Cybersecurity News and Vulnerability Aggregator

Cybersecurity news aggregator

Top Cybersecurity Stories Today

The Hacker News 3h ago

Threat actors have been observed weaponizing n8n, a popular artificial intelligence (AI) workflow automation platform, to facilitate sophisticated phishing campaigns and deliver malicious payloads or fingerprint devices by sending automated emails. "By leveraging trusted infrastructure, these attackers bypass traditional security filters, turning productivity tools into delivery

Bleeping Computer 6h ago

CISA warned U.S. government agencies to secure their systems against a Windows Task Host privilege escalation vulnerability that could allow attackers to gain SYSTEM privileges. [...]

The Register 13h ago

Researchers who found the flaws scored beer money bounties and warn the problem is probably pervasive Exclusive Security researchers hijacked three popular AI agents that integrate with GitHub Actions by using a new type of prompt injection attack to steal API keys and access tokens, and the vendors who run agents didn’t disclose the problem.…

Latest

Wednesday, April 15
r/cybersecurity Just now

Hi guys, I send out a weekly newsletter with the latest cybersecurity vendor reports and research, and thought you might find it useful, so sharing it here. All the reports and research below were published between April 6th - April 12th. You can get the below into your inbox every week if you want: [https://www.cybersecstats.com/cybersecstatsnewsletter/](https://www.cybersecstats.com/cybersecstatsnewsletter/)  # Big Picture Reports Threat Intelligence Report 2026 (iProov) Gen AI is making identity fraud faster, cheaper, and way more scalable, and iOS devices are suddenly a major target. Key stats: * Injection attacks targeting iOS devices surged by 1,151% in the second half of 2025 compared with the same period in 2024. * Southeast Asia experienced a 720% spike in attacks in Q3 2025. * In the first half of 2025, injection attacks increased by 14.9% before surging in the second half. Read the full report [here](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/cf8bd864?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39). March 2026 Cyber Threat Landscape Shows No Relief as Ransomware Rebounds and GenAI Risks Intensify (Check Point) Check Point’s monthly numbers are in. Ransomware bounced back, and GenAI is quietly leaking sensitive data. Key stats: * In March 2026, 672 ransomware attacks were reported globally, a 7% increase from February. * 1 in every 28 GenAI prompts posed a high risk of sensitive data leakage in March 2026. * The education sector was the most targeted industry, experiencing an average of 4,632 cyber-attacks per organization per week. Read the full report [here](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/e20f8eb9?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39). # AI and API Security  The Impact of Data Trust on AI Initiative Success (MIND & CISO Executive Network) Most organizations have rushed to deploy AI without the data governance and security foundations to support it, and CISOs are struggling to close the gap.  Key stats: * 90% of organizations are running enterprise GenAI at scale. * Only 20% of AI initiatives meet their intended KPIs. * 65% of CISOs lack confidence in their data security controls. Read the full report [here](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/6958ef3c?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39). AI and Non-Human Identities Are Outpacing Security Controls (Keeper Security) Scary insights into how non-human and AI-driven identities are operating with privileged access across enterprises.  Key stats: * 76% of cybersecurity professionals say non-human identities are not consistently governed under privileged access policies. * Only 28% of organizations report full visibility into non-human identities across cloud, on-premises, and SaaS environments. * More than 40% experienced a security incident involving non-human identities or credentials in the past year. Read the full report [here](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/100ffb83?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39). The State of AI and API Security: Navigating the Agentic Era (Salt Security) AI agents are multiplying, and so are the APIs they rely on, but security isn't keeping up. Key stats: * 99% of API attack attempts originate from authenticated sources. * 66% of organizations report API growth of more than 50% in the past year. * Only 8% report advanced API security maturity. Read the full report [here](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/da1979c3?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39). # Cloud  Cloud Cost Optimization In 2026 (Azul) Nearly a quarter of cloud spend is wasted, and CFOs are starting to notice. Key stats: * 88% of U.S. CFOs and senior finance leaders report that their cloud spending is increasing. * The average estimated cloud waste sits at nearly a quarter of total spend, equal to 23% of cloud expenditure. * 66% of CFOs say cloud spend has become a board-level issue. Read the full report [here](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/dbcbedfa?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39). # Application Security 2026 State of Application Security Report (Orca Security) Cloud and AI adoption keep racing ahead of security basics, and the gaps are showing. Key stats: * 41.88% of production organizations have leaked AI or ML credentials. * 46.20% of organizations remain exposed to Log4Shell years after disclosure. * Over 77% leave high or critical container vulnerabilities unpatched for more than 90 days. Read the full report [here](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/b5c6d75f?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39). # Fraud  Evolving Threats Beneath The Surface (LexisNexis Risk Solutions) How fraudsters are staying ahead of developing defenses, with a look at regional trends.  Key stats: * Synthetic fraud showed an eight-fold global increase year over year. * First-party fraud accounts for 38.3% of reported fraud globally and remains the leading fraud type for the second consecutive year. * Agentic traffic rose 450% between January and December 2025. Read the full report [here](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/924f8b34?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39). # Enterprise Perspective  2026 State of Exposure Management (Seemplicity) Most enterprises say they're using AI for security, but surprisingly few actually trust what it tells them. Key stats: * 88% of enterprises have integrated AI into their security stacks. * Only 31% fully trust AI-sourced recommendations to influence prioritization decisions. * 43% admit their remediation processes are still ad hoc. Read the full report [here](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/ec08d82b?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39). # Industry-Specific  US Healthcare and Cyber Risk: Threats, Trends and Strategies (Resilience) A look at what's actually driving cyber losses in healthcare, based on real claims.  Key stats: * Individual extortion demands in healthcare reached as high as $4 million in the first half of 2025. * Social engineering drove 88% of material losses in the first half of 2025, making human error the industry's single most consequential vulnerability. * Average claim severity increased from $800,000 in 2024 to more than $2 million per incident in 2025. Read the full report [here](https://www.cybersecstats.com/r/b5dd762f?m=50f43416-1146-4a3d-a1e1-5afc95e09a39).

Praetorian 2h ago

What Are Shadow Admins in AD? A common problem we encounter within many customer AD environments are accounts that, at first glance, may appear innocuous, but that actually have hidden administrative privileges equivalent to those of a domain administrator account. We call these accounts shadow admins. They represent one of the most persistent shadow admin risks in enterprise cybersecurity today. A “shadow admin” is any user account that holds sensitive privileges or admin permissions without being a member of a traditional admin group like the “Domain Admins” or “Enterprise Admins” groups. These shadow admin accounts don’t show up when you run the net group command. They won’t appear in your PAM solution’s reports. But a malicious actor who finds one has effectively won the domain. Unlike a traditional admin who is visible in privileged groups, a shadow admin account becomes a blind spot. Identity and access management tools often miss these indirect privilege paths. Over the past several years, the problem has gotten significantly worse as organizations undergo digital transformation. Workloads are migrating to AWS and Azure, identity is being federated to the cloud via ADFS, and domain controllers are running as virtual machines on ESXi. The blast radius of a single compromised account now extends well beyond the traditional AD boundary. A “shadow” admin path in 2016 might have been a service account with an overly permissive access control entry. In 2026, it’s an ADFS server running on a hypervisor managed by a VMware operator who doesn’t even know they’re one hop from full domain compromise, and two hops from your entire AWS environment. In this post, we’ll walk through several real-world examples we routinely discover during engagements and show how Praetorian Guard’s continuous attack path mapping surfaces them before an adversary does.

Bleeping Computer 3h ago

A digitally signed adware tool has deployed payloads running with SYSTEM privileges that disabled antivirus protections on thousands of endpoints, some in the educational, utilities, government, and healthcare sectors. [...]

The Hacker News 3h ago

Threat actors have been observed weaponizing n8n, a popular artificial intelligence (AI) workflow automation platform, to facilitate sophisticated phishing campaigns and deliver malicious payloads or fingerprint devices by sending automated emails. "By leveraging trusted infrastructure, these attackers bypass traditional security filters, turning productivity tools into delivery

r/cybersecurity 4h ago

A romance scammer just got 15 years in prison… after trying to scam another scammer. He spent years posing as a woman, building fake relationships, and pulling over $1.5M from victims. At one point, he messaged someone who turned out to be in the same “industry.” Instead of sending money, the other guy basically critiqued his technique and told him to do a cleaner job. Those chat logs ended up helping convict him. It sounds funny, but it highlights something bigger. This wasn’t about malware or some advanced exploit. It was pure social engineering, built on trust, emotion, and loneliness. We like to treat cybersecurity as a technical problem, but cases like this show it’s often behavioral. People aren’t just getting hacked, they’re getting manipulated. And what can people realistically do to avoid getting caught in scams like this? Share your thoughts! [Source](https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/hotforsecurity/nigerian-romance-scammer-jailed).

r/cybersecurity 5h ago

IBM says hackers are starting to use powerful AI models to find vulnerabilities and automate cyberattacks, and it thinks traditional security teams may not be able to keep up. The company just announced new cybersecurity tools, including an AI-driven assessment to identify weaknesses in enterprise systems and something called IBM Autonomous Security, which uses coordinated AI agents to detect threats and automatically respond at machine speed. In other words, IBM’s answer to AI-powered hackers is more AI, which raises the interesting possibility that future cyber battles could end up being machines defending networks against other machines.

Bleeping Computer 6h ago

CISA warned U.S. government agencies to secure their systems against a Windows Task Host privilege escalation vulnerability that could allow attackers to gain SYSTEM privileges. [...]

r/cybersecurity 7h ago
APT

Hola, básicamente tengo una shell inversa C2 bastante potente. Algunos de sus comandos incluyen el registro de pulsaciones de teclas, la captura de eventos del sistema y otro comando para descargar fotos, vídeos, documentos, activar el micrófono, la cámara, etc. Desactivar Defender, apagar el PC, abrir aplicaciones en segundo plano, subir archivos, etc. Básicamente, cualquier cosa que puedas imaginar. Empezó como un proyecto personal para trastear con mi PC y portátil, pero creo que se ha convertido en un monstruo, así que por eso estoy pensando en compartirlo en GitHub, aunque no estoy seguro de si es legal o está permitido en la plataforma. En general, no uso vulnerabilidades ni intento evadir el antivirus (aunque VirusTotal muestra 0 detecciones y FileScan dice que el riesgo es bajo, jajaja, ni idea de por qué). Si alguien lo sabe, por favor, que me lo diga. 🙏🙏🙏 Edit: I've done it: [https://github.com/Dragon56YT/RevShell](https://github.com/Dragon56YT/RevShell)

Bleeping Computer 7h ago

Modern trucks are rolling networks packed with sensors, connectivity, and attack surfaces, creating new cyber risks. NMFTA's Cybersecurity Conference brings industry leaders together to tackle emerging threats in transportation. [...]

Cloudflare 8h ago

While there have been small improvements along the way, the interface of technical products has not really changed since the dawn of the Internet. It still remains: clicking five pages deep, cross-referencing logs across tabs, and hunting for hidden toggles. AI gives us the opportunity to rethink all that. Instead of complexity spread over a sprawling graphical user interface: what if you could describe in plain language what you wanted to achieve? This is the future — and we’re launching it today. We didn’t want to just put an agent in a dashboard. We wanted to create an entirely new way to interact with our entire platform. Any task, any surface, a single prompt. Introducing Agent Lee. Agent Lee is an in-dashboard AI assistant that understands your Cloudflare account. It can help you with troubleshooting, which, today, is a manual grind. If your Worker starts returning 503s at 02:00 UTC, finding the root cause: be it an R2 bucket, a misconfigured route, or a hidden rate limit, you’re opening half a dozen tabs and hoping you recognize the pattern. Most developers don't have a teammate who knows the entire platform standing over their shoulder at 2 a.m. Agent Lee does. But it won’t just troubleshoot for you at 2 a.m. Agent Lee will also fix the problem for you on the spot. Agent Lee has been running in an active beta during which it has served over 18,000 daily users, executing nearly a quarter of a million tool calls per day. While we are confident in its current capabilities and success in production, this is a system we are continuously developing. As it remains in beta, you may encounter unexpected limitations or edge cases as we refine its performance. We encourage you to use the feedback form below to help us make it better

Cloudflare 8h ago

Today we're launching the next chapter of Cloudflare Registrar: the Registrar API in beta . The Registrar API makes it possible to search for domains, check availability, and register them programmatically. Now, buying a domain the moment an idea starts to feel real no longer has to pull you out of the agentic workflow. A Registrar API has been one of the clearest asks from builders using Cloudflare. As more of the agentic workflow has moved into editors, terminals, and agent-driven tools, domain registration became the obvious gap to close. When we launched Cloudflare Registrar seven years ago, the idea was simple. Domains should be offered at cost , with no markup and no games. Since then, Cloudflare Registrar has become one of the fastest growing registrars in the world as more people choose Cloudflare as the place to build their next project. Prompting an agent inside an AI code editor to generate name ideas, search, check, and purchase a domain. Built for agents and automation The Registrar API is designed to work well anywhere software is already being built: inside editors, deployment pipelines, backend services, and agent-driven workflows. The workflow is intentionally simple and machine-friendly. Search returns candidate names. Check returns real-time availability and pricing. Register takes a minimal request and returns a workflow-shaped response that can complete immediately or be polled if it takes longer. That makes it straightforward to use for traditional API clients and for

Cloudflare 8h ago
APT

AI agents need to interact with the web. To do that, they need a browser. They need to navigate sites, read pages, fill forms, extract data, and take screenshots. They need to observe whether things are working as expected, with a way for their humans to step in if needed. And they need to do all of this at scale. Today, we’re renaming Browser Rendering to Browser Run , and shipping key features that make it the browser for AI agents . The name Browser Rendering never fully captured what the product does. Browser Run lets you run full browser sessions on Cloudflare's global network, drive them with code or AI, record and replay sessions, crawl pages for content, debug in real time, and let humans intervene when your agent needs help. Here’s what’s new: Live View : see what your agent sees and is doing, in real time. Know instantly if things are working, and when they’re not, see exactly why. Human in the Loop : when your agent hits a snag like a login page or unexpected edge case, it can hand off to a human instead of failing. The human steps in, resolves, then hands back control. Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) Endpoint : the Chrome DevTools Protocol is how agents control browsers. Browser Run now exposes it directly, so agents get maximum control over the browser and existing CDP scripts work on Cloudflare. MCP Client Support: AI coding agents like Claude Desktop, Cursor, and OpenCode can now use Browser Run as their remote browser. WebMCP Support : agents will outnumber humans using the web. WebMCP allows websites to declare what actions are available for agents to discover and call, making navigation more reliable. Session Recordings : capture every browser session for debugging purposes. When something goes wrong, you have the full

Cloudflare 8h ago

When we originally built Workflows , our durable execution engine for multi-step applications, it was designed for a world in which workflows were triggered by human actions, like a user signing up or placing an order. For use cases like onboarding flows, workflows only had to support one instance per person — and people can only click so fast. Over time, what we’ve actually seen is a quantitative shift in the workload and access pattern: fewer human-triggered workflows, and more agent-triggered workflows, created at machine speed. As agents become persistent and autonomous infrastructure, operating on behalf of users for hours or days, they need a durable, asynchronous execution engine for the work they are doing. Workflows provides exactly that: every step is independently retryable, the workflow can pause for human-in-the-loop approval, and each instance survives failures without losing progress. Moreover, workflows themselves are being used to implement agent loops and serve as the durable harnesses that manage and keep agents alive. Our Agents SDK integration accelerated this, making it easy for agents to spawn workflow instances and get real-time progress back. A single agent session can now kick off dozens of workflows, and many agents running concurrently means thousands of instances created in seconds. With Project Think now available, we anticipate that velocity will only increase. To help developers scale their agents and applications on Workflows, we are excited to announce that we now support: 50,000 concurrent instances (number of workflow executions running in parallel),

Cloudflare 8h ago

For many of us, our first experiences with AI agents have been through typing into a chat box. And for those of us using agents day to day, we have likely gotten very good at writing detailed prompts or markdown files to guide them. But some of the moments where agents would be most useful are not always text-first. You might be on a long commute, juggling a few open sessions, or just wanting to speak naturally to an agent, have it speak back, and continue the interaction. Adding voice to an agent should not require moving that agent into a separate voice framework. Today, we are releasing an experimental voice pipeline for the Agents SDK . With @cloudflare/voice , you can add real-time voice to the same Agent architecture you already use. Voice just becomes another way you can talk to the same Durable Object, with the same tools, persistence, and WebSocket connection model that the Agents SDK already provides. @cloudflare/voice is an experimental package for the Agents SDK that provides: withVoice(Agent) for full conversation voice agents withVoiceInput(Agent) for speech-to-text-only use cases, like dictation or voice search useVoiceAgent and useVoiceInput hooks for React apps VoiceClient for framework-agnostic clients Built-in Workers AI providers, so that you can get started without external API keys: Continuous STT with Deepgram Flux Continuous STT with Deepgram Nova 3 Text-to-speech with

The Hacker News 8h ago

A recently disclosed critical security flaw impacting nginx-ui, an open-source, web-based Nginx management tool, has come under active exploitation in the wild. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-33032 (CVSS score: 9.8), an authentication bypass vulnerability that enables threat actors to seize control of the Nginx service. It has been codenamed MCPwn by Pluto Security. "

The Register 9h ago

Vuln old enough to drive lands on CISA's exploited list While Microsoft was rolling out its bumper Patch Tuesday updates this week, US cybersecurity agency CISA was readying an alert about a 17-year-old critical Excel flaw now under exploit.…

The Hacker News 9h ago
AI

Few technologies have moved from experimentation to boardroom mandate as quickly as AI. Across industries, leadership teams have embraced its broader potential, and boards, investors, and executives are already pushing organizations to adopt it across operational and security functions. Pentera’s AI Security and Exposure Report 2026 reflects that momentum: every CISO surveyed

r/blueteamsec 11h ago

Hey everyone, A while back I shared the early concept of a project I was building to get better visibility into internal networks (homelabs/SMBs). Today, HoneyWire v1.0.0 is officially released, stable, and ready to be deployed. I originally looked into solutions like Wazuh, but got tired of the traditional SIEM approach. Collecting gigabytes of legitimate traffic logs and constantly tuning out false positives was a massive resource drain. I just wanted a low-maintenance, high-signal solution for my LAN. So, I built HoneyWire. Instead of a "magnifying glass" approach, it uses a tripwire model. Instead of watching everything that goes through a legitimate door, you set up a fake door (or put sensors on existing doors that shouldn't be touched). If it trips, it’s not a misconfiguration it’s an active threat or lateral movement. It basically acts as an instant alarm system for your network. It’s completely free, open-source, and deploys in less than 60 seconds via docker compose. I built it for myself, but I'm sharing it because it might solve the same problem for someone else. With the v1.0.0 release, the architecture is production-ready. Here is a quick breakdown: * **The Dashboard:** Pure Go + SQLite backend serving a Vue 3 frontend. Uses WebSockets to instantly stream events and syntax-highlight forensic payloads. * **UI Alerts:** Native integrations for Discord, Slack, Ntfy, and Gotify. You manage keys, retention, and webhooks directly from the UI without editing text files. * **The Sensors:** Ships with official, statically-linked Go binaries: TCP Tarpits, Web Admin Decoys, File Canaries (FIM), ICMP Canaries, and Network Scan Detectors. * **Sandboxing:** Security is the priority. Everything runs in minimal Distroless containers as non-root users, with dropped Linux capabilities. * **Universal Standard:** The Hub is sensor-agnostic. I built a universal JSON contract, meaning you can write custom tripwires in Python, Bash, or Rust, send a payload, and the Hub will automatically parse it. I would absolutely love your feedback. I am excited to hear what experienced blue teamers think of this architecture, and I want to know where my blind spots are. Specifically: 1. What decoy or sensor types are absolute must-haves that I am currently missing? 2. Is the "Bring Your Own Sensor" JSON extensibility actually useful for custom environments, or does it introduce too much risk? 3. What gaps in the architecture would prevent you from testing this in a lab or SMB right now? 4. Would you find integration with existing enterprise SIEMs useful? Someone suggested using this tool alongside standard SIEMs to forward these high-fidelity logs, which sounds like an interesting next step. Here is the GitHub repo: [https://github.com/andreicscs/HoneyWire](https://github.com/andreicscs/HoneyWire) Please roast it as much as you can, I am here to learn. Thanks!

r/netsec 12h ago

Been doing some detection work around Kerberoast traffic this week and wanted to share a gap that's easy to miss in environments that haven't fully deprecated RC4. The standard detection is Event ID 4769 filtered on encryption type `0x17`. Most SIEMs have this as a canned rule. The problem is in environments with mixed OS versions or legacy applications that dynamically negotiate encryption, `0x17` requests are normal background noise. If you're not filtering beyond encryption type you're either drowning in false positives or you've tuned it so aggressively you're missing real attacks. What you should look for: 4769 where: * Encryption type is `0x17` * Requesting account is a user principal, not a machine account * Service name is not `krbtgt` and not a known computer principal * The requesting account has had no prior 4769 events against that specific SPN That last condition is the one most people skip. Legitimate service ticket requests follow patterns. A user account requesting a ticket for a service it's never touched before at 2am is a different signal than the same request during business hours from a known admin workstation. But the actual gaps noone is talking about -> gMSA accounts are immune to offline cracking because the password is 120 characters of random data rotated every 30 days. But the migration is never complete. Every environment has at least a handful of service accounts that can't be migrated.. anything that needs a plaintext password in a config file, some Exchange components, legacy apps with no gMSA support. Those accounts are permanent Kerberoast targets. (!) The question isn't whether they're there. It's whether you know exactly which ones they are and whether you're watching them specifically. On the offensive side of this: RC4 downgrade via AS-REQ pre-auth is well documented. Less discussed is that in environments where AES is enforced at the GPO level but legacy applications are still negotiating through Netlogon, you can still coerce RC4 service ticket issuance by manipulating the etype list in the TGS-REQ. `LmCompatibilityLevel = 5` controls client behavior. It has no authority over what a misconfigured application server requests through MS-NRPC. Silverfort published a POC on this last year (i wrote about this a couple weeks ago) they forced NTLMv1 through a DC configured to block it using the `ParameterControl` flag in `NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO`. Microsoft acknowledged it, didn't patch it, announced OS-level removal in Server 2025 and Win11 24H2 instead. (typcial) If your environment isn't on those versions, that vector is still open and there's no compensating control beyond full NTLM audit logging and application-level remediation. btw: `auditpol /set /subcategory:"Kerberos Service Ticket Operations" /success:enable` gets you the 4769 visibility.

The Register 13h ago

Researchers who found the flaws scored beer money bounties and warn the problem is probably pervasive Exclusive Security researchers hijacked three popular AI agents that integrate with GitHub Actions by using a new type of prompt injection attack to steal API keys and access tokens, and the vendors who run agents didn’t disclose the problem.…

The Hacker News 16h ago

OpenAI on Tuesday unveiled GPT-5.4-Cyber, a variant of its latest flagship model, GPT‑5.4, that's specifically optimized for defensive cybersecurity use cases, days after rival Anthropic unveiled its own frontier model, Mythos. "The progressive use of AI accelerates defenders – those responsible for keeping systems, data, and users safe – enabling them to find and fix problems

Tuesday, April 14
Krebs on Security 23h ago

Microsoft today pushed software updates to fix a staggering 167 security vulnerabilities in its Windows operating systems and related software, including a SharePoint Server zero-day and a publicly disclosed weakness in Windows Defender dubbed “ BlueHammer .” Separately, Google Chrome fixed its fourth zero-day of 2026, and an emergency update for Adobe Reader nixes an actively exploited flaw that can lead to remote code execution. Redmond warns that attackers are already targeting CVE-2026-32201 , a vulnerability in Microsoft SharePoint Server that allows attackers to spoof trusted content or interfaces over a network. Mike Walters , president and co-founder of Action1 , said CVE-2026-32201 can be used to deceive employees, partners, or customers by presenting falsified information within trusted SharePoint environments. “This CVE can enable phishing attacks, unauthorized data manipulation, or social engineering campaigns that lead to further compromise,” Walters said. “The presence of active exploitation significantly increases or

r/computerforensics 23h ago

Hey everyone! we just released version 0.9.0 of Crow-eye, and it brings some major updates we've been working hard on. A big focus for us in this version was removing the friction of dealing with forensic images. We actually added direct support for analyzing images right inside Crow-eye, so you don't need any other mounting software to get started. You can just point it at the image and let it parse. Right now we support parsing directly from: \* E01 / Ex01 \* VHDX / VHD \* VMDK \* ISO \* Raw / DD We also decided it was time to move on from the old timeline prototype. We built a brand new version of the Timeline Visualization from the ground up, making it way easier to correlate everything and actually see the full picture in one place. https://preview.redd.it/t22zt7ty68vg1.png?width=3439&format=png&auto=webp&s=7d5bc5f51cb0e93029ce0641813636a068ba3d58 And finally, something a lot of people asked for: Crow-eye is now completely cross-platform! We updated all the parsers so they no longer depend on Windows APIs for offline artifacts. This means you can now run it natively on Linux to parse offline artifacts and process those forensic images without needing a Windows machine. GitHub : [https://github.com/Ghassan-elsman/Crow-Eye](https://github.com/Ghassan-elsman/Crow-Eye) Let me know how it runs for you, what you think of the new timeline, or if you run into any bugs or issues!

The Register Apr 14

The company's new software keeps an eye on your agents and backs up data. Keep your agents close and your agent-monitoring software closer. Commvault’s new AI Protect can discover and monitor AI agents running inside AWS, Azure, and GCP environments and even roll back their actions when something goes wrong.…

r/Malware Apr 14

Hello, I downloaded a sample from Malwarebazaar. It was a .bat file around 208.38 KB. I set it up into [AnyRun](https://any.run), and started the analysis. \--- **Threat Type:** XWorm v6.5 (RAT) + Stealer sold as Malware-as-a-Service. Capabilities include credential theft, keylogging, screenshot capture, file exfiltration, and hijacking of crypto wallets and accounts. **Execution Process:** 1. `.bat` file runs -> checks for sandbox using `findstr.exe` 2. Uses `certutil.exe` to Base64-decode an embedded payload 3. `cscript.exe` executes decoded VBScript, dropping `svchost.exe` (fake) to %TEMP% 4. Payload launches, copies itself to `%APPDATA%\main.exe` and the startup folder for persistence 5. Connects to C2 and sends system fingerprint via Telegram Bot API # IOCs **Dropper SHA256:** dea6cfb3234780ceeea718787e027cc6d2de18cfead1f8cc234e0ad268987868 **Dropped Payload SHA256:** 7f2b0ffbc5b149b4f9858589763bacdebf63ea1b3a00532e9278d613f75462ea * **C2:** `23.160(.)168.174:3212` * **AES Key:** `<666666>` * **Mutex:** `XUH24Sz2TPub4OF4` * **USB drop name:** `XWorm V6.5 by c3lestial(.)fun` Full Analysis: [https://app.any.run/tasks/1cd22443-8259-49c0-8e6e-a0ca93b0371c](https://app.any.run/tasks/1cd22443-8259-49c0-8e6e-a0ca93b0371c)

The Hacker News Apr 14

Two high-severity security vulnerabilities have been disclosed in Composer, a package manager for PHP, that, if successfully exploited, could result in arbitrary command execution. The vulnerabilities have been described as command injection flaws affecting the Perforce VCS (version control software) driver. Details of the two flaws are below - CVE-2026-40176 (CVSS

Synack Apr 14

When you hire an elite Red Team, you start with an implicit signal of their talent. You review their resumes, their standing within the research community, certifications with trusted vendors like OffSec and CREST. You assume they can navigate your specific tech stack and pivot through your environment. But in offensive security, assumptions are liabilities. […] The post Validating AI Pentesting with Explicit Signals from Synack Red Team appeared first on Synack .

The Hacker News Apr 14

Google has announced the integration of a Rust-based Domain Name System (DNS) parser into the modem firmware as part of its ongoing efforts to beef up the security of Pixel devices and push memory-safe code at a more foundational level. "The new Rust-based DNS parser significantly reduces our security risk by mitigating an entire class of vulnerabilities in a risky area, while also laying

The Hacker News Apr 14

Cybersecurity researchers have unmasked a novel ad fraud scheme that has been found to leverage search engine poisoning (SEO) techniques and artificial intelligence (AI)-generated content to push deceptive news stories into Google's Discover feed and trick users into enabling persistent browser notifications that lead to scareware and financial scams. The campaign, which has been

Cloudflare Apr 14

Agents let you build software faster than ever, but securing your environment and the code you write — from both mistakes and malice — takes real effort. Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) details a number of risks present in agentic AI systems, including the risk of credential leaks, user impersonation, and elevation of privilege. These risks can result in extreme damage to your environments including denial of service, data loss, or data leaks — which can do untold financial and reputational damage. This is an identity problem. In modern development, "identities" aren't just people — they are the agents, scripts, and third-party tools that act on your behalf. To secure these non-human identities, you need to manage their entire lifecycle: ensuring their credentials (tokens) aren't leaked, seeing which applications have access via OAuth, and narrowing their permissions using granular RBAC. Today, we are introducing updates to address these needs: scannable tokens to protect your credentials, OAuth visibility to manage your principals, and resource-scoped RBAC to fine-tune your policies. Understanding identity: Principals, Credentials, and Policies To secure the Internet in an era of autonomous agents , we have to rethink how we handle identity. Whether a request comes from a human developer or an AI agent, every interaction with an API relies on three core pillars: The Principal (The Traveler): This is the identity itself — the "who." It might be you logging in via OAuth, or a background agent using an API token to

Cloudflare Apr 14

We at Cloudflare have aggressively adopted Model Context Protocol (MCP) as a core part of our AI strategy. This shift has moved well beyond our engineering organization, with employees across product, sales, marketing, and finance teams now using agentic workflows to drive efficiency in their daily tasks. But the adoption of agentic workflow with MCP is not without its security risks. These range from authorization sprawl, prompt injection , and supply chain risks . To secure this broad company-wide adoption, we have integrated a suite of security controls from both our Cloudflare One (SASE) platform and our Cloudflare Developer platform , allowing us to govern AI usage with MCP without slowing down our workforce. In this blog we’ll walk through our own best practices for securing MCP workflows, by putting different parts of our platform together to create a unified security architecture for the era of autonomous AI. We’ll also share two new concepts that support enterprise MCP deployments: We are launching Code Mode with MCP server portals , to drastically reduce token costs associated with MCP usage; We describe how to use Cloudflare Gateway for Shadow MCP detection, to discover use of unauthorized remote MCP servers. We also talk about how our organization approached deploying MCP, and how we built out our MCP security architecture using Cloudflare products inclu

Cloudflare Apr 14

We have thousands of internal apps at Cloudflare. Some are things we’ve built ourselves, others are self-hosted instances of software built by others. They range from business-critical apps nearly every person uses, to side projects and prototypes. All of these apps are protected by Cloudflare Access . But when we started using and building agents — particularly for uses beyond writing code — we hit a wall. People could access apps behind Access, but their agents couldn’t. Access sits in front of internal apps. You define a policy, and then Access will send unauthenticated users to a login page to choose how to authenticate. Example of a Cloudflare Access login page This flow worked great for humans. But all agents could see was a redirect to a login page that they couldn’t act on. Providing agents with access to internal app data is so vital that we immediately implemented a stopgap for our own internal use. We modified OpenCode’s web fetch tool such that for specific domains, it triggered the cloudflared CLI to open an authorization flow to fetch a JWT (JSON Web Token). By appending this token to requests, we enabled secure, immediate access to our internal ecosystem. While this solution was a temporary answer to our own dilemma, today we’re retiring this workaround and fixing this problem for everyone. Now in open beta, every Access application supports managed OAuth. One click to enab

The Hacker News Apr 14

A nascent Android remote access trojan called Mirax has been observed actively targeting Spanish-speaking countries, with campaigns reaching more than 220,000 accounts on Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and Threads through advertisements on Meta. "Mirax integrates advanced Remote Access Trojan (RAT) capabilities, allowing threat actors to fully interact with compromised devices in real

The Hacker News Apr 14

OX Security recently analyzed 216 million security findings across 250 organizations over a 90-day period. The primary takeaway: while raw alert volume grew by 52% year-over-year, prioritized critical risk grew by nearly 400%. The surge in AI-assisted development is creating a "velocity gap" where the density of high-impact vulnerabilities is scaling faster than

Compass Security Apr 14
CVE

This post is part of a small blog series covering common Entra ID security findings observed during real-world assessments. Each article explores selected findings in more detail to provide a clearer understanding of the underlying risks and practical implications. Part 1: Privileged Foreign Enterprise Applications Part 2: Privileged Unprotected Groups Part 3: Weak Privileged Identity Management Configuration Conditional Access Policies Conditional Access policies are among the most important security controls in Entra ID. As the name suggests, they define under which conditions access is allowed within a tenant. They are used to enforce protections such as MFA, restrict access based on device state or location, and apply stronger controls to sensitive applications or privileged accounts. At the same time, Conditional Access is a broad and complex topic. The

Troy Hunt Apr 14

Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite I'm starting to become pretty fond of Bruce. Actually, I've had a bit of an epiphany: an AI assistant like Bruce isn't just about auto-responding to tickets in an entirely autonomous manner; it's also pretty awesome at responding with just a little bit of human assistance. Charlotte and I both replied to some tickets today that were way too specific for Bruce to ever do on his own, but by feeding in just a little bit of additional info (such as the number of domains someone was presently monitoring), Bruce was able to construct a really good reply and "own" the ticket. So maybe that's the sweet spot: auto-reply to the really obvious stuff and then take just a little human input on everything else.

The Hacker News Apr 14

A critical security vulnerability impacting ShowDoc, a document management and collaboration service popular in China, has come under active exploitation in the wild. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2025-0520 (aka CNVD-2020-26585), which carries a CVSS score of 9.4 out of 10.0. It relates to a case of unrestricted file upload that stems from improper validation of

Monday, April 13
The Register Apr 13

Google Sites lure leads to bogus root certificate Imagine getting asked to do something by a person in authority. An unknown malware slinger targeting open source software developers via Slack impersonated a real Linux Foundation official and used pages hosted on Google.com to steal developers' credentials and take over their systems.…

r/Malware Apr 13

[](https://www.reddit.com/r/cybersecurity/?f=flair_name%3A%22News%20-%20General%22)Hello everyone, I have just analyzed a Kalim Backdoor sample to better understand its behavior, persistence mechanisms, and remote control capabilities. [Full Report](https://github.com/SalahEldinFikri/Kalim_Backdoor) [Linkedin](https://www.linkedin.com/in/salaheldin-fikri-kamil-1ab233218/) This sample demonstrates how attackers can establish unauthorized access to a compromised system, enabling continuous control, command execution, and stealthy operations without user awareness. Key Findings: \- Remote Command Execution: The backdoor allows attackers to execute commands on the infected system, giving full control over the victim machine. \- Persistence Mechanism: Implements techniques to survive system reboots, ensuring long-term access for the attacker. \- Backdoor Communication: Maintains communication with the attacker, enabling continuous interaction and data exchange. \- System Control Capabilities: Provides the ability to manipulate the system, making it suitable for post-exploitation activities. \- Stealth Techniques: Designed to operate quietly in the background, reducing the chances of detection. \- Detection (YARA): A custom YARA rule was developed based on behavioral indicators. \#CyberSecurity #MalwareAnalysis #ReverseEngineering #ThreatIntelligence #BlueTeam #Research #MalDocs #BlueTeam #Attacks #InfoSec #ThreatIntelligence #CyberThreats #DigitalForensics #BlueTeam

r/netsec Apr 13
CVE

The current version of RAGFlow, a widely-deployed Retrieval Augmented Generation solution, contains a post-auth vulnerability that allows for arbitrary code execution. This post includes a POC, walkthrough and patch. The TL;DR is to make sure your RAGFlow instances aren't on the public internet, that you have the minimum number of necessary users, and that those user accounts are protected by complex passwords. (This is especially true if you're using Infinity for storage.)

The Hacker News Apr 13

The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in partnership with the Indonesian National Police, has dismantled the infrastructure associated with a global phishing operation that leveraged an off-the-shelf toolkit called W3LL to steal thousands of victims' account credentials and attempt more than $20 million in fraud. In tandem, authorities detained the alleged developer, who has&

The Hacker News Apr 13

Anthropic restricted its Mythos Preview model last week after it autonomously found and exploited zero-day vulnerabilities in every major operating system and browser. Palo Alto Networks' Wendi Whitmore warned that similar capabilities are weeks or months from proliferation. CrowdStrike's 2026 Global Threat Report puts average eCrime breakout time at 29 minutes. Mandiant's M-Trends

The Register Apr 13

ShinyHunters claims it accessed Snowflake metrics via third-party tool ShinyHunters is back, this time pinning Rockstar Games to its leak site and claiming it didn't so much hack its way in as walk through a door someone else left wide open.…

r/blueteamsec Apr 13
CVE

Last week, a new BYOVD vulnerability (CVE-2026-29923) was discovered in pstrip64.sys driver, which allows an unprivileged user to escalate privileges to SYSTEM via a crafted IOCTL request. I just published a complete deep-dive on my GitHub covering the entire exploit lifecycle: ▪️Reverse-engineering the vulnerable IOCTL to gain a physical read/write primitive. ▪️ Building the Proof of Concept (PoC) from the ground up. ▪️ Actionable mitigation and detection recommendations for defenders. Enjoy the read, and feel free to DM me if you have any questions! ⚠️ Disclaimer: This write-up and code are provided strictly for educational and defensive research purposes only. Any malicious or unauthorized use is strictly prohibited.

r/ReverseEngineering Apr 13

To reduce the amount of noise from questions, we have disabled self-posts in favor of a unified questions thread every week. Feel free to ask any question about reverse engineering here. If your question is about how to use a specific tool, or is specific to some particular target, you will have better luck on the [Reverse Engineering StackExchange](http://reverseengineering.stackexchange.com/). See also /r/AskReverseEngineering.

The Hacker News Apr 13

OpenAI revealed a GitHub Actions workflow used to sign its macOS apps led to the download of the malicious Axios library on March 31, but noted that no user data or internal system was compromised. "Out of an abundance of caution, we are taking steps to protect the process that certifies our macOS applications are legitimate OpenAI apps," OpenAI said in a post last week. "We found no

The Register Apr 13

PLUS: Toyota wheels out basketball bot; Arm scores AI server win with SK Telecom; India ponders payment pauses to foil fraudsters; And more! Asia In Brief China’s National Data Administration last Friday published its action plan for AI in education which calls for upskilling of the nation’s citizens to ensure they can put the technology to work.…

Synack Apr 13

Introducing the Glasswing-Readiness Assessment In my last post, we looked at the emergence of Anthropic’s Mythos and how it has collapsed the exploit timeline from weeks to days. But once you accept that the speed of the adversary has changed, a more difficult question remains for security leaders: What do we actually do now? The […] The post Become Mythos-Ready and Close the AI Coverage Gap with Synack appeared first on Synack .

Sunday, April 12
Saturday, April 11
Friday, April 10
Praetorian Apr 10

The Blind Spot As organizations race to deploy LLM-powered chat agents, many have adopted a layered defense model: a primary chat agent handles user interactions while a secondary supervisor agent monitors contextual input (i.e., chat messages) for prompt injection attacks and policy violations. This architecture mirrors traditional security patterns like web application firewalls sitting in front of application servers. But what happens when the supervisor only watches the front door? Indirect prompt injection is a class of attack where adversarial instructions are embedded not in the user’s direct input, but in external data sources that an LLM consumes as context: profile fields, retrieved documents, tool outputs, or database records. Unlike direct prompt injection, where a user explicitly sends malicious instructions through the chat interface, indirect injection hides the payload in data that the application fetches on the user’s behalf—often from sources the system implicitly trusts. During a recent engagement targeting a multi-model AI-integrated customer service solution, our team identified a weakness in the architecture that made it susceptible to indirect prompt injection attacks. The customer service solution consisted of an AI-enabled chat agent that processed user requests and a separate supervisor agent that monitored the chat communications for adversarial instructions and manipulation, including prompts injected into data provided to the agent via the chat window. The supervisor agent was effective in consistently detecting and blocking attempts to attack or manipulate the chat agent. However, by injecting adversarial instructions into user profile fields—such as a user’s name—that the chat agent would retrieve upon request, we were able to bypass supervisor protections and trick the chat agent into misinterpreting our user’s profile data as a prompt and executing our hidden instructions. The root cause is a fundamen

r/computerforensics Apr 10
CVE

Hey everyone, I don't know about you, but I was getting seriously frustrated with how fragmented our tools are. Trying to piece together an investigation across Windows, Linux, and Mac artifacts usually means jumping between half a dozen different apps, and the centralized "all-in-one" solutions cost some money So, about 9 months ago, I decided to just try and build the tool I actually wanted to use. It's called **Heimdall DFIR**. **GitHub:** [https://raiseix.github.io/Heimdall-DFIR](https://raiseix.github.io/Heimdall-DFIR) Instead of a bunch of marketing buzzwords, here is what it actually does right now: * **One giant timeline:** It takes your artifacts (EVTX, MFT, Prefetch and other Windows artifacts Linux/Mac logs, etc.) and merges them into a single chronological grid. I spent a lot of time trying to make the output actually human-readable instead of just dumping raw JSON on the screen * **RAM Analysis:** I hooked it up to VolWeb (Volatility 3). You can upload massive memory dumps directly in the UI and it actually handles the stream without crashing the backend * **Collaborative mode:** Investigating alone sucks, so I added a side-chat and an evidence-pinning system so a team can look at the exact same case simultaneously **To be completely transparent with you all:** This is very much a Beta. It’s a massive undertaking and it’s still missing a lot of features I want to add before calling it a complete platform That’s honestly why I’m sharing it today. I’m hoping to get some brutally honest feedback from people who do this daily. What parsers are you constantly missing in open-source tools? What would make you actually want to use this? If anyone wants to spin it up (Docker compose is ready to go), break it, submit bug reports, or even contribute code to help build this out, I would be incredibly grateful. Let me know what you think. If you like the vision, a GitHub ⭐ helps a lot!

Google Security Apr 10
CVE

Posted by Jiacheng Lu, Software Engineer, Google Pixel Team Google is continuously advancing the security of Pixel devices. We have been focusing on hardening the cellular baseband modem against exploitation. Recognizing the risks associated within the complex modem firmware, Pixel 9 shipped with mitigations against a range of memory-safety vulnerabilities. For Pixel 10, Google is advancing its proactive security measures further. Following our previous discussion on "Deploying Rust in Existing Firmware Codebases" , this post shares a concrete application: integrating a memory-safe Rust DNS(Domain Name System) parser into the modem firmware. The new Rust-based DNS parser significantly reduces our security risk by mitigating an entire class of vulnerabilities in a risky area, while also laying the foundation for broader adoption of memory-safe code in other areas. Here we share our experience of working on it, and hope it can inspire the use of more memory safe languages in low-level environments. Why Modem Memory Safety Can’t Wait In recent years, we have seen increasing interest in the cellular modem from attackers and security researchers. For example, Google's Project Zero gained remote code execution on Pixel modems over the Internet. Pixel modem has tens of Megabytes of executable code. Given the complexity and remote attack surface of the modem, other critical memory safety vulnerabilities may remain in t

NVISO Labs Apr 10

Keyloggers: A Persistent Threat Nowadays, virtually all digital services rely on logins and authentication, from email inboxes to help desks. These involve login credentials to prove identity, typically at least a username and a password. Initially, this information is confidential from a potential attacker. Whi

Thursday, April 9
Synack Apr 9

Anthropic’s Mythos announcement marks a genuine inflection point in the threat landscape. And for those of us who have spent careers watching it evolve, this one feels different. Building a reliable working exploit used to take a skilled attacker the better part of a year. With AI-powered offensive tooling, we’re looking at potentially days. That […] The post Mythos Changes Everything: Why Your Entire Attack Surface Is Now at Risk appeared first on Synack .

Google Security Apr 9

Posted by Ben Ackerman, Chrome team, Daniel Rubery, Chrome team and Guillaume Ehinger, Google Account Security team Following our April 2024 announcement , Device Bound Session Credentials (DBSC) is now entering public availability for Windows users on Chrome 146, and expanding to macOS in an upcoming Chrome release. This project represents a significant step forward in our ongoing efforts to combat session theft, which remains a prevalent threat in the modern security landscape. Session theft typically occurs when a user inadvertently downloads malware onto their device. Once active, the malware can silently extract existing session cookies from the browser or wait for the user to log in to new accounts, before exfiltrating these tokens to an attacker-controlled server. Infostealer malware families, such as LummaC2, have become increasingly sophisticated at harvesting these credentials. Because cookies often have extended lifetimes, attackers can use them to gain unauthorized access to a user’s accounts without ever needing their passwords; this access is then often bundled, traded, or sold among threat actors. Crucially, once sophisticated malware has gained access to a machine, it can read the local files and memory where browsers store authentication cookies. As a result, there is no reliable way to prevent cookie exfiltration using software alone on any operating system. Historically, mitigating session theft relied on detecting the stolen credentials after the fact using a complex set of abuse heuristics – a reactive approach that persistent attackers could often circumvent. DBSC fundamentally changes the web's capability to defend against this threat by shifting the paradigm from reactive detection to proactive prevention, ensuring that successfully exfiltrated c

r/netsec Apr 9

Hi everyone, I’m a Cybersecurity student at HFU in Germany and recently submitted a vulnerability to the Google VRP regarding the Google Password Manager on Android (tested on Pixel 8, Android 16). **The Issue:** When you view a cleartext password in the app and minimize it, the app fails to apply `FLAG_SECURE` or blur the background. When opening the "Recent Apps" (Task Switcher), the cleartext password is fully visible in the preview, *even though* the app actively overlays a "Enter your screen lock" biometric prompt in the foreground. It basically renders its own secondary biometric lock completely useless. **Google's Response:** Google closed the report as *Won't Fix (Intended Behavior)*. Their threat model assumes that if an attacker has physical access to an unlocked device, it's game over. **The BSI Discrepancy:** What makes this interesting is that the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recently published a study on Password Managers. In their Threat Model A02 ("Attacker has temporary access to the unlocked device"), they explicitly mandate that sensitive content MUST be protected from background snapshots/screenshots. So while Google says this is intended, national security guidelines classify this as a vulnerability. (For comparison: The iOS built-in password manager instantly blurs the screen when losing focus). Here is my PoC screenshot: [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PTGKRpyFj\_jY9S76Jlo62mSCDJ3c6uLO/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PTGKRpyFj_jY9S76Jlo62mSCDJ3c6uLO/view?usp=sharing) [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1nIJMQbM4R17EMt9f1Ffb4UmCPYY7-GXb/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1nIJMQbM4R17EMt9f1Ffb4UmCPYY7-GXb/view?usp=sharing) What are your thoughts on this? Should password managers protect against shoulder surfing via the Task Switcher, or is Google right to rely solely on the OS lockscreen?

CERT/CC Apr 9
CVE

Overview Multiple vulnerabilities have been identified in Orthanc DICOM Server version, 1.12.10 and earlier, that affect image decoding and HTTP request handling components. These vulnerabilities include heap buffer overflows, out-of-bounds reads, and resource exhaustion vulnerabilities that may allow attackers to crash the server, leak memory contents, or potentially execute arbitrary code. Description Orthanc is an open-source lightweight Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine (DICOM) server used to store, process, and retrieve medical imaging data in healthcare environments. The following nine vulnerabilities identified in Orthanc primarily stem from unsafe arithmetic operations, missing bounds checks, and insufficient validation of attacker-controlled metadata in DICOM files and HTTP requests. CVE-2026-5437 An out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in DicomStreamReader during DICOM meta-header parsing. When processing malformed metadata structures, the parser may read beyond the bounds of the allocated metadata buffer. Although this issue does not typically crash the server or expose data directly to the attacker, it reflects insufficient input validation in the parsing logic. CVE-2026-5438 A gzip decompression bomb vulnerability exists when Orthanc processes an HTTP request with Content-Encoding: gzip . The server does not enforce limits on decompressed size and allocates memory based on attacker-controlled compression metadata. A specially crafted gzip payload can trigger excessive memory allocation and exhaust system memory. CVE-2026-5439 A memory exhaustion vulnerability exists in ZIP archive processing. Orthanc automatically extracts ZIP archives uploaded t

Trail of Bits Apr 9

We added a new chapter to our Testing Handbook: a comprehensive security checklist for C and C++ code . We’ve identified a broad range of common bug classes, known footguns, and API gotchas across C and C++ codebases and organized them into sections covering Linux, Windows, and seccomp. Whereas other handbook chapters focus on static and dynamic analysis, this chapter offers a strong basis for manual code review. LLM enthusiasts rejoice: we’re also developing a Claude skill based on this new chapter. It will turn the checklist into bug-finding prompts that an LLM can run against a codebase, and it’ll be platform and threat-model aware. Be sure to give it a try when we release it. And after reading the chapter, you can test your C/C++ review skills against two challenges at the end of this post. Be in the first 10 to submit correct answers to win Trail of Bits swag! What&rsquo;s in the chapter The chapter covers five areas: general bug classes, Linux usermode and kernel, Windows usermode and kernel, and seccomp/BPF sandboxes. It starts with language-level issues in the bug classes section—memory safety, integer errors, type confusion, compiler-introduced bugs—and gets progressively more environment-specific. The Linux usermode section focuses on libc gotchas. This section is also applicable to most POSIX systems. It ranges from well-known problems with string methods, to somewhat less known caveats around privilege dropping and environment variable handling. The Linux kernel is a complicated beast, and no checklist could cover even a part of its intricacies. However, our new Testing Handbook chapter can give you a starting point to bootstrap manual reviews of drivers and modules.

Rekt News Apr 9

Public blockchains solved settlement. They didn't solve privacy. Institutions need to protect positions, counterparty relationships, and transaction amounts without abandoning transparency entirely - and every architecture that tried to solve this hit the same wall. Protocol-level privacy locks everything. Permissioned chains recreate centralization. Separate privacy layers fragment liquidity. Stellar's answer is different. Cryptographic primitives baked into the base layer, two production-ready privacy models on top, and the institution decides what to reveal and to whom. Transparent when you want it. Private when you need it.

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