Marimo has addressed a high-severity security flaw in its notebook software that allowed an attacker to execute an attacker-supplied Model Context Protocol (MCP) command in a specially crafted notebook, according to VulnCheck's CVE Numbering Authority (CNA) record. The CNA record says the command can run as a local subprocess when the notebook is opened in edit mode. The vulnerability, tracked
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A package gets installed. A login prompt opens. A box sits exposed to the internet. Nothing looks unusual yet. That’s roughly the mood this week. Trusted tools turn hostile, old weak spots get fresh attention, AI makes exploit work cheaper, and researchers keep finding attacks that sound harder than they actually are. Plenty to clean up. Here’s the short version. ⚡ Threat of the Week U.S.
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Tuesday, August 25
A few years ago, Dow's cyber engineering team made the switch from point-in-time pentesting to continuous coverage for their high-value assets. How'd they do it? By partnering with Synack. And keep in mind this was before the recent wave of AI-powered pentesting solutions. Dow was ahead of the curve. The post How Continuous Pentesting Became Standard Practice at Dow appeared first on Synack .
This must sound very niche, especially since there are already established products such as Greenbone and Tenable Nessus. But I still want to ask. I live and work in the Netherlands and I recently (like an hour ago) came across a project by the Dutch government called OpenKAT It seems active in its development [https://github.com/SSC-ICT-Innovatie/nl-kat-coordination](https://github.com/SSC-ICT-Innovatie/nl-kat-coordination) And I was wondering if there is anyone else out there who can tell me more on what is it compared to things such as greenbone and tenable nessus. Since I am very curious with the new NIS2 directive going into law very soon.
Hey everyone, just dropped a tool called winflesher that might come in super handy for windows machines. It's strictly for enumeration and assessment, so no auto-exploitation—purely helps you map things out. Check it out if you want! Like PingCastle went out for drinks with Bloodhound, and they actually decided to get some work done. 🍷 WinFlesher is an advanced attack surface security assessment framework designed to analyze, evaluate, and report on security postures, attack paths, and remediation strategies in complex environments. Developed for security professionals and cybersecurity auditors, WinFlesher automates vulnerability discovery and critical path correlation within Active Directory and local infrastructures. https://github.com/mindsflee/WinFlesher
Hi, This could be the dumbest question ever, or it could be a real mystery. I only barely understand what I'm asking. So, please answer like I'm 5. lol We regularly email a client and we recently discovered they can't get emails from our CEO, no mailer daemon or bounce notification -- just absorbed by their filter. Their email filter (Proofpoint) rejected his email because of a URL in our email footer. It looks normal to a human, but when hovering over it, the actual URL starts with [linkprotect.cudasvc.com/](http://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/) and gobbeldygook that includes the actual company URL. Barracuda claims they didn't do this and they don't have our domain in their customer list. Removing the link (no URL, not the wrapped one, nor a clean) allows the client to receive email from my boss. However, I have an email to me, from my boss as far back as Nov 2025 with the wrapped/weird link in the hover. As if he's been using the cudasvc version of the link for a while now and it just stopped working in late July for this one client. Two questions: 1. How can this link be in my boss' email? Especially since we are not Barracuda customers. 2. Regardless of how it got there, why is it suddenly not working? We are using Outlook, but as far as we know we are not using any Barracuda add-ons, nor have we paid any fees to Barracuda. None of the other company email address are adding wrappers to links. And I guess a third question: How do I fix it? lol, help me be the hero. We have four people using AIchat and finding nothing useful. Let's let the humans win one! :) Please help. [](https://www.reddit.com/submit/?source_id=t3_1vya98e&composer_entry=crosspost_prompt)
Unauthenticated remote uninstall in my own EDR agent, and the four other auth bugs that turned out to be the same bug
Sentora is my own project, so this is a postmortem on my own code, not someone else's. The agent shipped this: @/app.post("/self_destruct") async def self_destruct(request: Request): threading.Thread(target=perform_destruction, daemon=True).start() return sanic_json({"status": "Destruction initiated"}) No auth. Listening on `0.0.0.0:9099`. `perform_destruction()` ran `rm -rf "$(pwd)"`. One unauthenticated POST from anywhere on the subnet uninstalled the EDR. The four others: **Permissive auth on by default.** A `_is_permissive_auth()` helper accepted any non-empty `X-Agent-Key` when a specific env var was unset. Nothing in the installer, the systemd unit, or the scheduled task ever set that var, so every default install accepted `X-Agent-Key: a` on `/soar/execute`, which runs commands. **Unauthenticated automation reporting.** The server took a `task_id` from the request body and wrote a status. Enumerate the IDs, POST `status: SUCCESS`, and every queued containment action flips to done. The real agent stops seeing it as pending, so the isolation never runs, and the dashboard goes green. Not a bypass so much as a way to make the SOC watch a screen that says everything worked. **LDAP injection in login.** `search_filter = login_filter % username`, with only a length check on the input. **Missing authorization on 8 routes.** 143 routes, 103 with a decorator. Authentication was solid (opaque tokens, SHA-256 at rest, expiry enforced in SQL), which is exactly why I stopped looking at authorization. Any logged-in account could hit `run_playbook`, `delete_soar_action`, and `test_ldap_connection`, the last of which works as a credential oracle against the directory. All five reduce to the same thing: I was taking the caller's word for who they were. Identity from the URL path, from a `metadata.agent` body field, from a header being non-empty, from `X-Forwarded-For`, and from being authenticated at all. I only caught the route bugs by writing a test that walks the AST and asserts every route is either explicitly public or carries a check. It failed on the first run and named all eight. Reading code to spot a missing decorator does not work, because nothing is on the page to notice. Full writeup with the fixes: [https://d3vhex.github.io/2026-08-25-unauthenticated-remote-uninstall/](https://d3vhex.github.io/2026-08-25-unauthenticated-remote-uninstall/) Repo (AGPL): [https://github.com/d3vhex/Sentora](https://github.com/d3vhex/Sentora) Everything above is fixed on `main`. The agent listener is still the most interesting surface if anyone wants to poke at it, and I would rather hear about it here than in an incident.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury has announced fresh sanctions on Iranian cyber actors as part of what it called an "unprecedented, whole-of-government, economic campaign" against the nation and its enablers. "We are launching an economic onslaught against Iran's financial connections around the globe. Our objective is to sever every economic lifeline that sustains this tyrannical regime
Overview The Kaltura HTML5 Player Library (mwEmbed / html5lib) contains two vulnerabilities, both involving the same insecure deserialization flaw, that enable arbitrary file read and remote code execution. Affected versions include html5lib v2.45, v2.103 and earlier, and other v2.x releases that expose the vulnerable mwEmbedLoader.php endpoint. Until a vendor patch is available, users are advised to restrict access to the affected endpoint or disable it entirely. Description Kaltura is an AI video platform that provides tools for video management, publishing, playback, and integration with web applications. Kaltura’s HTML5 player library exposes the mwEmbedLoader.php endpoint, which accepts a user-controlled ServiceUrl parameter as the target URL for backend API requests. The KalturaClientBase PHP client library fetches data from this URL and automatically deserializes it using PHP's unserialize() function without validating source, scheme, or content. CVE-2026-19913 results from the combination of this unsafe deserialization flaw and improper error-handling behavior. An attacker can provide the location of a local file to ServiceUrl as a file:// path, and the client will fetch the internal file's contents and attempt to deserialize them. When deserialization fails, the raw bytes are reflected back to the client in the resulting error message, enabling the attacker to read any file accessible to the web-server user. CVE-2026-19912 is caused by insufficient sanitization of the parameter uiconf_id , which is appended to the base cache folder path when the application writes d
Hi BlueTeamers, Not sure whether this is useful for blue-team activities as well, but sharing it in case it is: While reviewing Entra ID tenants, I found that Access Packages and Entitlement Management Catalogs are difficult to assess properly through the portal, especially when there are many packages, policies, resources, and catalogs. At the same time, they can introduce high-impact access paths that are easily missed when a review focuses on directory roles, Azure RBAC, and group memberships. A broadly requestable Access Package may grant sensitive access without approval. A Catalog Owner or another privileged Catalog RBAC role may be able to manage packages that use already-added sensitive resources. This effectively creates another access-management control plane. I therefore added Entitlement Management coverage to EntraFalcon. The update includes interactive reports for Access Packages, Catalogs, and Catalog RBAC, plus findings for common high-risk configurations. Other potentially useful additions for Blue teamers include Intune RBAC enumeration and checks for Enterprise Applications and Agent Blueprint Principals with suspicious visually similar non-Latin characters in their names. I have already identified malicious applications using this technique during assessments 🤔 . If you are interested, feel free to check it out on GitHub: [https://github.com/CompassSecurity/EntraFalcon](https://github.com/CompassSecurity/EntraFalcon) Happy to answer questions or take suggestions.
Oasis Security has disclosed a weakness in NVIDIA NemoClaw that could let an attacker-controlled webpage take unauthenticated control of the local Ollama instance serving an AI agent and plant hidden instructions inside the model itself. The findings were shared with The Hacker News ahead of publication, and the report says Oasis Security reported them to NVIDIA's Product Security Incident
Meta on Tuesday announced a set of WhatsApp account security features, including support for multiple passkeys to a single account to help users with both iOS and Android devices sign into their accounts using the phishing-resistant method. The tech giant said more than 1 billion people use a passkey to log into WhatsApp. Support for passkeys was first introduced in Android in October 2023,
Marimo has addressed a high-severity security flaw in its notebook software that allowed an attacker to execute an attacker-supplied Model Context Protocol (MCP) command in a specially crafted notebook, according to VulnCheck's CVE Numbering Authority (CNA) record. The CNA record says the command can run as a local subprocess when the notebook is opened in edit mode. The vulnerability, tracked
ShinyHunters has listed data center operator CyrusOne on its leak site and is claiming a fairly substantial haul, but there is an important caveat: CyrusOne has not publicly confirmed the alleged breach, and the claims have not been independently verified. The group says it obtained 12.9 million Salesforce records and a SharePoint collection totaling about 645 GB uncompressed, with 288,729 files across more than 60,000 folders. It also claims the data contains more than 8,300 employee records. The part worth watching is the alleged operational and physical-security material. ShinyHunters names active badge reports, Data Center Access Control forms, physical key inventory logs, floor plans, electrical diagrams, security-system drawings, site schematics, contracts, Okta SSC access lists, and security policies. The group is demanding $13 million and reportedly gave CyrusOne 24 hours to engage following an August 23 update. Until CyrusOne confirms an incident or evidence becomes independently available, these numbers and file descriptions should be treated as threat-actor claims rather than established breach facts. Our report has the detailed breakdown of the claimed Salesforce and SharePoint datasets, the security-sensitive file categories named by ShinyHunters, and what CyrusOne customers and employees may want to watch while the breach remains unconfirmed: [https://www.technadu.com/shinyhunters-claims-cyrusone-breach-demands-13-million-for-640-gb-of-data/633850/](https://www.technadu.com/shinyhunters-claims-cyrusone-breach-demands-13-million-for-640-gb-of-data/633850/) For people working in data center or physical security: **if material like access records, facility schematics, and key inventories were exposed, which controls would you prioritize reviewing first?** #
Thousands of companies have been affected by the Mirage2FA campaign from 2024 to 2026. The commercial phishing-as-a-service toolkit targets Microsoft 365 accounts by abusing legitimate login flows and bypassing two-factor authentication. According to ANY.RUN research, 48% of targeted email addresses were potentially compromised. Most of the affected companies are US-based. Mirage2FA Campaign
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a new campaign that uses a cluster of 24 npm packages as free phishing infrastructure for redirecting to ClickFix-style fake CAPTCHA pages. "While the malware is simply a single HTML page inside the npm package, and while downloading it wouldn't do harm, the threat actor’s use of npm isn't to infect developers who install it, but to use the
Cybersecurity researchers are calling attention to a new campaign that employs FTP banners as dead drop resolvers (DDRs) to deliver two previously unreported remote access trojans (RATs) tracked as E4del and PINHOLE. While threat actors are known to abuse legitimate services to point to additional command-and-control (C2) infrastructure and blend in with regular network traffic, the development
Vulnerability management has been a staple of security programs since the dawn of the cybersecurity discipline. The symbiotic relationship between vulnerability and patch management teams has also existed for that time and has gone through waves of contention and thankfulness. While this relationship required thoughtful care and feeding from both sides, both sides were aiming to work toward a
Illinois prosecutors shared defendants’ personal data with federal immigration agents without criminal warrants, public disclosure, or legislative oversight.
We found and reported a bug in Provenance Blockchain, a public proof-of-stake chain built on Cosmos SDK , that lets any user grant themselves admin control over marker accounts without holding a single token. Provenance covers a range of financial services, including on-chain tokenized loans, private equity tokens, bridged assets, and asset registries. Our bug affected 82 markers representing live financial assets on mainnet. We found the bug, which affects versions before 1.28.0, in March 2026, and reported it to Provenance on April 1. It was mitigated in PR #2627 (commit c81fd65 ), which shipped in v1.28.0 on May 1, 2026, and fixed in PR #2734 , which shipped in v1.29.0 on June 8, 2026. What is a marker? The marker module is Provenance’s core primitive for fungible tokens. Chain participants can issue a new asset on Provenance by submitting a MsgAddMarkerRequest transaction; the chain creates a dedicated account for that asset, called a marker. Each marker is a special account type that controls: A denomination (e.g., uusd.trading , cusd.deposit , cguaranteedrateomni ) An access control list governing who can mint, burn, withdraw, deposit, or administer the token A supply field recording the canonical token count An escrow balance (the marke
Bad actors are attempting to exploit two severe unauthenticated authentication bypasses in the Xecurify miniOrange SAML 2.0 Single Sign On plugin that make it possible for an attacker to sign in as any WordPress user, including administrators. The vulnerabilities, as disclosed by Patchstack, are listed below - CVE-2026-61979 (CVSS score: 8.1) - An unauthenticated privilege escalation
GitHub - JuanLunaIA/aegis-latent-core: AI governance and evidence gateway for multi-provider LLM applications. FastAPI + optional Rust core for policy, WAF, egress, rate limits, sessions, signed durable evidence, and fail-closed error paths. Self-hosted; no certification or SLO claim.
Hi everyone, I've been looking into how enterprises are deploying LLMs, and there's a massive compliance gap. If an AI agent makes a discriminatory financial decision or leaks medical data, standard access logs (Splunk, SQL) are legally deniable. A database admin can just alter the row. I spent the last few months building an open-source (AGPLv3) AI Evidence Gateway called Aegis Latent Core to fix this. Instead of normal logging, it treats AI inference as a cryptographic ledger: 1. **Rust WAL:** It commits the request/response hashes to a memory-mapped Write-Ahead Log before returning the HTTP response. 2. **Merkle Mountain Ranges (MMR):** It builds an append-only Merkle tree. The client SDKs actually intercept the HTTP headers and verify the cryptographic inclusion proof locally. 3. **Forensic Export:** It exports DAG-CBOR and JCS (RFC 8785) bundles that align with ISO/IEC 27037 digital evidence handling. I actually used 6 AI agents as "contributors" to help me scale the test suite (over 5,700 tests) and write the TLA+ and Z3 SMT formal verification models. I'm trying to bridge the gap between AI engineering and hardcore InfoSec. I'd love to hear from auditors or AppSec folks: does this cryptographic approach solve the headaches you are seeing with AI compliance? Repo: https://github.com/JuanLunaIA/aegis-latent-core
Some months ago, I performed a web application penetration test on an application that used passkey for authentication. As part of the assessment, I also tested the passkey implementation and noticed some unusual behavior. During the debugging process, I created two short JavaScript helper functions that can be used to hook the browser APIs involved in passkey operations, allowing the passkey configuration to be inspected and manipulated. This gave me the ability to reliably perform some passkey tests and assess the configuration and implementation. “Fishing with a Passkey ”
Hey everyone, Over the last few months, I've been curating and categorizing a massive catalog of malware families designed specifically for incident responders, SOC analysts, and threat hunters. I got tired of having to scrape together fragmented IOCs and CISA advisories every time a new variant popped up, so I built a centralized, open-source dataset. \*\*What's included:\*\* \* \*\*2,800+ Malware Families\*\* categorized by type (Ransomware, InfoStealer, Wiper, etc.) \* \*\*Framework Mapping:\*\* Families are mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques, NIST CSF guidelines, and official CISA advisories. \* \*\*Response Playbooks:\*\* Actionable containment steps and "what to avoid" during an active incident. \* \*\*Formats:\*\* Available via a web UI, JSON API, Parquet, and JSONL. It’s completely free and Apache-2.0 licensed. You can browse the catalog here: [https://jordanricky1604-ship-it.github.io/malware-families-catalog/](https://jordanricky1604-ship-it.github.io/malware-families-catalog/) I'd love to hear your feedback on the schema or if there are specific families you think need deeper analysis. I'm actively maintaining and updating this!
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Monday added a maximum-severity security flaw impacting Oracle HTTP Server and Oracle WebLogic Server to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, citing evidence of active exploitation. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-21962 (CVSS score: 10.0), allows an unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to
Monday, August 24
You likely noticed the recent redesign of the Cloudflare Blog. We added dark mode, modernized the look and feel, and made a lot of other small improvements along the way. What you might not have noticed – well, except for those who are more terminally online – is that the redesign was part of a much bigger migration project. On Wednesday, August 12, we moved the blog to EmDash , a content management system (CMS) built especially to work on Astro and with Cloudflare. We’ll take you into the migration story – what we learned and how EmDash got better – as well as into the benefits we’re already seeing from a new platform. We are Customer Zero At Cloudflare, Cloudflare itself is Customer Zero. This means that we use our products. And – in use – we make them better for ourselves and our customers. This is a very real cultural value at Cloudflare. The burden of proof is on you if you want to use an external vendor. Why can’t that team support you, what gaps are there, why can’t those gaps be filled, and are those “gaps” true requirements? This preference is even enshrined in our internal engineering standards, known as our Codex. We don’t just build products for others; we build them to run Cloudflare itself. We are our own first, most demanding customer. We validate scale, security, and usability on our own massive infrastructure before a paying customer ever touches the product. If a product breaks, it breaks us first. This forces us to fix issues immediately, ensuring that by the time a feature reaches the enterprise, it has already survived the harshest production environment on earth. With the launch of EmDash and some limitations with our
If your developers are using AI coding tools, you are probably already seeing the upside: faster development, more code, and less time spent on routine work. The harder part is what comes after. AI can also introduce open-source packages at a pace your security team was never built to handle. More dependencies mean more vulnerabilities to review, more remediation work, and a backlog that can
Cybersecurity researchers have found that several websites are still actively distributing a malware family known as Weedhack to gamers by masquerading as Minecraft clients. McAfee Labs said it detected and blocked more than 6,300 attempts to access malicious sites, adding that it found lookalike gaming websites designed to mimic legitimate projects, including branding, feature lists, FAQs,
Before dawn on 10 July 2024, one ransomware attack took down ten schools inside the same multi-academy trust at once. Every control that eventually stopped it was something the Department for Education’s own cyber security standard already asked for, well before the attack. That’s a case DfE has published on its own Cyber Security Hub, […] The post What the DfE’s cyber security update means for multi-academy trusts appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
Overview Konami's Metal Gear Online 3 video game contains a heap-based buffer overflow that can be triggered by an input‑validation vulnerability that allows match hosts to remotely execute arbitrary code on lobby members' machines through specially crafted data. Description Metal Gear Online 3 is an online 8 vs. 8 competitive shooter game that uses Steam Matchmaking to handle its multiplayer lobbies and matches. As detailed in CVE‑2026‑19874 , version 1.1.2.8 of Metal Gear Online 3 (Steam AppID 287700) contains an input‑validation vulnerability in the processing of Steam lobby metadata related to the player‑removal feature. The game tracks a lobby field ( kick_num ) indicating the number of players designated for removal, along with corresponding Steam ID entries of each kicked player ( kicked_id_%i ). When joining a lobby, the player's client parses these fields to check whether its own Steam ID is on the list, and if so, the player is prevented from joining the match. The function responsible for parsing this lobby data does not validate the kick_num value against the size of the fixed‑length buffer allocated for kicked player identifiers. Supplying a kick_num value larger than the buffer capacity results in out‑of‑bounds writes into adjacent memory. The memory region immediately following this buffer contains internal Steamworks callback handler structures that store function pointers and callback arguments for processing lobby data changes, messages, and other related events. By manipulating the overflow, an attacker can corrupt these handler structures and redirect callback execution, resulting in control‑flow hijacking on affected client systems. The vulnerability can be triggered automatically w
A package gets installed. A login prompt opens. A box sits exposed to the internet. Nothing looks unusual yet. That’s roughly the mood this week. Trusted tools turn hostile, old weak spots get fresh attention, AI makes exploit work cheaper, and researchers keep finding attacks that sound harder than they actually are. Plenty to clean up. Here’s the short version. ⚡ Threat of the Week U.S.
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged two new malware families called WordlistLoader and SynkLoader that's used to deliver next-stage payloads and likely sell access to ransomware groups. According to findings from Gen Digital, WordlistLoader is being used to deliver Amatera Stealer (aka ACR Stealer or AcridRain Stealer) via ClearFake campaigns, which employ the ClickFix (aka FakeCaptcha)
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a cyber espionage campaign targeting Myanmar that uses graduation ceremony invitation lures to deliver a Go backdoor called QUICAgent. The campaign, codenamed Operation QUICSILVER, has been found to target government and information technology sectors, per Seqrite Labs. The activity is assessed to be the work of a China-nexus threat actor with moderate
Big security risks come in small packages. While enterprise security teams focus on policing the proliferation of employees using ChatGPT and Claude for quick drafting tasks, a more urgent threat is posed by a handful of AI super-adopters who are quietly hardcoding unvetted tools into critical business operations. According to new research published by Akamai, the top 5% of enterprise power
Proofpoint catches malicious traffic and blocks data exfiltration well, with solid coverage for business email compromise, phishing, and malware. But it’s built for the enterprise, and it shows. G2 reviewers flagged a steep learning curve and steep pricing, and suggested Proofpoint’s support would need improving. The platform’s also in flux. Proofpoint closed a $1.8 billion […] The post 9 Proofpoint alternatives. Pros & cons of the leading options appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
To reduce the amount of noise from questions, we have disabled self-posts in favor of a unified questions thread every week. Feel free to ask any question about reverse engineering here. If your question is about how to use a specific tool, or is specific to some particular target, you will have better luck on the [Reverse Engineering StackExchange](http://reverseengineering.stackexchange.com/). See also /r/AskReverseEngineering.
Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite I genuinely think I've nailed the IoT door lock situation! Well, Ubiquiti has, but I think I've worked out how to put it all into a residential house and have it make sense. There are a few basic tenets: Main power (never have to rely on batteries) Fail-secure (needs to remain locked on power outage) Local control (no cloud latency to contend with) Manual override ("the house is on fire, let me out") Which is exactly what we have here in this week's vid (and sorry about the section of rubbish audio; the camera mic started capturing it for a short period there). There are some edge cases I want to validate the impact of, namely the inability to keep the door both closed and unlocked, and some of the assumptions I've made around access methods. The laundry will be our low-impact test case; then, if that's all good, I'll start rolling this approach out much more seriously across the house. Stay tuned, I think this will actually be pretty awesome.
Sunday, August 23
[Tool] Strilight: Zero-Unroll O(1) SMT Loop Lifting & Strided Interval Domain for x86_64 Binary Analysis
Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite Today, we welcome the 48th government onboarded to Have I Been Pwned’s free gov service: Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka CERT now has access to monitor Sri Lankan government domains against the data in HIBP, helping identify exposed government accounts and respond when they appear in new data breaches. As with the other governments already using the service, this is about using breach data for good: giving national cyber teams practical visibility into their public sector exposure and supporting their work to protect government services.
Saturday, August 22
The U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) announced on Friday that ByteDance-owned TikTok will pay $400 million to settle a 2024 lawsuit accusing the company of violating child privacy laws in the country. As part of the settlement, the social media platform will pay $300 million immediately, and an additional $100 million "upon entry of an order vacating a prior consent decree entered against
Plus: Apple sends out an “unprecedented” number of spyware warnings, Ukraine hits a Russian ecommerce giant with cyber and drone attacks, and more.
Friday, August 21
We’re constantly building for the different goals of our customers. Some customers want to optimize for discovery, while others want to protect their content with the strictest security policy. Among these differing policies, there are multiple ways to mitigate bot traffic. Some mechanisms simply state your preference, assuming best intent from crawlers, and other approaches actually lock down content by outright blocking with a Bot Management solution. We recognize that it's cumbersome to maintain multiple layers of protection on your website. For example, there are cases in which your robots.txt states that a crawler is Disallowed from accessing your website, while your enforcement rules actually don’t block that crawler. When your stated preferences and your enforced rules disagree, some crawlers treat it as a basis to disregard your preferences or try to bypass your enforced rules. A couple of years ago, Cloudflare announced an easier way to disallow AI training on your website by tackling two of these layers: a managed value of robots.txt that told a fixed list of major Training crawlers not to train on your content, along with edge-enforced blocks to Training crawlers. On July 1, 2026, we launched easier options to manage different kinds of AI traffic use cases. You can say what you want to do about Search, Agent, and Training traffic on your website. We're announcing Bot Preference Sync , available to all customers from the Free tier to Enterprise. Bot Preference Sync reflects what you've set in your AI bot configuration by updating corresponding preferences to your robots.txt, and it can be turned on or off at any time. No more static file for one use case: we'll help you tailor your robots.txt to reflect what you’ve already configured for different AI bot categories . New questions facing the Internet For years, the most pressing question in this space was: "
Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a set of trojanized npm packages that masquerade as working calendar and streak utilities but are engineered to stealthily deliver an artificial intelligence (AI)-powered Linux implant dubbed RedC2 4.0. "When the module loads, it locates the bundled binary, marks it executable, and launches it as a detached background process," TrendAI, Trend Micro's
Overview The Calix GS7 XGS GS5239XG router running firmware EXOS/6.6.47 contains a missing authentication vulnerability that exposes its UPnP (Universal Plug and Play) WANIPConnection service on the public WAN interface. Description Calix GS7 XGS GS5239XG is a residential gateway that provides routing, NAT, and firewall functionality for home networks. The device includes the Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) service implemented via MiniUPnPd 2.3.7, a lightweight software program that provides features such as automatic port forwarding for applications and devices on the LAN. By default, the UPnP service is exposed on the device’s WAN interface and does not require authentication. CVE-2026-75501 In affected firmware versions, the router binds its UPnP WANIPConnection SOAP service to the public WAN interface on TCP port 5000. Because the service does not require authentication when accepting SOAP requests, a remote attacker can obtain full access to the router’s critical UPnP functions including adding, deleting, and enumerating NAT port mappings. Impact CVE-2026-75501 enables an unauthenticated, remote attacker to remotely query and manipulate existing NAT mappings. By exploiting this vulnerability to create arbitrary port-forwarding rules on the router, an attacker can bypass NAT and firewall protections, exposing internal LAN devices to the public internet. Because the Calix router is typically provisioned with its default UPnP-enabled configuration, this issue poses significant risk to residential users with network-connected internal devices such as security cameras, network-attached storage (NAS), and other IoT appliances. Solution Unfortunately, the CERT/CC was
Thursday, August 20
This week on “Uncanny Valley,” Andy Greenberg discusses sitting in on a war game simulating a cyberattack from the Chinese hacking group Volt Typhoon
Since June, developers have created thousands of third-party OAuth apps on Cloudflare , with more than a million authorizations since. OAuth makes delegated access possible. It lets applications act on a user’s behalf without asking them to handle long-lived credentials or hand over a password. That model works well when an application can describe its access needs with a small set of scopes. Developers use OAuth for SaaS integrations, internal tools, CLIs, and agents. Our permission model has become more granular over time to support better scoping of these different workflows. That is great for security, but it makes a purely all-or-nothing consent screen hard to justify. Cloudflare OAuth already allows clients to request a subset of their configured scopes. But once the client made that request, the user could not narrow it any further on the consent screen. For the user on the consent screen, the experience was still an all-or-nothing one. If an application requested more access than a user was comfortable granting, their only options were to approve the full request, or deny outright. MCP servers are a good example of this. An MCP server might request a broad set of permissions, because in theory an agent could use all of them. But most users would not want an agent to have that much access. Before this feature, the only way to handle this was for the app developer to build a custom scope selection screen before sending the user to our consent flow. Today, we’re introducing OAuth scope customization. Client owners can mark specific scopes as optional when configuring an OAuth client, giving users the ability to grant a narrower subset of an application’s requested access at authorization time. The OAuth spec already allows authorization servers to grant a narrower set of scopes than wh
Most enterprises should treat annual penetration testing as a baseline, not a complete answer. PCI DSS is the one framework with an explicit annual and change-triggered mandate. SOC 2, the current HIPAA Security Rule, and ISO 27001 all expect testing to follow the organization's own risk assessment and control design, not one fixed calendar date. HHS has proposed an annual HIPAA pentesting requirement, but that rule has not been finalized. Enterprises that combine a formal annual assessment with change-triggered and continuous validation stay ahead of frameworks that were never designed around a single testing frequency. The post How Often Should Enterprises Run a Penetration Test? appeared first on Synack .
N4D Mesh Controller: New infrastructure, a UPX-packed agent labeled "go-titan," and how to hunt for it
Datadog Security Research executed a newer N4D Mesh Controller sample in isolated microVMs, uncovering rotated infrastructure, a UPX-packed go-titan agent, MCP tool abuse in action, and direct runtime evidence of multi-service scanning and persistence.
Wednesday, August 19
strip --strip-all a binary and this still names functions by micro-executing them and matching the effect trace against a corpus. spot check: zlib corpus vs a fully stripped O0 build, it named 9 functions and all 9 were right, and it stays quiet on the ones it isn't sure about (no confident garbage on thunks). where byte sigs (FLIRT) die on recompile and CFG diffing gets fragile across opt levels, behavior holds up better. optimized-vs-optimized is still the hard case, i'm honest about that in the numbers. x86-64 only atm. [https://github.com/1rhino2/fnprint](https://github.com/1rhino2/fnprint)
Overview RDK Central RDK-B WebUI version, rdkb-2025q4-kirkstone, contains multiple vulnerabilities involving memory corruption, improper authentication, race conditions, and insufficient input validation. An attacker with network access to an affected WebUI may be able to bypass authentication, obtain administrative access, cause a denial-of-service condition, or corrupt memory within underlying RDK-B processes. Under certain conditions, this memory corruption may potentially be leveraged for arbitrary code execution. Description RDK-B (Reference Design Kit for Broadband) is an open-source software platform used in broadband gateways and related networking devices. The RDK-B WebUI provides a web-based interface for configuring and administering an RDK-B device. Five vulnerabilities have been identified in the RDK-B WebUI. CVE-2026-19505 JWT (JSON Web Token) authentication in javascript-templates/source/jst_functions.c does not correctly verify whether a token's cryptographic signature is valid. The application treats both a valid signature and an invalid signature as successful verification because it incorrectly checks the return value from OpenSSL's EVP_VerifyFinal() function. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can craft a JWT with an invalid signature that is still accepted by the WebUI. Successful exploitation allows the attacker to log in as the privileged user and gain administrative access to the device. CVE-2026-19506 The login process in /usr/www2/check.jst uses a shared value to store the result of password verification. Because this value is shared between multiple requests, the application may return one user's authentication result to another user's session. An unau
In 2021, we assessed remote Spectre attacks against Cloudflare Workers. Based on the results, we shipped a production defense called Dynamic Process Isolation (DyPrIs), which identifies maliciously looking scripts and isolates them into separate processes. Since then, newer techniques in the area of stabilizing Spectre attacks have been discovered. To understand if these techniques posed a threat to our Workers production environment, we decided to internally reassess the remote Spectre attack. Building an updated proof-of-concept on the production environment allowed us to empirically assess the risk of Spectre attacks under production workloads. To mount a successful side-channel attack in production, an external attacker has to overcome additional obstacles such as activity on shared hardware resources, interrupts, context switches, and coarse-grained timers. Our research uncovered a limitation in the implementation of DyPrIs and we managed to demonstrate a remote Spectre attack reliably leaking up to 12 bit/s with a 99% accuracy in the production environment of Cloudflare Workers. As a consequence of this research, we improved DyPrIs, integrated the V8 Sandbox and an in-process isolation mechanism to further reduce the risk of memory disclosure attacks. Today we are publishing a paper describing our findings, co-authored by Albert Pedersen, Haocheng Xiao, Sam Ainsworth, Nigel Topham, and Martin Schwarzl. This paper covers research done in 2024 and early 2025. Note that the presented attack is mitigated alread
AI pentesting works, but building it in-house is the hard part. Synack VP Chris Brown breaks down the reliability, token economics, model dependency and validation costs that come with building versus buying an AI pentesting capability. The post AI Pentesting Works. Building It Yourself Is the Hard Part. appeared first on Synack .
I finally found some time to organize my notes on secure boot, remote attestation, measured boot and in general embedded security. This is not ground breaking zero-day research but I figured some of you might like a good story. Good here is obviously subjective but I felt like it came out quite readable. This blog builds heavily on public research so as already stated at the end of article if you liked some particular section, show the respective person some love :) P.S.: yes I know the image is AI generated please don’t give me shit for that
The people-search tool ClarityCheck says its reverse image search service is “private and secure”—but it left a database containing more than 9 million image files exposed.
Flock’s surveillance cameras have already sparked outrage. WIRED reconstructed its next-generation AI system, already in use by some police, to confirm it goes much further than tracking license plates.
Three variations on subversive use of DNS by the Agent are documented in Hugging Face's technical writeup of the July 2026 security incident involving OpenAI models. In this article, I discuss what each of these three types of DNS workarounds achieve in practice, the constraints an actor might have faced to attempt a particular one, and additional benefits from choosing each.
We tested Sonnet 5, Composer 2.5, and GPT 5.5 in plan mode and default mode to see whether plan mode produces measurably more secure code.