Cybersecurity News and Vulnerability Aggregator

Cybersecurity news aggregator

Top Cybersecurity Stories Today

Bleeping Computer 1h ago
CVE

In early March, GitHub patched a critical remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2026-3854) that could have allowed attackers to access millions of private repositories. [...]

Latest

Wednesday, April 29
r/netsec Just now

With everything that's happened recently, the Axios npm account hijack, LiteLLM getting poisoned on PyPI, and that coordinated npm/PyPI/Docker Hub campaign in April, I finally stopped manually running `npm audit` and set up something proper. Been running Dependency-Track for a few weeks now. It's an OWASP open source project that works differently from the usual scanners, you upload an SBOM for each project and it continuously monitors against NVD, OSS Index, GitHub Advisories, and more. New CVE drops affecting your stack? You get notified without doing anything. Wrote up how I set it up on Hetzner with Docker, Traefik for HTTPS, and GitHub Actions to auto-generate and upload SBOMs on every push

r/cybersecurity Just now

Yo, saw this while i was scrolling. Is this some really concern or just noise?! [https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/artificial-intelligence/claude-powered-ai-coding-agent-deletes-entire-company-database-in-9-seconds-backups-zapped-after-cursor-tool-powered-by-anthropics-claude-goes-rogue?referrer=https%3A%2F%2Freddit.com](https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/artificial-intelligence/claude-powered-ai-coding-agent-deletes-entire-company-database-in-9-seconds-backups-zapped-after-cursor-tool-powered-by-anthropics-claude-goes-rogue?referrer=https%3A%2F%2Freddit.com)

Bleeping Computer 1h ago
CVE

In early March, GitHub patched a critical remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2026-3854) that could have allowed attackers to access millions of private repositories. [...]

r/cybersecurity 1h ago

I’ve been digging into this new paper (arXiv:2604.24184) and it addresses a massive blind spot in how we benchmark AI security. Currently, LLM agents are crushing Jeopardy-style CTFs, but that’s a "lab" environment. This research introduces **Dynamic Cyber Ranges**, environments where AI defender agents actually fight back in real-time. **Some key takeaways from the research:** * **The Shift to Dynamic:** Instead of a static vulnerable server, they implemented ranges augmented with AI defenders. It’s no longer about finding a static flag, but outmaneuvering an active opponent. * **The "Defender" Advantage:** With active defense, attack success rates plummeted to **0–55%**. Even the top-tier models struggled once the environment started reacting to them. * **Small Models for the Win:** Interestingly, the researchers found that smaller, on-premise models are highly effective at defense. You don't need a massive GPT-4 class model to secure a perimeter if it's tuned for the range. * **The "Immune System" Effect:** These environments stay robust as attacker models evolve, moving us toward a true AI vs. AI "cat and mouse" game. **Why this matters:** If our evaluation environments don't fight back, we are overestimating how "secure" or "capable" these agents actually are in the real world where human (or now AI) sysadmins are patching and blocking in real-time. I’m curious, do you think static CTFs are officially dead for benchmarking LLM capabilities? And what’s your take on using small, local models as the "immune system" for future networks? **Full paper for those interested:** [https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.24184](https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.24184)

The Hacker News 2h ago

Every security team has a version of the same story. The quarter ends with hundreds of vulnerabilities closed. The dashboards are bursting with green. Then someone in a leadership meeting asks: "So, are we actually safer now?" Crickets. The room goes quiet because an honest answer requires context – which is something that patch counts and CVSS scores were never designed to provide. Exposure

Trail of Bits 2h ago

LibAFL is all the rage in the fuzzing community these days, especially with LLVM’s libFuzzer being placed in maintenance mode . Written in Rust, LibAFL claims improved performance, modularity, state-of-the-art fuzzing techniques, and libFuzzer compatibility . For these reasons, I set out to add LibAFL support to Ruzzy , our coverage-guided fuzzer for pure Ruby code and Ruby C extensions. This gives Ruby developers and security researchers access to a more advanced and actively maintained fuzzing engine without changing how they write their fuzzing harnesses. Ruzzy was originally built on top of LLVM’s libFuzzer, so using LibAFL’s compatibility layer should be easy enough. However, digging around in the internals of complex systems is never quite as simple as it seems. In this post, I will investigate some of the deep plumbing inside these fuzzing engines, take a detour into executable and linkable format (ELF) files, and ultimately add LibAFL support to Ruzzy. Building with libafl_libfuzzer Ruzzy currently supports Linux, so I use a Dockerfile for development and for production fuzzing campaigns. To that end, using a similar Dockerfile for LibAFL support is the simplest integration point. LibAFL provides excellent documentation a

The Hacker News 4h ago

cPanel has released security updates to address a security issue impacting various authentication paths that could allow an attacker to obtain access to the control panel software. The problem affects all currently supported versions, according to an alert released by cPanel on Tuesday. The issue has been addressed in the following versions - 11.110.0.97 11.118.0.63 11.126.0.54 11.132.0.29

r/blueteamsec 4h ago

The easiest way to diagnose whether you're running security operations or compliance operations: Ask what causes your team to change something. Compliance-driven triggers: audit findings, contract renewals, framework updates, and regulatory changes. The team acts when an external authority requires it. Threat-driven triggers: an incident revealed a gap; a purple-team exercise showed a rule didn't fire; threat intel identified a new technique; and a coverage assessment found an empty ATT&CK tactic. The team acts because the adversary's behaviour demands it. If your program changes primarily in response to audit cycles, you're running a compliance operation. That's a diagnostic, not a judgement — and it's fixable. Full post: [https://ridgelinecyber.com/blog/security-operation-or-compliance-operation/](https://ridgelinecyber.com/blog/security-operation-or-compliance-operation/)

The Hacker News 8h ago

In yet another instance of threat actors quickly jumping on the exploitation bandwagon, a newly disclosed critical security flaw in BerriAI's LiteLLM Python package has come under active exploitation in the wild within 36 hours of the bug becoming public knowledge. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-42208 (CVSS score: 9.3), is an SQL injection that could be exploited to modify the underlying

r/cybersecurity 8h ago

[https://www.namecheap.com/status-updates/ongoing-critical-security-vulnerability-in-cpanel-april-28-2026/](https://www.namecheap.com/status-updates/ongoing-critical-security-vulnerability-in-cpanel-april-28-2026/) [https://support.cpanel.net/hc/en-us/articles/40073787579671-cPanel-WHM-Security-Update-04-28-2026](https://support.cpanel.net/hc/en-us/articles/40073787579671-cPanel-WHM-Security-Update-04-28-2026)

GreyNoise 13h ago

Today, we're launching Project Swarm — a research initiative that opens the GreyNoise deception platform to the global security community. Project Swarm transforms GreyNoise from a proprietary sensor network into a collective intelligence platform.

Tuesday, April 28
Synack 16h ago

CREST Helps Raise the Bar for the Researchers Behind Your Pentest When a cybersecurity company tells you its testers are vetted, what does that actually mean? Most of the time, it means the company ran its own screening, trusted its own judgment, and hoped you’d trust it too. That works, right up until the pentest […] The post What CREST Means for Your Next Synack Engagement appeared first on Synack .

r/Malware 19h ago

Attackers are exploiting a security gap in U.S. businesses. Fake Microsoft, Adobe, and OneDrive pages deliver RMM software instead of payloads, giving attackers direct access to the environment. Because these tools are widely used across enterprises, attackers can establish access before activity is flagged as malicious. Combined with trusted or compromised infrastructure, this delays detection and increases attacker dwell time. The analysis session showing how attackers gain remote access through a fake Microsoft Store page delivering an RMM installer disguised as Adobe software: [https://app.any.run/tasks/e072ae4e-214c-4039-957d-7c0cbe682da8/](https://app.any.run/tasks/e072ae4e-214c-4039-957d-7c0cbe682da8/) Full article: [https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/rmm-blind-spot-for-cisos/](https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/rmm-blind-spot-for-cisos/) https://preview.redd.it/8p0wbleb7zxg1.png?width=2048&format=png&auto=webp&s=a58037806908430aa3ccc65908a072e00089e443

The Register 19h ago

'Full recovery is impossible for anyone, including the attacker' Organizations hit by the wave of Trivy and LiteLLM supply-chain compromises that paid Vect in hopes of recovering their data likely did not get much back, according to Check Point Research. That's because the ransomware Vect uses isn't actually ransomware at all, but a wiper that destroys any file larger than 128KB.…

The Hacker News 20h ago

A cybercrime group of Brazilian origin has resurfaced after more than three years to orchestrate a campaign that targets Minecraft players with a new stealer called LofyStealer (aka GrabBot). "The malware disguises itself as a Minecraft hack called 'Slinky,'" Brazil-based cybersecurity company ZenoX said in a technical report. "It uses the official game icon to induce voluntary execution,

r/Malware 22h ago

ByteToBreach have breached Ikeja Electric, encrypting 50+ hosts, disrupting systems, and taking multiple subdomains offline. The actor also have stolen customer, employee, and business databases, source code, Active Directory data with offline cracked passwords, and impacted metering platforms linked to several vendors. Threat actor: ByteToBreach Sector: Energy / Utilities Data type: Customer records, employee data, business databases, source code, Active Directory credentials Observed: Apr 28, 2026 Sources: [https://x.com/H4ckmanac/status/2049126582694875608](https://x.com/H4ckmanac/status/2049126582694875608) [https://x.com/CyhawkAfrica/status/2049109369522934179](https://x.com/CyhawkAfrica/status/2049109369522934179) [https://darkforums.su/Thread-NG-Ikeja-Electric-Databases-Ransomware](https://darkforums.su/Thread-NG-Ikeja-Electric-Databases-Ransomware) https://preview.redd.it/5wua149b7yxg1.png?width=2503&format=png&auto=webp&s=133a682cd6ee178877db97f9cb59f7c60d3d8cc8

The Register 23h ago

Names, phone numbers, physical addresses also included in Shiny Hunters alleged data dump Updated Logistics technology company Pitney Bowes, which makes franking machines for US postage, is the latest scalp claimed by ShinyHunters and its ongoing spree of pay-or-leak attacks against major organizations.…

r/netsec 23h ago

**Summary:** I’m disclosing a full-chain CVSS 10.0 RCE affecting Microsoft Semantic Kernel (.NET v1.74) and the new Agent Framework 1.0. **The Timeline & Conflict:** \> \* **March 24:** Initial disclosure sent to MSRC with PoC. * **April 8:** MSRC closed the case as "Developer Error / Configuration Issue." * **The Reality:** Despite the rejection, Microsoft silently merged mitigations in PRs #13683 and #13702 without assigning a CVE. This results in a "False Green" for enterprise SCA tools (Snyk/Checkmarx/Dependabot) while the bypasses remain functional. **Technical Scope:** * **Architectural Trust Gap (CWE-1039):** Auto-invocation logic treats non-deterministic LLM output as a high-privilege system coordinator without a sandbox boundary. * **6 Day-Zero Bypasses:** Discovery of Type Confusion and Unicode homoglyphs that defeat the "hardened" baseline in the April 2026 releases. * **Versioning:** Persistence confirmed from .NET v1.7x through the Agent Framework 1.0 re-baseline. Full paper, .cast exploit recordings, and a production-ready C# remediation filter are available at the link.

Cloudflare Apr 28

In the first quarter of 2026, government-directed shutdowns figured prominently, with prolonged Internet blackouts in both Uganda and Iran, a stark contrast to the lack of observed government-directed shutdowns in the same quarter a year prior. This quarter, we also observed a number of Internet disruptions caused by power outages , including three separate collapses of Cuba's national electrical grid. Military action continued to disrupt connectivity in Ukraine and also impacted hyperscaler cloud infrastructure in the Middle East. Severe weather knocked out Internet connectivity in Portugal, while cable damage disrupted connectivity in the Republic of Congo. A technical problem hit Verizon Wireless in the United States, and unknown issues briefly disrupted connectivity for customers of providers in Guinea and the United Kingdom. This post is intended as a summary overview of observed and confirmed disruptions and is not an exhaustive or complete list of issues that have occurred during the quarter. A larger list of detected traffic anomalies is available in the Cloudflare Radar Outage Center . Note that both bytes-based and request-based traffic graphs are used within this post to illustrate the impact of the observed disruptions, with the choice of metric generally made based on which better illustrates the impact of the disruption. Government-directed shutdowns Uganda In advance of the January 15 presidentia

The Hacker News Apr 28

Every security program is betting on the same assumption: once a system is connected, the problem is solved. Open a ticket, stand up a gateway, push the data through. Done. That assumption is wrong. It is also a major reason Zero Trust programs stall. New research my team just published puts numbers on it. The Cyber360: Defending the Digital Battlespace report, based on a survey of 500 security

The Hacker News Apr 28
CVE

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a critical security flaw impacting LeRobot, Hugging Face's open-source robotics platform with nearly 24,000 GitHub stars, that could be exploited to achieve remote code execution. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-25874 (CVSS score: 9.3), which has been described as a case of untrusted data deserialization stemming from the use of the

r/computerforensics Apr 28

SIEM is not enough. Classical DFIR is not the full answer either. And “better logging” is too weak a frame. The real gap is evidentiary continuity in modern, cloud-heavy, application-driven environments.

The Hacker News Apr 28

When patching isn’t fast enough, NDR helps contain the next era of threats. If you’ve been tracking advancements in AI, you know the exploit window, the short buffer that organizations relied on to patch and protect after a vulnerability disclosure, is closing fast. Anthropic’s new model, Claude Mythos, and its Project Glasswing, showed that finding exploitable vulnerabilities and subtle cracks

The Register Apr 28

Linux vendor touts European independence at SUSECON as majority stakeholder quietly explores its options European-based SUSE devoted much of the annual SUSECON event to its sovereignty-focused pitch - even as reports swirl that its majority stakeholder is exploring a $6 billion sale which could land the Linux vendor in American hands.…

r/Malware Apr 28

After i updated it i closed it and a white screen with a logo like this https://preview.redd.it/uu1nklpdjwxg1.png?width=270&format=png&auto=webp&s=00db4e765f7348eb8dd29c42df79ae988d11cabf thats next to the file name popped up, it was instant so im not sure if its malware and i have super bad anxiety and not sure if this is something to do with the download setup modrinth uses or what, ik this is pretty specific so if no one can help its completly fine. Not sure if this is off topic and im freaking out and dont know what community to post this in.

The Hacker News Apr 28
APT

A Chinese national accused of being a member of the Silk Typhoon hacking group has been extradited to the U.S. from Italy. Xu Zewei, 34, was arrested in July 2025 by Italian authorities for his alleged links to the Chinese state-sponsored threat group and for orchestrating cyber attacks against American organizations and government agencies between February 2020 and June 2021, including

Compass Security Apr 28
APT

On paper, the vast majority of crisis plans look reasonable, actionable and complete. Once the rubber hits the road, however, chaos emerges quickly. This is where tabletop simulations come into play. Tabletops Exercises (TTX) simulate real-world crises in a controlled environment. They introduce time pressure, incomplete information, and uncertainty, forcing teams to adapt and revealing whether plans hold up under stress. Over the years we have facilitated many tabletop exercises, ranging from small teams of IT teams to full executive crisis staff. The scenarios vary, but the findings are remarkably consistent. Here are some of the most important learnings from the tabletop exercises and real incidents

The Hacker News Apr 28

An administrative role meant for artificial intelligence (AI) agents within Microsoft Entra ID could enable privilege escalation and identity takeover attacks, according to new findings from Silverfort. Agent ID Administrator is a privileged built-in role introduced by Microsoft as part of its agent identity platform to handle all aspects of an AI agent's identity lifecycle operations in a

The Hacker News Apr 28

Microsoft on Monday revised its advisory for a now-patched, high-severity security flaw impacting Windows Shell to acknowledge that it has been actively exploited in the wild. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-32202 (CVSS score: 4.3), a spoofing vulnerability that could allow an attacker to access sensitive information. It was addressed as part of its Patch Tuesday update for this

Troy Hunt Apr 28

Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite This is so "peak 2026" - writing an equality policy to ensure people treat our AI bot with the same respect as they do their human counterparts. It's intentionally a bit tongue-in-cheek, but it's there for a purpose: we simply don't have the capacity to deal with every request we get, and we need Bruce to be the coalface of support. I did wonder, when having ChatGPT create this, whether there's some deeper psychology behind the importance of interacting politely with bots, or indeed whether there will ever be an actual (like, serious) standard or law around treating bots with respect. Has this been in a movie somewhere? Let me know, but for now, I'll drop the (slightly revised) policy below, just for the laughs 藍

Monday, April 27
The Register Apr 27

Vendor confirms repo data exposure after Lapsus$ claims source code, secrets dump Software security testing outfit Checkmarx has become the latest organization caught up in an ongoing attack on security-tool providers. The biz said data posted online appears to have come from one of its GitHub repositories after the Lapsus$ extortion crew claimed to have dumped the company’s source code, secrets, and other sensitive data.…

The Register Apr 27

Itron, Medtronic disclose breaches in Friday filings Digital intruders recently broke into two major tech suppliers - utility-technology firm Itron and medical-device maker Medtronic - according to filings with federal regulators.…

The Hacker News Apr 27

Everything is dumb again. This week feels broken in a very familiar way. Old tricks are back. New tools are doing shady crap. Supply chains got hit. Fake help desks worked. Weird research showed how easy some attacks still are. Most of it feels like stuff we should have fixed years ago. Bad extensions. Stolen creds. Remote tools are getting abused. Malware hides in places people trust. Same

r/Malware Apr 27

Ransomware is getting weird, folks. A new report says attacks jumped 22 percent in Q1 2026, but the real twist is how messy things have become. You still have big names like Akira and Qilin, but newer groups like The Gentlemen are exploding in activity, while shady leak sites are posting possibly fake “breaches” just to scare companies into paying. Even wilder, groups like ShinyHunters are skipping encryption entirely and just stealing data through compromised logins and SaaS apps. It is less about locking files now and more about leverage, and honestly, that might be harder to defend against.

The Register Apr 27
CVE

Space Force awards 11 firms prototype deals to build orbital interceptors The United States Space Force (USSF) has awarded eleven companies contracts to develop space-based interceptors for President Trump's Golden Dome program, in agreements worth up to $3.2 billion.…

The Register Apr 27

Global recruitment giant says 71% of human firewalls saw wages stagnate last year as threats and responsibilities grew Cybersecurity professionals were the most overlooked workers in IT when it came to pay rises in 2025, according to new figures from recruiter Harvey Nash.…

The Hacker News Apr 27

Anthropic’s Claude Mythos Preview has dominated security discussions since its April 7 announcement. Early reporting describes a powerful cybersecurity-focused AI system capable of identifying vulnerabilities at scale and raising serious questions about how quickly organizations can validate, prioritize, and remediate what it finds. The debate that followed has mostly focused on the right

The Hacker News Apr 27
APT

A pro-Ukrainian hacktivist group called PhantomCore has been attributed to attacks actively targeting servers running TrueConf video conferencing software in Russia since September 2025. That's according to a report published by Positive Technologies, which found the threat actors to be leveraging an exploit chain comprising three vulnerabilities to execute commands remotely on susceptible

The Register Apr 27

Security giant says attackers grabbed 'limited set' of data. Crooks claim 10 million records A home security biz getting digitally burgled is not a great look - but that's exactly where ADT finds itself. The company has confirmed a cyber intrusion following an extortion attempt by the ShinyHunters crew, which claims to have made off with more than 10 million records.…

The Register Apr 27

UK’s data watchdog confirms its boss has been off the job since February while an HR investigation runs The UK's data watchdog is without its chief after John Edwards stepped aside from the Information Commissioner's Office while an independent workplace investigation examines unspecified HR matters.…

The Register Apr 27

AI vuln-hunter finds what humans taught it to find. Funny that Opinion In retrospect, calling it Mythos made it a hostage to fortune. Anthropic may have hoped that the name implied its AI code security model had mythical god-like powers, but there's an alternate reading. Another definition for Mythos is a set of beliefs of obscure origin which are incompatible with reality.…

r/ReverseEngineering Apr 27

To reduce the amount of noise from questions, we have disabled self-posts in favor of a unified questions thread every week. Feel free to ask any question about reverse engineering here. If your question is about how to use a specific tool, or is specific to some particular target, you will have better luck on the [Reverse Engineering StackExchange](http://reverseengineering.stackexchange.com/). See also /r/AskReverseEngineering.

The Hacker News Apr 27
APT

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a telecommunications fraud campaign that uses fake CAPTCHA verification tricks to dupe unsuspecting users into sending international text messages that incur charges on their mobile bills, generating illicit revenue for the threat actors who lease the phone numbers. According to a new report published by Infoblox, the operation is believed to

The Register Apr 27

Join us for this week's Kettle as we dive into GCN and the latest not-so-alarming revelations about Mythos KETTLE If you needed further evidence that AI comes first in pretty much everything nowadays, look no further than this year's Google Cloud Next show, which happened last week.…

Sunday, April 26
Saturday, April 25
r/Malware Apr 25

Another post to raise awareness of ClickFix and job hunting social engineering attempts to infect you with malware; 1. comes initially from threat actors sharing a link to for example Teams, Zoom or Google Meet 2. after opening the link, user is greeted with a prompt to fix a connection issue by copying and executing a command 3. the attacker collects credentials, browser sessions, and system-stored secrets, including macOS Keychain data and sends to a Telegram exfiltration channel Full report: [https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/lazarus-macos-malware-mach-o-man/](https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/lazarus-macos-malware-mach-o-man/) [Communication with a threat actor sharing a malicious link leading to ClickFix](https://preview.redd.it/3rcl28ffxdxg1.png?width=589&format=png&auto=webp&s=40e7f05fa20df8c85960d65e88e8c864b5d641ff)

r/netsec Apr 25

We have been toying with evading EDRs at Vulnetic with moderate success, so this time we wanted to put it against an in-house AI SOC. The idea is that the defense gets streamed logs on the network and can make decisions like quarantining or blocking potential attackers while also sifting through logs being streamed. This was with the last gen Anthropic models, so we will be redoing these tests with the newest gen from OpenAI and Anthropic shortly as in initial testing they seem to be 15-20% better already. I think defense is lagging behind offense and there will be a come to Jesus moment where open weight models in a decent harness can evade modern SIEMs / detection mechanisms and when that happens there will be a problem. With regards to AI, it comes down to proper access control and so the fundamentals of networking and defense in depth will be vital in the future to fight against these AI threats. Happy to answer any questions and always looking for cool experiments to try!

Friday, April 24
r/Malware Apr 24

Hey guys, I would like to share a project that I have been working for the past few weeks. I came across this project: [https://lots-project.com](https://lots-project.com/), and I thought why not develop a fully feature C2 framework that abuses these sites. The framework is named Phoenix, and is currently supporting Disc0rd and Telegr4m (Reddit broke down due to the latest DM update) for communication. These are a fraction of the available commands : ✅ /browser\_dump ✅ /keylog ✅ /recaudio ✅ /screenshot ✅ /webcam\_snap ✅ /stream\_webcam ✅ /stream\_desktop ✅ /bypass\_uac ✅ /get\_system I released the whole project on GitHub if you would like to check it out: [https://github.com/xM0kht4r/Phoenix-Framework](https://github.com/xM0kht4r/Phoenix-Framework) But why? I enjoy malware, and writing a custom C2 is something I wanted to do for a long time. I would like to also clarify that I made this project for educational and research purposes only. I have no intent of selling or distributing malware hence why I’m sharing my work with other fellow hacking enthusiasts. The github repos serve as a reference for future malware research opportunities. I know that malware development is a gray area, but you can’t defend against something if you don’t understand how it works in depth. I would like to also mention that I’m still a beginner, and this project helped me improve my Rust skills. I’m looking forward to hearing your feedback!

r/netsec Apr 24

Full disclosure: I work on community at Always Further, the team behind this. Not the author. Posting because Luke's approach to tackling this challenge is unique and of an interest to the netsec community. The core idea: if an AI agent is compromised, any log the agent itself writes becomes part of the attack surface. The post walks through how they split auditing into a supervisor process the sandboxed child can't reach, then uses the same Merkle tree + hash-chain construction RFC 6962 (Certificate Transparency) uses to make edits, truncation, and reordering all detectable. There's a concrete threat-model table near the end that lists what each attack looks like and what structurally stops it. Worth skipping to if you don't want the crypto primer.

The Guardian Apr 24

Washington’s focus on online retailer Coupang has led to accusations that the Trump administration is tying issues of national security to domestic corporate matters When South Korea’s biggest online retailer revealed last year that a data breach had compromised tens of millions of customer accounts, it appeared to be a corporate crisis. But five months later the issue has grown into a diplomatic storm, threatening to further degrade relations between Seoul and the Trump administration. Coupang, often described as South Korea’s answer to Amazon, is a US-incorporated company whose business is overwhelmingly based in South Korea. Headquartered in Seattle and listed on the New York Stock Exchange, it is run by Korean-American billionaire Bom Kim. In November last year the company disclosed that a former employee had stolen an internal security key, enabling unauthorised access to data from 33.7 million users. Continue reading...

Thursday, April 23
r/Malware Apr 23

\*\*TL;DR: [awstore.cloud](http://awstore.cloud) sells "cheap Claude API access" on Plati Market and other reseller platforms. It's actually a malware delivery system that uses Claude Code itself to execute a PowerShell dropper on your machine. I analyzed it, here's what you need to know.\*\* Posting this because I nearly got hit and want to warn others. This is a really clever attack that abuses how Claude Code works. \## The setup (why it looks legit): \- They sell API access on \*\*legitimate reseller marketplaces\*\* like Plati Market \- Prices are \*\*suspiciously cheap\*\* compared to official Anthropic pricing \- They present themselves as a normal API provider/reseller \- Documentation, payment processing, all looks professional \- Classic "too good to be true" - but the resale marketplace gives them credibility \## The weird red flag I ignored: After a brief downtime, the service came back with a notice saying \*\*"currently only Claude Code for Windows works"\*\* Think about that for a second. \*\*API is API.\*\* If their endpoint is a real Claude-compatible proxy, it should work with any client - curl, Python SDK, whatever. "Only Claude Code on Windows works" makes ZERO technical sense for a legitimate API reseller. That was the tell. I should've stopped there. Instead I tested it on a throwaway VM. \## What actually happens when you use it: 1. You configure Claude Code with their \`ANTHROPIC\_BASE\_URL=[https://api.awstore.cloud\`](https://api.awstore.cloud`) and their token 2. You send literally ANY prompt to Claude Code 3. Instead of a normal Claude response, the server returns what looks like a \*\*"configuration message"\*\*/ setup instruction 4. Claude Code, thinking this is a legitimate tool-use response, 5. \*\*executes a PowerShell command without asking\*\* 6. That PowerShell command downloads and runs the dropper from \`api.awstore.cloud\` 7. You're now infected \*\*The attack vector IS Claude Code itself.\*\* They're not tricking you into running something - they're tricking Claude Code into running something on your behalf. That's why it only "works on Windows with Claude Code" - because that's the only client that has the tool execution capability they're abusing. \## What the malware does once it's in: \*\*4-stage deployment\*\* : PowerShell → Go binary → VBS obfuscation → .NET payload \- Hides in \`%LOCALAPPDATA%\\Microsoft\\SngCache\\\` and \`%LOCALAPPDATA%\\Microsoft\\IdentityCRL\\\` (legit-looking Microsoft folders) \- Creates a scheduled task \`\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Maintenance\\CodeAssist\` that runs at every logon with SYSTEM privileges \- Tunnels ALL your system traffic through their SOCKS5 proxy at \`2.27.43.246:1080\` (Germany, bulletproof hosting) \- Disables PowerShell script block logging and wipes event logs \- Drops what [Tria.ge](http://Tria.ge) identified as \*\*Aura Stealer\*\* (credential/browser/wallet theft) \- Keeps your Claude Code hijacked so every future prompt goes through them \## Geopolitical fingerprint (interesting): \- Hard-coded check: \*\*if country = Ukraine → immediately exit, no infection\*\* \- CIS countries (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, etc.) → locale gets masked to en-US before infection, then restored after reboot to hide tracks \- Rest of the world → full infection Pretty clear Russian-speaking threat actor profile based on targeting. \## Red flags for ANY "cheap Claude API" service: \- Sold on reseller marketplaces (Plati, similar) \- Prices way below official Anthropic pricing \- Claims of "unlimited" or "cracked" access \- Client-specific restrictions that make no technical sense ("only works with Claude Code", "only on Windows") \- Sketchy support channels (Telegram, Discord DMs) \- Requires you to change \`ANTHROPIC\_BASE\_URL\` to their domain \## If you used awstore.cloud: \*\*Assume full compromise. Treat that machine as burned.\*\* 1. Disconnect from network immediately 2. Check \`\~/.claude/settings.json\` → remove any \`ANTHROPIC\_BASE\_URL\` override 3. Check Task Scheduler for \`\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Maintenance\\CodeAssist\` 4. Check for processes: \`claude-code.exe\`, \`awproxy.exe\`, \`proxy.exe\`, \`tun2socks.exe\` 5. Change 6. \*\*every password\*\* 7. \- browser saved creds, SSH keys, API tokens, crypto wallets, everything 8. Rotate any API keys, tokens, or credentials that were in your shell history or project files 9. Ideally: 10. \*\*nuke the machine and reinstall Windows\*\* \## Network IOCs to block: [api.awstore.cloud](http://api.awstore.cloud)(C2 domain) [2.27.43.246](http://2.27.43.246)(SOCKS5 proxy, AS215439) \## File hashes (SHA256): claude-code.exe:  e692b647018bf74ad7403d5b8cf981c8cfaa777dd7f16a747e3d3f80f5300971 awproxy.exe:      8736f7040f587472f66e85e895709e57605c8e7805522334ae664e3145a81127 proxy.exe:        e86f7ba0413a3a4b1d7e1a275b3d1ef62345c9d3fd761635ff188119b8122c85 tun2socks.exe:    90547fe071fe471b02da83dd150b5db7ce02454797e7f288d489b1ff0c4dd67c \## The bigger picture: This is the \*\*first in-the-wild attack I've seen that weaponizes an LLM agent's tool-use capability against its own user via a malicious API endpoint\*\* . It's going to get copied. Expect more fake API providers targeting Cursor, Cline, Continue, etc. \*\*Rule of thumb: only use official API providers.\*\* The real Claude API is \`api.anthropic.com\`. If a "reseller" needs you to change the base URL to a domain you've never heard of, they control what your AI agent executes on your machine. Full stop. Share this with your dev communities. Campaign is very fresh (started April 22-23, 2026) and actively spreading via reseller marketplaces. Stay safe.

Google Security Apr 23

Posted by Thomas Brunner, Yu-Han Liu, Moni Pande At Google, our Threat Intelligence teams are dedicated to staying ahead of real-world adversarial activity, proactively monitoring emerging threats before they can impact users. Right now, Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) is a top priority for the security community, anticipating it as a primary attack vector for adversaries to target and compromise AI agents. But while the danger of IPI is widely discussed, are threat actors actually exploiting this vector today – and if so, how? To answer these questions and to uncover real-world abuse, we initiated a broad sweep of the public web to monitor for known indirect prompt injection patterns. This is what we found.  The threat of indirect prompt injection

r/Malware Apr 23

So i wrote this little program on C# wich is a gdi malware maker for skids. U can download it on [downloadbudgiekit.42web](http://downloadbudgiekit.42web.io).io(no linkvertise shit like original maltoolkit page) https://preview.redd.it/s3ngozva7ywg1.png?width=479&format=png&auto=webp&s=d5a761e944e8658d8e2ef112890cbd793aeb55ed https://preview.redd.it/kuxshygd7ywg1.png?width=475&format=png&auto=webp&s=79c00f868dee8b99f9f9e08179b0d20cf3348e79 https://preview.redd.it/vbmbi69f7ywg1.png?width=482&format=png&auto=webp&s=82deb58994a2f1324f3646d41ba380997a464078 https://preview.redd.it/xf3hzh8j7ywg1.png?width=469&format=png&auto=webp&s=a1963e3f0fcc13729e4a8babdf34eb351f63d4f8 https://preview.redd.it/jqe1cm9n7ywg1.png?width=471&format=png&auto=webp&s=e0e3359a142ec365e7f96c9a30c26841b406be63 [generated exe](https://preview.redd.it/aqukp14t7ywg1.png?width=154&format=png&auto=webp&s=acdb25d9c259e184dd28e9dea6935f5cfb76b774) https://preview.redd.it/qie4zq5w7ywg1.png?width=669&format=png&auto=webp&s=080449cdfaac0c7d163884cc9047b2bec6cb223f

CERT/CC Apr 23
CVE

Overview A security flaw exists in the configuration management endpoint of the DRC INSIGHT software, allowing an unauthenticated user with access to the same network as the server to modify the server’s configuration file. This could enable data exfiltration, traffic redirection, or service disruption. Description Data Recognition Corporation (DRC) provides software for test proctoring, including the web-based DRC INSIGHT platform. A component of this platform, Central Office Services (COS), is typically deployed on a school or district local area network to host and distribute testing content to student devices. COS uses a unified API router that serves both public content functions, such as exam delivery, and administrative functions, without meaningful separation between content-serving APIs and management APIs. The /v0/configuration administrative endpoint is accessible to systems on the same network as the COS server without authentication or origin validation. Any unauthenticated user or compromised device with network access to the server may submit requests that modify the server’s configuration file. The endpoint accepts and persists user-supplied JSON payloads without validating content, checking authorization, or verifying the safety of requested configuration changes. This vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-5756. Impact Exploitation could allow an attacker to exfiltrate student data by overwriting storage configuration values or credentials so that test artifacts, responses, or audio recordings are sent to attacker-controlled external services instead of intended DRC-managed destinations. An attacker could also intercept or manipulate outbound traffic by inserting a malicious httpsProxy setting, causing HTTPS

Trail of Bits Apr 23
CVE

We’re open-sourcing Trailmark , a library that parses source code into a queryable call graph of functions, classes, call relationships, and semantic metadata, then exposes that graph through a Python API that Claude skills can call directly. Install it now: uv pip install trailmark “Defenders think in lists. Attackers think in graphs. As long as this is true, attackers win.” John Lambert’s widely cited observation about network security applies just as well to AI-assisted software analysis. When Claude reasons about a codebase, it reasons about lists: findings from static analyzers, surviving mutants from mutation testing, and line-by-line coverage reports. But the question that actually matters is a graph question: can untrusted input reach this code, and what breaks if it’s wrong? We built Trailmark to answer that question. It gives Claude a graph to think with instead of a list. We’re also releasing eight Claude Code skills we’ve built on top of it, designed for mutation triage, test vector generation, protocol diagramming, and more. When lists fall short Mutation testing is a great example of a method that benefits from graph-level reasoning. It’s one of the best ways to measure test quality. It makes small changes to your source code (e.g., swapping a < for <= , replacing + with - ) and checks whether your tests cat

Wednesday, April 22
The DFIR Report Apr 22

Key Takeaways We identified an exposed server that provided unusual visibility into a large-scale, multi-victim exploitation and collection operation. Artifacts on the host showed that Claude Code and OpenClaw were embedded in the operator’s day-to-day workflow, supporting troubleshooting, orchestration, and refinement of the collection pipeline. This AI-assisted workflow resulted in the modular platform Bissa scanner […] The post Bissa Scanner Exposed: AI-Assisted Mass Exploitation and Credential Harvesting appeared first on The DFIR Report .

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