The North Korean threat actor known as Lazarus Group has been attributed to the zero-day exploitation of a newly patched security flaw impacting Microsoft Windows to deliver a never-before-seen backdoor targeting defense and aerospace companies across France, Germany, Brazil, and India. The activity, per Check Point Research, is part of Operation Dream Job, a long-running cyber espionage and
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Adobe has shipped updates to address multiple critical security vulnerabilities impacting ColdFusion, Commerce, and Campaign Classic that, if successfully exploited, could result in arbitrary code execution and privilege escalation. The most severe of the flaws are listed below - CVE-2026-48362 (CVSS score: 10.0) - An operating system command injection vulnerability in ColdFusion that could
Mozilla has scrapped the cryptographic key behind Firefox and Thunderbird downloads for Linux after an unencrypted copy of it was committed by mistake to one of the company's own private code repositories. That key is how a user, or a Linux distribution packaging the browser, confirms a downloaded Firefox tarball came from Mozilla and was not tampered with. That decision carries a cost for
Overview The OpenCart v4.2.0.0 extension installer contains a directory traversal vulnerability. The extension installation process extracts uploaded .zip files then uses the zip entry filenames as filesystem paths, without validating that the resolved path stays inside the intended directory. This vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-18412. Description OpenCart is a free, open‑source e‑commerce solution designed to help businesses build and manage online stores. OpenCart extensions are uploaded as zip files with .ocmod.zip extensions. Upon installation, the OpenCart v4.2.0.0 extension installer extracts these zip files, but does not validate that the extracted paths stay inside the intended extraction directory. An attacker can craft a malicious extension containing file path traversal sequences, such as ../ . With this vulnerability, an attacker can write files, such as a PHP web shell, into the webroot directory. Impact If a user with valid admininistrator credentials installs a malicious extension, it could allow a user to remotely execute code with the same privileges that OpenCart has on the target server. This includes the potential creation of a web shell, which could further enable remote execution of system-level commands. The vulnerability was confirmed against version 4.2.0.0, but other 4.x versions of OpenCart may be affected. Solution Unfortunately, OpenCart could not be reached to coordinate this vulnerability, and a patch is not available at the time of this writing. The CERT/CC recommends that OpenCart users update to the latest version and avoid installing extensions from unknown or untrusted sources. Additionally, OpenCart should be configured to run
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Thursday, August 13
* Auth Bypass. * Commands over CAN Bus to internal components. * Protection mechanisms disabled and configuration changes. * Impact: damage connected devices, permanent DoS to the inverter itself, fines, and even risk to the lives of grid technicians. * proprietary communication protocols and file formats. * RX architecture reverse engineering.
I kept hitting this during vulnerability research when I’d find the bug, then spend hours jumping between tags to work out the affected range. So I tried turning the vulnerability description into a source code check and running it across releases. It caught an interesting case in qutebrowser where one advisory implied 11 releases were safe even though the fix wasn’t present in them. I turned the workflow into an open source CLI called Taggity. Describe the vulnerability, review the drafted check, then test it against any version or audit an advisory’s claimed range. Repo: [https://github.com/nickelsec/taggity](https://github.com/nickelsec/taggity) If you have an advisory with a messy or disputed version range, send it over. I need harder cases :)
Decoupling Intent from Execution: Why Deterministic Policy Gateways Must Replace LLM-Based Guardrails
As enterprise security teams grant autonomous AI agents execution privileges—calling internal APIs, orchestrating cloud infrastructure, or querying production databases—a fundamental safety flaw has emerged in standard deployment models. Most current agent frameworks rely on "soft guardrails" or secondary LLM reviewer loops to evaluate whether an action is authorized and safe before execution. Here is a breakdown of why this probabilistic security pattern breaks down under adversarial conditions, and how to structure a deterministic policy layer instead: 1. The Fallacy of Probabilistic Guardrails Using a non-deterministic evaluation engine (an LLM) to police non-deterministic output introduces a fundamental feedback flaw. If an attacker achieves indirect prompt injection or manipulates the agent's context window, a secondary LLM reviewer operating on the same or similar context remains vulnerable to identical manipulation. Safety boundaries must execute deterministically at the infrastructure boundary, not probabilistically within the reasoning loop. 2. Threat Vector: Telemetry Poisoning & Induced Self-DoS In fully autonomous environments, an adversary doesn't always need direct prompt access to alter agent behavior. By injecting sub-threshold synthetic noise or anomalous metric spikes into monitored telemetry streams, an attacker can intentionally skew the environmental context the agent evaluates. When the agent interprets this poisoned context, it initiates automated containment or fail-safe routines—triggering self-inflicted system downtime or isolating healthy operational nodes without the attacker ever gaining elevated privileges. 3. Proposed Pattern: Deterministic Gateway Enforcement To enforce true security boundaries around agentic tool-calling, authorization must be entirely decoupled from model reasoning: * Intent Proposal (Non-Deterministic): The LLM's role is strictly confined to generating a structured intent request (e.g., a candidate API call or JSON payload). * Deterministic Schema Verification: The intent passes to a dedicated API Gateway running static, immutable policy engines (e.g., rigid JSON schemas, RBAC, hard cryptographic token checks). If identity == UNVERIFIED or location == ANOMALOUS, the token is revoked deterministically—no LLM evaluation required. * Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) Verification Gates: For actions flagged as high-impact probabilistic anomalies, execution suspends hard at the gateway layer until human validation confirms true business context. I published a full paper breaking down these operational failure modes and architectural diagrams on HackerNoon: [https://hackernoon.com/the-vulnerability-of-intent](https://hackernoon.com/the-vulnerability-of-intent) Discussion for the sub: For those managing or building agentic AI pipelines: How are you handling authorization boundaries for tool-calling models? Are you relying on model-level guardrail frameworks, or enforcing strict API gateway schemas?
Since we launched Certificate Transparency Monitoring in public beta in 2019, we've been emailing subscribers whenever a new TLS certificate appears in a public Certificate Transparency (CT) log for one of their domains. Today, it's turned on for more than 650,000 customer domains. It's an early warning that someone, somewhere, has issued a certificate for a hostname in your zone, giving you a chance to spot a mis-issued certificate early. It's a useful signal, but it had a noise problem, and we felt it ourselves. Cloudflare issues a large volume of certificates on your behalf: Universal SSL renewals, certificates from Advanced Certificate Manager, and backup certificates. All of them are logged to public CT logs by design, because a certificate that isn't logged won't be trusted by major browsers like Google Chrome and Apple's Safari. So the same transparency that lets you monitor for mis-issuance also surfaces every certificate we issue for you. And issuance isn't a one-time event. Certificates are short-lived and renew automatically: a single Universal SSL certificate can renew as often as every 60 days , up to about six times a year. That cadence is set to increase, with the CA/Browser Forum having voted to cut the maximum certificate lifetime to 47 days by 2029, multiplying the routine renewals that fl
Records obtained by WIRED detail hundreds of allegations of Customs and Border Protection workers misusing internal tools to look up romantic interests and track colleagues’ cell phones.
A pretty amateurish threat actor is causing a lot of stir in the banking world. The article showcases how they operate and the IOCs identified so far.
Threat actors have begun to exploit a newly disclosed Microsoft SharePoint vulnerability following the release of a proof-of-concept (PoC) code. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-55040 (CVSS score: 9.1), which refers to a critical security feature bypass that stems from weak authentication. It was patched by Microsoft as part of its July 2026 Patch Tuesday updates. "The authentication
Watched the openAI cybersecurity incident presentation. Key findings and implications 1. AI Agents when given unlimited tokens, try endlessly to achieve their goals. They may take action or plan that are remotely possible. While human hackers may give up by weighting effort/time with value. AI Agent didn't. They try until making progresses. This is the major shift in threat modeling and risk assessment. Cybersecurity blue team are facing an adversary that does not consider time nor efforts! 2. The speakers mentioned AI agent discovered SSRF and zero day vulnerabilities. In hindsight, HuggingFace team should have known the risk. But realistically, it is impossible for a cybersecurity team to check every websites for SSRF before giving AI agent to access it. We are facing a dilemma that if we give AI agent access to web resources owned by another company, the AI agent may gain unauthorized tools or rights. There is no limit if just a tiny crack is found. AI agent can adapt and abuse any security holes. ( next point) 3. AI agents communicate via folder names, when they find they cannot create files. Two agents were creating folders with name over hundreds characters and use folder name to share info. While humans limit or control files, AI find the one we missed. Cybersecurity team can no longer say "these controls were working since 1990, everyone are doing it" AI dont care the history. 4. When AI agent run independently and with different goals, a collective intelligence emerged. They shared info and made open requests to other AI agents. The thinking text log showed AI Agents were opportunistic and hoping by sharing items, they will trigger other AI Agents to share theirs. They even tried to create their identity in the process. The video is 37mins and I believe every cybersecurity student shall watch it. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=87DyyMV0kCY](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=87DyyMV0kCY)
GitHub - slushiimusic/CamelCrusherBridge: CamelCrusher, running again. Five years after macOS and Apple Silicon broke it — an arm64 VST2/AU front-end hosts the original x86_64 binary over shared memory, and the long-blank GUI is redrawn natively in Cocoa. Works on current macOS on M-series Macs.
Wednesday, August 12
The North Korean threat actor known as Lazarus Group has been attributed to the zero-day exploitation of a newly patched security flaw impacting Microsoft Windows to deliver a never-before-seen backdoor targeting defense and aerospace companies across France, Germany, Brazil, and India. The activity, per Check Point Research, is part of Operation Dream Job, a long-running cyber espionage and
A massive set of 737 free VPN and proxy extensions have been found to mainly target Russian-speaking users seeking access to blocked services with an aim to intercept browser traffic and route them through a proxy infrastructure. The extensions, published across at least 40 Chrome Web Store developer accounts, racked up 75,486 installs. Of those identified, 274 have been found to impersonate 66
Security researchers found that in less than 60 seconds, they could open a hatch on a plane’s exterior, plug in a tiny device, and redirect the aircraft’s autopilot or sabotage its flight plan.
A newly disclosed flaw in the way OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google carried hidden AI reasoning between API calls let researchers recover internal reasoning and secrets from session logs, including API keys and passwords. The weakness affected encrypted reasoning objects used by the providers' reasoning APIs, where a block created in one session could be replayed into another and, during testing,
Enterprise defenses are tuned to catch the attacks that make noise. This year's data shows attackers winning by making none. According to Picus Labs' new Blue Report 2026, which measured more than 338 million real attack simulations across actual client production environments in the first half of 2026, defenses are having one of their strongest years yet. Average prevention effectiveness
Adobe has shipped updates to address multiple critical security vulnerabilities impacting ColdFusion, Commerce, and Campaign Classic that, if successfully exploited, could result in arbitrary code execution and privilege escalation. The most severe of the flaws are listed below - CVE-2026-48362 (CVSS score: 10.0) - An operating system command injection vulnerability in ColdFusion that could
Experts allege that two recent incidents in California show the extreme lengths that criminal organizations are willing to go to to steal servers and other gear meant for data centers.
Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite A little wind noise, a little connectivity flakiness, and a little lip-sync issues from YouTube, but look at that view! 朗 Back to business, it's the Brinks Home FAQ I found most interesting this week. I mean, how do you write your own FAQ then fail to actually answer most of the questions?! Being conscious that they're the target of criminal extortion and are genuinely the victims here, I still struggle to grasp how simple incident response questions can be so lawyer-speaked as to remove all sensible meaning from the responses. But this is how these things tend to play out these days (speaking generically, yet to be seen fully for Brinks): hacker gets data by just calling up and asking for it (vishing -> OAuth), hacker demands money, hacker gets no money so dumps the data, company gets a gazillion class actions overnight and lawyers up to the hilt, customers get notified "where legally required" (which it usually isn't) 路♂️
Two malicious LiteLLM releases sat on PyPI for about 40 minutes in March carrying credential-stealing code capable of harvesting cloud keys, SSH keys, Kubernetes tokens, database passwords, and other secrets from systems that installed them. Threat intelligence firm CloudSEK now says a dataset it obtained, built from roughly 434,000 files the attackers captured, maps potential exposure to more
Cisco has warned that a new vulnerability impacting Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) Software has been exploited in the wild. The high-severity flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-20349 (CVSS score: 8.6), is a case of insufficient error checking when processing HTTP requests that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to trigger
Tuesday, August 11
Microsoft today released updates to remedy at least 398 security vulnerabilities in its Windows operating systems and supported software, including one weakness that is already being actively exploited and two others that were publicly detailed prior to today. Image: Shutterstock, Mallika Home Studio. August’s overstuffed bundle of patch joy from Microsoft did not eclipse its recording breaking release of more than 570 security updates last month , but it is double June’s then-record batch of nearly 200 fixes . Microsoft has attributed the recent patch deluge to vulnerability discoveries aided by artificial intelligence, and experts roundly agree that Windows users should get used to the idea of Patch Tuesdays (the second Tuesday of each month) covering hundreds of newly discovered security flaws. Fully 42 of the 398 flaws that Microsoft patched today earned Redmond’s most-dire “critical” rating, meaning they are severe enough that malware or malcontents could exploit them to gain remote control over a Windows computer with little to no help from the user. The sole known 
I registered an expired DMARC reporting domain (gca-emailauth\[.\]org) for $10. It had been published as the aggregate-reporting address in Global Cyber Alliance DMARC training docs going back to a 2019 bootcamp, and at some point it lapsed. Shortly after registration, aggregate DMARC reports for 86 domains across 20+ organizations started arriving. 56 belonged to The Toro Company (NYSE-listed), including myturf\[.\]com, their distributor platform, which sits at p=none. The rest - University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point (14 subdomains), the North Carolina School of Science and Mathematics, Ennis ISD (Texas), Great Prairie AEA (an Iowa education agency serving 35,000 students), two county governments, and several commercial domains. For most of these it was a second rua address sitting behind a working commercial processor (Proofpoint, in Toro's case). Reports still arrived at the primary. GCA's engineers later traced it to a former partner who'd held the domain and let it lapse - the dependency was never written down. As of my last sweep, 65 of the 86 still publish the endpoint. We disclosed to everyone whose reports we were receiving; only 21 domains stopped publishing the endpoint, and almost nobody replied. After 8 months of owning the domain, we coordinated a transfer back to GCA.
Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a new version of the Kimwolf/AISURU Android and Internet of Things (IoT) botnet that comes with significant improvements to improve its operational resilience and conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. The new version, tracked as Kimwolf v7, was discovered by Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 in February 2026. "Kimwolf v7 adds an HTTP/2-based
The Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) has disclosed details of a new social engineering campaign orchestrated by Russian nation-state threat actors targeting IT workers in the country by masquerading as recruiters to trick them into installing malware. CERT-UA pinned the activity on a threat cluster it tracks as UAC-0145, which is a subgroup within Sandworm (aka APT44,
Every Signal chat starts the same way: the client asks the Signal server for the public key associated with your contact’s phone number. But how do you know the server gave you the right key? A compromised server could provide a false public key, allowing the client to encrypt messages to an attacker rather than the intended recipient. Until now, the only way to detect such malfeasance was to verify safety numbers with your contact in person or over a trusted channel. Signal recently launched an alternative: Automatic Key Verification , a feature that helps validate that your chats are secure without requiring direct safety number comparison . Trail of Bits built and operates one of the three auditors that make this system trustworthy. Our auditor, which is an independent implementation written from scratch, continuously checks that the Automatic Key Verification system behaves honestly. How key verification works Automatic Key Verification is a form of “key transparency” that makes mismatch attacks harder to hide by creating a globally consistent view of the set of public keys associated with each phone number. The Signal app now performs a periodic self-check to ensure that all keys stored in the global map for your account belong to your devices. If the app is unable to verify the log, or finds that not all keys are expected, the user is presented with a warning that “Automatic Key Verification is currently unavailable for your device.” Automatic Key Verification may also be unavailable for other reasons, as outlined in Signal’s documentation
Security researchers found a way to enter Microsoft SharePoint servers as any user, including an administrator, with no valid account. A significant part of the work that found it was done through an AI agent. The flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-55040 (CVSS 9.1), affects SharePoint Server Subscription Edition, SharePoint Server 2019, and SharePoint Server 2016. Microsoft's
The ransomware group known as DeadLock has been observed using decentralized infrastructure to facilitate victim communications and data leak operations in a bid to improve operational resilience. "Its recovery ecosystem combines the Session messaging network with blockchain-backed services that store and deliver resources used throughout the extortion process," the Microsoft Threat
[Tool/Writeup] ALPC-Enumerator: A dynamic, userland C++ tool to enumerate ALPC ports and detect ALPC spoofing
Hey everyone For some time now, I've been digging into ALPC, it's a fascinating and deliberately under documented corner of Windows internals. I originally built this userland enumerator to mitigate userland restrictions, but it’s structured as a simple C++ program that can easily be chained to enhance other reverse engineering workflows. To ensure it runs effectively across different Windows builds, I made it completely dynamic, resolving structures at runtime rather than relying on hardcoded offsets. One specific angle that fascinated me during this research was ALPC spoofing. A malicious process can easily spoof its name and path over ALPC, but it *cannot* spoof the type and a signer. This mismatch becomes a highly reliable detection signal for defensive purposes. I've verified the output and every angle using WinDbg, and both logs are available in the GitHub repo. I put together a full technical breakdown detailing the dynamic PPL-aware enumeration approach and the spoofing detection mechanics here:[**https://medium.com/@sphinx\_321/userland-alpc-enumeration-dynamic-ppl-aware-approach-283541194102**](https://medium.com/@sphinx_321/userland-alpc-enumeration-dynamic-ppl-aware-approach-283541194102) I'm planning to broaden this research next to map out the local RPC/ALPC attack surface, so I might drop more tools regarding this soon. I’d love to hear your thoughts or feedback on the implementation!
Author here. We discovered a vulnerability in `docker cp` that allows a malicious container to create or overwrite files on the machine running the Docker CLI. The exploit combines a filesystem race in Docker’s archive creation with unsafe symlink handling during extraction. Depending on the CLI user’s privileges, this can lead to developer-account compromise or root code execution. Docker confirmed that `sbx cp` was also affected. Fixed versions: * Docker Engine/CLI 29.7.2+ * Docker Desktop 4.86.0+ * Docker Sandboxes 0.38.0+ Happy to answer technical questions.
VU#431093: TCG TPM 2.0 reference code found vulnerable to information leakage and timing side-channel attacks
Overview Two vulnerabilities have been identified in the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0 reference implementation: CVE-2026-6726 – Information leakage via falsified TPM keys. CVE-2026-6727 – A timing side-channel vulnerability in RSA OAEP decryption. An attacker with privileged access to a TPM command interface may be able to exploit these vulnerabilities by sending specially crafted TPM commands. Successful exploitation could allow the attacker to decrypt ciphertexts encrypted to affected TPM-managed RSA keys, including the RSA Endorsement Key (EK), or obtain credentials for falsified TPM keys, enabling forged TPM 2.0 attestations. These vulnerabilities are also documented by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) in advisories - TCGVRT010 and TCGVRT0011 : Description Trusted Platform Module (TPM) technology provides hardware-backed cryptographic services for modern computing platforms. TPMs are designed to resist tampering and may be implemented as discrete chips, integrated hardware, firmware-based TPMs (fTPMs), or software implementations used in cloud and virtualized environments. The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) maintains the TPM specifications and publishes a reference implementation to assist vendors in developing TPM-compliant products. Two vulnerabilities were identified in the TPM 2.0 reference implementation. CVE-2026-6727 A timing side-channel vulnerability exists in the RSA OAEP decryption implementation. A privileged local attacker with access to the TPM command interface may be able to exploit timing differ
OpenAI on Monday unveiled a new cybersecurity-focused model called GPT‑5.6‑Cyber that it said is focused on vulnerability research, penetration testing, and incident response. "Built on GPT‑5.6 Sol, it is trained to improve capabilities on several specialized cybersecurity tasks (e.g., finding zero-day vulnerabilities and developing exploit chains) and to reduce refusals for certain higher-risk
Cloudflare DDoS Threat Report H1 2026: 1 Tbps attacks soar as DNS floods and geopolitical tensions drive a new wave
Welcome to the 25th edition of Cloudflare's DDoS Threat Report. This is the first half-year edition in the series: rather than publishing separate reports for the first and second quarters of 2026, we have combined our coverage of Q1 and Q2 into a single volume covering January through June 2026. The analysis is produced by Cloudforce One , Cloudflare’s Threat Intelligence organization, providing a comprehensive analysis of the evolving threat landscape of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks based on data from the Cloudflare network . Key insights The 1 Tbps club grew. Cloudflare mitigated a combined 935 network-layer DDoS attacks exceeding 1 Tbps in the first half of 2026 and a +519% quarter-over-quarter surge between Q1 and Q2. The attack-vector center of gravity shifted from botnet floods to reflection and amplification. DNS-based attacks accounted for 34.3% of all network-layer activity in the first half of 2026, with DNS Floods alone climbing from 25.7% to 40.0% of network-layer attacks quarter-over-quarter. CLDAP Floods surged +580% quarter-over-quarter to become the #3 vector in Q2. Geopolitics and global events influence the landscape. Media, Production & Publishing held the #1 most-attacked industry crown in both quarters at 14.2% of all mitigated HTTP DDoS requests as coverage of Iran, Ukraine, and the World Cup drew sustained attention. In para
Researchers say it took fewer than 20 prompts for a public AI tool to find a flaw (now fixed) allowing anyone on a Zoom call to hijack another participants’ device.
A malicious SIM card can order the device it sits in to run commands of the attacker's choosing. On the cellular modules built into electric-vehicle chargers, industrial routers, and car telematics units, that is enough to take the whole device over. Researchers at the University of Birmingham and the security firm Fuzzware tested 26 phones and cellular modules for the capability, found it
Mozilla has scrapped the cryptographic key behind Firefox and Thunderbird downloads for Linux after an unencrypted copy of it was committed by mistake to one of the company's own private code repositories. That key is how a user, or a Linux distribution packaging the browser, confirms a downloaded Firefox tarball came from Mozilla and was not tampered with. That decision carries a cost for
RSModsPlus: Digital drop pedal and speaker mode for Rocksmith 2014 which shifts the song to match your guitar's tuning
SMAP is Pre-Disarmed: How a Stack Pivot That Shouldn't Work Revealed a Kernel-Wide Design Compromise
While working through a kernel exploit chain on Windows 11, I noticed that a stack pivot into user-mode memory didn't trigger SMAP. I wrote up three experiments to figure out why. Short version: the normal syscall entry path arrives with RFLAGS.AC=1. SMAP is effectively disabled for any code reached through a standard IOCTL dispatch. This aligns with what MSRC documented back in 2020 (the Windows kernel simply wasn't built with SMAP in mind, and retrofitting it would touch \~2,900 locations: [here](https://github.com/microsoft/MSRC-Security-Research/blob/master/papers/2020/Evaluating%20the%20feasibility%20of%20enabling%20SMAP%20for%20the%20Windows%20kernel.pdf)) My conclusion isn't novel here. It's just an experimental confirmation of the architectural compromise on current builds. I just wanted to shine the light on this blind spot.
Most security leaders can report what they spent on bug bounty last year. Far fewer can understand the value being delivered by proving what it actually tested. Open programs show which bugs were reported, not which assets received real, skilled attention. Managed bug bounty closes that gap. Researcher-hour and traffic analytics turn testing depth into evidence you can measure, not an assumption you have to trust, giving you coverage you can hand to a board, an auditor, or a compliance team. The post Managed Bug Bounty: Why Provable Coverage Beats Blind Spend appeared first on Synack .
Monday, August 10
At the beginning of Agents Week, Rita shared that agents represent the next evolution of computing: not only as a new application of AI but also as a new class of software that’s shaping how people interact with technology, and how software interacts with the Internet. Over the last year or so, we set out to explore what this shift means for developers and customers building AI-native apps and the infrastructure needed to support them. As agents become more capable and autonomous, the challenges extend beyond the models themselves — to identity, communication, orchestration, memory, observability, and security. Over the past week we’ve shared how we’re bringing those pieces together across the Cloudflare platform to serve an Agentic Internet. Each day we presented new tools, products, and ideas toward building for an Internet where humans and agents cooperate instead of collide . Monday, August 3 Monday focused on the foundations for building and running intelligent, autonomous apps — the runtime and infrastructure agents rely on. Tuesday, August 4 Tuesday introduced the Agent Development Lifecycle (ADLC) and the primitives that take agentic software from prototype to production. Wednesday, August 5 Wednesday extended Zero Trust from users and devices to agents themselves — and we shared how we’re running it internally at Cloudflare. Thursday, August 6 Thursday defined the Agentic Internet, and how website owners, publishers, and agents can all contribute to an Internet that works for people and agents alike.
Found inside camview.tar.gz on an exposed server: a Docker project used to find, exploit, and stream internet-exposed IP cameras in a browser. The operator's own name for it, from the archive and README, is camview. It is not connected to any legitimate app of the same name. * Built with FastAPI and Uvicorn, Python 3.11 image with FFmpeg, nmap, and masscan baked in * FFmpeg transcodes the camera RTSP feed to MJPEG for display; nmap and masscan provide the initial scan layer * The audit feature is where the exploitation happens: cameras are fingerprinted across a dozen-plus brands, queried over ONVIF, tested against known CVEs, then brute-forced over HTTP and RTSP with a 3,811-entry username:password dictionary * Working credentials and stream URL patterns are written to disk and prioritized on later runs, so it improves per vendor * The exploitation itself is not custom. camview wraps Ingram, a public webcam scanner, mounted in from the host * On a second, unrelated directory, scripts named camworm.py and routerworm.py follow a compromise-then-proxy pattern and contain no actual worm functionality despite the naming We rebuilt the UI in a sealed test environment by running it with empty data. Full analysis in the post: [https://hunt.io/blog/russian-speaking-operator-ukrainian-camera-toolkit](https://hunt.io/blog/russian-speaking-operator-ukrainian-camera-toolkit)
Overview The OpenCart v4.2.0.0 extension installer contains a directory traversal vulnerability. The extension installation process extracts uploaded .zip files then uses the zip entry filenames as filesystem paths, without validating that the resolved path stays inside the intended directory. This vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-18412. Description OpenCart is a free, open‑source e‑commerce solution designed to help businesses build and manage online stores. OpenCart extensions are uploaded as zip files with .ocmod.zip extensions. Upon installation, the OpenCart v4.2.0.0 extension installer extracts these zip files, but does not validate that the extracted paths stay inside the intended extraction directory. An attacker can craft a malicious extension containing file path traversal sequences, such as ../ . With this vulnerability, an attacker can write files, such as a PHP web shell, into the webroot directory. Impact If a user with valid admininistrator credentials installs a malicious extension, it could allow a user to remotely execute code with the same privileges that OpenCart has on the target server. This includes the potential creation of a web shell, which could further enable remote execution of system-level commands. The vulnerability was confirmed against version 4.2.0.0, but other 4.x versions of OpenCart may be affected. Solution Unfortunately, OpenCart could not be reached to coordinate this vulnerability, and a patch is not available at the time of this writing. The CERT/CC recommends that OpenCart users update to the latest version and avoid installing extensions from unknown or untrusted sources. Additionally, OpenCart should be configured to run
Serving the most critical missions: Cloudflare for Government achieves FedRAMP Class D (High) Certified status
We believe the Internet must be a force for good, and that it requires a foundation of trust. Nowhere is that trust more critical than in public service. Government agencies are the stewards of a nation’s most sensitive data. They protect national security, critical infrastructure , and the personal information of every citizen. Cloudflare’s mission is to help build a better Internet. A key part of that mission is giving public sector agencies the best technology to stay secure, fast, and reliable. That means meeting the highest possible standards. Today, we are proud to announce a major milestone: Cloudflare for Government has achieved FedRAMP Class D (High) certification status . We are honored to take this step with our sponsoring agency, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, whose global mission demands the highest level of security. We are also very excited to announce that we are using the new systems we developed for FedRAMP High as the foundation of our commitment to pursuing U.S. Department of Defense Impact Level 4 (DoD IL4) authorization. IL4 is the department’s cybersecurity standard for systems handling controlled, unclassified data. We are confident that bringing our global network to this space will change the pace of innovation in the defense community. What is FedRAMP, and why does being “certified” matter? The Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) is a U.S. government-wide program that provides a rigorous, standardize
i got tired of switching between windbg ida and x64dbg so i built an orchestrator to control them all
To reduce the amount of noise from questions, we have disabled self-posts in favor of a unified questions thread every week. Feel free to ask any question about reverse engineering here. If your question is about how to use a specific tool, or is specific to some particular target, you will have better luck on the [Reverse Engineering StackExchange](http://reverseengineering.stackexchange.com/). See also /r/AskReverseEngineering.
Sunday, August 9
HANDLE Duplication internals : What happens behind the scenes when you call kernelbase! DuplicateHandle( )
I am making a Emulator Bypass of a Lame Game "Free Fire" it works perfectly and not give any type of Ban/Blacklist in Casual modes Games but as soon as i start a Ranked match it triggers blacklist ! I have a Safe Bypass DLL ! I have attached the DLL link. Someone Recreate it i will pay !
Evil Fonts deceive a viewer by rendering a different letter than is actually on the disk. Evil Fonts can poison HTML, DOCX, PDFs, and anywhere else you can bring your own fonts. Works great in Windows corporate networks for bypassing security tooling, initial access through JavaScript free click fix (beats mitm web security tooling), and leaving traps around the network to harvest shells. Imagine thinking you are copying whoami but what is actually on the disk is rm -rf \\\~ Demos: (Use desktop) https://doctoreww.github.io/EvilFontTool/ For the demos, copy and paste the HTML/DOCX to a notepad to remove the evil fonts. For the AI ones imagine your security tooling inspects the benign text on disk, but shows the obviously malicious extortion to the user. Labs: https://github.com/DoctorEww/EvilFontTool/blob/main/labs%2FREADME.md Lab Walkthrough: https://github.com/DoctorEww/EvilFontTool/blob/main/labs%2Fwalkthrough.md Some evil font uses: Tamper homework to make it so students poison AI queries Poison help desk documentation Bypass email filters Clickfix Beat resume AI filters
Saturday, August 8
I recently analyzed a multi-stage PowerShell payload delivery chain involving heavily obfuscated PowerShell loaders and remotely hosted payloads. The analysis covers PowerShell deobfuscation, hidden execution, Base64/XOR decoding, a decoy “Verification complete!” prompt, payload delivery, and IOCs. Initial indicators: `203[.]188[.]171[.]166` `dorenzaa[.]com`
Hey everyone, I'm OP here so feel free to ask questions
Plus: A judge rules cell tower dumps unconstitutional, water utility hacks spread to a dozen states, a phishing email opens a missile-parts supplier’s inbox, and a ransomware boss gets 16 years.
Two security researchers bought cheap domains—including noreply.net and deleteduser.com—and set up email listening services. Hundreds of companies are sending them corporate secrets.
Yes, given that the legacy SCT protocol has known security vulnerabilities such as sctphantom, the industry strongly recommends deprecating it and migrating to more secure modern standards to ensure system security.
Friday, August 7
The Internet isn’t a single lane of traffic. For a long time, the rule of thumb in web security was that bots are bad, while humans are good. Of course, we’re far past this generalization. Humans can be fraudulent, and bots can be helpful at different levels. Site owners actively want some automated traffic to interact with our sites to make the Internet functional and discoverable. To complicate things further, the line between "human" and "bot" is blurring more and more. Now, we have a type of “hybrid” traffic where a single session shifts from human to agentic and back again. (Think of a user browsing a store, and then handing off the checkout process to an automated shopping assistant.) So, how do website owners manage this kind of complexity? What matters here is assessing behaviors . Is this behavior abusive? Malicious? What’s the risk presented here, and can I trust this visitor based on their actions? Solving this requires moving beyond static, point-in-time checks. It requires analyzing continuous behaviors to evaluate Trust. In this post, we’ll share an inside look into the strategy of the Web Integrity & Trust team (covering the bots and fraud problem spaces) around detecting and analyzing good and bad behaviors, providing tools to help site owners tackle emerging challenges in the shifting Agentic Internet. We’ll also share findings around agentic traffic since the launch of Precursor , and a simulation where you can see how your own cursor movements would be assessed as human or bot — plus some exciting launch updates to expect in the near future. Defining Risk and Trust Let’s talk about the distinction between Risk and Trust , the way we discuss it within the teams at Cloudflare who work in bot detection. These are often viewed as polar
Since launching in 2020, Cloudflare Radar has provided one-of-a-kind insight into Internet traffic on a global scale. The open data that Radar publishes from our global network is used by a variety of experts in different domains: human rights advocates, journalists, academic researchers, network operators, and more. Today, as part of Agents Week , Radar is beta-launching a new tool: Radar Researcher. Now, if you want to answer a question with Radar’s data, you can just ask in plain language and get an answer back with real, interactive charts, all built on Cloudflare's developer platform. You no longer need to find the right page, choose the right filters, or read the API documentation to write a query. Why we built Radar Researcher Over the past six years, the Radar team has worked to provide clear, accessible, reliable data visualizations of complex datasets. This is not without its challenges: our user base is vast and ranges from curious novices to technical network experts. Even so, we publish as much insight into the Internet as seen from our network as we can: DNS queries from our public resolver 1.1.1.1 , HTTP traffic from across our global network, network quality data collected from Cloudflare Speed Test , and so much more. We also believe in the power of open, public data, which is why everything you see in Radar’s data visualizations is available via our free API . Every year we make more and more of the Internet visible. But as Rad
As a platform for helping build a better Internet, Cloudflare helps turn ideas into real products and experiences around the world. Across communities and backgrounds, developers build with Cloudflare using the tools they love, shaping what comes next for the Internet while inspiring, collaborating with, and teaching others. The community is where some of Cloudflare’s best moments happen. Students show their friends how to deploy Workers for the first time. Discord users answer questions from other developers via working code samples, instead of links to documentation. Open-source contributors build novel solutions to solve their own problems, then share them with the world. Organizers host events that give builders from all backgrounds the space to start building their dream project. All of these represent a community at its best: people helping other people build. This spirit of community is an exciting and vital part of helping to build the Internet. Those who step up to educate and support others, or to invent, build, or maintain tools shared across the ecosystem, make lasting contributions to the health and potential of the Internet. We want to have their backs. That's why today we’re announcing an improved community program, designed to better support, recognize, and empower the people getting involved, while working with them to shape what comes next. The program has two main tracks: Cloudflare Ambassadors: Bringing Cloudflare to their own communities. Cloudflare Community Engineers: Contributing to open-source projects that improve the Internet. We’re launching a new home for the program where you can learn more and get involved: cloudflare.com/community . Cloudflare Ambassadors Cloudflare Ambassadors are people who bring Cloudflare into their own communities. You can probably think
AI Gateway and Workers AI first started as distinct products, but over time, we noticed our users were converging. With AI Gateway, you can proxy requests to any model provider and get built-in observability, logging, access, and security. On Workers AI, we host models on the GPU infrastructure that we manage, exposing an API endpoint you can leverage to access inference-as-a-service. The architecture of these products looks different, but to an end user, it achieves the same goal: connecting you to models with a sophisticated control plane. Today, we're excited to share our plans on how these products converge into one unified path, so you can connect to any model provider (including Workers AI), while managing things like observability, billing, security, and logging from a single control plane. It’s the next step toward some big plans we have — read on to learn what a unified control plane means for the future of model routing. Merging the binding and API We've been hinting at the fact that these products are becoming more unified through our entrypoints: the Workers binding and the REST API. We have an AI binding that you can use to call AI Gateway and Workers AI. There's no concept of a separate AI Gateway and Workers AI binding: it all goes through the same path. We shipped the idea of a “default” gateway a few months ago, so that if you have never set up an AI Gateway before, you could still automatically inherit the AI Gateway observability and logging. Of course, you can still specify your own gateway if you'd like to split up applications into multiple projects. Here's what the binding call looks like, if you are calling Workers AI via AI Gateway: We’ve also announced a single unified REST API — the /ai/ endpoint that allows you to make similar calls to Workers AI via AI Gateway. Doing this allows us to unify the entrypoi
Thursday, August 6
Security researchers tracked and eavesdropped on a WIRED reporter using vulnerabilities in a pink plastic smartwatch. It’s just one piece of a deeply insecure supply chain of GPS-enabled gadgets.
VU#487613: Alinto SOGo v5.12.7 vulnerable to cross-site scripting via malformed ICS calendar invitations
Overview A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Alinto SOGo v5.12.7 allows attackers to achieve remote code execution by embedding malicious SVG (Scalable Vector Graphics) objects in ICS (iCalendar) invitations. The vulnerability has been actively exploited in the wild, as confirmed by VirusTotal sightings. Description Alinto SOGo is an open-source webmail and groupware platform for email, calendars, contacts, and shared scheduling. It is primarily used by organizations seeking a self-hosted interface solution for existing mail infrastructure. CVE-2026-8496 The vulnerability exists in SOGo’s handling of ICS files, where the DESCRIPTION field is rendered without proper sanitization or Content Security Policy (CSP) enforcement. When a calendar invite contains an SVG payload, such as <animate onrepeat='...'> , with JavaScript event handlers, the browser executes the script in the context of the SOGo webmail interface. This occurs during normal calendar view rendering (e.g., when a user opens or previews the calendar tab), even without explicit interaction. Impact Once an attacker delivers a malicious ICS file via email, any user who views the calendar will execute the embedded XSS payload, granting the attacker full read access to the victim's mailbox. This enables: Credential theft through forced logout/login phishing Password manager autofill hijacking Full exfiltration of email messages, folder contents, and metadata Extraction of contact lists and calendar data Solution Users are recommended to upgrade to SOGo v5.12.8 or newer. v5.12.8 addresses this
A 26-year-old Canadian man once described as one of the most consequential cybercrime threat actors of 2024 has pleaded guilty to computer fraud and conspiracy to hack and extort more than 165 organizations that used the cloud provider Snowflake . Connor Riley Moucka , of Kitchener, Ontario, also admitted to stealing call and text history records of more than 100 million AT&T customers. A surveillance photo of Connor Riley Moucka, a.k.a. “Judische” and “Waifu,” dated Oct 21, 2024, 9 days before Moucka’s arrest. This image was included in an affidavit filed by an investigator with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The U.S. Justice Department said between February and October 2024, Moucka and co-conspirators used stolen login credentials to steal cloud-hosted data belonging to at least 165 customers of a U.S.-based software-as-a-service company. The hackers targeted stolen credentials for Snowflake customer accounts that did not enforce multi-factor authentication, and extorted or attempted to extort a host of well-known companies, including TicketMaster, Lending Tree, Advance Auto Parts and Neiman Marcus. Snowflake responded to the data thefts by increasing password complexity requirements and enforcing multi-factor authentication.