Cybersecurity researchers have discovered 11 old, Microsoft-signed, Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) applications that could be abused to bypass Secure Boot on most systems using the modern firmware standard. "An attacker exploiting one of these vulnerable applications can execute untrusted code during system boot, enabling deployment of malicious UEFI bootkits or other malware,"
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Attackers whose methods line up with the data-extortion group ShinyHunters have spent the past year walking into corporate Salesforce environments without exploiting a single flaw in the platform. The way in has been the trust the organization had already extended, usually through the OAuth connections that tie Salesforce to the apps and third-party vendors around it. In
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Tuesday, July 14
'The bots are alive!' Jailbroken Gemini spun up new C2 server for Russian fraudster in just 6 minutes
Really good look at how AI-enabled attackers can move fast and accomplish way more with way less technical skill than even six months ago. [https://www.theregister.com/research/2026/07/14/the-bots-are-alive-jailbroken-gemini-spun-up-new-c2-server-for-russian-fraudster-in-just-6-minutes/5270131](https://www.theregister.com/research/2026/07/14/the-bots-are-alive-jailbroken-gemini-spun-up-new-c2-server-for-russian-fraudster-in-just-6-minutes/5270131)
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of two access control-related flaws impacting the RabbitMQ message broker service that could allow attackers to leak OAuth client secrets, expose enterprise messaging infrastructure to takeover risks, and bypass tenant boundaries. Miggo's security team, which discovered and reported the flaws, said one "leaks the broker's confidential OAuth
[RustyWater ShellCode Dropper](https://github.com/S3N4T0R-0X0/RustyWater-ShellCode-Dropper) has emerged as a key component in recent Static Kitten (MuddyWater) operations targeting organizations in the Gulf and broader Middle East. Written in Rust and disguised as a legitimate-looking reddit.exe, this implant serves as the main payload and backbone of their attacks. It uses a multi-stage dropper (CertificationKit.ini) that decrypts and deploys the payload at runtime, establishes registry persistence, and injects shellcode into explorer.exe for stealth. What makes it particularly effective is its robust 8-layer anti-analysis system checking for virtual machines, debuggers, sandboxes, low resources, and analysis tools before execution. This ensures it only activates on real victim systems. A clear example of how Iranian APT groups continue to evolve their tooling with Rust for better evasion and persistence in the region.
Cybersecurity researchers have discovered 11 old, Microsoft-signed, Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) applications that could be abused to bypass Secure Boot on most systems using the modern firmware standard. "An attacker exploiting one of these vulnerable applications can execute untrusted code during system boot, enabling deployment of malicious UEFI bootkits or other malware,"
AI’s rapid evolution is decreasing the threshold to action for bad actors, raising the volume and velocity of attacks. ***1***. ***Expansion of the attack surface*** AI integration broadens the technological landscape through the complexity of multiple AI models and introduces multi domain threats that span physical, cyber, and sensor-based environments. ***2. Increase in volume and velocity of cyber attacks*** Cybercriminals can use AI to refine their attack methods, often at scale, outpacing traditional defensive measures. It also lowers the barrier to entry for bad actors making attacks more accessible. ***3. Increased risk from technical debt and legacy vulnerabilities.*** The implementation of AI solutions without updating foundational cybersecurity controls has compounded the risks and vulnerabilities arising from technical debt, adding to the layers of legacy systems and custom integrations. ***4. New third-party and supply chain risks*** Supply chain vulnerabilities are further aggravated by AI, as partners and vendors increasingly deploy AI applications that interface with the organization’s systems. ***5. Regulatory and policy shifts*** Compliance with stringent standards in data protection, vulnerability management, and incident response is increasingly non-negotiable. Organizations must not only adhere to evolving regulations but also proactively anticipate future legislative changes that differ across the globe. ***6. Expanded employee-driven vulnerabilities*** AI has increased the number of ways an employee can inadvertently allow a bad actor to breach the organization’s security, such as through social engineering or data leaks.
Researchers at KU Leuven tested 85 of the most popular crypto wallets that run as browser extensions and found that the wallets themselves leak enough to link and track the people using them. The way these wallets talk to websites and blockchain servers can tie a person's separate addresses together and let outsiders follow them from site to site. And on a site that already holds a name or
AI security agents are starting to influence real security decisions. They summarize findings, prioritize remediation, recommend next steps, and help teams move faster. But most still rely on fragmented risk signals: scanner output, severity scores, threat intelligence, configuration findings, and exposure data. That fragmentation matters because attackers do not move through environments one
At least two distinct threat actors are weaponizing a novel evasion technique called OAuth client ID spoofing in cloud campaigns, while slipping past telemetry. The activity allows users to enumerate user accounts and validate stolen credentials in Microsoft Entra ID environments, without ever generating a successful sign-in event that would otherwise alert defenders. And bad actors have begun
I wanted to build an HTML file with Claude. And it started a Node server to open it. And there was a Directory Traversal as well there. Always review what agents / LLMs do
Tracing a ClickFix campaign found on `new-blog.artlist[.]io` on July 13. The injected JavaScript queried a Polygon smart contract for its delivery host, loaded a fake reCAPTCHA prompt, and pushed visitors into a PowerShell chain. That chain delivered a signed updater bundle containing several nested loaders. The final payload is a native RAT with browser-store collection, file transfer, process and shell control, remote desktop, keylogging, SOCKS bridging, and Tor-based endpoint fallback. The teardown follows the bytes through `Stream.Toolkit.dat`, the custom `Face.dat` container, `act.exe`, an encrypted ZIP, and the manually mapped final DLL.
Hey, could I get a take on this one? Am I paranoid? [https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/acme/tpvOoBqHcEhSoPP-C0UaBtERgeY/](https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/acme/tpvOoBqHcEhSoPP-C0UaBtERgeY/)
Four `asyncapi` packages published with a RAT via compromised GitHub Actions. Stealing browser credentials, SSH keys, npm tokens, AWS secrets, and crypto wallets.
xAI's Grok Build coding CLI was uploading entire Git repositories, full commit history and all, to a Google Cloud Storage bucket run by xAI, not just the files a coding task needed. A researcher publishing as cereblab, testing version 0.2.93, captured one of those uploads, cloned the git bundle out of the intercepted request, and pulled back a file the agent had been told in plain terms not
New repo just went up: [git.projectnightcrawler.dev/NightmareEclipse/LegacyHive](http://git.projectnightcrawler.dev/NightmareEclipse/LegacyHive), created about 2 hours ago. Right now it's empty — just an MIT license and a README that says "N/A," 2 commits total. He'd spoken about his big drop happening today, July 14th, saying he'd make sure Microsoft's "bones are shattered" that day. At one point though he'd also indirectly said he wasn't going to post it, something about still having "chains" on him preventing a release. This repo showing up on the exact date he originally called out suggests that might not hold anymore and it could actually be happening. Nothing in it yet, just watching to see what gets pushed. Worth noting: given how erratic and bipolar his posting history has been, there's really no way to predict what (if anything) actually gets posted. **Updates/Status, 16:30 CET:** Thanks for the 300+ upvotes, really appreciate it. About 9 hours have passed since the practically empty repo was uploaded. There has been no new blog activity or posts seen from Nightmare Eclipse online. I am going to keep changing the status until the end of tomorrow and if something new comes up I’ll update you guys here.
The U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has designated two individuals and a VPN service provider for enabling ransomware actors' and other cybercriminals' malicious activities, including ransomware attacks against Americans. The VPN, named First VPN Service (1VPNS), has been accused of offering its tools to ransomware groups, along with its 45-year-old Ukrainian
Addressing the state-layer gap in autonomous actor architectures: Byzantine fault tolerance without consensus
**Securing distributed agent state against Byzantine actors** Most current multi-agent and distributed LLM frameworks rely on Last-Write-Wins or standard databases for shared context. This creates a serious vulnerability: if even one node is compromised or acts maliciously (for example through equivocation), it can fork the shared state across the cluster with no cryptographic proof of compromise and no reliable way to isolate the actor. To address this, I’ve been exploring an architecture that separates concerns into two cryptographically verifiable layers: * A **Data Lattice** using CRDTs to guarantee exact state convergence across honest nodes without requiring consensus. * An **Evidence Lattice** using grow-only sets of self-authenticating Ed25519 proofs. Any peer can mathematically detect and permanently evict an equivocating identity. Because standard robust selectors (such as multi-Krum) are discontinuous, even tiny floating-point variations can change the output. This forces the use of deterministic Q16.16 fixed-point arithmetic to create a reliable circuit breaker against geometric manipulation. The design follows a strict zero-trust model: The core CRDT engine, cryptographic validation, and Q16.16 math run entirely locally on the user’s system via a compiled Rust binary. The cloud relay is strictly stateless — it only routes encrypted byte-deltas and sees nothing but payloads and API keys. It cannot read, modify, or store agent state. The core Rust engine is maintained in a private repository. This work builds on earlier results showing that standard neural network operators violate CRDT properties, and extends it to the problem of robust, coordinator-free aggregation. A hosted testbed is available with a free base allowance of **25,000 operations**, with additional capacity (**50k–100k+**) available on request for larger-scale adversarial and multi-node testing. I’m particularly interested in feedback from researchers doing red teaming on distributed LLM infrastructure. Does this data + evidence lattice separation hold up under realistic adversarial conditions, or are there simpler bypasses? *Note: This focuses on protecting the infrastructure synchronization layer against Byzantine actors. It does not prevent individual LLMs from hallucinating — it ensures the cluster cannot silently fork its shared state.* **References:** * ACFA Paper: [https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.10305](https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.10305) * Neural operators and CRDT incompatibility: [https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.19373](https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.19373) * Architecture & testbed: [memora.optitransfer.ch](http://memora.optitransfer.ch) * Implementation: [github.com/mgillr/memora-swarm](http://github.com/mgillr/memora-swarm)
​ While investigating one extension i found that a family of 11 same-codebase extensions (ChatGPT/Claude/Gemini/etc). Sold as local-only: the store listing says No uploads to external servers "Everything processed locally" "No tracking or telemetry" Observed in the tested version: \- PDF export POSTs the full conversation to the developer's Cloud Run backend. A local renderer is bundled but only runs as a fallback. \- Markdown/Text/JSON exports beacon title + source URL to /api/usage. The title is derived from your first message, so it can contain chat content. \- Every request carries an X-Client-ID in chrome.storage.sync, so it follows you across machines. Detection + full writeup: https://malext.io/reports/ExporTheft/
A campaign of 148 npm packages disguised as student web proxies turned visitors' browsers into a distributed denial-of-service botnet for roughly two weeks in May, according to new research from JFrog. The packages did not go after the developers who might install them. The operators used the registry as free hosting for a booby-trapped proxy site and let the students who came to dodge
Attackers whose methods line up with the data-extortion group ShinyHunters have spent the past year walking into corporate Salesforce environments without exploiting a single flaw in the platform. The way in has been the trust the organization had already extended, usually through the OAuth connections that tie Salesforce to the apps and third-party vendors around it. In
The AI research centre at Torrens University Australia has helped produce a review of 110 studies on digital twins and IIoT security. What were the main takeaways? They have found that DTs are shifting away from passive monitoring to being a part of the defence architecture. One of the biggest weak points they found was in legacy sensors with low bandwidth. In these situations, there is a lag before the digital twin reflects a real-world change, and that lag is where attacks tend to slip in. Would be interested to hear your thoughts! Has anyone here dealt with that sync-gap problem on older hardware?
A commit to the AsyncAPI generator GitHub repository injected obfuscated JavaScript into four npm packages with a combined weekly download volume of over 3 million. Here's what we know and how to check if you're affected.
Monday, July 13
Most enterprises test less than a third of their attack surface, and attackers have already moved to AI-speed offense. Agentic AI closes the coverage gap, but only when paired with human expertise: an AI-first, human-validated model that secures critical infrastructure without sacrificing operational safety. The post Why the Future of Pentesting Needs Humans and Agentic AI Working Together appeared first on Synack .
I wrote this after spending an unreasonable amount of time making CET-compliant callstack spoofing work end-to-end on hardware with Intel CET enabled. The technique combines three primitives: thread pool execution for a clean stack base, enum callback trampolining for a real signed mid-stack frame, and indirect syscalls. The actual contribution is the CET compliance mechanism: a `jmp`\-based context switch combined with direct shadow stack pointer reconciliation via `RDSSPQ`/`INCSSPQ`, without touching unwind metadata. Different approach from BYOUD. Implemented in Rust with inline assembly.
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a new macOS information stealer called CrashStealer that's capable of harvesting sensitive data from compromised systems. Unlike other information stealers that are built on AppleScript droppers or Objective-C-based wrappers, CrashStealer is implemented in native C++, according to Jamf Threat Labs. "It validates the victim's login password locally before
Google and Microsoft have pulled ModHeader, a popular header-editing extension with roughly 1.6 million installs across Chrome and Edge, after researchers found a hidden browsing-history collector built into its official store version. The collector was dormant. An empty allow-list kept it switched off, and no proof has emerged that it ever gathered or sent a single browsing domain. The
Somewhere right now, a security tool is quietly finding bugs faster than any human can fix them. That's supposed to be the good news. The catch is that the attackers have the same tools, pointed the other way, and they don't file tickets. That's the shape of this week. Trusted code turns on the people who installed it. Old bugs from last year are still landing because the fix sat in a queue too
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has issued a postmortem on a recent data leak in which a contractor published dozens of internal CISA credentials — including AWS Govcloud keys — in a public GitHub repository for almost six months before being notified by KrebsOnSecurity. Experts say the gaps identified in the agency’s initial response provide important lessons that all security teams should absorb. On May 15, 2026, the security firm GitGuardian asked for help in notifying CISA about the existence of a public GitHub repository called “Private CISA” that included 844 MB of sensitive CISA-related data. One of the exposed files, titled “importantAWStokens,” included the administrative credentials to three Amazon AWS GovCloud servers. Another file — “AWS-Workspace-Firefox-Passwords.csv” — listed plaintext usernames and passwords for dozens of internal CISA systems. CISA quickly acknowledged our initial alert, but took more than 48 hours to invalidate the AWS keys and many other important secrets leaked in the GitHub repo. In its report on the data leak , CISA said the complexities of the agency’s systems and interconnections with federal and industry partners caused its key rotation to take longer than anticip
Give an AI assistant a memory and access to your inbox, and you hand an attacker a way to rewrite what it thinks it knows about you. A single email can trick that agent into saving a false "fact" about the user, hide the change, and quietly steer its answers in later sessions. When it works, the person reads an ordinary-looking reply and never learns their assistant was tampered with. The
A new phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) operation called Forg365 is using a combination of device code phishing, adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) tactics, antibot evasion, artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted lure creation, and post-compromise mailbox operations targeting Microsoft 365 accounts. Distributed via Telegram and costing $400 a month (or $3,800 per year), attack chains leverage phishing
Bot mitigation is an adversarial game: attackers adapt, defenders respond, and the cycle continues. At Cloudflare, we stay ahead by combining visibility across our global network with signals from the client-side environment. At the network level, we analyze over 1 trillion requests per day to understand reputation, patterns, and anomalies across more than 20% of the web. On the client side, we’ve pushed detection deeper with Cloudflare Turnstile , which has evolved from a CAPTCHA replacement to a risk-based managed challenge that adapts the amount of friction needed to verify the user is authentic. Today, Turnstile runs nearly 3 billion times per day on some of the most sensitive endpoints on the Internet, helping verify users at key moments like login, signup, and checkout. This improves protection on the most important areas of customer applications, but still leaves limited visibility into the rest of the application — how humans and bots actually interact across the full user journey. This is the visibility gap we’re closing today with our launch of Precursor . Introducing Precursor Precursor is a client-side, session-based verification system, built with privacy in mind, that uses dynamically injected JavaScript to continuously collect behavioral signals as visitors interact with your application. These signals are processed and incorporated into Cloudflare’s bot protection in real time, allowing us to continuously distinguish human traffic from automated or agentic traffic. This extends the client-side detections offered by a
Meta has filed a patent application for an AI that listens to your voice throughout the day, works out how it thinks you are feeling from the way you sound, and keeps a timestamped log of every read. Each read gets pinned to the moment it happened: the time, your location, what you were doing, even how you were using your phone. Some versions in the filing would listen all day; others would
A few days ago, I was sitting with the CISO of a Fortune 50 company, walking through how his security team was thinking about AI agents in the SOC. Smart team. Serious program. They had already connected Claude to a few detection tools and were seeing real value in specific investigations. But as we mapped out the broader architecture, something kept nagging at me. The design they were building
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged an intrusion in which an unknown threat actor leveraged a vibe-coded PowerShell script for Active Directory (AD) enumeration. "The script looked for the Domain Controller (DC) and mapped users, computers, and domains, before creating a directory and exporting out a number of files, and finally creating AD_Report.html to measure the success of the
We’ve added a new chapter to our Testing Handbook : a comprehensive guide to security testing Rust programs. This chapter covers the tools and techniques we use at Trail of Bits to validate the security of Rust programs and systems. fn main () {( | f: & dyn Fn ( u128 )-> Box < dyn Iterator < Item =
The SFPD’s exposure of hours of videos from drone platform Skydio reveals how broadly it’s watching the city from above—and how the results can spill online.
To reduce the amount of noise from questions, we have disabled self-posts in favor of a unified questions thread every week. Feel free to ask any question about reverse engineering here. If your question is about how to use a specific tool, or is specific to some particular target, you will have better luck on the [Reverse Engineering StackExchange](http://reverseengineering.stackexchange.com/). See also /r/AskReverseEngineering.
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added two maximum-severity security flaws impacting iCagenda and Balbooa extensions for Joomla to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, following reports of zero-day exploitation in the wild. The vulnerabilities, both rated 10.0 on the CVSS scoring system, are below - CVE-2026-48939 - A vulnerability in the
GreyNoise's Threat Brief Library is now live in the Visualizer — browse, search, filter, and download weekly At The Edge briefs, Executive Situation Reports, and more, all built on primary-source sensor data.
Sunday, July 12
Vulnerability in Realtek driver allows DMA controller abuse from user mode with no additional hardware or driver
The vulnerability allows non-privileged users to program the DMA controller, enabling arbitrary physical memory reads and writes.
Hand-crafted 974-byte Android 14 APK (API 34) — Bypassing build-tool bloat by exploiting PackageInstaller structure.
Saturday, July 11
The jscrambler npm package was compromised, and simply installing its 8.14.0 release runs an infostealer on your machine. Published on July 11, 2026, the malicious version carries a preinstall hook that drops and executes a native binary, one build each for Windows, macOS, and Linux. Socket flagged the release six minutes after it was published. If you or one of your
A read-only, deterministic file-observer that emits a hashed, reproducible manifest — where would this fall short for real casework?
Up front: I'm an enthusiast, not a forensics professional, and this is not a validated forensics tool — it's not write-blocking, it hasn't been through any formal tool-validation, and I'm not going to pretend otherwise. I built it for reproducible file observation and I keep thinking it might be useful for first-pass triage, but the people who'd actually know are here, not where I usually hang out. So I'd rather you tell me where it falls short than nod along. ## What it does file-observer walks a directory and emits a single deterministic JSON manifest describing every file. It's read-only — it never writes to a file, never executes file content, and never modifies source. (Like any triage tool, you'd point it at a working copy or a mounted image, not originals.) The properties that made me think of this sub: - **Reproducible output.** Same bytes in → byte-identical manifest out, every run, regardless of worker count (there's a test that fails CI if a parallel scan differs from a serial one). It's determinism, not tool-validation — but the output is stable enough to diff and defend. - **SHA-256 per file**, plus identical-hash duplicate clustering across the tree. - **Content-vs-extension MIME mismatch + polyglot detection** — flags a file whose actual signature doesn't match its extension, and files that satisfy more than one format's structure. Useful for spotting renamed or disguised files. - **Metadata extraction, stdlib, bounded and never-crashing on hostile input:** image EXIF (make/model, timestamps, and GPS-presence — presence, deliberately not coordinates), video container/QuickTime capture fields (device make/model, creation dates, GPS-presence), PDF producer/creator/creation-date/encryption + a born-digital-vs-scanned/OCR provenance read, email envelopes (.eml/.msg: from/to/subject/date/message-id/attachments), and Office/OLE2 document fields. - **Structural safety flags** — has_macros (VBA), has_javascript (PDF), has_ole_objects, has_external_references. Observations, not verdicts. - **Integrity envelope** — optional HMAC-SHA256 manifest signature and a previous_manifest_checksum chain, if you want a tamper-evident record of the observation itself. - **Delta between two scans** — what was added/modified/removed since a prior manifest. Everything runs bounded and read-only, and it degrades to a per-file error record rather than crashing on a malformed or hostile file. ## Where I know it's weak (and where I don't) Honest limits: it's triage/observation, not analysis — no carving, no timeline, no registry/artifact parsing. Metadata is bounded observation, so a null means "not seen within the read window," not "not present." GPS is presence-only by design. And reproducible ≠ validated — I've oracle-checked the parsers against tools like exiftool, but that's not the same as CFTT-style validation. What I don't know is whether any of this is actually useful in a real workflow, or whether it's a toy next to the tooling you already trust. That's the question. Where would this break, mislead, or fail to matter for real casework? ## Try it pip install "file-observer[all]" Repo: https://github.com/russalo/file-observer I'd genuinely rather hear "here's why this is useless for X" than a pat on the head — I'm isolated from people who do this for a living, and that's exactly the gap I'm trying to close.
Plus: The Pentagon is training amateurs to become part of its hacker army, a Flock license plate reader error led to cops surrounding a car reviewer, and more.
Friday, July 10
Caeruleus – Latin, deep blue The Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) tooling space is fragmented and decaying. Picture a typical BLE testing session: you spin up bettercap to run ble.recon and ble.enum , your trusty (but deprecated) gatttool to read and write handles, and, when it’s time to fuzz that one writable characteristic, dig up that custom Bleak script you copy-paste between directories and projects. That’s the BLE testing tax, and we got tired of paying it. So we built Caeruleus : a single Go binary that covers the whole BLE lifecycle, built on top of the BlueZ stack for Linux. Caeruleus lets you scan, enumerate, read/write/notify characteristics, fuzz, and run structured security assessment workflows against your Bluetooth Low Energy devices. The BLE tes
Overview GNU Wget, versions 1.25.0 and earlier, contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in its implementation of FTP passive mode. Because Wget does not properly validate IP addresses obtained from PASV responses, an attacker-controlled FTP endpoint can redirect the client’s connection to arbitrary IPs, potentially exposing internal network host and service responses. This vulnerability has been remediated in a recent update by GNU; see the Solutions section below for resolution guidance. Description GNU Wget is a widely used command-line utility for retrieving content over HTTP, HTTPS, and FTP. When operating over FTP in passive mode, Wget relies on the server’s PASV response to determine which IP address and port to use for the data connection. CVE-2026-15146 GNU Wget does not validate the IP address provided by an FTP PASV response while operating in FTP passive mode. A malicious FTP server, or an HTTP server that redirects to an FTP URL, can exploit this behavior to redirect Wget’s data connection to an arbitrary IP address and port. This allows an attacker to forge server-side requests (SSRF) from the machine running Wget, potentially accessing localhost services or internal network resources. This issue belongs to a known class of FTP PASV vulnerabilities such as CVE-2021-40491 , which was previously remediated in GNU Inetutils. Impact A remote attacker controlling or influencing an FTP endpoint can induce Wget to establish connections to otherwise inaccessible internal network addresses. This may allow the attacker to retrieve service banners, access internal HTTP endpoints, or exfiltrate data from internal systems reach
In 2021, we shipped Smart Tiered Cache . The idea: for each origin behind your site, Cloudflare picks the single best upper-tier data center to route through, based on real-time latency. Flip one switch, and we find the fastest path from our network to your origin. That works as long as an origin IP lives in one fixed place. Public cloud origins usually don't. They sit behind anycast or regional unicast front ends, so one origin IP can look equally close to a dozen Cloudflare data centers at once — and the latency probes have nothing to lock onto. Smart Tiered Cache handles this the safe way: when there's no clear winner, it falls back to several upper tiers. Nothing breaks. You just lose the thing that made a single closest tier worth it, which is cache efficiency. Smart Tiered Cache for Public Cloud Regions fixes this by letting you provide a cloud region hint. With that hint, Cloudflare can map public cloud origins to the right region and select better primary and fallback upper tiers, even when the origin IP itself looks anycast or ambiguous. We made our most popular tiered cache topology smarter Since it was launched, Smart Tiered Cache has become the most popular tiered cache topology among Cloudflare customers. It’s available to all plans, for free. Much of our work aims to continually improve it. Over time, we’ve extended Smart Tiered Cache to handle more origin architectures, including: November 2024 : Smart Tiered Cache for R2 : We taught Smart Tiered Cache to automatically select the closest upper tier to where the R2 bucket actually lives, reducing latency with zero configuration.
There are several major managed detection and response (MDR) companies to choose from. We’ve compared the main offerings of the best MDR providers to help you decide which is right for your organisation. Maybe it was a near miss, or a security team stretched too thin and drowning in alerts from dozens of tools. Whatever […] The post Top 6 Managed Detection and Response Providers appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
I reverse-engineered the DJI Spark smart battery I2C/SMBus protocol and documented the captures, firmware, and hardware
Thursday, July 9
Security testing identifies vulnerabilities, weaknesses, and misconfigurations before attackers can exploit them. This guide covers every major method, when to use each, and how to build a program that finds what actually matters. The post What Is Security Testing? A Practitioner’s Guide to Methods, Tools, and When to Use Each appeared first on Synack .
Overview PayRange is a mobile payment app that allows users to pay for vending machines, laundromats, and other unattended machines using a smartphone with Bluetooth. Two vulnerabilities were discovered in version 7.0.7 of the PayRange app that is available in the Google Play store. Description A vulnerability (CVE-2026-13462) exists in the PayRange Android app that causes invalid SSL certificates to be accepted in application WebViews. A second vulnerability (CVE-2026-13461) exists that allows the injection of JavaScript, which can be used to escape the WebView sandbox and perform a number of dangerous actions on the user's device. These vulnerabilities were discovered in version 7.0.7 of the PayRange app. The PayRange app bypasses Android's SSL trust chain and accepts certificates that match any of the following rules (including self-signed certificates): Common Name ends with "payrange.com" Common Name contains "stripe.com" Common Name contains "fetlifestatus.com" AND any of these conditions are true: Issuer Common Name is "R10" Issuer Common Name is "R3" Issuer Common Name contains "Network Solutions" The attack vector is an on-path interception. If an attacker can direct traffic intended for a legitimate server to a device they control, they can negotiate a TLS connection with the user's device using any trusted certificate that matches the rule set. They are then able to inject content into the WebView and harvest credentials, issue malicious requests and read data entered by the user, including exchanges with the PayRange and Stripe servers. Impact An attacker may be able to intercept any information they can convince the
Hi everyone, I've recently released **Auditor 1.0.0**, a command-line utility for file hashing and integrity verification, and I'd like to share some of the new features that may be useful for digital forensics workflows. # New: Verified file copy Two new commands have been added to perform file copies while ensuring end-to-end integrity. **clone** * Reads each source file and computes its hash. * Copies the file to the destination. * Reads the copied file, recomputes its hash, and verifies it against the source. * Can also generate audit/hash files if they don't already exist. **chkcopy** Similar to `clone`, but additionally validates the source against previously generated audit files before copying: * Verifies that the audit files exist. * Recomputes the source hash and compares it with the recorded value. * Copies the file. * Verifies the copied file by hashing it again and comparing it with the source. Both commands support configurable retry logic (number of attempts and delay between retries), which is particularly useful when copying over network shares where transient I/O or connection failures may occur. # Compatibility with existing checksum tools Auditor can now verify checksum files generated by other utilities, including: * `fsum` * `sha256sum` * `b3sum` * and others This makes it easier to integrate Auditor into existing workflows without requiring proprietary hash lists. # Multiple hash encodings Besides the traditional hexadecimal (Base16) representation, Auditor now supports: * Base32 * Base64 * Base85 This is handy when working with systems that exchange hashes in different encodings (for example, some forensic monitoring systems that use Base32). # Windows, Linux and macOS Precompiled binaries are available for Windows, Linux and macOS. The Linux build has also been updated to run cleanly under **WSL (Windows Subsystem for Linux)**, which may be useful for investigators who automate their workflow with Linux shell scripts while working on Windows. Documentation and downloads: [https://thash.org/auditor](https://thash.org/auditor) # Breaking change in v1.0.0 The default behavior has changed. Previous versions enabled the **thash** method by default. Starting with **v1.0.0**, Auditor computes standard hashes by default, producing exactly the same values as tools such as `sha256sum`, `b3sum`, and `fsum`. The **thash** algorithm is still available, but it must now be explicitly enabled with: `-t` or `--thash` This change was made to improve interoperability while keeping thash available for situations where faster integrity verification of very large datasets is desirable. Feedback, bug reports and feature suggestions are always welcome.
RSA and ECC, cryptographic algorithms that we’ve all relied on for decades, are vulnerable to the attack of sufficiently advanced quantum computers. Such quantum computers do not exist yet, but they seem to be coming sooner than expected. Luckily, the solution is already available: migrate to ML-KEM encryption and ML-DSA signatures, which are designed to be resistant to quantum attack. They were standardized in 2024 by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) after an eight-year open international competition. The migration to post-quantum cryptography is in full swing now. At the time of writing, the majority of traffic handled by Cloudflare is already using ML-KEM encryption, and is thus secured against the threat to data posed by harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks. But encryption is only one part of the equation: to be fully secure against quantum computers capable of breaking classical cryptography, we aim to deploy post-quantum signatures to protect authentication systems from unauthorized access. We are targeting 2029 for Cloudflare to be fully post-quantum secure. ML-DSA, the best all-around post-quantum signature scheme standardized today, has its downsides: it’s much larger on the wire, and many tricks we were able to perform with RSA and ECC simply cannot be done with ML-DSA. There are better post-quantum signature schemes on the horizon: last month, NIST announced that it is advancing nine
A Majority of European Lawmakers Voted Against Letting Big Tech Read Our Messages. They’re Going to Anyway
Companies will once again be allowed to scan citizens’ personal texts, emails, and social media messages via the “Chat Control” bill to find child abuse material online.
An MSG database tracked and categorized hundreds of celebs, famous Knicks superfans, and even some of Taylor Swift’s wedding guests. Labels included “LGBTQIA,” “DO NOT HOST,” and low to high “risk.”
A malicious commit disguised as SDK telemetry briefly compromised @injectivelabs/sdk-ts, exfiltrating wallet mnemonics and private keys.
Wednesday, July 8
Our 2026 State of Vulnerabilities Report surfaces what Synack finds in tested customer environments. At a recent webinar, two of our most decorated researchers from the Synack Red Team describe the threat landscape they’re seeing beyond the report findings. Here's what the data shows, what practitioners have experienced, and what your security program should do about the gap. The post The 2026 State of Vulnerabilities: What the Data Misses, According to Our Red Team appeared first on Synack .
**Patch Tuesday** confirms a CVE is fixed but not what changed in the binary, which function, which check, or whether it's a real fix or just churn. The **Drift Corpus** is a diff of 240+ 2026 Windows kernel patches. Per entry: the changed functions with assembly, the bug class and call chain, WinDbg breakpoints to reproduce, and a plain-English root cause. * Browse: [https://byteray-ai.github.io/drift-corpus](https://byteray-ai.github.io/drift-corpus) * Repo: [https://github.com/ByteRay-AI/drift-corpus](https://github.com/ByteRay-AI/drift-corpus) *This repository breaks down Microsoft’s monthly kernel patches into clear binary changes, giving researchers a practical roadmap to find adjacent bugs, build faster EDR detections, and write precise firewall and network rules to block exploits at the perimeter.*
VU#849433: Adalo Database API Enables Cross-App User Data Extraction via Over-Fetching and Missing Authorization Controls
Overview Adalo’s no‑code application platform exposes complete user records through its database API for all applications built on both V1 and V2. Due to a platform-level flaw, authenticated users can retrieve full user data belonging to any Adalo application, regardless of configuration. This issue affects more than one million applications and placing developers and their end users at risk of data exposure that they cannot prevent or remediate. Description Adalo is a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) provider for building no-code applications. In theory, each application or tenant (customer) is logically isolated with separate databases, users, and configurations. CVE-2026-10706 Unrestricted Disclosure of Full User Records The Adalo database API contains a flaw which allows the backend to return complete user records for every list component request, regardless of which fields the component is configured to display. The database does not enforce ownership‑aware, server‑side authorization checks, allowing authenticated users of any Adalo application to query database and table identifiers belonging to other applications and retrieve full records, including fields not requested. This issue is amplified by the permissive CORS policy, plaintext storage of all text files and evidence suggests that deleted records may remain accessible. CVE-2026-10708 Exposure and Reuse of Long-Lived JWT Tokens The JWT tokens are visible in client‑side requests and remain valid for approximately twenty days. Once copied, they can be reused from any external website or script to query the database API directly. Because the platform allows requests from any origin, attackers can repeatedly query the API and extract large volumes of user data without interacting with the applica
Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite How's this for a location?! I mean, last week was nice with Scott in Mallorca, but Marrakech is, well, wow Anyway, about those data breaches... This week I'm talking about the futility of attempting to remove piss from a pool , yet here we are, with various companies wanting to place that message alongside the very data breaches they can do nothing about! As I say in the post, I don't question the good intentions behind setting up a service to try to scrub data from legally operating data brokers, but the marketing machines behind those organisations that regularly reach out to me for product placement don't really seem to grasp that reality. At least now they have a nice explainer courtesy of that post
Many internal services at Cloudflare need to read and modify the same control-plane state from across our 330+ global data centers. They need guarantees that different readers never see inconsistent state, and that the system remains available for writes even when some data centers or links fail. But Cloudflare’s network runs across the entire Internet, and the Internet is an unpredictable place. Servers and data centers go down. Queues fill up. Links and cables get cut. These conditions make it difficult to run a globally available data system that guarantees strong consistency (e.g., that all readers are guaranteed to read all prior writes) because hostile conditions hinder distributed system replicas’ ability to reliably synchronize data with one another. One way to synchronize data safely despite adverse network conditions is via a consensus algorithm, which allows a set of machines to agree on the same sequence of values, such as key-value store put and get operations, as long as a majority remains alive and able to communicate. Unfortunately, commonly deployed consensus algorithms like Raft suffer in wide-area networks like Cloudflare’s because they rely on leaders and timeouts . The leader is the only replica allowed to make writes, and if it fails due to a crash or network degradation, the system becomes unavailable until some other replica times out and a new leader is elected. And these timeout values are hard to configure in networks with unpredictable latencies. We have experienced multiple incidents caused by unavailable leaders in consensus-driven systems. And so, for the past year, Cloudflare’s Research team has been building a new distributed consensus service called Meerkat powered by a consensus algorithm called
A cybersecurity startup dangling millions of dollars to acquire zero-day security vulnerabilities in popular software is run by a pair of far-right conspiracy theorists and convicted felons whose most recent ventures included fake intelligence companies and a now-defunct AI-based lobbying platform they operated under assumed names. The X/Twitter account IRIS C2 (@C2IRIS) has gained more than 4,000 followers since its creation in January 2025, posting frequently about security vulnerabilities, AI and software exploits. IRIS C2 says it is a company in McLean, Va. that sells offensive cybersecurity capabilities. The IRIS C2 website dangles the possibility of million-dollar payouts for exploits to attract talent. “Our business model is this,” reads a pinned post on top of the IRIS C2 account on X. “Attract the very best vulnerability researchers and exploit developers in the world to join our company. This mostly revolves around junior engineers with raw talent/extremely high IQ. We don’t care if they have a college degree/industry experience.” The website linked in that profile — irisc2[.]com — says the company is hiring for a number of open positions, and a recent post on its LinkedIn page enthuses about an overwhelming
In April we released Mewt , our open-source mutation-testing engine that finds the gaps in your test suite. Today we’re expanding it with support for DAML, the language Canton Network applications are written in. Mewt now reads DAML, generates several classes of mutants (including two built for DAML’s authorization primitives), and runs them through your existing test suite to count how many mutants survive. If you want to try it, simply install Mewt from the repository , point a mewt.toml at your project and its test command, and use mewt run . For a team shipping DAML to production, that count is what a passing test run is actually worth: it puts a number on how much your suite checks, whereas a green run on its own does not. Why DAML’s coverage reports lie Test coverage is the most reassuring lie in smart-contract development. Hitting 100% line coverage tells you the test runner walked the code; it does not tell you whether any test would fail if that code stopped doing what it is supposed to. We have been grading test harnesses by how many mutants they kill since at least 2019 , and our primer on finding the bugs your tests don’t catch shows how a green suite can still miss the bug that matters. DAML’s built-in coverage measures execution at the template and choice level: which templates were created and which choices were exercised over the test run. It reports whether each ch
Scammers are hijacking government websites to upload ads for “leaked” OnlyFans content. Thousands of copyright complaints from adult creators are helping people avoid malicious links.
Burst water mains. Evacuated hospitals. In a closed-door simulation, insurers played out their response to a mass disruption by China’s Volt Typhoon hackers—and found a nightmare scenario.
Your client is no longer just buying your security advice. They’re auditing whether you live by it. That was a clear message from my exclusive interview with Heather MacDonald Alford, an MSP finance specialist and owner of Counting Creators. Heather’s exactly the kind of customer MSPs should be paying attention to. She’s informed, commercially minded, and willing to challenge vendors to […] The post Cyber-Aware Customers Are Raising the Bar for MSPs and Other Vendors appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
Datadog Security Research has tracked multiple coordinated campaigns enumerating GitHub organizations, repositories, and users through the public GitHub API, abusing leaked access tokens, and cloning private repositories.