Google on Thursday announced that it fixed a whopping 1,072 security bugs in Chrome versions 149 and 150, surpassing the total number of flaws the company fixed across the prior 23 milestones combined. Both versions were released last month. In its latest patch for Chrome 151, released Wednesday, the tech giant resolved 370 flaws, out of which 349 were reported by Google itself. Seven of the
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VU#281278: SGLang contains six different vulnerabilities including RCE, data exfiltration, and credential disclosure
Overview Six vulnerabilities have been discovered within the SGLang project, including remote code execution (RCE), server-side request forgery (SSRF), local file read, credential leakage, and model weight exfiltration on a target server. Exploitation does not require authentication in most cases, and some vulnerabilities require only network access with no API keys or user credentials. At the time of publication, no patches are available from the project maintainers, and coordination attempts have been unsuccessful. Description SGLang is an open-source framework for serving large language models (LLMs) and multimodal AI models, supporting models such as Qwen, DeepSeek, Mistral, and Skywork, and is compatible with OpenAI APIs. Six vulnerabilities have been discovered within the tool and are tracked as follows: CVE-2026-15969 SGLang contains unauthenticated RCE in /load_lora_adapter_from_tensors by bypass of SafeUnpickler’s incomplete denylist, allowing arbitrary command execution through crafted base64-encoded pickle payloads. CVE-2026-15971 SGLang contains an RCE vulnerability when the optional dumper subsystem is enabled, which allows for a sandbox escape when DUMPER_SERVER_PORT is set, enabling code execution on inference requests. CVE-2026-15974 SGLang contains an SSRF and local file read in the multimodal generation endpoint /v1/chat/completions because image_url input is unsanitized, allowing access to internal metadata, secrets, and services. CVE-2026-15976 SGLang contains a RCE vulnerability when attempting to load model weights f
In a new disclosure, OpenAI says its agent used exposed logins to gain access to at least four “publicly available services” in its unhinged quest to solve a test.
Overview VPS.org's one-click deployment templates provision services with default passwords and predefined network bindings instead of generating randomized secrets or applying per-deployment hardening measures. Description VPS.org is a cloud and virtual private server hosting provider that offers a library of templates for quickly provisioning common applications and services. Multiple vulnerabilities exist in the one-click deployment templates feature. These vulnerabilities stem from the same root cause: content is directly instantiated from static templates, using default passwords and static secrets with no deployment-specific randomization or interface-binding hardening at provisioning time. CVE-2026-16503 The Supabase template provides an instance of PostgreSQL that is bound to all network interfaces (0.0.0.0:5432) and uses the hard-coded database password postgres . Because Docker manages its own iptables rules, this exposure can bypass standard host UFW firewall configurations. If the the instance is exposed to the internet, a remote attacker could connect to the host's published TCP port 5432 and authenticate as the postgres superuser account using the default postgres password. CVE-2026-16504 The Zulip template ships with a hard-coded application key secret_key: changeme , a default database password zulip , and the setting DISABLE_HTTPS=True . An attacker can use this public secret key to forge or validate signed session material, enabling session forgery and authentication bypass against the instance. If unchanged, t
Anthropic on Thursday became the latest artificial intelligence (AI) company to reveal that three of its models, including Claude Opus 4.7, Mythos 5, and an unnamed research model, had breached three unnamed organizations during cybersecurity testing without its knowledge. The AI firm said the earliest incidents date back to April 2026, adding it made the discoveries after launching a "
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Friday, July 31
Overview VPS.org's one-click deployment templates provision services with default passwords and predefined network bindings instead of generating randomized secrets or applying per-deployment hardening measures. Description VPS.org is a cloud and virtual private server hosting provider that offers a library of templates for quickly provisioning common applications and services. Multiple vulnerabilities exist in the one-click deployment templates feature. These vulnerabilities stem from the same root cause: content is directly instantiated from static templates, using default passwords and static secrets with no deployment-specific randomization or interface-binding hardening at provisioning time. CVE-2026-16503 The Supabase template provides an instance of PostgreSQL that is bound to all network interfaces (0.0.0.0:5432) and uses the hard-coded database password postgres . Because Docker manages its own iptables rules, this exposure can bypass standard host UFW firewall configurations. If the the instance is exposed to the internet, a remote attacker could connect to the host's published TCP port 5432 and authenticate as the postgres superuser account using the default postgres password. CVE-2026-16504 The Zulip template ships with a hard-coded application key secret_key: changeme , a default database password zulip , and the setting DISABLE_HTTPS=True . An attacker can use this public secret key to forge or validate signed session material, enabling session forgery and authentication bypass against the instance. If unchanged, t
This honeypot stages trojanized binaries disguised as security-critical artifacts, tricking attacking LLMs into downloading and executing them. The defender gets arbitrary code execution on the attacker's machine.
Last year, we enabled Media over QUIC (MoQ) on every Cloudflare server and opened the network for anyone to test. It provided a global MoQ endpoint, but not the isolation and access controls needed to run an application. Today, we’re adding those isolation and access controls. The new MoQ provisioning API lets you create an isolated relay for your application and issue separate credentials for publishers and subscribers. The relays you create are available across Cloudflare’s network within seconds, with no servers to deploy, size, or load balance. Cloudflare now supports the draft-14 and draft-16 versions of the MoQ Transport protocol with authentication support. You can create relays through the API and the Cloudflare dashboard . They are completely free to use during beta. A QUIC recap on MoQ MoQ (originally short for Media over QUIC) is a new open protocol under development at the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the standards body that also standardized HTTP, TLS, and QUIC. It is being developed in the open and will become a free public standard (an RFC) that anyone can implement. No single company owns it. MoQ is a publish/subscribe system. A publisher sends out streams of data that have names, and subscribers ask for those streams by name. Between them sit relays, which are just CDN servers that copy each stream to everyone who wants it. A relay never has to look inside the data
Google on Thursday announced that it fixed a whopping 1,072 security bugs in Chrome versions 149 and 150, surpassing the total number of flaws the company fixed across the prior 23 milestones combined. Both versions were released last month. In its latest patch for Chrome 151, released Wednesday, the tech giant resolved 370 flaws, out of which 349 were reported by Google itself. Seven of the
[Academic] Almost at my target! A few more people needed to review some network security alerts (~10–15 min) (Everyone)
Hi all! I posted here recently looking for participants and the response was genuinely brilliant, thank you to everyone who took part. 🙏 I'm now just a handful of responses short of my target, so I'm putting out one last call. If you missed it: it's a short study for my MSc Cyber Security dissertation at the University of Gloucestershire. You review a series of network security alerts one at a time and decide whether you'd confirm, dismiss, or escalate each one, plus how confident you feel. No security background needed, the interface explains everything. ⏱️ \~10–15 minutes · 💻 desktop or phone · 🔒 anonymous, ethics-approved, 18+ 👉 [http://dissertation-explainids.uogs.co.uk](http://dissertation-explainids.uogs.co.uk) Every single response makes a real difference at this stage. Thank you so much!
An academic study has disclosed a "widespread class" of security vulnerabilities impacting 4G and 5G core networks that, if successfully exploited, could trigger denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and even session hijacking, allowing an attacker to seize control of a user's network session. The findings have been released by a group of researchers from Singapore's Nanyang Technological University
Device code phishing - the abuse of the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant to steal access tokens - has evolved from a niche red-team technique to an industrial-scale threat in under six months. Designed for input-constrained devices like smart TVs, printers, and so on, the device authorization login flow has been adopted by a wide range of apps and use-cases that it wasn't originally
Hello Everyone I published a short guide about transforming raw logs into detection-ready data. It covers the log-processing pipeline, common log formats, normalization, and more.. I’d appreciate any feedback or suggestions from you all : [https://medium.com/@0xzyadelzyat/log-parsing-for-security-engineers-building-the-foundation-for-reliable-threat-detection-c34e71b01b9a](https://medium.com/@0xzyadelzyat/log-parsing-for-security-engineers-building-the-foundation-for-reliable-threat-detection-c34e71b01b9a)
Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 says a Chinese-speaking threat actor used DeepSeek through the open-source Hermes Agent framework to launch attacks autonomously. After an initial Telegram instruction, the agent found internet-facing systems and selected public exploits. The researchers recovered no further operator input in the session. The operator, tracked through the aliases knaithe and KnYuan,
Created by legendary hardware hacker Andrew “bunnie” Huang, the badges for this year’s famed security conference aim to push the boundaries of security and transparency.
Anthropic on Thursday became the latest artificial intelligence (AI) company to reveal that three of its models, including Claude Opus 4.7, Mythos 5, and an unnamed research model, had breached three unnamed organizations during cybersecurity testing without its knowledge. The AI firm said the earliest incidents date back to April 2026, adding it made the discoveries after launching a "
Operation Endgame disrupted hundreds of systems — a StealC backend I reported still exposes its known routes
In April, I documented a StealC v2 campaign distributed through 19 GitHub typosquat repositories, including one impersonating my own open-source project. The delivery chain was: ```text GitHub typosquat -> Python dropper -> api.nailproxy.space -> encrypted Windows loader -> StealC v2 DLL -> spellmarketplace.club / 62.60.226.113:6673 ``` GitHub later removed all 19 repositories. The backend infrastructure remained a separate problem. I reported the domains, IP, malware routes, and hashes to the relevant registrars, Cloudflare, the hosting provider, CERT-Bund, GitHub Security Lab, ThreatFox, and AlienVault OTX. Then Operation Endgame disrupted infrastructure associated with SocGholish, Amadey, and StealC. Europol reported 326 servers and 142 domains actioned. Microsoft separately said it moved against more than 200 malicious Amadey and StealC C2 domains and IPs. Three months after my original disclosure, I checked the known infrastructure again using only minimal unauthenticated GET and HEAD requests. The documented malware-specific routes still behave differently from an arbitrary control path: ```text GET /api/v1/auth/session -> 405 Method Not Allowed GET /api/v1/data/sync -> 405 Method Not Allowed GET /foo/bar/baz -> 404 Not Found ``` HEAD returns the same status codes for all three paths. This does not prove that payload delivery, authentication, or exfiltration still works. I deliberately did not send the HMAC handshake, trigger Stage 2, or interact with the malware protocol. It does show that the known application routes remain registered and reachable. The evidence also has limitations: - The monitoring cron produced only 18 measurements over 69 days. - There were gaps of up to 20 days. - The endpoints briefly became unreachable in late May. - GET and HEAD return different status codes on the root paths of `spellmarketplace.club` and the bare IP, so I do not treat those checks as proof that the complete backend is operational. The point is not that Operation Endgame failed. It clearly disrupted a large amount of criminal infrastructure. The narrower lesson is that both of these statements can be true: > Hundreds of malicious systems were disrupted. > A specific previously reported backend still exposes its documented malware routes. Full technical write-up, including the original kill chain, abuse-report timeline, ThreatFox/OTX submissions, current probe results, and evidence limitations: https://blog.technopathy.club/operation-endgame-stealc-backend-still-responds I would be interested in how other analysts verify whether previously reported C2 infrastructure was actually included in a large takedown without actively engaging the malware protocol.
When a compromised AI Agent holds valid credentials (such as OAuth tokens or DB keys), traditional perimeter defenses like WAFs, EDRs, and LLM prompt firewalls often become ineffective. Recently, I've been researching a approach to bring runtime governance down to the C-ABI (Application Binary Interface) system call layer to enforce deterministic execution boundaries for local agentic workflows. Key Architectural Considerations I'm testing: \- Deterministic Binary Gate: Pre-compiled permissions mapped to immutable O(1) bitmaps, causing illegal syscalls to physically fail with <500ns panic latency. \- Cryptographic Identity Binding: A 3-Tier PKI Certificate Authority architecture coupled with identity tokens (DIT) to resolve OS-level execution context loss. \- B2B Multi-Enterprise Supply Chain Defense: Simulating agentic supply chain execution vectors (e.g., automated workload interactions with untrusted external repos). I'd love to hear feedback from the netsec community on deterministic runtime bounds and sandbox isolation models for autonomous agents. Is pushing governance down to the C-ABI layer practical in your agentic environments, or are there edge cases in execution context tracking that I might be overlooking?
Thursday, July 30
My Attempt at Modernizing Posture Assessment & Continuous Validation Workflows by Building Control Drift
Hi Everyone, I'm a cybersecurity practitioner of 7 years and I recently took the initiative to start an internal purple team / gap analysis program at my company. When I went to research existing platforms to help facilitate this, I found that they largely consisted of enterprise solutions geared toward heavy, complex SaaS deployments, while the open-source alternatives featured dated UIs and clunky workflows that weren't particularly inviting to newcomers. Since this was an independent initiative, I didn't want to deal with bloated workflows or massive infrastructure just to validate our controls. I needed something sleeker and more lightweight to track our defensive posture and manage the gap analysis lifecycle. So, I built Control Drift. Control Drift is an open-source, AI-augmented continuous validation platform designed to empower security professionals of all experience levels to execute precise threat simulations, map their defensive coverage, and manage gaps without the friction of enterprise bloat. **TL;DR on what makes it cool:** * **Lightweight Design** Runs completely in-browser (via `localStorage`) by default. Clone it and `npm run dev` to try it instantly, with a swappable DB adapter to scale for enterprise deployment later. * **Pessimistic Scoring:** If 1 out of 10 payload variations bypasses your EDR, it forcefully caps that MITRE technique's coverage score at "Partial" instead of "Optimal", eliminating false sense of security. * **Plug-and-play AI:** Connect local models or any OpenAI-compatible API endpoints to augment the simulation workflow, map attack paths, generate detection rules, and interact with a global assistant. * **Not Boring UI:** Built with React and u/react-three`/fiber` for a 3D globe MITRE ATT&CK heatmap. Control Drift was molded from own industry experiences and perspectives, so I would greatly appreciate any recommendations or general feedback from the community here! **Repo:** [`https://github.com/Control-Drift/Control-Drift`](https://github.com/Control-Drift/Control-Drift)
A memo obtained by WIRED, issued by the water utilities information sharing group WaterISAC, links dozens of cyberattacks against Minnesota water utilities to Tehran.
Craig Rosewarne, Managing Director of Wolfpack Information Risk, explains why continuous, AI-enabled validation, paired with human-verified exploitability, gives security leaders a real-time view of what's actually at risk. The post Guest Blog: The Annual Pentest Is No Longer Enough appeared first on Synack .
Threat actors with ties to North Korea have been attributed to a sophisticated macOS malvertising campaign that involves redirecting users to fake web pages displaying a full-screen non-existent update sequence to deliver malware as part of a new iteration of the long-running Contagious Interview campaign. The defining aspect of the attack is that bogus macOS software update screen stealthily
VU#281278: SGLang contains six different vulnerabilities including RCE, data exfiltration, and credential disclosure
Overview Six vulnerabilities have been discovered within the SGLang project, including remote code execution (RCE), server-side request forgery (SSRF), local file read, credential leakage, and model weight exfiltration on a target server. Exploitation does not require authentication in most cases, and some vulnerabilities require only network access with no API keys or user credentials. At the time of publication, no patches are available from the project maintainers, and coordination attempts have been unsuccessful. Description SGLang is an open-source framework for serving large language models (LLMs) and multimodal AI models, supporting models such as Qwen, DeepSeek, Mistral, and Skywork, and is compatible with OpenAI APIs. Six vulnerabilities have been discovered within the tool and are tracked as follows: CVE-2026-15969 SGLang contains unauthenticated RCE in /load_lora_adapter_from_tensors by bypass of SafeUnpickler’s incomplete denylist, allowing arbitrary command execution through crafted base64-encoded pickle payloads. CVE-2026-15971 SGLang contains an RCE vulnerability when the optional dumper subsystem is enabled, which allows for a sandbox escape when DUMPER_SERVER_PORT is set, enabling code execution on inference requests. CVE-2026-15974 SGLang contains an SSRF and local file read in the multimodal generation endpoint /v1/chat/completions because image_url input is unsanitized, allowing access to internal metadata, secrets, and services. CVE-2026-15976 SGLang contains a RCE vulnerability when attempting to load model weights f
The two Chrome updates in June patched more bugs than the 23 updates before them. Now, Google is ramping up its patching schedule thanks to AI-assisted vulnerability discovery.
Security experts have been sounding the alarm for years about the risks of using generic TV boxes that promise unlimited content streaming for a one-time fee, warning that they secretly rent the user’s Internet connection out to strangers. But a groundbreaking new analysis finds these devices also routinely spoof themselves as mobile phones clicking ads on AI-generated websites as part of a sprawling operation that seeks to defraud online merchants and advertising networks. Pedro Falé is a threat researcher with the security firm Bitsight . Falé told KrebsOnSecurity he was able to peer inside a vast and complex ad fraud network by registering an expired domain name that was used to coordinate fake ad clicks across a particularly popular brand of these streaming devices known as H96 . An H96 TV streaming device currently advertised for sale on Amazon. Falé said the domain he scooped up was previously used for telemetry, periodically collecting full hardware information and the entire list of installed apps from tens of thousands of H96 streaming sticks plugged into television sets around the globe. But upon inspecting the traffic being funneled to the domain, he discovered nearly all of the TV boxes transmitting data claimed to be mobile phone models from a variety of ma
A now-patched vulnerability in Azure Cosmos DB could have let an attacker escape the service's Gremlin query sandbox and obtain full read and write access to databases across customer tenants, according to Wiz. Wiz, which codenamed the chain CosmosEscape, said the exploit chain began with a crafted query against a Gremlin database controlled by the attacker. From there, code execution on a
As of June 23, 2026, cdnjs, one of the Internet's busiest open-source CDNs, is running exclusively on Cloudflare’s Developer Platform . Along the way, cdnjs surfaced limits in the platform, and the platform grew to meet them. cdnjs is a free, open-source content delivery network for JavaScript and CSS libraries. Instead of using a bundler or self-hosting jQuery, Bootstrap, or Lodash, you drop a tag pointing to cdnjs.cloudflare.com and the library loads from Cloudflare's edge, instantly, anywhere in the world, with no signup, no API keys, and no rate limits. It's the infrastructure behind a significant portion of “intro to JavaScript” tutorials, CodePen demos, and Stack Overflow answers. Community-driven, cdnjs is used on roughly 12% of all websites , a 48.3% share of the JavaScript CDN market. It serves an average of 108,000 requests per second, 9 billion per day, across more than 330 Cloudflare data centers , with a 98.6% cache hit rate. Pretty cool, Internet! In 2011, when bundlers were exotic, npm was barely a year old, and "just drop a tag" was how the web shipped JavaScript, Ryan Kirkman and Thomas Davis built cdnjs as a free, community-run mirror of every popular open-source library. Cloudflare stepped in to host it free of charge months later , and took over project maintenance
London, UK, 30 July 2026 – New data from Heimdal’s telemetry measures the gap between execution of the MediaArena adware and the completion of quarantine. The same pattern has been confirmed across more than 40 client environments. MediaArena is a browser-modifier adware family that Microsoft has tracked since 2023. It is low-severity, and that is […] The post Heimdal data reveals MediaArena adware completes persistence before antivirus quarantine finishes appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
Hidden instructions in a Word document can make Microsoft 365 Copilot rewrite figures in a report, then copy the same instructions into the finished file. Håkon Måløy disclosed the technique on July 28, 144 days after reporting it to Microsoft. In his proof of concept, the internally generated file triggered the same behavior when it was used in a second Copilot drafting session. Måløy's
Network firewalls are the workhorses of modern cybersecurity. They are trusted to protect the network, blocking malicious traffic and preventing intrusions and breaches. And for decades, network security teams have built controls around a relatively stable model: users connect to applications, applications exchange data, and security tools inspect packets, protocols, and destinations. Firewalls
Uniswap v4 hooks let developers add custom behavior to pools, including dynamic fees, custom accounting, and external integrations. This flexibility moves some security responsibilities into application and hook code. The Cork and Bunni exploits are two app-level incidents that show what can go wrong in that code. Together, they account for more than $20M in losses. Neither incident stemmed from a flaw in the Uniswap v4 core protocol or the PoolManager; both arose from application-specific authorization and accounting logic built around hooks. After analyzing dozens of findings from Trail of Bits audits (including our Uniswap v4-core security review ), public reports from other firms, and the Solodit database, I’ve identified seven recurring failure patterns in application and hook code, including missing caller checks and accounting bugs that still satisfy the PoolManager’s settlement invariant. Builders can use these patterns as a secure-development checklist; auditors can use them to focus their review. What the PoolManager guarantees If you’re familiar with Uniswap v3, where each pool was a separate contract, v4 inverts the model. All pool state now lives in a singleton PoolManager contract, with each pool represented in its storage. Uniswap v4 adds hooks: independent contracts that execute custom logic at specific points in the swap and liquidity lifecycle.
South Korean authorities and four security firms have disclosed a state-sponsored campaign that compromised trusted domestic websites. The attackers used those sites to exploit locally installed financial-security software and infect targeted visitors with SIGNBT or COPPERHEDGE backdoors. A compromised page could infect a system running a vulnerable AnySign4PC version without a prompt or
The Chinese cybercrime group known as Silver Fox has been observed using new drivers as part of bring your own vulnerable driver (BYOVD) attacks targeting a Japanese organization in the industrial manufacturing sector to ultimately deliver ValleyRAT (aka Winos 4.0) for persistent remote access. "In this campaign, the group combines new vulnerable-driver abuse, newly observed abuse of legitimate
If the generative AI giant had followed well-known security best practices, it’s likely that its AI agent would never have escaped to the open internet and hacked multiple companies.
Drone warfare is making the skies more dangerous, even for airplanes far from the battlefield.
Researchers pitted a person against a Claude agent and found that, after a week of texting, the AI chatbot was more effective at creating “exploitable trust” with others.
Heimdal did not start as a traditional cybersecurity company. It started with two Danish cybersecurity researchers, a piece of innovative technology and a challenge. Could they create something that could identify vulnerabilities, intercept malicious activity and help protect machines before threats could take hold? That technology went on to compete at the Defcon CTF world […] The post How Heimdal grew from a bold idea into a global cybersecurity platform appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
The Russian threat actors recently linked to the exploitation of a now-patched vulnerability in Zimbra have been observed exploiting another vulnerability, this time in Microsoft Outlook Web Access (OWA), to target U.S. and European government entities, as well as the telecommunications, financial, hospitality, and aerospace sectors. The activity, which began on July 22, 2026, involves the
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) added foreign-produced mobile robots and networked power inverters to its Covered List on July 28. The move generally prevents new models from receiving the equipment authorization required for import, marketing, or sale in the US. Previously authorized models can still be sold, and devices people already own are unaffected. Federal purchases and use
Amazon has tied the September 2025 hijack of the npm packages debug and chalk to North Korea. For ten months, the incident sat in the public record as crypto theft: a maintainer phished through a lookalike npm domain and a wallet-draining script pushed into at least 18 packages carrying more than 2 billion weekly downloads between them. The original Aikido and Wiz reports did not attribute the
Wednesday, July 29
This is another post in my series on the Chinese Wool farmers underground. This time we are dissecting their public github repos, trying to figure out how it all fits together!
Details of parents and staff, including email addresses and phone numbers, are among data taken by cybercriminals The Department for Education and a police database have been targeted by a cyber-attack, exposing more than 740,000 pieces of data. Details of government officials, senior school leaders, university staff, police officers and members of the public have been taken by hackers. Continue reading...
Europe regulates AI through risk tiers and conformity checks. America accelerates AI through deregulation and infrastructure speed. Both models ask different questions but land on the same gap: neither tells you whether a live AI system actually holds up against real attacks. Enterprise AI security depends on evidence, not paperwork or policy. Continuous, human-validated offensive testing is the layer that both regulatory philosophies are missing and that every organization operating across borders actually needs. The post Europe Is Regulating AI. America Is Accelerating AI. Both Need Offensive Security Validation. appeared first on Synack .
Ruby on Rails has released fixes for a critical Active Storage vulnerability that could let unauthenticated attackers read arbitrary files from application servers through crafted image uploads. Tracked as CVE-2026-66066 (CVSS score: 9.5), the flaw can expose the Rails process environment and secrets such as secret_key_base, the Rails master key, database passwords, cloud storage credentials,
VU#293714: Arbitrary File Overwrite in Develar app-builder (zipx.Unzip) via Symlink Following on macOS (APFS)
Overview A vulnerability in the zipx.Unzip extraction routine of Develar’s app-builder allows an attacker to overwrite arbitrary files on macOS using Apple File System (APFS). The issue arises from a combination of Unicode normalization collisions and unsafe symlink-following behavior. APFS treats certain Unicode equivalent filenames as identical (e.g., ß ↔ ss), while app builder performs no canonical normalization before validating or writing paths. Description Develar’s app-builder is a command‑line build tool used heavily in the Electron ecosystem to package, sign, notarize, and produce distributable application bundles for macOS, Windows, and Linux. It is popular because it is a transitive dependency of electron-builder, one of the most widely used packaging tools for Electron apps. The vulnerability arises from how the zipx.Unzip routine handles Unicode‑equivalent filenames and symbolic links during ZIP extraction. APFS treats certain Unicode representations as identical (e.g., ß and ss), but app-builder does not perform canonical normalization before validating output paths. As a result, an attacker can craft ZIP archives that combine Unicode normalization collisions with malicious symlinks to redirect writes outside the intended extraction directory. The GitHub Pull Request addresses the symlink-following variant of this vulnerability (CWE‑22 and CWE‑59) by rejecting any symlink whose resolved target escapes the intended output directory and by adding O_NOFOLLOW to regular file writes. Without these protections, an attacker can craft ZIP archives containing malicious symlinks and Unicode-colliding filenames to overwrite arbitrary files on APFS-backed systems. Impact Exploitation of this vulnerabi
CISA's Binding Operational Directive 26-04, issued June 10, 2026, replaces the KEV directive with a four-variable risk model: asset exposure, KEV status, exploit automation, and technical impact. CISA publishes three of the four answers generically per CVE. The two that decide whether prioritization is defensible (real exposure and real impact in your environment) can only be proven by testing the asset the way an adversary would. Continuous, human-validated pentesting is built to produce that evidence. The post BOD 26-04 Makes Exploitability the Priority Signal: Scanners Can’t Measure It appeared first on Synack .
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a maximum-severity security flaw in Ruflo, an open-source agent meta-harness for Anthropic Claude Code and OpenAI Codex, that could result in unauthenticated remote code execution. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-59726 (CVSS score: 10.0), impacts all versions of the project before version 3.16.3. It has been codenamed RufRoot by Noma Security's
Cloudflare's Authenticated Origin Pulls and Custom Origin Trust Store now support post-quantum authentication. Here we’ll explain how you can configure fully post-quantum secure mutually authenticated TLS connections to your origin server, dive into the engineering details of how we built it, make a shameful confession, and finally explain how this work fits into our overall post-quantum migration roadmap. Reaching a major milestone Our focus for the past several years has been in deploying post-quantum encryption to protect against harvest-now/decrypt-later attacks, where an attacker quietly stockpiles your encrypted data with the hope of decrypting it in the future with a quantum computer. However, recent breakthroughs in quantum computing and cryptanalysis pulled the timelines for upgrading to post-quantum cryptography forward across industry and government and have caused us to shift our attention to deploying post-quantum authentication , to protect against attackers who will soon be able to use quantum computers to break classical credentials and carry out impersonation attacks. In a previous post, we announced that Cloudflare is
Hi everyone, I've released APKX-Hunter v2.5.0, an open-source Android Static Analysis Framework written in C.
One day after a federal judge ordered an ICE detention center opened to state health inspectors, the agency posted new contract terms that would void state oversight at four facilities.
In a new disclosure, OpenAI says its agent used exposed logins to gain access to at least four “publicly available services” in its unhinged quest to solve a test.
Tuesday, July 28
How much could a single underscore in a username really matter? Just ask Brandon Klayme, who served 18 months in prison before realizing how authorities arrested, charged, and convicted the wrong man.
VU#141367: AT&T's Arris BGW210-700 gateway contains authentication bypass vulnerability in LAN-side management interface
Overview Firmware versions 2.7.7 and earlier of the Arris BGW210-700 residential gateway contain an authentication bypass vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-16771, that allows any unauthenticated LAN-side user to read sensitive configuration data and modify device settings through web management endpoints. Although this vulnerability was recently discovered, the majority of in-service gateways are not expected to be running the affected version. Only devices that have not received automated ISP-managed firmware updates since version 2.7.7 in 2020 are vulnerable. Description The Arris BGW210-700 is a residential gateway used widely in AT&T deployments to provide routing, wireless networking, and wide-area network (WAN) connectivity for home users. The device exposes a browser-based management interface on the local-area network (LAN) side that allows users to configure WiFi settings, check diagnostics, and run system operations. Several CGI (Common Gateway Interface) handlers within the BGW210-700's web interface do not enforce any server-side authentication checks. Although the interface presents an "Access Code" prompt to users, this restriction is entirely implemented through client-side HTML and JavaScript and is not validated by the server before processing requests. As a result, any HTTP client that ignores client-side code can directly access and interact with the underlying CGI endpoints. The lack of server-side authentication affects multiple configuration and diagnostic pages. The wconfig_unified.ha endpoint returns the plaintext WiFi pre-shared key for all configured SSIDs to any unauthenticated requester. The broadbandconfig.ha endpoint accepts unauthenticated POST requests that directly modify WAN configuration parameters, including settings that persist acr
“Make everyone one percent better and it compounds across the team.” That’s the line Joe Head wrote about his own job and when I read it back to him, he didn’t hesitate. “That is 100% the objective,” he said. Joe runs AI adoption for an 80-person team as the only AI automation specialist in the […] The post Tools Change. Teach People How to Keep Up appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
TL;DR: We identified 36,872 internet-exposed BMCs, and 24,650 of them disclosed password-derived authentication hashes before login because of CVE-2013-4786. More than 30% of the returned hashes were linked to passwords that could be recovered using common wordlists or predictable factory password formats. The exposure affected modern Supermicro and HPE servers, including systems operated by GPU providers. The bigger risk is that a compromised BMC gives an attacker highly privileged access below the operating system. Because BMC management networks are often poorly segmented and lightly monitored, one exposed interface can become a foothold into broader data center infrastructure. We also created an interactive map where you can explore the exposed systems: https://lavahq.io/bmcradar
Like most infrastructure, the Internet's fragility is easy to overlook — as long as it's working. When it fails, its complexity comes into full view. Cloudflare is in a unique position to detect and document the moments when one of the interrelated systems the Internet depends on breaks down and connectivity suffers as a result. Each quarter, we summarize the disruptions we detect and annotate on Cloudflare Radar . In Q2 2026, Super Typhoon Sinlaku just north of Guam caused the longest outage, while government-mandated shutdowns during exam periods in Sudan were the most frequent. Iran restored national Internet access, reconnecting its citizens to the global network after an 88-day blackout, even as damage from drone strikes continued to disrupt AWS infrastructure elsewhere in the region. Finally, a cable cut in Saint Lucia and the distribution of faulty DNSSEC signatures in Germany underscored the fragility of Internet infrastructure, but also the remarkable stability these regional and global systems maintain when operating normally. Here we will walk through the most significant Internet disruptions we observed in the second quarter of 2026, drawing on traffic data from Cloudflare Radar to show how each unfolded and what it meant for users on the ground. As always, this is a summary of notable, confirmed disruptions rather than an exhaustive list; a fuller view of detected traffic anomalies is available in the Cloudflare Radar Outage Center . Natural disasters and electricity cause disruptions in Guam, Venezuela, and Tanzania Super Typhoon Sinlaku, the strongest storm of the 2026 Pacific typhoon season so far, tracked through the Mariana Islands in mid-April, passing just north of Guam. Tho
Reverse-engineered the BLE protocol of a discontinued Fisher-Price toy Lumalou after its app was discontinued
Codex’s /goal feature amplifies bug hunting, but getting good results requires the right prompt, the right scope, and the right number of outcomes per run. For Patch the Planet , our joint initiative with OpenAI to find and fix bugs in open-source software, we pointed Codex at some of the most widely used, heavily audited codebases in the world, like Rust, curl, and zlib. One tool came up again and again in our internal bug-report channels: /goal , which hands Codex an open-ended objective and lets it work independently toward a success condition. Here are a few highlights: /goal found every Rust bug we submitted, including a soundness hole and a miscompilation now patched in Rust 1.98, from a single variant-analysis pipeline. It turned every project’s past CVEs into Semgrep rules that had to fire on the vulnerable version and stay silent on the patched one, then flagged 11 variant hits across multiple projects. It uncovered two potential high-severity privilege-escalation bugs in Keycloak’s SAML component during a discovery run. Over the first few weeks of Patch the Planet, our engineers independently converged on three techniques for using /goal . We found that getting the most out of /goal means treating the prompt as a set of specific success criteria, not a set of instructions. (Note that this blog post uses /goal to refer to goal-based prompting in general. Codex can also set goals for itself through a tool call, and that’s how we recommend everyone use it; we rarely type the slash command ourselves.) 1. Let Codex write the goal The art o
GitHub - memues/mstar-monitor-firmware-dumper: Dump SPI flash firmware from MStar scaler-based monitors over I2C/DDC
Monday, July 27
The outgoing executive director of the Office of Homeland Security Statistics is one of very few federal officials to speak out against the Trump administration’s immigration crackdown.
The screwup shows how tricky it can be to stop web crawlers from making ostensibly private conversations with AI chatbots entirely too public.
CVE-2026-61511 - a critical vulnerability in vBulletin that allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a remote server.
Debugging privacy-preserving protocols is hard. Oblivious HTTP has several different steps across four different parties, not to mention binary HTTP encoding and details spread across many draft RFCs. We've taken what we've learned operating protocols like Oblivious HTTP at the scale of millions of requests per second, and wrapped it up in a nice, clean CLI tool — that we are open-sourcing today. We call it our privacy-client , or pvcli . We’re releasing it under the Apache-2.0 License, and it is open for contributions . Here’s a single line of code that executes a full Oblivious HTTP request with a relay, gateway and origin. Don't worry if you don't know what that means, we'll cover it below. We’ll explain why we built this tool, and show just how handy it can be. Why privacy protocols can be hard to debug Let’s take a closer look at our motivation for creating pvcli. Over time, the Privacy team’s product suite and customer base grew. We added products like Privacy Proxy and Privacy Gateway, which power Apple’s Private Relay , Microsoft’s Edge Secure Network VPN , Flo Health’s Anonymous Mode , and more. With it came an increasing amount of special customer requirements, domain knowledge, and complexity. As a result, we saw increased friction in development and incident response. To see this in action, let’s look at how one of our products implements
We analyze how VoidLink, LinkPro, and Atomic Arch abuse eBPF helpers to hide from defenders, and show how to detect them at load time, before they can act.
Sunday, July 26
Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite The Origin Energy breach down here in Aus is all over the news this week, and as with many breaches, it's multi-faceted. You've got them leading with "don't worry, your credit card is fine", the hacker leading with "they didn't respond when I tried to report it", and now news that the two parties have "come to an agreement". Maybe money was paid, or maybe Origin made some promises to restrain the hounds if commitments about data deletion were made. But both outcomes, of course, provide no guarantee that data has been nuked, so now they get to spend perpetuity waiting for the data that maybe - just maybe - it leaks. And we all should be working on precisely that assumption, just like we did with Optus and Medibank and Latitude and Ticketek and Qantas...
Saturday, July 25
Featured Chrome extension "Planet Search" (2M installs) routes every query to the nextgeeker[.]com hijacker network
While analyzing featured extensions on our beloved chrome web store I landed on Planet Search (`kadaohckdkghfaclhjmkmplebcdcnfnp`), Featured, 2M users, publisher FREE VPN PLANET SRL. https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/planet-search/kadaohckdkghfaclhjmkmplebcdcnfnp The extensions has a 0-byte background.js with zero permissions. The whole mechanism is one \`chrome\_settings\_overrides\` search provider, so nothing shows up statically. It's all server-side. Declared provider is planet-search[.]com Tracing: planet-search[.]com/search/?q= 301 → sstmaster[.]com/edge/PN1021?q= 302 → nextgeeker[.]com/B151001.php?q=&src=PN1021 nextgeeker[.]com is flagged as a browser hijacker by multiple vendors (pcrisk, gridinsoft, others). Same publisher ships a ~1M-user VPN extension and a few others. Still tracing those, not going to characterize them until I have. Report: https://malext.io/reports/RoguePlanet
I'm helping organize **Après-Cyber Slopes Summit 2027**, and our CFP is now open. We're particularly interested in **technical presentations** and original research involving AI and modern cybersecurity. Topics we're hoping to see include: * AI red teaming * LLM security * Prompt injection research * Agent security * Offensive tooling * Detection engineering * Reverse engineering * Malware analysis * Cloud exploitation and defense * Identity attacks * Threat intelligence * AI-assisted security tooling * Novel attack techniques * Defensive research We especially appreciate talks that include demonstrations, technical depth, or research that attendees can reproduce themselves. Conference: February 24–26, 2027 Location: Park City, Utah CFP: [https://sessionize.com/apres-cyber-slopes-summit-2027](https://sessionize.com/apres-cyber-slopes-summit-2027) Conference website: [https://www.aprescyber.com](https://www.aprescyber.com) Happy to answer questions about the CFP or conference.
Friday, July 24
Border Gateway Protocol ( BGP ) is the de facto routing protocol of the Internet. It offers built-in mechanisms to allow entities, represented by Autonomous Systems (ASes), to express how they want to send and receive traffic on the Internet. One such mechanism is path attributes , which carry essential routing information and metadata for their associated route. The path selection algorithm processes some of these path attributes in a deterministic sequence to calculate the best path for this specific prefix. Using our unique position on the Internet, we took an investigative look at one of the well-known mandatory attributes in BGP, the ORIGIN attribute. ORIGIN must be present in every BGP prefix announcement and should not be modified by any router after being set by the originating one. What we found through our own experiments was a dramatic ~70% of observed paths in numerous vantage points have a different ORIGIN value compared to what was set by the originating Autonomous System. This ORIGIN attribute manipulation has a significant impact on the way traffic is forwarded on the Internet, as we’ll explore in this post. BGP ORIGIN and its operational history The ORIGIN attribute indicates how a route was injected into BGP — not to be confused with the origin AS that ind
Iberia Cards CISO José Manuel Rivera García explains why he's stuck with Synack's PTaaS model across multiple organizations, and how running Sara AI Pentest alongside human researchers helps him balance regulatory compliance with real risk reduction. He also shares candid advice for other CISOs on avoiding the false sense of security that comes from infrequent testing and over-reliance on perimeter controls. The post How Iberia Cards Uses Sara AI Pentesting to Stay Ahead of Modern Threats appeared first on Synack .