A security researcher found a flaw in Anthropic's Claude Code GitHub Action that let an attacker take over vulnerable public repositories running it, with nothing more than a single opened GitHub issue. Because Anthropic's own action repo used the same workflow, a working attack could have pushed malicious code into the action itself and onto the projects downstream that pull it. RyotaK of GMO
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Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed a one-click attack via Microsoft Visual Studio Code (VS Code) that makes it possible to steal a user's GitHub token. "Just by clicking a link, it's possible for an attacker to steal a GitHub token that can read and write to your repos, including private ones," security researcher Ammar Askar said. GitHub supports a feature called GitHub.dev that runs as
A data breach at the dental benefits administrator DentaQuest has reportedly exposed the sensitive data of 2.6 million accounts. [...]
On Wednesday, Microsoft fixed an issue that caused some Windows devices to install driver updates without notice despite policies configured to prevent auto-updates. [...]
French and Spanish authorities took down an online marketplace selling fake identity documents to migrant smuggling rings operating within the European Union. [...]
Latest
Thursday, June 4
# New Tool: OWASP's CVE Lite CLI for Dependency Scanning OWASP has released **CVE Lite CLI**, a new dependency scanner designed to help developers identify and address known vulnerabilities in their project dependencies. **What it does:** This command-line tool provides actionable fixes for discovered vulnerabilities by checking against advisory databases. **Who it's for:** Primarily **developers** and **DevSecOps teams** looking to quickly scan for and remediate known CVEs within their software dependencies. **Why it's useful:** It aims to close the gap on easily fixable dependency vulnerabilities, offering a streamlined way to get actionable remediation advice. However, the article notes an important limitation: while effective for known CVEs, it won't prevent more sophisticated, zero-day supply chain attacks that don't yet exist in public advisory databases. This underscores the need for a multi-layered approach to supply chain security beyond just dependency scanning. **Source:** [https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/cve-lite-cli](https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/cve-lite-cli)
A data breach at the dental benefits administrator DentaQuest has reportedly exposed the sensitive data of 2.6 million accounts. [...]
Code reviewed by WIRED uncovered an unreleased face-recognition system embedded in Meta’s smart glasses platform. It’s designed to identify people via biometric data stored on users’ phones.
Cisco has patched a bug in Unified Communications Manager that lets an unauthenticated attacker on the network write files to the box and, from there, climb to root. It is tracked as CVE-2026-20230, and proof-of-concept exploit code is already public. Cisco's PSIRT says it has not seen the flaw used in attacks yet. The PoC shortens that runway. The flaw is a server-side request forgery.
The United Nations' World Food Programme (WFP), the world's largest humanitarian organization, revealed over the weekend that its self-registration application (SRA) for Palestine was breached. [...]
[https://techspective.net/2026/06/04/real-time-fraud-prevention-to-stop-ai-driven-attacks/](https://techspective.net/2026/06/04/real-time-fraud-prevention-to-stop-ai-driven-attacks/)
A new supply-chain attack has infected 36 packages on the Node Package Manager (npm) index with infostealer malware called IronWorm. [...]
A security researcher found a flaw in Anthropic's Claude Code GitHub Action that let an attacker take over vulnerable public repositories running it, with nothing more than a single opened GitHub issue. Because Anthropic's own action repo used the same workflow, a working attack could have pushed malicious code into the action itself and onto the projects downstream that pull it. RyotaK of GMO
Over the past several weeks, the cybersecurity community has been reminded how quickly frontier and agentic AI in defense networks can challenge our assumptions. When Anthropic's Claude Mythos model was made available to a limited set of organizations as a technical preview, it was reported that an unauthorized group claimed that it had gained access within hours. The incident, if true, was
Threat actors are actively teaching newcomers how to find, exploit, and profit from vulnerable systems. Flare explores what a popular underground hacking tutorial reveals about modern attacker workflows. [...]
ThreatsDay Bulletin: AI Agents Gone Wrong, Sketchy C2 Tools, ClickFix Tricks, JS Backdoors & 20+ New Stories
It got stupid again. The internet still feels held together with tape. Bad plugins, old bugs, fake tools, trusted apps doing shady things. Same mess, new wrapper. And now the weird stuff is normal. Forums go down and come back worse. Cheap hackers get better toys. AI starts breaking real systems. Great. Read the whole thing before it ruins your week anyway. Unauthenticated
On Wednesday, Microsoft fixed an issue that caused some Windows devices to install driver updates without notice despite policies configured to prevent auto-updates. [...]
Hi. [https://hexderef.com/windows-11-passwords-in-memory-lsass-ctfmon-analysis](https://hexderef.com/windows-11-passwords-in-memory-lsass-ctfmon-analysis) Should it be a concern if another AV behaves like this? Definitely, especially if it transmits credentials over the network.
In our last post we used a Claude skill to systematically beat down VirusTotal detection rates on offensive security tools, with a brief mention of a new loader we’d been using to apply those techniques in bulk. This post is about that loader, which we call WasmForge. WasmForge is, from the user’s perspective, a build wrapper. You point it at a Go project and you get back a Windows or macOS binary that runs your tool but doesn’t look anything like it. Internally it’s a lot more. It’s a Go-to-WebAssembly compiler, a custom Wazero fork, around eighty host shim functions for MacOS and Windows APIs, and a healthy amount of evasion techniques from our previously discussed skill. The whole pipeline exists to solve one specific problem: take an existing offensive security tool, change zero lines of its source code, and produce a binary you can actually drop on a hardened endpoint. The Tool Authors Won, Then The Tool Authors Lost Many red team engagements can be completed using the same handful of established tools. Sliver for
VoidZero, the company behind Vite , Vitest , Rolldown , Oxc , and Vite+ , is joining Cloudflare. As part of this change, all team members of VoidZero are joining Cloudflare, too. Before saying anything else, we want to make the most important thing clear: Vite, Vitest, Rolldown, Oxc, and Vite+ will stay open source, vendor-agnostic, and community-driven. Nothing about that changes. Cloudflare's mission is to help build a better Internet. And a better Internet is an open Internet. Developers need choice, frameworks need a neutral foundation, and applications need to be portable. It is not reasonable to expect the entire web ecosystem to build around a single vendor. The most important tools and frameworks are portable by design. Vite is one of the few foundational tools that the whole JavaScript ecosystem agrees on. It earned that position by being fast, excellent, portable, and vendor-neutral. One of the best ways Cloudflare can help build a better Internet is by investing in that foundational open source toolchain. A toolchain that makes the Internet better for everyone, not just people who use Cloudflare or choose to host with us. Over the last few years we've invested heavily in making Cloudflare the best place to build and run websites, applications, and agents on our developer platform . But ultimately that choice will always be yours. Run your Vite application anywhere you want. What this means for Vite Today's news gives Vite more resources to keep growing, while the things that make Vite what it is remain the same: Vi
French and Spanish authorities took down an online marketplace selling fake identity documents to migrant smuggling rings operating within the European Union. [...]
A new China-linked cybercrime group known as TA4922 has expanded its targeting focus to target European organizations in the U.K., Germany, Italy, and South Africa. These efforts have been complemented by a "rapid operational tempo" and a continually evolving malware arsenal comprising known families like ValleyRAT (aka Winos 4.0) and Atlas RAT (aka AtlasCross RAT), as well as previously
void-sniff: A lightweight x64 Native API syscall monitor with a custom inline hook engine and zero dependencies
Cybersecurity researchers have shed light on a macOS malvertising campaign codenamed Operation FlutterBridge that spreads a new backdoor called FlutterShell. According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, the campaign is said to be the next stage of a previously reported activity cluster dubbed JSCoreRunner (aka FileRipple) in late August 2025. The cybercrime group behind the two attack chains is
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a large-scale operation that impersonates open-source and freeware projects to funnel unsuspecting users through a Traffic Distribution System (TDS) and deliver malware families like Remus Stealer, AnimateClipper, and the SessionGate framework. "The sites are well-designed and often look like legitimate project portals at a glance, sometimes referencing
Unknown attackers spent at least five months inside the Outlook mailbox of a senior executive at a major global stock exchange, copying the inbox out in small, repeated batches and routing it through Dropbox and OneDrive so the traffic blended into normal cloud activity. Symantec and Carbon Black's Threat Hunter Team reported the campaign this week. This points to espionage, not a money grab:
One thing that kept slowing me down during investigations and security assessments wasn't exploitation. Once I had initial access (e.g. Domain Admin), there is often still a large gap in demonstrating the exploitability of business-critical assets. You might tell a customer, "I got Domain Admin, job done". But in reality, that’s not always enough. A CISO may understand why it’s critical, but what would the CTO or CEO say? They need dead-head proofs, so you go beyond and look for business-critical assets, that\`s where post-exploitation begins!) My small research is about logs. Windows ones. Collecting Windows Event Logs does not simply mean copying EVTX files. We\`ve got some problems here :) \- How do I acquire logs when Windows blocks direct access? \- How do I exfiltrate the content? \- How do I process it? \- How do I work around AV, even trying to read it? \- How do I get even some use out of it? In practice, things become more complicated when investigating live systems. Windows keeps many log files open and actively written to. After several iterations I ended up building a small open-source project called LogHound. I'm curious how other people here approach large-scale log analysis during: * DFIR investigations * Red Team operations * malware analysis * incident response * system troubleshooting So here is how i solved all the problems: **How do I acquire logs when Windows blocks direct access?** We know - Windows blocks every .evtx file with process and does not let anyone to read\\copy\\download it. So we\`re looking for a simple solution As it is a post-exploitation engagement, we could make use of native Windows tools, especially - wevtutils. A small command lets us do all the dumping/filtering job `wevtutil epl Security "%s" /q:%s` **How do I exfiltrate the content?** As we are talking about Red Team engagements, we would like to make use of smth legitimate and widespread everywhere - and impackets smb library fits the best here. Minimum load logs, straightforward protocol and speed. **How do I process it?** If I were in a defender role, I would probably use some PowerShell module or GUI. Here we do not have such privileges, so Python\`s evtx lib + multithreading + filtering at start help to do the job quickly. **How do I work around AV, even trying to read it?** Well, nowadays you cannot just log in to Windows, get some shell and execute commands. 99% of available pentester tools would be blocked by every EDR, so we are also looking for smth legit and widespread. Most reason that is not the case with GitHub tools - EDRs collects behavioral patterns even with legit protocols and detects it easy. I\`ll use a legit WMI query with Win32\_Process.Create, hoping I won't leave a lot of indicators... and, for now, it works! **How do I get even some use out of it?** Collecting post-exploitation data is a fun process, but you can't really make a profit from gigabytes of raw data, and I\`m glad there are strong visualisation frameworks like BloodHound. It has a pretty convenient JSON scheme and, if not very adaptive but usable API. So I decided - importing that data to the BloodHound scheme would work out the best. And after all, we could continue our post-exploitation activities with a bit more useful information :) Project: [LogHound GitHub Repository](https://github.com/RNB-Team/LogHound)
At Accenture’s scale, training alone cannot solve every security problem. That was the reality facing Kris Burkhardt, Global CISO at Accenture. With a workforce of more than 800,000 people, close to 80,000 new hires each year, and a sprawling global attack surface, traditional penetration testing was no longer enough. A once-a-year compliance audit may check […] The post How Accenture Turned Penetration Testing Into a Force Multiplier for Security appeared first on Synack .
The U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) on Wednesday announced the results of a sweeping action undertaken by government authorities and private sector companies to combat cyber-enabled and cryptocurrency fraud targeting Americans. The "Disruption Week" operation began May 18, 2026, leading to the takedown of millions of social media, email, and internet access accounts used by transnational
I wanted to drop two repo's I've released. I plan to release at least one more dataset when I have time. These were generated without any human input (but have been human verified) using a fully autonomous, on-prem red team I've developed. \*no LLM or data center is used in my AI. Everything has been developed using pure python stdlib - there are zero external dependencies. I am focusing on democratizing AI and providing an affordable cybersecurity stack for SMBs. The defender is fully integrated: EDR, SIEM, SOAR, Vuln Scan, Network Anomaly detection (sits on top of firewall - can work with CSF et al) **How it work:** Two reinforcement learning systems: the red team attacks, learns from the blue team, and tries again. After \~100 cycles, a new, novel threat vector is generated based on how the blue team responded, confidence scores, and final decisions. \- If a threat is allowed, the red team leans into it until it is finally blocked/quarantined. \- if a threat is blocked/quarantined, the red team tries new methods or new combinations in order to bypass detection. This is how all these datasets were generated without any human direction. [You can grab them on Codeberg here](https://codeberg.org/SYNTEX/nemesis-mitre-mutations)
Learn four practical ways GreyNoise improves SOC outcomes—from reducing alert volume and surfacing targeted threats to identifying compromised hosts.
Wednesday, June 3
A Chinese-speaking cybercrime group has expanded its targeting to the European space, deploying previously undocumented malware and the Atlas backdoor. [...]
The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has announced sanctions against Nobitex, Iran's largest cryptocurrency exchange, for facilitating payments related to terrorist activities. [...]
CISA, the FBI, the NSA, the Department of Energy, and other US government partners are warning that hackers are targeting internet-exposed automatic tank gauge (ATG) systems used to monitor fuel and liquid storage tanks across various critical infrastructure sectors. [...]
A single poisoned notification from WhatsApp, Slack, SMS, Signal, Instagram, or Messenger could have hijacked Google Gemini's voice assistant on Android and made it open a victim's connected windows, fake a message from their boss, push the phone into a Zoom call, or quietly poison its long-term memory. No malicious app on the phone is required. The assistant just had to treat a hostile
A new denial-of-service (DoS) attack dubbed HTTP/2 Bomb can be launched from a single machine to take down web servers within seconds. [...]
Four people suing Elon Musk's AI firm under pseudonyms due to the risks of being identified may face a difficult choice: Reveal your real names, or drop the lawsuit.
VU#595768: Securly Chrome Extension contains multiple weak encryption and access control vulnerabilities
Overview Version 3.0.7 of the Securly Chrome Extension contains multiple vulnerabilities involving insecure data transmission, weak cryptography, and improper access control. These issues may expose sensitive filtering rules, enable the manipulation of downloaded configuration files, and allow unauthenticated access to protected resources. An attacker could exploit these weakness to steal configuration information, induce a Denial of Service (DoS), or modify content blocking rules for student users. Description The Securly Chrome Extension is a browser add-on commonly used in K–12 school-managed Chromebooks to enforce internet safety policies, filter or block websites, and provide activity monitoring for students. It is an element of the Securly classroom management platform, which helps schools comply with web filtering requirements and safely manage student online access. CVE-2026-8874 Version 3.0.7 of the Securly Chrome Extension downloads JSON files containing crisis alert keywords and filtering rules over unencrypted HTTP via the Fetch API. Other endpoints in the same extension correctly fetch Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) and Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) data over HTTPS, demonstrating an inconsistent implementation of TLS. CVE-2026-8876 The Securly Chrome Extension contains hardcoded, plaintext AES passphrases in securly.min.js . These keys decrypt crisis alert keyword data and intervention site data. CVE-2026-8878 The Securly Chrome Extension exposes multiple publicly accessible endpoints that allow unauthenticated access to sensitive data. The exposed information consists of SHA-1 hashes that are inadequately obfuscated using a simple Caesar ciph
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed a one-click attack via Microsoft Visual Studio Code (VS Code) that makes it possible to steal a user's GitHub token. "Just by clicking a link, it's possible for an attacker to steal a GitHub token that can read and write to your repos, including private ones," security researcher Ammar Askar said. GitHub supports a feature called GitHub.dev that runs as
Anyone doing dark web collection knows the throughput problem: a single Tor circuit caps out low, and when you need to archive a leak dump, a marketplace mirror, or a few hundred MB off a hidden service before it rotates or disappears, sequential pulls over one circuit are painful. I built a small Python tool for this, **OnionAccelerator**, and figured I'd share it here in case it's useful to others doing the same kind of work and because I'd like a second set of eyes on the approach. What it does: it fans downloads out across multiple SOCKS5 proxies (Tor instances), in three modes: * **multi** — pulls a list of URLs in parallel, one worker per circuit * **partial** — splits a single file into byte-range chunks, fetches each chunk over a different circuit, then merges. * **speedtest** — benchmarks each proxy port so you can drop dead/slow circuits before a run You can back it with locally Dockerised Tor instances (there's a one-liner in the README that spins up \~20) or an external SOCKS5 list. It also does User-Agent rotation, inline retries, per-host output paths so same-named files don't clobber each other, and per-job logging. Caveats I'm aware of, and would rather name than hide: it leans on running multiple circuits, so mind the load and your own OPSEC around whatever proxies you route through. It's meant for collection you're authorised to do, not for hammering anything. The code started as a personal utility, so it's rough in places. [Repo](https://github.com/euphoria95/OnionAccelerator) PRs, issues, and "you're doing X wrong" all welcome. Mostly curious whether the byte-range-across-circuits approach lines up with how others handle bulk retrieval over Tor, or if people are solving it differently.
Some recent route hijacks reported by Spamhaus captured our attention. In many of these hijack attempts, an apparent bad actor took advantage of unused autonomous system numbers , or ASNs. Notably in these hijacks, the actor appears to be creating fake AS_PATHs toward destinations, misdirecting traffic down an unexpected path. By creating forged AS_PATHs, the hijacker is attempting to lead traffic somewhere it isn’t normally meant to go while also trying to conceal their identity. A hijacker could strip enough information away from a network path that they could pretend to be the origin of a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) prefix themselves. Attackers can use this hijacked route to intercept traffic and for other nefarious purposes. There is a simple solution for these cases: basic verification that a BGP peer autonomous system (AS) always includes their network as the “First AS” in an advertised route. To get a sense of how well these safeguards are implemented, we stress-tested several major networks and researched their BGP implementations. Read on to see what we learned. Examining route hijacks involving forged paths The idea that an actor is creating fake AS_PATHs is supported when we take a closer look at implausible AS relationships in the path. For example, let’s examine one of the hijacks reported by Spamhaus, involving a prefix belonging to Orange S.A., the French telecom company. Using the monocle tool, we can
Redis has patched a use-after-free in its blocking-client code that lets an authenticated user run arbitrary OS commands on the machine hosting the database. The flaw was found by an autonomous AI tool built to hunt bugs in large codebases. Tracked as CVE-2026-23479, the flaw was introduced in Redis 7.2.0 and remained in every stable branch until the May 5 fixes, unnoticed for over two years.
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Wednesday added a critical flaw impacting Mirasvit Cache Warmer, a popular Magento full-page cache extension, to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, following reports of active exploitation in the wild. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-45247 (CVSS score: 9.8), is a case of deserialization of untrusted
PCPJack's operator left their full deployment toolkit exposed on an open directory, no authentication required. Host IOCs include /var/tmp/.xs, a systemd service named xsync masquerading as a system sync utility, and Chisel reverse SOCKS5 tunnels on ports 10000-14999. MITRE ATT&CK mapping and HuntSQL queries included. 👉 Full breakdown and IOCs here:[ https://hunt.io/blog/pcpjack-230-cloud-servers-smtp-proxy-network-sliver-chisel](https://hunt.io/blog/pcpjack-230-cloud-servers-smtp-proxy-network-sliver-chisel)
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is warning that hackers are exploiting vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel and Android operating system. [...]
I recently analysed a malvertising campaign where the attackers are using ChatGPT / OpenAI branding to deceive users into downloading malware. https://evalian.co.uk/fake-chatgpt-malvertising-campaign/
A two-week penetration test can leave roughly 345 days of real-world exposure unvalidated. Sprocket Security explores why continuous testing is becoming critical as attack surfaces constantly change. [...]
A [recent report by Axios](https://www.axios.com/2026/05/28/ai-spending-roi-enterprise-costs) claims a company accidentally spent $500 million in one month on Claude usage after failing to implement usage limits for employees. This extreme anecdote punctuates growing uncertainty about how token usage and API bills could become a major bottleneck for companies seeking to reap the productivity benefits of AI tools. Even major tech companies are reportedly seeking to reel in their AI spending, with [The Verge](https://www.theverge.com/tech/930447/microsoft-claude-code-discontinued-notepad) reporting that Microsoft is canceling its Claude Code licenses to steer employees toward its own GitHub Copilot and Uber CTO Praveen Neppalli Naga telling [The Information](https://www.theinformation.com/newsletters/applied-ai/uber-cto-shows-claude-code-can-blow-ai-budgets) the company used up its entire AI coding budget for 2026 within four months. How does this fit into cybersecurity? With the landmark moment of Anthropic’s [Claude Mythos’ release under Project Glasswing](https://www.scworld.com/news/anthropic-claude-mythos-preview-finds-thousands-of-vulnerabilities-in-weeks), AI-driven code review and vulnerability discovery are gaining interest, but [an analysis by Contrast Security](https://www.contrastsecurity.com/security-influencers/the-hidden-cost-of-ai-security-scanners) offers a sobering look at the “hidden cost of AI security scanners.” Contrast’s research found that the biggest spend for organizations seeking to use AI to scan their code for vulnerabilities isn’t the API bill, but the cost of triaging and validating thousands of findings, including a huge number of false positives and inconsistent findings between runs and models. For example, a simple scan of 1.8 million lines of code using Claude Sonnet 4.6 surfaced 3,560 findings and cost just $315 in token usage, but those 3,560 findings don’t triage and validate themselves. Contrast calculated that if a security engineer making $150,000 per year spent half an hour triaging each finding, the labor cost would come out to $128,000. Full article: [https://www.scworld.com/feature/ai-securitys-cost-bottleneck-isnt-tokens-its-validation](https://www.scworld.com/feature/ai-securitys-cost-bottleneck-isnt-tokens-its-validation)
The Fragmented State of Modern Enterprise Identity Enterprise IAM is approaching a breaking point. As organizations scale, identity becomes increasingly fragmented across thousands of applications, decentralized teams, machine identities, and autonomous systems. The result is Identity Dark Matter: identity activity that sits outside the visibility of centralized IAM and beyond the reach of
Acer is working to address two maximum-severity zero-day vulnerabilities affecting its Wave 7 mesh routers. [...]
Public skill marketplaces are being flooded with malicious skills that steal credentials, exfiltrate data, and hijack agents. In response, a segment of the security industry released skill scanners, a new family of tools designed to detect malicious skills before they’re installed. But we tested them, and they don’t work. We recently bypassed ClawHub’s malicious skill detector , Cisco’s agent skill scanner , and all three of the scanners integrated into skills.sh . These were not advanced attacks: it took us less than an hour to conceive and implement three of the four malicious skills in trailofbits/overtly-malicious-skills , using standard tricks and rapid inspection of the scanner source code. The fourth malicious skill took a few hours, but only because the prompt injection required some trial and error. Our findings demonstrate that even when skill scanners have some defenses, their static nature gives an adversary unlimited bites at the apple to tweak an attack until it finds a way through. Why skill security matters Software supply chains have long been the soft underbelly of computer security. As fragile infrastructure susceptible to both insider threats and external attackers, these supply chains were vulnerable enough when malicious code was the sole vector of compromise. But the rise in agentic systems has spawned a new style of dependency—the skill—and with it a whole new ecosystem of marketplaces and distribution channels that now run alongside traditional package managers. Malicious skills can embed harmful instructions in nat
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a new campaign targeting Minecraft players via YouTube to spread malware capable of gaining control of victims' systems. The Minecraft-focused malware-as-a-service (MaaS) campaign has been codenamed Weedhack by McAfee Labs, stating the activity has been active since January 2026 and impersonates Minecraft clients and mods to infect users. In all, 3820
Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite Today, we welcome the 46th government onboarded to Have I Been Pwned’s free gov service: the Philippines. The Philippines’ National CERT, working with the Department of Information and Communications Technology, now has access to monitor official government domains against the data in HIBP. This gives their Cyber Threat Intel and Monitoring Section the ability to identify exposure across government email addresses and respond quickly when those accounts appear in new data breach. This is precisely what the HIBP government service was built for: helping national cyber teams better understand credential exposure across their government domain space, monitor for compromised accounts on demand via API, and receive notifications when government domains are impacted by newly loaded breach data. The Philippines joins a growing list of national CERTs and government cybersecurity teams using HIBP to help strengthen national cyber defense, protect government departments and resources, and reduce the risk posed by compromised credentials before attackers can take advantage.
Tuesday, June 2
Available for Android 12 and later, the anti-scam feature is baked into Google Dialer, which sends a silent “confirmation signal” to ensure whoever’s calling you is who they appear to be.
Overview VoLTE deployments on Verizon’s IMS network have operated without negotiated SIP integrity protection. In observed test conditions, SIP signaling—including registration, call setup, and messaging—traveled without IPsec ESP encapsulation and without SIP Security Agreement headers, exposing it to interception and modification by on-path attackers. Recent carrier configuration updates, including Apple’s iOS 26.5 carrier bundle released on May 11, 2026, include IMS IPsec–related settings. However, such configuration entries do not confirm active deployment, successful negotiation, or functional protection in production. Description CVE-2026-10629 Verizon IMS deployments were observed transmitting SIP signaling without integrity protection. REGISTER exchanges lacked Security-Client, Security-Server, and Security-Verify headers, and no ESP-encapsulated SIP traffic was detected during subsequent signaling such as INVITE, MESSAGE, BYE, and UPDATE. This pattern persisted across devices, operating systems, and network conditions, indicating a deliberate network configuration rather than a transient issue. Per 3GPP TS 33.203 and GSMA IR.92, SIP signaling between the UE and P-CSCF must be protected using IPsec ESP following IMS AKA authentication, with negotiation occurring during registration. The absence of this protection allows attackers to manipulate SIP signaling undetected, enabling call hijacking, spoofing, denial-of-service, and misrouting of emergency calls. Verizon initially acknowledged the issue and stated that integrity support would be available upon request and extended broadly later in the year. However, the company has since ceased participation in coordination, including follow-up discussions and draft review, and has not provided verifiable evidence of mi
Overview A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability has been discovered in Appsmith, specifically in the CodeMirror based SQL query editor’s autocomplete renderer. CVE-2026-7299 has been assigned to track the vulnerability. An attacker with developer level access to a shared PostgreSQL datasource can inject arbitrary JavaScript by creating malicious database objects whose names contain XSS payloads. Successful exploitation leads to arbitrary JavaScript execution in the browser of any workspace member who triggers SQL autocomplete, enabling session hijacking, privilege escalation, or credential theft. Version 2.1 of Appsmith fixes CVE-2026-7299. Description Appsmith is an open source, low code platform intended to allow developers to build internal tools, dashboards, and applications using a UI builder, database and API integrations, and JavaScript customization. Appsmith can also be deployable either self-hosted or via the cloud. A vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-7299, has been discovered, allowing for XSS within the SQL query editors autocomplete function. The vulnerability description is below. CVE-2026-7299 Appsmith’s SQL query editor’s autocomplete functionality fails to sanitize database object names before rendering them in innerHTML, allowing an authenticated Developer to inject persistent XSS by a malicious table or column names triggering arbitrary code execution in the sessions of other workspace members when they interact with the same datasource. This vulnerability requires an account with developer access. A developer Appsmith account is an account designed to create, edit, and delete apps within a workspace they are assigned to. When an administrator opens the SQL editor and triggers autocomplete (e.g., by typing SELECT * FROM), the malicious ta
Overview The Collibra Platform Agent contains vulnerabilities that can be chained by a remote, unauthenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution. An attacker can exploit these issues by uploading a crafted ZIP archive that writes attacker-controlled files to arbitrary locations on the server once extracted, resulting in code execution. Description Collibra Platform (CP) and Collibra Platform Self-Hosted (CPSH), an enterprise grade, cloud-based platform designed to help organizations locate, understand, trust, and manage their data assets. The Collibra Agent of CP and CPSH that is installed on the host system is an independent service that listens on different port than the web interface and have the following vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-10622 Privileged REST endpoints exposed under /rest/* do not properly enforce authentication or authorization. This allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to interact with sensitive application functionality and gather information useful for further exploitation, including identifying suitable filesystem locations or application paths. Additionally, the web services hosting the vulnerable REST endpoint was observed to bind to all available network interfaces regardless of the setting passed to the installer script. This behavior may increase exposure in deployments where administrators believe access is restricted to specific interfaces or trusted networks. CVE-2026-10621 A Zip Slip vulnerability during extraction is exposed through POST /rest/restore and enables path traversal. When a ZIP archive is processed, file paths contained within the archive are not properly validated or canonicalized before extraction.
The right-wing think tank is actively pushing “civil terrorism”—increasing penalties for minor crimes committed while people engage in constitutionally protected free speech.
Attackers are abusing the shared content features of AI chatbot platforms — ChatGPT and Claude — to deliver malware through pages hosted on legitimate, trusted domains, distributing the malicious links via sponsored malvertising ads on search engines.
Monday, June 1
running custom firmware / patching the stock firmware of the soundcore headphones and running DOOM on it!
Came across an article, product like phpBB still has some potential flaws.
Key Takeaways We just got back from Tenable Exposure 2026 in Boston and three big questions dominated every conversation we had on the floor: The good news is, Synack is exactly positioned to answer these questions. Tenable Finds It. Sara AI Pentesting Proves What’s Exploitable. The Synack and Tenable integration addresses a gap that’s gotten […] The post Tenable Exposure 2026: AI Pentesting Helps Partners Scale appeared first on Synack .
The Instagram accounts for the Obama White House and the Chief Master Sergeant of the U.S. Space Force were briefly defaced with pro-Iranian images and messages over the weekend, after instructions began circulating on Telegram showing how to trick Meta’s “AI support assistant” bot into resetting account passwords. A screenshot from a video released on Telegram claiming to show how Meta’s AI customer support bot could be tricked into resetting a target’s password. On May 31, word began to spread on several Telegram instant message channels that Meta’s AI bot would happily add an email address to an existing account as part of the bot’s standard password reset flow. A video released on Telegram by pro-Iran hackers claimed to document a remarkably simple exploit that appears to have involved using a VPN connection with an IP address that is in or near the target’s usual hometown, requesting a password reset for the account, and then choosing to chat with Meta’s AI support assistant. From there, the video shows the attacker told the bot to link the account in question to a new email address, after which the bot dutifully sent that address a one-time code that allowed a password reset. The Telegram account that posted the video also linked to screenshots of pro-Iran images, videos and messages that defaced the hacked Instagram accounts, saying hackers had used the exploit to hijack a number of valuable (read: short) Instagram account names that allegedly have a resale value of more than a half million dollars. Meta has not res
Cloudflare's core is the centralized data centers that run our control plane, billing, and analytics — distinct from the globally distributed edge that handles user traffic. Core servers are bare metal, and when issues happen during reboot, the consequences can cascade fast. Their boot sequence is orchestrated by UEFI , the modern firmware standard that initializes hardware and hands off control to the operating system. Small quirks in that handoff can have outsized consequences. After a routine firmware update, some of our core servers were taking four hours to come back online, rather than just minutes as they did before. What should have been a one-day fleet-wide rollout was stretching into multi-day slogs. New nodes faced the full timeout gauntlet on their very first boot. Maintenance windows ballooned. Engineering teams had to babysit upgrades that should have run unattended. The behavior we saw was brought to light when we were bringing nodes online that had been powered off for an extended period. These nodes’ firmware was out of date and required multiple updates to resolve. Combine this with recent updates to the boot protocols used by servers in some of our locations, and boot times on the affected nodes became unacceptable. This is the story of how we tracked the cause to a firmware quirk and an over-eager linear search through every available network boot interface, and how we cut total boot and upgrade time from hours back down to minutes. Along the way, we'll share what we learned about UEFI internals, vendor-specific quirks, and the automation strategies that ultimately solved the problem. The network boot interface A network boot interface allows a server to boot its operating system over the network instead of from local storage. This is critical f
In this excerpt from WIRED Book Club pick The Yahoo Boys, journalist Carlos Barragán traces one scammer’s journey from flop to fortune.
Thanks to the newly detailed FROST technique, telltale SSD activity can be measured in the browser using simple JavaScript.
To reduce the amount of noise from questions, we have disabled self-posts in favor of a unified questions thread every week. Feel free to ask any question about reverse engineering here. If your question is about how to use a specific tool, or is specific to some particular target, you will have better luck on the [Reverse Engineering StackExchange](http://reverseengineering.stackexchange.com/). See also /r/AskReverseEngineering.
Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite I'm finding it quite fascinating to watch the current spate of ShinyHunters breaches and dumps. There's the obvious criminality of it all, but then there's also the response from organisations (or lack thereof, as it relates to disclosure to victims), the appearance and disappearance of victims on their dark web site, the speculation around payments and so on and so forth. And it's seemingly endless - I mentioned DentaQuest during the video, and sure enough, the next day, a 233GB corpus allegedly from them was dropped. By the next update, it might be BCD Travel as well and who knows which other services will appear on the "pay or leak" list. Strange times, I can't remember it ever being this crazy before TBH.
Sunday, May 31
[https://youtu.be/1W8gCFU8B0U](https://youtu.be/1W8gCFU8B0U) Thought it would be fun to share some learnings I made when building a similar lab at work but for me. Not exactly what I built at work (I think mines a bit better TBH) but this first video could be a jumping off point for different ways to do this 😄 Open to suggestions and feedback ❤️ Edit: I've fixed the audio so it should be better now!
Saturday, May 30
I reverse engineered how Plex gates its Pass features, then wrote a tiny patch that flips them all on (Linux)
Plus: A ransomware group is now stealing data in person, BusPatrol wants to hand its license plate surveillance data to the cops, and more.
Friday, May 29
The website, which compares human beings to extraterrestrials, touts arrest numbers from the Trump administration’s sweeping immigration crackdown. But some of its details are really out there.
We found a cluster of 1,001 IPs across 306 networks and 64 countries, tied to eight shared staging servers and a single TLS and HTTP fingerprint that appears nowhere else, plus smaller botnets that fall into clean separate islands.
I built an independent benchmark with 20 real CVEs across 15 CWE categories, 5 models (3 OpenAI, 2 Poolside Laguna), three prompt conditions: full advisory, behavioral description only, and location only (file and function, no description of the flaw). I have three findings worth sharing: * **No model reliably fixes real vulnerabilities.** The best solve rate (gpt-5.5) is 50% overall and 60% under the most favorable condition. The failure modes (e.g, wrong-search drift, budget exhaustion mid-implementation, plausible-but-incomplete patches that pass every visible test) are structured and repeatable across models and tasks. * **Token cost varies 4x for equivalent outcomes.** The Laguna models consume 3–4x more tokens than OpenAI models of the same capability tier, with no improvement in solve rate. * **The locate condition is the benchmark's sharpest instrument.** Give a model only a file and function (no description of the flaw). Every model drops. The differences between models are within noise at this scale, but it's the condition that most closely resembles what a security researcher actually does: reading code cold and recognizing independently that something is wrong. Benchmark code and evaluation traces are open sourced.
Thursday, May 28
Discovery During a recent network security assessment, we were working on an environment that was well-hardened – Patching was current, password policies were strong, and network segmentation was in place. So, as part of our enumeration of all network assets, we started looking for default credentials and this led us to multiple Canon enterprise printers configured with default administrator credentials. Enterprise printers are an interesting attack surface because it is common practice to have them configured with domain credentials. So, with administrative access, we tried to execute auth-back attacks by modifying the printer’s configuration to point to our server for credential capture or relay. However, network segmentation controls blocked this attack, as outbound controls prevented traffic from reaching our attacker-controlled subnet. We needed a different approach. We turned our attention to how the printer handled stored credentials. Specifically, we were curious to look at what happened to them during export. While exploring the printer’s administrative interface, we found a configuration export feature that allows administrators to back up device settings. This immediately raised a question: how were stored credentials being protected during export? Canon’s documentation states that exporting sensitive data requires encryption and the web interface presents encryption options (Security Level 1 and 2) that appear mandatory. However, we quickly discovered that these controls are implemented client-side without server-side validation. Vulnerability Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX printers provide a configuration export feature that is accessible through the web management interface. The web UI appears to enforce encryption by requiring a user-supplied pass