much larger tasks. But they are not yet used evenly across the SDLC. Cloudflare treats agents as our customers. They can buy domains , create temporary accounts and
Today, it is difficult for AI agents to try out new APIs. They often have to navigate through a login page designed for humans and not agents, contact a human to add a payment method, generate an API key, and then figure out how to call the API. This flow is very difficult for agents for two reasons: Agents do not have a stable identifier to sign up for an API, and they do not have a native way to pay for APIs. Because they lack these things, they often struggle to onboard onto software, which limits the growth of agentic commerce. AI agents often give up on these tasks entirely, kicking registration, payment methods, and API key generation back to humans. This makes it very difficult for agents to try out and compare many APIs. To solve this, we’ve created Cloudflare Wallets. Starting today, you can claim a Cloudflare Wallet handle for your account, which will provide a unique username to help you better connect with merchants. Soon, you will be able to set up and use your Cloudflare Wallet to pay for APIs and content. Earlier this month, we announced the Monetization Gateway to help Cloudflare customers get paid for their websites and applications. Monetization Gateway will support micropayments using the x402 protocol , which allows for payments to be attached to HTTP requests. These micropayments will be able to pay for uses ranging from AI inference to data to content. If you want to pay or get paid for services behind Monetization Gateway and other x402-compatible endpoints , you’ll need a wallet. Cloudflare Wallets will allow you to store s
We are moving toward a world in which you can store, build, test, and deploy your code fully on Cloudflare. We built the first piece with Artifacts , versioned code storage that scales to millions of repos. We have stitched the store, build, and deploy steps together with the CI SDK , built on Cloudflare Workflows , so that you can run your continuous integration (CI) pipeline on Cloudflare. You can send artifact push events directly to your Workflow, triggering an instance of its execution — a CI job, essentially — through a new events field in your wrangler configuration file. Then, directly from the Workflow with @cloudflare/ci installed, you can: Automate builds: compile code from your Artifacts repo in a safe, isolated environment Run linters and typechecks: enforce code style, catch type errors, and flag any potential issues Cache dependencies: run your install once and cache dependencies across steps in the CI job Execute unit tests: verify that each piece of your code works as expected Self-heal: integrate an AI review agent to catch broken steps in your build and push commits to fix Deploy conditionally: automatically deploy your code, only if your build step is successful Today, everyone is building a platform, whether it’s an internal vibe coding platform or an extension of your customer-facing product via customization through code.
Over the past four months, our AI code reviewer has flagged nearly a quarter of a million deviations from Cloudflare engineering standards (what we’ll call “violations” in this post) and blocked 16,000 merges. Our spec reviewer agent has evaluated close to 600 technical designs against the same standards before implementation began. Both systems draw from the Cloudflare Codex, a shared source of engineering guidance built for people and agents. This post explains why we built the Codex, how it supports the engineering lifecycle, and what we plan to do next. Before the Codex (which we briefly introduced in a previous post about our AI engineering stack), developer guidance at Cloudflare lived in many places: formal documentation, repository files, chat threads, and the accumulated knowledge of individual engineers. Engineers often spent too much time searching for guidance instead of working on the problem they were trying to solve. Even after finding an answer, they could not always tell whether it was current, authoritative, or applicable to their situation. As Cloudflare grew, that model became increasingly difficult to sustain. No engineer could read every standard, and reviewers could not reliably check every requirement. Institutional knowledge became harder to recover when people moved between teams, and guidance that was not consistently surfaced or enforced led to drift between projects. We rebuilt this body of knowledge as the Cloudflare Codex: a governed set of engineering standards that agents can retrieve and apply at the point of work. The same guidance can now inform code review, technical design review, incident report review, and many other use cases, while engineers focus their time and judgment on the resul
Starting today, wrangler dev and vite dev automatically capture OpenTelemetry traces for local Worker invocations. When Cloudflare's tooling detects an agent session, it points the agent to the Local Explorer API , a local debugging API where it can query those traces. You do not need to install an SDK, enable tracing, configure your agent, or even mention observability in the prompt. A prompt can be as simple as: This builds on years of investment in local development, from introducing Miniflare to making local mode the default in Wrangler 3 . Local traces give coding agents structured feedback from that development environment before code is deployed. Agents discover the Local Explorer API automatically As part of its normal workflow, an agent starts wrangler dev or vite dev to run and test the Worker. When the development server recognizes a supported coding-agent session, it automatically prints a hint that looks like this: The Local Explorer is a browser-based interface and REST API for viewing and editing local resource data and querying observability data during development. The API root serves an OpenAPI schema, so agents can discover available endpoint
Everyone is talking about software factories: the idea that AI agents can be assembled into a pipeline that produces working software on their own, the way a factory turns raw materials into finished goods. There’s endless debate over whether that’s actually possible, how far the automation can really go, and whether the “loops” people are demoing count for anything. Some have already written them off as a failure. Running alongside that is a quieter, more worried conversation: open source maintainers are burning out. The AI boom has made it nearly free to generate issues, pull requests, and security reports, and enormously expensive for a maintainer to read through them all. The old ways of keeping a project healthy are buckling under the volume. Everyone has a hot take on both topics. We think we have something rarer to offer: real results. For the past several months we’ve run an automated triage pipeline on the Astro repository. It reads incoming bug reports, reproduces them in sandboxes, diagnoses the root cause, and ships preview releases for the reporter to verify. The engine underneath it grew into Flue , an open framework for building this kind of agent automation, and it’s the same tool you could use to build your own. It wasn’t an instant success. But through a lot of iteration, we’ve used it to bring our open issues down from over 200 to about 30, and we expect to hit zero sometime in the next month. That would be the first time this repository has seen zero open issues in its 5+ year history. We didn’t get there by declaring "issue bankruptcy," auto-closing cold tickets, or ignoring reports. We did it by automating issue triage with a team of isolated AI subagents running right inside GitHub Actions. Here’s the story of how we got there, and what you might take back to your own projects. Sta
The cybersecurity industry has spent decades assuming that offensive capability scales with technical expertise. That assumption is starting to break. Security teams have long estimated risk by ranking attacker sophistication. Nation-state actors sat at one end. Organized criminal groups followed. Inexperienced attackers, dismissed as "script kiddies," sat at the other end, running public
Technical analysis of Parivahan App ( shared on ScamIndia by /u/ImpressiveYouth3990 couple of days back )
# Fake mParivahan : Malware Analysis Report # 422 Users are affected by it till now ( I was able to get the attackers admin panel ) **Classification:** Critical : Android SMS / UPI spyware RAT **Method:** Static reverse engineering of dropper + payload; no-root payload extraction; StringFog decryption; read-only Firebase C2 IOC enumeration # 1. Executive summary Marketed as **“M Parivahan”** is a **two-stage Android malware** operation: 1. **Dropper** (`com.ioaheishsbsb.ljgcdfhm`) : NP Manager–packed installer with a fake VPN / WebView UI that decrypts and sideloads an embedded APK (`output.apk`). 2. **Payload** (`com.veaheishsbsb.kekskks`) : Sketchware-style SMS/call spyware with **Firebase Realtime Database** command-and-control and **Telegram** first-run alerts. The payload steals SMS and device telemetry, can forward SMS and calls, and can send SMS from the victim’s SIM (commonly abused for UPI / OTP fraud). At the time of analysis the Firebase panel was r**everse engineered too** and contained **422** client device IDs. # 2. Sample identification |Field|Stage 1 (Dropper)|Stage 2 (Payload)| |:-|:-|:-| |Package|`com.ioaheishsbsb.ljgcdfhm`|`com.veaheishsbsb.kekskks`| |Related / alias|`com.mr_fox.bhai`|Label: “M Parivahan”| |Application class|NP Manager shell|`np.protect.assets.ShellApplication`| |Protection|NP Manager (`libnp_protect_res.so`, xhook)|NP Manager + StringFog XOR| |UI|Fake VPN + `file:///android_asset/main_ui.html`|Permission / settings-style UX| |Embedded artifact|Logical asset `output.apk` (encrypted on disk)|—| |SDK|—|minSdk 21, targetSdk 28, compileSdk 33| |Build leftover|—|Synthetic names: `dApp-binance-Trading-Signals`| **Related package queried by dropper:** [`com.avejfhdhd.android`](http://com.avejfhdhd.android) # 3. Infection chain Victim sideloads fake “mParivahan” APK │ ▼ Dropper (NP Manager) decrypts embedded payload │ ▼ Writes temp_info.apk / temp_install.apk → installs com.veaheishsbsb.kekskks │ ▼ Payload requests SMS / phone permissions │ ▼ MyService enrolls device on Firebase + dumps ~50 SMS │ ▼ Telegram alert to operator bot/chat │ ▼ Listens on clients/<deviceId>/webhookEvent for remote commands **Extraction note:** Static decrypt of the packed dropper blob failed due to native crypto. Payload was recovered without device root by patching the unpack path to `getExternalFilesDir` and pulling `/sdcard/Android/data/com.ioaheishsbsb.ljgcdfhm/files/temp_info.apk`. # 4. Capabilities |Capability|Severity|Detail| |:-|:-|:-| |SMS theft|Critical|Intercepts inbound/outbound SMS; uploads to `messages/<deviceId>`| |SMS forward|Critical|Relays SMS to operator number (`SmsForwardTo`)| |Remote SMS send|Critical|Sends SMS from chosen SIM (`sendSms` webhook)| |Call forwarding|High|USSD `**21*<number>#` / `##21#`| |Device fingerprinting|High|Model, Android version, root, storage, CPU, carrier, public IP, SIMs, battery, MSISDN| |Telegram notify|High|First-run HTML report to admin bot/chat| |Persistence|High|Foreground service, boot/alarm receivers, restart in `onDestroy`| |Keylogger flag|Medium|`KeyLogger` webhook present; appears stubbed/partial| # 5. Remote command surface **Listener path:** `clients/<androidId>/webhookEvent/` |Command key|Fields|Action| |:-|:-|:-| |`callForward`|`from`, `to`, `isActive`|Activate/deactivate call forward via USSD| |`smsForward`|`from`, `to`, `isActive`|Toggle SMS forward preference| |`sendSms`|`from`, `to`, `message`, `isSended`|Send SMS from victim SIM| |`checkLiveness`|`text=ping`|Reply `pong` under webhook| |`KeyLogger`|`isActive`|Preference flag (partial implementation)| Presence uses `clients/<id>/status` with Firebase `.info/connected` \+ `onDisconnect`. # 6. C2 infrastructure & IOCs # 6.1 Firebase |Item|Value| |:-|:-| |RTDB URL|`REMOVED I HAVE IT, IF ANY OFFICAL IS READING IT, PLEASE REACH OUT ASAP`| |API key|`REMOVED I HAVE IT, IF ANY OFFICAL IS READING IT, PLEASE REACH OUT ASAP`| |App ID|`REMOVED I HAVE IT, IF ANY OFFICAL IS READING IT, PLEASE REACH OUT ASAP`| |Storage|`REMOVED I HAVE IT, IF ANY OFFICAL IS READING IT, PLEASE REACH OUT ASAP`| |Top-level nodes|`clients`, `messages`, `devices`, `deviceMessages`| |Clients observed|**422** (2026-08-04, shallow enumeration)| |Rules posture|Open / world-readable (IOC check succeeded without auth)| # 6.2 Firebase path map |Path|Purpose| |:-|:-| |`clients/<androidId>`|Device profile enrollment| |`clients/<androidId>/status`|Online/offline| |`clients/<androidId>/webhookEvent/*`|Command inbox| |`messages/<androidId>/<timestamp>`|Stolen SMS| |`.info/connected`|Connectivity watch| # 6.3 Telegram |Item|Value| |:-|:-| |Endpoint|`https://api.telegram.org/bot<token>/sendMessage`| |Bot token|`REMOVED I HAVE IT, IF ANY OFFICAL IS READING IT, PLEASE REACH OUT ASAP`| |Admin chat ID|`REMOVED I HAVE IT, IF ANY OFFICAL IS READING IT, PLEASE REACH OUT ASAP`| |Config source|Raw resource `Loda` (obfuscated APK path `ۦ/ۥ۟`)| { "chatIDs": ["REMOVED I HAVE IT, IF ANY OFFICAL IS READING IT, PLEASE REACH OUT ASAP"], "tokens": ["REMOVED I HAVE IT, IF ANY OFFICAL IS READING IT, PLEASE REACH OUT ASAP"], "workSuccess": 1 } Only **one** admin chat/token pair is embedded in the sample. # 7. Attacker / mule phone numbers **Not hardcoded in the APK.** Numbers are pushed via Firebase webhooks at runtime. From live `clients/*/webhookEvent` (`smsForward` / `sendSms` `to` fields), 2026-08-04: |Number|Hits|Observed role| |:-|:-|:-| |**8789**\*\*\*\*\*|**6**|**Primary SMS forward target (strongest IOC)**| |9279\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*|2|SMS forward + sendSms| |8340\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*|2|SMS forward| |9522\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*|2|sendSms| |9279\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*|1|sendSms (same line as 927\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* with country code)| |8712\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*|1 each|sendSms / UPI-style collect| |9211\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*|1 each|sendSms / UPI-style collect| |8291\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*|1|sendSms / UPI-style collect| |Others (one-offs)|1|Mixed sendSms destinations| **Primary SMS-intercept candidate:** `8789`\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* UPI collect destinations may be money-mule wallets rather than the panel operator’s personal line. # 8. Persistence & stealth # Components (payload) * Activities: `MainActivity`, `PermissionRequestActivity`, `DebugActivity` * Service: `MyService` (foreground; `FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MEDIA_PLAYBACK`) * Receivers: `SmsReceiver`, `BootReceiver`, `AlarmReceiver`, `MultiEventReceiver`, `BatteryLevelReceiver` * Persistent notification text: **“System Settings is Running…”** # Obfuscation / hardening * NP Manager resource and path mangling * StringFog (Base64 + XOR with key `UTF-8`) * Dropper encrypted asset (non-standard ZIP compression) * `usesCleartextTraffic="true"`, `allowBackup="true"` # 9. Dangerous permissions (payload) * `INTERNET`, `ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE`, `ACCESS_WIFI_STATE`, `CHANGE_*` * `READ_SMS`, `RECEIVE_SMS`, `SEND_SMS`, `DELETE_SMS`, `BROADCAST_SMS` * `CALL_PHONE`, `READ_PHONE_STATE`, `READ_PHONE_NUMBERS` * `RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED`, `WAKE_LOCK` * `FOREGROUND_SERVICE`, `FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MEDIA_PLAYBACK` * `REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS`, `POST_NOTIFICATIONS` # 10. Key payload classes |Class|Role| |:-|:-| |`MyService`|Core RAT: enroll, listen, process commands| |`SmsReceiver`|SMS intercept / forward / Firebase write| |`TelegramBotUtils`|HTTP Telegram `sendMessage`| |`AdminInfo`|Load bot token ↔ chat ID map| |`callForwardingUtility`|USSD call forward| |`SmsHelper` / `SMSRetriever`|Send SMS / dump inbox| |`DeviceInfoUtil` / `SimInfoUtil`|Fingerprint + public IP| |`SharedPrefManager`|`isFirst`, `isSmsForward`, `SmsForwardTo`, flags| |`BootReceiver` / `AlarmReceiver`|Keep-alive| # 11. MITRE ATT&CK (Mobile) mapping |ID|Technique|Evidence| |:-|:-|:-| |T1660|Phishing / fake app|mParivahan brand abuse| |T1406|Obfuscated files or information|NP Manager + StringFog| |T1624|Event triggered execution|`BOOT_COMPLETED`, `SMS_RECEIVED`| |T1517|Access notifications / SMS|SMS permissions + receivers| |T1437|Application layer protocol|Firebase + Telegram HTTPS| |T1636|Protected user data|SMS, MSISDN, SIM info| |T1428|Exploit via SMS / USSD|`sendSms`, `**21*`| |T1409|Stored application data|SharedPreferences C2 flags| |T1625|Hijack execution flow / packer|`ShellApplication` dropper|
Intro In 2024 I released the initial version of Pipeleek. At the time the tool was a simple GitLab CI/CD pipeline secrets scanner, not much more. Since then, it has evolved quite a bit: I’ve added support for new CI/CD platforms, integrated the Renovate security research published last year, and built a range of helper commands on top of the scanner. Today it’s time to release version 1.0 of Pipeleek! Features Secret Scanner Platform Additions At its core Pipeleek is still a secrets scanner for exposed credentials in CI/CD pipelines. While many products scan for secrets at the version control level, Pipeleek covers leaked credentials in pipeline logs and artifacts. With version 1, Pipeleek supports the following CI/CD platforms: GitLab GitHub Bitbucket Azure DevOps Gitea CircleCI Jenkins Pentest Helpers
Monday, August 3
Internal documents show ICE's DNA collection has skyrocketed in the second Trump administration. Now hundreds of thousands of people never convicted of a crime are in an FBI criminal database forever.
Reverse engineered the Realtek RTS0177 USB SD card reader proprietary vendor protocol (F0 commands via SG_IO)
To reduce the amount of noise from questions, we have disabled self-posts in favor of a unified questions thread every week. Feel free to ask any question about reverse engineering here. If your question is about how to use a specific tool, or is specific to some particular target, you will have better luck on the [Reverse Engineering StackExchange](http://reverseengineering.stackexchange.com/). See also /r/AskReverseEngineering.
Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite Today, we welcome the 47th government onboarded to Have I Been Pwned’s free gov service: Nepal. Their National Cyber Security Centre now has access to monitor Nepalese government domains against the data in HIBP. This gives the NCSC the ability to identify exposure across government email addresses and respond quickly when those accounts appear in a new data breach. This is precisely what the HIBP government service was built for: helping national cyber teams strengthen threat monitoring and incident response capabilities by providing visibility into compromised credentials and breached accounts across their government domain space. Nepal joins a growing list of governments and national cybersecurity teams using HIBP to better understand their exposure, protect government departments and public resources, and reduce the risk posed by compromised credentials before attackers can take advantage.
Obfuscate using pure java bytecode virtual machine to interpret mutated java bytecodes of original java program.
Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite Apparently, Aussies are so obsessed with coffee that it's referred to as the coffee capital of the world down here (some bits, at least). "But what about Italy?" people ask. Having spent a lot of time in a lot of Italy, no, it's just not the same. It's not the same ubiquity of high-quality coffee shops and passion for what many view as the art of making espresso-based drinks. There's comparably little tolerance for the likes of Starbucks ( who have not fared well in Australia ), and other mass-produced forms of the drink (I don't think I've ever seen diner-style filter coffee here ). All that said, we may have gone just a little overboard with the new machine, but anything worth doing is worth doing to excess
Learn how trusted coding-agent projects can execute repository-controlled code before the first prompt through Codex MCP configuration and Claude Code environment settings.
Sunday, August 2
Keep your logins locked down with our favorite password management apps for PC, Mac, Android, iPhone, and web browsers.
Security lapse leaves sensitive information and contact details of 51 government officials exposed for 40 hours The public body in charge of the UK’s state investments has been pushed to improve its internal security after a data breach left “high-level management information” publicly accessible for nearly two days. UK Government Investments (UKGI), the agency that manages the taxpayers’ interest in a swathe of companies including Channel 4 and the Post Office, said the security failure also left more than 50 government officials’ personal details exposed for nearly 40 hours. Continue reading...
Saturday, August 1
GitHub - 0xD34D/KARR_Scan: KARR Scan passively scans for KARR Security devices and displays their telemetry
Runtime analysis of Linux binaries with DynamoRIO, including an audit of address and thread-scope errors [PDF]
The critical RufRoot vulnerability gave unauthenticated attackers a path from an exposed MCP endpoint to shell access, stolen AI provider keys and poisoned agent memory. Paul Mote explains why the incident should change how security teams define, test and recover their AI attack surface. The post RufRoot Exposed the Hidden AI Agent Attack Surface appeared first on Synack .
Plus: The FBI eyes AI-powered tech to detect future crimes, Russia charges Telegram’s founder, xAI sues to stop a state’s “nudification” ban, and the Democrats learn a lesson about getting scammed.
Both major AI labs’ models broke containment, escaped onto the internet, and hacked other companies. If a human had done that, the law would likely be against them. But a bot?
Friday, July 31
In three incidents across six runs, the agents treated real systems as simulated targets and tried weak passwords or unauthenticated endpoints.
Overview VPS.org's one-click deployment templates provision services with default passwords and predefined network bindings instead of generating randomized secrets or applying per-deployment hardening measures. Description VPS.org is a cloud and virtual private server hosting provider that offers a library of templates for quickly provisioning common applications and services. Multiple vulnerabilities exist in the one-click deployment templates feature. These vulnerabilities stem from the same root cause: content is directly instantiated from static templates, using default passwords and static secrets with no deployment-specific randomization or interface-binding hardening at provisioning time. CVE-2026-16503 The Supabase template provides an instance of PostgreSQL that is bound to all network interfaces (0.0.0.0:5432) and uses the hard-coded database password postgres . Because Docker manages its own iptables rules, this exposure can bypass standard host UFW firewall configurations. If the the instance is exposed to the internet, a remote attacker could connect to the host's published TCP port 5432 and authenticate as the postgres superuser account using the default postgres password. CVE-2026-16504 The Zulip template ships with a hard-coded application key secret_key: changeme , a default database password zulip , and the setting DISABLE_HTTPS=True . An attacker can use this public secret key to forge or validate signed session material, enabling session forgery and authentication bypass against the instance. If unchanged, t
Created by legendary hardware hacker Andrew “bunnie” Huang, the badges for this year’s famed security conference aim to push the boundaries of security and transparency.
Operation Endgame disrupted hundreds of systems — a StealC backend I reported still exposes its known routes
In April, I documented a StealC v2 campaign distributed through 19 GitHub typosquat repositories, including one impersonating my own open-source project. The delivery chain was: ```text GitHub typosquat -> Python dropper -> api.nailproxy.space -> encrypted Windows loader -> StealC v2 DLL -> spellmarketplace.club / 62.60.226.113:6673 ``` GitHub later removed all 19 repositories. The backend infrastructure remained a separate problem. I reported the domains, IP, malware routes, and hashes to the relevant registrars, Cloudflare, the hosting provider, CERT-Bund, GitHub Security Lab, ThreatFox, and AlienVault OTX. Then Operation Endgame disrupted infrastructure associated with SocGholish, Amadey, and StealC. Europol reported 326 servers and 142 domains actioned. Microsoft separately said it moved against more than 200 malicious Amadey and StealC C2 domains and IPs. Three months after my original disclosure, I checked the known infrastructure again using only minimal unauthenticated GET and HEAD requests. The documented malware-specific routes still behave differently from an arbitrary control path: ```text GET /api/v1/auth/session -> 405 Method Not Allowed GET /api/v1/data/sync -> 405 Method Not Allowed GET /foo/bar/baz -> 404 Not Found ``` HEAD returns the same status codes for all three paths. This does not prove that payload delivery, authentication, or exfiltration still works. I deliberately did not send the HMAC handshake, trigger Stage 2, or interact with the malware protocol. It does show that the known application routes remain registered and reachable. The evidence also has limitations: - The monitoring cron produced only 18 measurements over 69 days. - There were gaps of up to 20 days. - The endpoints briefly became unreachable in late May. - GET and HEAD return different status codes on the root paths of `spellmarketplace.club` and the bare IP, so I do not treat those checks as proof that the complete backend is operational. The point is not that Operation Endgame failed. It clearly disrupted a large amount of criminal infrastructure. The narrower lesson is that both of these statements can be true: > Hundreds of malicious systems were disrupted. > A specific previously reported backend still exposes its documented malware routes. Full technical write-up, including the original kill chain, abuse-report timeline, ThreatFox/OTX submissions, current probe results, and evidence limitations: https://blog.technopathy.club/operation-endgame-stealc-backend-still-responds I would be interested in how other analysts verify whether previously reported C2 infrastructure was actually included in a large takedown without actively engaging the malware protocol.
In a review triggered by OpenAI’s Hugging Face incident, Anthropic discovered three of its AI models had breached real-world organizations during third-party evaluations.
GreyNoise Tactics gives anyone running a Deception Sensor visibility into what adversaries do after initial compromise, automatically mapping qualifying sessions to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
Thursday, July 30
Craig Rosewarne, Managing Director of Wolfpack Information Risk, explains why continuous, AI-enabled validation, paired with human-verified exploitability, gives security leaders a real-time view of what's actually at risk. The post Guest Blog: The Annual Pentest Is No Longer Enough appeared first on Synack .
With Chrome, Google pioneered the rapid release model for browser security. Now, Google says updates may need to change in the face of AI security analysis. According to the company, the number of bug fixes in Chrome releases has skyrocketed in recent months because AI is detecting so many flaws . We could be looking at more frequent updates soon, but Google is also working on ways to get those updates rolled out without bothering you as much. Google has released two major Chrome milestone builds recently—Chrome 149 in early June and Chrome 150 just a few weeks later. These two updates had a total of 1,072 bug fixes, which is more than the previous 23 releases combined. Such is the impact of giant cybersecurity AI models that can probe software for vulnerabilities at light speed. Some of these vulnerabilities were serious, too, with one bug hiding in the Chrome codebase for 13 years. If it had been exploited, an attacker could have bypassed the Chrome sandbox to make the browser access local files.
VU#281278: SGLang contains six different vulnerabilities including RCE, data exfiltration, and credential disclosure
Overview Six vulnerabilities have been discovered within the SGLang project, including remote code execution (RCE), server-side request forgery (SSRF), local file read, credential leakage, and model weight exfiltration on a target server. Exploitation does not require authentication in most cases, and some vulnerabilities require only network access with no API keys or user credentials. At the time of publication, no patches are available from the project maintainers, and coordination attempts have been unsuccessful. Description SGLang is an open-source framework for serving large language models (LLMs) and multimodal AI models, supporting models such as Qwen, DeepSeek, Mistral, and Skywork, and is compatible with OpenAI APIs. Six vulnerabilities have been discovered within the tool and are tracked as follows: CVE-2026-15969 SGLang contains unauthenticated RCE in /load_lora_adapter_from_tensors by bypass of SafeUnpickler’s incomplete denylist, allowing arbitrary command execution through crafted base64-encoded pickle payloads. CVE-2026-15971 SGLang contains an RCE vulnerability when the optional dumper subsystem is enabled, which allows for a sandbox escape when DUMPER_SERVER_PORT is set, enabling code execution on inference requests. CVE-2026-15974 SGLang contains an SSRF and local file read in the multimodal generation endpoint /v1/chat/completions because image_url input is unsanitized, allowing access to internal metadata, secrets, and services. CVE-2026-15976 SGLang contains a RCE vulnerability when attempting to load model weights f
The two Chrome updates in June patched more bugs than the 23 updates before them. Now, Google is ramping up its patching schedule thanks to AI-assisted vulnerability discovery.
London, UK, 30 July 2026 – New data from Heimdal’s telemetry measures the gap between execution of the MediaArena adware and the completion of quarantine. The same pattern has been confirmed across more than 40 client environments. MediaArena is a browser-modifier adware family that Microsoft has tracked since 2023. It is low-severity, and that is […] The post Heimdal data reveals MediaArena adware completes persistence before antivirus quarantine finishes appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
If the generative AI giant had followed well-known security best practices, it’s likely that its AI agent would never have escaped to the open internet and hacked multiple companies.
Drone warfare is making the skies more dangerous, even for airplanes far from the battlefield.
Researchers pitted a person against a Claude agent and found that, after a week of texting, the AI chatbot was more effective at creating “exploitable trust” with others.
Heimdal did not start as a traditional cybersecurity company. It started with two Danish cybersecurity researchers, a piece of innovative technology and a challenge. Could they create something that could identify vulnerabilities, intercept malicious activity and help protect machines before threats could take hold? That technology went on to compete at the Defcon CTF world […] The post How Heimdal grew from a bold idea into a global cybersecurity platform appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
Check out GreyNoise's new Head of Adversary Engagement, Mark Mager, on why traditional detection engineering can't keep pace with CVE growth — and the agentic pipeline replacing it.