Attackers whose methods line up with the data-extortion group ShinyHunters have spent the past year walking into corporate Salesforce environments without exploiting a single flaw in the platform. The way in has been the trust the organization had already extended, usually through the OAuth connections that tie Salesforce to the apps and third-party vendors around it. In
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Somewhere right now, a security tool is quietly finding bugs faster than any human can fix them. That's supposed to be the good news. The catch is that the attackers have the same tools, pointed the other way, and they don't file tickets. That's the shape of this week. Trusted code turns on the people who installed it. Old bugs from last year are still landing because the fix sat in a queue too
A new phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) operation called Forg365 is using a combination of device code phishing, adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) tactics, antibot evasion, artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted lure creation, and post-compromise mailbox operations targeting Microsoft 365 accounts. Distributed via Telegram and costing $400 a month (or $3,800 per year), attack chains leverage phishing
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Tuesday, July 14
I wanted to build an HTML file with Claude. And it started a Node server to open it. And there was a Directory Traversal as well there. Always review what agents / LLMs do
Tracing a ClickFix campaign found on `new-blog.artlist[.]io` on July 13. The injected JavaScript queried a Polygon smart contract for its delivery host, loaded a fake reCAPTCHA prompt, and pushed visitors into a PowerShell chain. That chain delivered a signed updater bundle containing several nested loaders. The final payload is a native RAT with browser-store collection, file transfer, process and shell control, remote desktop, keylogging, SOCKS bridging, and Tor-based endpoint fallback. The teardown follows the bytes through `Stream.Toolkit.dat`, the custom `Face.dat` container, `act.exe`, an encrypted ZIP, and the manually mapped final DLL.
Hey, could I get a take on this one? Am I paranoid? [https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/acme/tpvOoBqHcEhSoPP-C0UaBtERgeY/](https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/acme/tpvOoBqHcEhSoPP-C0UaBtERgeY/)
Four `asyncapi` packages published with a RAT via compromised GitHub Actions. Stealing browser credentials, SSH keys, npm tokens, AWS secrets, and crypto wallets.
xAI's Grok Build coding CLI was uploading entire Git repositories, full commit history and all, to a Google Cloud Storage bucket run by xAI, not just the files a coding task needed. A researcher publishing as cereblab, testing version 0.2.93, captured one of those uploads, cloned the git bundle out of the intercepted request, and pulled back a file the agent had been told in plain terms not
Certified Cybersecurity Foundations (CORE) is a free beginner certification designed for people taking their first step into cybersecurity. It gives learners a clear, structured, and accessible introduction to the field. The goal is to make the first step easier, build a strong foundational mindset, and prepare learners for a more confident learning journey. No affiliations, just a PSA.
New repo just went up: [`git.projectnightcrawler.dev/NightmareEclipse/LegacyHive`](http://git.projectnightcrawler.dev/NightmareEclipse/LegacyHive), created about 2 hours ago. Right now it's empty — just an MIT license and a README that says "N/A," 2 commits total. He'd spoken about his big drop happening today, July 14th, saying he'd make sure Microsoft's "bones are shattered" that day. At one point though he'd also indirectly said he wasn't going to post it, something about still having "chains" on him preventing a release. This repo showing up on the exact date he originally called out suggests that might not hold anymore and it could actually be happening. Nothing in it yet, just watching to see what gets pushed. Worth noting: given how erratic and bipolar his posting history has been, there's really no way to predict what (if anything) actually gets posted. **Update 1, 13:20 CET:** Thanks for the 100 upvotes, really appreciate it. About 6 hours have passed since the practically empty repo was uploaded. There has been no new blog activity or posts seen from Nightmare Eclipse online.
The U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has designated two individuals and a VPN service provider for enabling ransomware actors' and other cybercriminals' malicious activities, including ransomware attacks against Americans. The VPN, named First VPN Service (1VPNS), has been accused of offering its tools to ransomware groups, along with its 45-year-old Ukrainian
Addressing the state-layer gap in autonomous actor architectures: Byzantine fault tolerance without consensus
**Securing distributed agent state against Byzantine actors** Most current multi-agent and distributed LLM frameworks rely on Last-Write-Wins or standard databases for shared context. This creates a serious vulnerability: if even one node is compromised or acts maliciously (for example through equivocation), it can fork the shared state across the cluster with no cryptographic proof of compromise and no reliable way to isolate the actor. To address this, I’ve been exploring an architecture that separates concerns into two cryptographically verifiable layers: * A **Data Lattice** using CRDTs to guarantee exact state convergence across honest nodes without requiring consensus. * An **Evidence Lattice** using grow-only sets of self-authenticating Ed25519 proofs. Any peer can mathematically detect and permanently evict an equivocating identity. Because standard robust selectors (such as multi-Krum) are discontinuous, even tiny floating-point variations can change the output. This forces the use of deterministic Q16.16 fixed-point arithmetic to create a reliable circuit breaker against geometric manipulation. The design follows a strict zero-trust model: The core CRDT engine, cryptographic validation, and Q16.16 math run entirely locally on the user’s system via a compiled Rust binary. The cloud relay is strictly stateless — it only routes encrypted byte-deltas and sees nothing but payloads and API keys. It cannot read, modify, or store agent state. The core Rust engine is maintained in a private repository. This work builds on earlier results showing that standard neural network operators violate CRDT properties, and extends it to the problem of robust, coordinator-free aggregation. A hosted testbed is available with a free base allowance of **25,000 operations**, with additional capacity (**50k–100k+**) available on request for larger-scale adversarial and multi-node testing. I’m particularly interested in feedback from researchers doing red teaming on distributed LLM infrastructure. Does this data + evidence lattice separation hold up under realistic adversarial conditions, or are there simpler bypasses? *Note: This focuses on protecting the infrastructure synchronization layer against Byzantine actors. It does not prevent individual LLMs from hallucinating — it ensures the cluster cannot silently fork its shared state.* **References:** * ACFA Paper: [https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.10305](https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.10305) * Neural operators and CRDT incompatibility: [https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.19373](https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.19373) * Architecture & testbed: [memora.optitransfer.ch](http://memora.optitransfer.ch) * Implementation: [github.com/mgillr/memora-swarm](http://github.com/mgillr/memora-swarm)
​ While investigating one extension i found that a family of 11 same-codebase extensions (ChatGPT/Claude/Gemini/etc). Sold as local-only: the store listing says No uploads to external servers "Everything processed locally" "No tracking or telemetry" Observed in the tested version: \- PDF export POSTs the full conversation to the developer's Cloud Run backend. A local renderer is bundled but only runs as a fallback. \- Markdown/Text/JSON exports beacon title + source URL to /api/usage. The title is derived from your first message, so it can contain chat content. \- Every request carries an X-Client-ID in chrome.storage.sync, so it follows you across machines. Detection + full writeup: https://malext.io/reports/ExporTheft/
A campaign of 148 npm packages disguised as student web proxies turned visitors' browsers into a distributed denial-of-service botnet for roughly two weeks in May, according to new research from JFrog. The packages did not go after the developers who might install them. The operators used the registry as free hosting for a booby-trapped proxy site and let the students who came to dodge
Attackers whose methods line up with the data-extortion group ShinyHunters have spent the past year walking into corporate Salesforce environments without exploiting a single flaw in the platform. The way in has been the trust the organization had already extended, usually through the OAuth connections that tie Salesforce to the apps and third-party vendors around it. In
The AI research centre at Torrens University Australia has helped produce a review of 110 studies on digital twins and IIoT security. What were the main takeaways? They have found that DTs are shifting away from passive monitoring to being a part of the defence architecture. One of the biggest weak points they found was in legacy sensors with low bandwidth. In these situations, there is a lag before the digital twin reflects a real-world change, and that lag is where attacks tend to slip in. Would be interested to hear your thoughts! Has anyone here dealt with that sync-gap problem on older hardware?
A commit to the AsyncAPI generator GitHub repository injected obfuscated JavaScript into four npm packages with a combined weekly download volume of over 3 million. Here's what we know and how to check if you're affected.
Monday, July 13
Most enterprises test less than a third of their attack surface, and attackers have already moved to AI-speed offense. Agentic AI closes the coverage gap, but only when paired with human expertise: an AI-first, human-validated model that secures critical infrastructure without sacrificing operational safety. The post Why the Future of Pentesting Needs Humans and Agentic AI Working Together appeared first on Synack .
I wrote this after spending an unreasonable amount of time making CET-compliant callstack spoofing work end-to-end on hardware with Intel CET enabled. The technique combines three primitives: thread pool execution for a clean stack base, enum callback trampolining for a real signed mid-stack frame, and indirect syscalls. The actual contribution is the CET compliance mechanism: a `jmp`\-based context switch combined with direct shadow stack pointer reconciliation via `RDSSPQ`/`INCSSPQ`, without touching unwind metadata. Different approach from BYOUD. Implemented in Rust with inline assembly.
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a new macOS information stealer called CrashStealer that's capable of harvesting sensitive data from compromised systems. Unlike other information stealers that are built on AppleScript droppers or Objective-C-based wrappers, CrashStealer is implemented in native C++, according to Jamf Threat Labs. "It validates the victim's login password locally before
Google and Microsoft have pulled ModHeader, a popular header-editing extension with roughly 1.6 million installs across Chrome and Edge, after researchers found a hidden browsing-history collector built into its official store version. The collector was dormant. An empty allow-list kept it switched off, and no proof has emerged that it ever gathered or sent a single browsing domain. The
Somewhere right now, a security tool is quietly finding bugs faster than any human can fix them. That's supposed to be the good news. The catch is that the attackers have the same tools, pointed the other way, and they don't file tickets. That's the shape of this week. Trusted code turns on the people who installed it. Old bugs from last year are still landing because the fix sat in a queue too
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has issued a postmortem on a recent data leak in which a contractor published dozens of internal CISA credentials — including AWS Govcloud keys — in a public GitHub repository for almost six months before being notified by KrebsOnSecurity. Experts say the gaps identified in the agency’s initial response provide important lessons that all security teams should absorb. On May 15, 2026, the security firm GitGuardian asked for help in notifying CISA about the existence of a public GitHub repository called “Private CISA” that included 844 MB of sensitive CISA-related data. One of the exposed files, titled “importantAWStokens,” included the administrative credentials to three Amazon AWS GovCloud servers. Another file — “AWS-Workspace-Firefox-Passwords.csv” — listed plaintext usernames and passwords for dozens of internal CISA systems. CISA quickly acknowledged our initial alert, but took more than 48 hours to invalidate the AWS keys and many other important secrets leaked in the GitHub repo. In its report on the data leak , CISA said the complexities of the agency’s systems and interconnections with federal and industry partners caused its key rotation to take longer than anticip
Give an AI assistant a memory and access to your inbox, and you hand an attacker a way to rewrite what it thinks it knows about you. A single email can trick that agent into saving a false "fact" about the user, hide the change, and quietly steer its answers in later sessions. When it works, the person reads an ordinary-looking reply and never learns their assistant was tampered with. The
A new phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) operation called Forg365 is using a combination of device code phishing, adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) tactics, antibot evasion, artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted lure creation, and post-compromise mailbox operations targeting Microsoft 365 accounts. Distributed via Telegram and costing $400 a month (or $3,800 per year), attack chains leverage phishing
Bot mitigation is an adversarial game: attackers adapt, defenders respond, and the cycle continues. At Cloudflare, we stay ahead by combining visibility across our global network with signals from the client-side environment. At the network level, we analyze over 1 trillion requests per day to understand reputation, patterns, and anomalies across more than 20% of the web. On the client side, we’ve pushed detection deeper with Cloudflare Turnstile , which has evolved from a CAPTCHA replacement to a risk-based managed challenge that adapts the amount of friction needed to verify the user is authentic. Today, Turnstile runs nearly 3 billion times per day on some of the most sensitive endpoints on the Internet, helping verify users at key moments like login, signup, and checkout. This improves protection on the most important areas of customer applications, but still leaves limited visibility into the rest of the application — how humans and bots actually interact across the full user journey. This is the visibility gap we’re closing today with our launch of Precursor . Introducing Precursor Precursor is a client-side, session-based verification system, built with privacy in mind, that uses dynamically injected JavaScript to continuously collect behavioral signals as visitors interact with your application. These signals are processed and incorporated into Cloudflare’s bot protection in real time, allowing us to continuously distinguish human traffic from automated or agentic traffic. This extends the client-side detections offered by a
Meta has filed a patent application for an AI that listens to your voice throughout the day, works out how it thinks you are feeling from the way you sound, and keeps a timestamped log of every read. Each read gets pinned to the moment it happened: the time, your location, what you were doing, even how you were using your phone. Some versions in the filing would listen all day; others would
A few days ago, I was sitting with the CISO of a Fortune 50 company, walking through how his security team was thinking about AI agents in the SOC. Smart team. Serious program. They had already connected Claude to a few detection tools and were seeing real value in specific investigations. But as we mapped out the broader architecture, something kept nagging at me. The design they were building
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged an intrusion in which an unknown threat actor leveraged a vibe-coded PowerShell script for Active Directory (AD) enumeration. "The script looked for the Domain Controller (DC) and mapped users, computers, and domains, before creating a directory and exporting out a number of files, and finally creating AD_Report.html to measure the success of the
We’ve added a new chapter to our Testing Handbook : a comprehensive guide to security testing Rust programs. This chapter covers the tools and techniques we use at Trail of Bits to validate the security of Rust programs and systems. fn main () {( | f: & dyn Fn ( u128 )-> Box < dyn Iterator < Item =
The SFPD’s exposure of hours of videos from drone platform Skydio reveals how broadly it’s watching the city from above—and how the results can spill online.
To reduce the amount of noise from questions, we have disabled self-posts in favor of a unified questions thread every week. Feel free to ask any question about reverse engineering here. If your question is about how to use a specific tool, or is specific to some particular target, you will have better luck on the [Reverse Engineering StackExchange](http://reverseengineering.stackexchange.com/). See also /r/AskReverseEngineering.
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added two maximum-severity security flaws impacting iCagenda and Balbooa extensions for Joomla to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, following reports of zero-day exploitation in the wild. The vulnerabilities, both rated 10.0 on the CVSS scoring system, are below - CVE-2026-48939 - A vulnerability in the
A verified, curated map of malware analysis & reverse engineering — every link opened and checked, no dead pages
This sub is malware-focused, so here's what's in it for that side specifically (the repo is broader, but the malware coverage is the core): * **Analysis workflow:** lab setup (FLARE-VM, REMnux), triage (DIE, capa, FLOSS), static/dynamic (PE-bear, Procmon, CAPE, Speakeasy), unpacking (unpac.me, PE-sieve, HollowsHunter, Scylla), config & IOC extraction (MalDuck, DC3-MWCP), and YARA (rules, yarGen, testing workflows). * **Internals writeups:** PEB walking / API hashing, process hollowing and doppelgänging, PPID spoofing, BYOVD, COFF/BOF loaders, plus real family teardowns (stealers, ransomware, Lazarus/FudModule, the Stuxnet dossier). * Research labs and analyst blogs (Securelist, Unit 42, Talos, Elastic, n1ght-w0lf, Embee, hasherezade, MalwareTech...) folded into the relevant section instead of a generic "blogs" dump. * *Every link was opened and verified before it went in; dead ones get pruned, notes are one line, tagged by level (intro/working/deep) and type.* **CC0, and corrections/PRs are welcome, if there's a teardown or tool you think** **is missing, tell me. That's the point.**
GreyNoise's Threat Brief Library is now live in the Visualizer — browse, search, filter, and download weekly At The Edge briefs, Executive Situation Reports, and more, all built on primary-source sensor data.
Sunday, July 12
Vulnerability in Realtek driver allows DMA controller abuse from user mode with no additional hardware or driver
The vulnerability allows non-privileged users to program the DMA controller, enabling arbitrary physical memory reads and writes.
Hand-crafted 974-byte Android 14 APK (API 34) — Bypassing build-tool bloat by exploiting PackageInstaller structure.
Saturday, July 11
The jscrambler npm package was compromised, and simply installing its 8.14.0 release runs an infostealer on your machine. Published on July 11, 2026, the malicious version carries a preinstall hook that drops and executes a native binary, one build each for Windows, macOS, and Linux. Socket flagged the release six minutes after it was published. If you or one of your
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of sustained cyber espionage activity against several Pakistani law enforcement organizations undertaken by suspected China- and India-aligned threat actors between February 2024 and April 2026. "At Balochistan Police, the compromised assets included servers hosting web applications that manage police and citizen data, such as criminal and
A read-only, deterministic file-observer that emits a hashed, reproducible manifest — where would this fall short for real casework?
Up front: I'm an enthusiast, not a forensics professional, and this is not a validated forensics tool — it's not write-blocking, it hasn't been through any formal tool-validation, and I'm not going to pretend otherwise. I built it for reproducible file observation and I keep thinking it might be useful for first-pass triage, but the people who'd actually know are here, not where I usually hang out. So I'd rather you tell me where it falls short than nod along. ## What it does file-observer walks a directory and emits a single deterministic JSON manifest describing every file. It's read-only — it never writes to a file, never executes file content, and never modifies source. (Like any triage tool, you'd point it at a working copy or a mounted image, not originals.) The properties that made me think of this sub: - **Reproducible output.** Same bytes in → byte-identical manifest out, every run, regardless of worker count (there's a test that fails CI if a parallel scan differs from a serial one). It's determinism, not tool-validation — but the output is stable enough to diff and defend. - **SHA-256 per file**, plus identical-hash duplicate clustering across the tree. - **Content-vs-extension MIME mismatch + polyglot detection** — flags a file whose actual signature doesn't match its extension, and files that satisfy more than one format's structure. Useful for spotting renamed or disguised files. - **Metadata extraction, stdlib, bounded and never-crashing on hostile input:** image EXIF (make/model, timestamps, and GPS-presence — presence, deliberately not coordinates), video container/QuickTime capture fields (device make/model, creation dates, GPS-presence), PDF producer/creator/creation-date/encryption + a born-digital-vs-scanned/OCR provenance read, email envelopes (.eml/.msg: from/to/subject/date/message-id/attachments), and Office/OLE2 document fields. - **Structural safety flags** — has_macros (VBA), has_javascript (PDF), has_ole_objects, has_external_references. Observations, not verdicts. - **Integrity envelope** — optional HMAC-SHA256 manifest signature and a previous_manifest_checksum chain, if you want a tamper-evident record of the observation itself. - **Delta between two scans** — what was added/modified/removed since a prior manifest. Everything runs bounded and read-only, and it degrades to a per-file error record rather than crashing on a malformed or hostile file. ## Where I know it's weak (and where I don't) Honest limits: it's triage/observation, not analysis — no carving, no timeline, no registry/artifact parsing. Metadata is bounded observation, so a null means "not seen within the read window," not "not present." GPS is presence-only by design. And reproducible ≠ validated — I've oracle-checked the parsers against tools like exiftool, but that's not the same as CFTT-style validation. What I don't know is whether any of this is actually useful in a real workflow, or whether it's a toy next to the tooling you already trust. That's the question. Where would this break, mislead, or fail to matter for real casework? ## Try it pip install "file-observer[all]" Repo: https://github.com/russalo/file-observer I'd genuinely rather hear "here's why this is useless for X" than a pat on the head — I'm isolated from people who do this for a living, and that's exactly the gap I'm trying to close.
Plus: The Pentagon is training amateurs to become part of its hacker army, a Flock license plate reader error led to cops surrounding a car reviewer, and more.
Friday, July 10
Caeruleus – Latin, deep blue The Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) tooling space is fragmented and decaying. Picture a typical BLE testing session: you spin up bettercap to run ble.recon and ble.enum , your trusty (but deprecated) gatttool to read and write handles, and, when it’s time to fuzz that one writable characteristic, dig up that custom Bleak script you copy-paste between directories and projects. That’s the BLE testing tax, and we got tired of paying it. So we built Caeruleus : a single Go binary that covers the whole BLE lifecycle, built on top of the BlueZ stack for Linux. Caeruleus lets you scan, enumerate, read/write/notify characteristics, fuzz, and run structured security assessment workflows against your Bluetooth Low Energy devices. The BLE tes
Google has flagged the widely-installed HTTP header editor ModHeader as malware Microsoft already pulled it from Edge on July 3. \[MalExt Sentry - Malicious Browser Extension Tracker\](https://malext.io/?q=ModHeader) \* 900k installs on chrome | idgpnmonknjnojddfkpgkljpfnnfcklj \* 700k installs on edge | opgbiafapkbbnbnjcdomjaghbckfkglc
Unknown threat actors compromised the Injective Labs SDK project's GitHub repository and leveraged it to publish a malicious package on the npm registry to steal cryptocurrency wallet private keys and mnemonic seed phrases. The compromised version, @injectivelabs/sdk-ts@1.20.21, came embedded with fake telemetry functionality that exfiltrated data from cryptocurrency wallets. The version was
Researchers at firmware security firm Binarly have found six new flaws in U-Boot, the small program that starts up hardware as varied as home routers, smart cameras, and the management chips inside data-center servers. Four of the bugs can crash a device. The other two could let an attacker who slips a malicious image in front of the bootloader run their own code, before the device
In 2021, we shipped Smart Tiered Cache . The idea: for each origin behind your site, Cloudflare picks the single best upper-tier data center to route through, based on real-time latency. Flip one switch, and we find the fastest path from our network to your origin. That works as long as an origin IP lives in one fixed place. Public cloud origins usually don't. They sit behind anycast or regional unicast front ends, so one origin IP can look equally close to a dozen Cloudflare data centers at once — and the latency probes have nothing to lock onto. Smart Tiered Cache handles this the safe way: when there's no clear winner, it falls back to several upper tiers. Nothing breaks. You just lose the thing that made a single closest tier worth it, which is cache efficiency. Smart Tiered Cache for Public Cloud Regions fixes this by letting you provide a cloud region hint. With that hint, Cloudflare can map public cloud origins to the right region and select better primary and fallback upper tiers, even when the origin IP itself looks anycast or ambiguous. We made our most popular tiered cache topology smarter Since it was launched, Smart Tiered Cache has become the most popular tiered cache topology among Cloudflare customers. It’s available to all plans, for free. Much of our work aims to continually improve it. Over time, we’ve extended Smart Tiered Cache to handle more origin architectures, including: November 2024 : Smart Tiered Cache for R2 : We taught Smart Tiered Cache to automatically select the closest upper tier to where the R2 bucket actually lives, reducing latency with zero configuration.
There are several major managed detection and response (MDR) companies to choose from. We’ve compared the main offerings of the best MDR providers to help you decide which is right for your organisation. Maybe it was a near miss, or a security team stretched too thin and drowning in alerts from dozens of tools. Whatever […] The post Top 6 Managed Detection and Response Providers appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
I reverse-engineered the DJI Spark smart battery I2C/SMBus protocol and documented the captures, firmware, and hardware
Thursday, July 9
Security testing identifies vulnerabilities, weaknesses, and misconfigurations before attackers can exploit them. This guide covers every major method, when to use each, and how to build a program that finds what actually matters. The post What Is Security Testing? A Practitioner’s Guide to Methods, Tools, and When to Use Each appeared first on Synack .
Hi everyone, I've recently released **Auditor 1.0.0**, a command-line utility for file hashing and integrity verification, and I'd like to share some of the new features that may be useful for digital forensics workflows. # New: Verified file copy Two new commands have been added to perform file copies while ensuring end-to-end integrity. **clone** * Reads each source file and computes its hash. * Copies the file to the destination. * Reads the copied file, recomputes its hash, and verifies it against the source. * Can also generate audit/hash files if they don't already exist. **chkcopy** Similar to `clone`, but additionally validates the source against previously generated audit files before copying: * Verifies that the audit files exist. * Recomputes the source hash and compares it with the recorded value. * Copies the file. * Verifies the copied file by hashing it again and comparing it with the source. Both commands support configurable retry logic (number of attempts and delay between retries), which is particularly useful when copying over network shares where transient I/O or connection failures may occur. # Compatibility with existing checksum tools Auditor can now verify checksum files generated by other utilities, including: * `fsum` * `sha256sum` * `b3sum` * and others This makes it easier to integrate Auditor into existing workflows without requiring proprietary hash lists. # Multiple hash encodings Besides the traditional hexadecimal (Base16) representation, Auditor now supports: * Base32 * Base64 * Base85 This is handy when working with systems that exchange hashes in different encodings (for example, some forensic monitoring systems that use Base32). # Windows, Linux and macOS Precompiled binaries are available for Windows, Linux and macOS. The Linux build has also been updated to run cleanly under **WSL (Windows Subsystem for Linux)**, which may be useful for investigators who automate their workflow with Linux shell scripts while working on Windows. Documentation and downloads: [https://thash.org/auditor](https://thash.org/auditor) # Breaking change in v1.0.0 The default behavior has changed. Previous versions enabled the **thash** method by default. Starting with **v1.0.0**, Auditor computes standard hashes by default, producing exactly the same values as tools such as `sha256sum`, `b3sum`, and `fsum`. The **thash** algorithm is still available, but it must now be explicitly enabled with: `-t` or `--thash` This change was made to improve interoperability while keeping thash available for situations where faster integrity verification of very large datasets is desirable. Feedback, bug reports and feature suggestions are always welcome.
RSA and ECC, cryptographic algorithms that we’ve all relied on for decades, are vulnerable to the attack of sufficiently advanced quantum computers. Such quantum computers do not exist yet, but they seem to be coming sooner than expected. Luckily, the solution is already available: migrate to ML-KEM encryption and ML-DSA signatures, which are designed to be resistant to quantum attack. They were standardized in 2024 by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) after an eight-year open international competition. The migration to post-quantum cryptography is in full swing now. At the time of writing, the majority of traffic handled by Cloudflare is already using ML-KEM encryption, and is thus secured against the threat to data posed by harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks. But encryption is only one part of the equation: to be fully secure against quantum computers capable of breaking classical cryptography, we aim to deploy post-quantum signatures to protect authentication systems from unauthorized access. We are targeting 2029 for Cloudflare to be fully post-quantum secure. ML-DSA, the best all-around post-quantum signature scheme standardized today, has its downsides: it’s much larger on the wire, and many tricks we were able to perform with RSA and ECC simply cannot be done with ML-DSA. There are better post-quantum signature schemes on the horizon: last month, NIST announced that it is advancing nine
A Majority of European Lawmakers Voted Against Letting Big Tech Read Our Messages. They’re Going to Anyway
Companies will once again be allowed to scan citizens’ personal texts, emails, and social media messages via the “Chat Control” bill to find child abuse material online.
An MSG database tracked and categorized hundreds of celebs, famous Knicks superfans, and even some of Taylor Swift’s wedding guests. Labels included “LGBTQIA,” “DO NOT HOST,” and low to high “risk.”
A malicious commit disguised as SDK telemetry briefly compromised @injectivelabs/sdk-ts, exfiltrating wallet mnemonics and private keys.
Wednesday, July 8
Our 2026 State of Vulnerabilities Report surfaces what Synack finds in tested customer environments. At a recent webinar, two of our most decorated researchers from the Synack Red Team describe the threat landscape they’re seeing beyond the report findings. Here's what the data shows, what practitioners have experienced, and what your security program should do about the gap. The post The 2026 State of Vulnerabilities: What the Data Misses, According to Our Red Team appeared first on Synack .
Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite How's this for a location?! I mean, last week was nice with Scott in Mallorca, but Marrakech is, well, wow Anyway, about those data breaches... This week I'm talking about the futility of attempting to remove piss from a pool , yet here we are, with various companies wanting to place that message alongside the very data breaches they can do nothing about! As I say in the post, I don't question the good intentions behind setting up a service to try to scrub data from legally operating data brokers, but the marketing machines behind those organisations that regularly reach out to me for product placement don't really seem to grasp that reality. At least now they have a nice explainer courtesy of that post
Many internal services at Cloudflare need to read and modify the same control-plane state from across our 330+ global data centers. They need guarantees that different readers never see inconsistent state, and that the system remains available for writes even when some data centers or links fail. But Cloudflare’s network runs across the entire Internet, and the Internet is an unpredictable place. Servers and data centers go down. Queues fill up. Links and cables get cut. These conditions make it difficult to run a globally available data system that guarantees strong consistency (e.g., that all readers are guaranteed to read all prior writes) because hostile conditions hinder distributed system replicas’ ability to reliably synchronize data with one another. One way to synchronize data safely despite adverse network conditions is via a consensus algorithm, which allows a set of machines to agree on the same sequence of values, such as key-value store put and get operations, as long as a majority remains alive and able to communicate. Unfortunately, commonly deployed consensus algorithms like Raft suffer in wide-area networks like Cloudflare’s because they rely on leaders and timeouts . The leader is the only replica allowed to make writes, and if it fails due to a crash or network degradation, the system becomes unavailable until some other replica times out and a new leader is elected. And these timeout values are hard to configure in networks with unpredictable latencies. We have experienced multiple incidents caused by unavailable leaders in consensus-driven systems. And so, for the past year, Cloudflare’s Research team has been building a new distributed consensus service called Meerkat powered by a consensus algorithm called
A cybersecurity startup dangling millions of dollars to acquire zero-day security vulnerabilities in popular software is run by a pair of far-right conspiracy theorists and convicted felons whose most recent ventures included fake intelligence companies and a now-defunct AI-based lobbying platform they operated under assumed names. The X/Twitter account IRIS C2 (@C2IRIS) has gained more than 4,000 followers since its creation in January 2025, posting frequently about security vulnerabilities, AI and software exploits. IRIS C2 says it is a company in McLean, Va. that sells offensive cybersecurity capabilities. The IRIS C2 website dangles the possibility of million-dollar payouts for exploits to attract talent. “Our business model is this,” reads a pinned post on top of the IRIS C2 account on X. “Attract the very best vulnerability researchers and exploit developers in the world to join our company. This mostly revolves around junior engineers with raw talent/extremely high IQ. We don’t care if they have a college degree/industry experience.” The website linked in that profile — irisc2[.]com — says the company is hiring for a number of open positions, and a recent post on its LinkedIn page enthuses about an overwhelming
In April we released Mewt , our open-source mutation-testing engine that finds the gaps in your test suite. Today we’re expanding it with support for DAML, the language Canton Network applications are written in. Mewt now reads DAML, generates several classes of mutants (including two built for DAML’s authorization primitives), and runs them through your existing test suite to count how many mutants survive. If you want to try it, simply install Mewt from the repository , point a mewt.toml at your project and its test command, and use mewt run . For a team shipping DAML to production, that count is what a passing test run is actually worth: it puts a number on how much your suite checks, whereas a green run on its own does not. Why DAML’s coverage reports lie Test coverage is the most reassuring lie in smart-contract development. Hitting 100% line coverage tells you the test runner walked the code; it does not tell you whether any test would fail if that code stopped doing what it is supposed to. We have been grading test harnesses by how many mutants they kill since at least 2019 , and our primer on finding the bugs your tests don’t catch shows how a green suite can still miss the bug that matters. DAML’s built-in coverage measures execution at the template and choice level: which templates were created and which choices were exercised over the test run. It reports whether each ch
Scammers are hijacking government websites to upload ads for “leaked” OnlyFans content. Thousands of copyright complaints from adult creators are helping people avoid malicious links.
Burst water mains. Evacuated hospitals. In a closed-door simulation, insurers played out their response to a mass disruption by China’s Volt Typhoon hackers—and found a nightmare scenario.
Your client is no longer just buying your security advice. They’re auditing whether you live by it. That was a clear message from my exclusive interview with Heather MacDonald Alford, an MSP finance specialist and owner of Counting Creators. Heather’s exactly the kind of customer MSPs should be paying attention to. She’s informed, commercially minded, and willing to challenge vendors to […] The post Cyber-Aware Customers Are Raising the Bar for MSPs and Other Vendors appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
Datadog Security Research has tracked multiple coordinated campaigns enumerating GitHub organizations, repositories, and users through the public GitHub API, abusing leaked access tokens, and cloning private repositories.
Tuesday, July 7
GitLost: a public GitHub issue can steer an org's Agentic Workflow into leaking private repo contents, and a one-word prefix ("Additionally") bypassed the threat-detection guardrail
Noma Security published a technique they call GitLost against GitHub Agentic Workflows (the plain-English-Markdown agent feature GitHub put into public preview in February, runnable on Copilot, Claude, Gemini, or Codex). Worth reading because it is a clean demonstration of why "filter the injection" does not hold as a defense. The setup. Workflows are read-only by default, but an org can hand one a personal access token with read access across its repos, private ones included, to give the agent cross-repo context. That grant is the whole vulnerability. Nothing else about the attack requires access: no stolen creds, no write access to anything private, no touching a server. The attacker just opens a normal-looking issue on a public repo. The technique is indirect prompt injection, which is not new, but the interesting part is what the agent controls. Noma's Sasi Levi frames the distinction as earlier injection being about manipulating what an agent says, versus GitLost being about what an agent does with its permissions. The agent here is a credentialed actor sitting in CI/CD-adjacent infrastructure with read scope over repos the attacker cannot see. In their PoC the malicious issue was dressed as a routine request from a "VP of Sales" after a customer meeting. A normal automation assigned the issue, the agent read it, pulled a private repo's README, and pasted it into a public comment. That public comment is the exfiltration channel. The guardrail bypass is the part netsec will care about. GitHub built defenses for exactly this class: sandboxing, read-only tokens by default, input cleaning, and a threat-detection step that scans the agent's proposed output before it posts. GitHub's own architecture docs are explicit that they design assuming the agent is already compromised (dedicated container, egress firewall, an MCP gateway container that holds the PAT so the agent process never touches it). Noma reported that prefixing the malicious instruction with a single word, "Additionally," got the model to treat it as a follow-on task rather than something to refuse, and the output scanner let it through. This maps cleanly onto Simon Willison's "lethal trifecta": an agent that (1) can reach private data, (2) ingests untrusted external content, and (3) has a way to send data out. All three present means a leak path, and Levi is explicit that this is structural, not a patch target. In natural language there is no clean data/instruction boundary the way there is in parameterized SQL, so the mitigation is architectural (isolation, scoped credentials, staged human review) rather than pattern-matching the payload away. Not an isolated finding either, this is a whole class: \- Anthropic's Claude Code GitHub Action: a single malicious issue pushed the agent into leaking secrets and seizing write access (Aikido). \- Orca's RoguePilot: a hidden prompt in an issue made Copilot leak a repo's privileged token. \- Invariant Labs (May 2025): a public issue drove a GitHub MCP-connected agent into reading a private repo and leaking it via PR. They called it architectural then too. \- "Comment and Control": cross-vendor study that got Claude Code, Gemini CLI, and Copilot to leak their own API keys through issue/PR text. Mitigations that actually reduce scope (from Noma): \- Scope the integration PAT to the single repo the workflow triages, not org-wide read. This is the biggest lever. A token that sees one repo is far less dangerous than one with broad org read granted for convenience. \- Limit what a public-facing workflow can post, since the comment is the exfil channel (safe outputs). \- Restrict which authors' content the agent will act on. \- Gate outputs behind human review. The threat-detection scan is a backstop, not a boundary, as the one-word bypass shows.
Today, the UK government launched the Cyber Resilience Pledge : a voluntary framework inviting organizations to commit to foundational cybersecurity governance, board-level accountability, and comprehensive cybersecurity coverage across supply chains. Cloudflare is proud to join the pledge’s founding cohort of signatories and continue our long-standing work with the Department of Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT), National Cyber Security Centre, and others to shape a more secure, future-ready digital economy for the UK . The pledge's core pillars — democratizing security, leadership accountability, and radical transparency — have been at the heart of Cloudflare since day one. Instead of approaching this framework as a new set of commitments to meet, we see it as a welcome validation from the UK government of the security philosophy and principles Cloudflare has championed for over a decade. We are glad to see the rest of the industry moving in this direction. This pledge is an important step, and it comes at a time of significant cyber risk. In the first quarter of 2026, Cloudflare's global network blocked an average of 234 billion cyber threats every day . Recently, we mitigated a hyper-volumetric DDoS attack that peaked at 31.4 Tbps . At th