PaperCut on Thursday released a new security maintenance release that replaces all previously published emergency patches that were pushed to address two security flaws that have come under active exploitation. The software development company said PaperCut NG/MF versions 26.0.5, 25.0.13 and 24.1.10 are now available for customers to download. "These are Regular Maintenance Releases (MR) that
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Attackers have chained two flaws in JFrog Artifactory, the repository that software build pipelines pull from, to take administrator control of self-hosted servers and plant backdoors, cloud security company Wiz said in a report. Wiz saw the attacks between August 15 and September 8. JFrog had fixed both flaws before then, so only servers that had not been updated were open to them.
A suspected Russian-speaking cyber actor has been attributed to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to devise exploits targeting a recently disclosed pair of security flaws in PaperCut NG/MF and break into hundreds of instances. According to independent reports from Blackpoint Cyber and GreyNoise, the activity originates from "45.142.193[.]132," an IP address that has been linked to
The City Attorney’s Office has asked Meta to explain how the harmful ads repeatedly ran on Facebook and Instagram. The company claims the ads are not under the city’s jurisdiction.
Before you sign with a penetration testing vendor, ask precise questions that turn marketing claims into measurable commitments. Confirm exact scope, learn which work is automated, AI-led, or human-led, and require that findings get reproduced and validated before they reach a report. Ask who can access your environment, how testers are vetted, and what the rules of engagement and stop conditions look like. Review sample reports, confirm remediation and retesting terms, and normalize every cost. Place every material promise in the contract rather than a slide deck. The post Questions to Ask a Penetration Testing Vendor Before You Sign appeared first on Synack .
Latest
Friday, September 11
Quick note: English isn't my native language so I used AI to help clean up the text/translation, but all technical details, logs, and screenshots are mine. I wanted to share a recent disclosure case regarding xAI's API Gateway billing enforcement to get feedback from the community on how infrastructure logic flaws are evaluated against broad LLM scope exclusions. **The Vulnerability & Impact** I identified a logic flaw in xAI's API Gateway regarding prepaid balance enforcement. The gateway failed to terminate sessions when an account hit $0, allowing an attacker to bypass prepaid limits, force an account into a deep negative balance (billing overdraft), and consume backend compute resources without authorization. **HackerOne's Response** HackerOne completely closed the report, classifying it as out-of-scope "intended model behavior." When escalated to H1 Mediation—pointing out that an API billing gateway failure is an infrastructure/billing logic issue rather than a model safety concern—they responded: "The billing overdraft is a downstream consequence of the same unbounded resource consumption that the program considers out of scope. The root cause and the scope exclusion are the same regardless of which layer the impact surfaces on." On July 28, Mediation permanently closed the ticket, refusing further re-examination. **Initial "Duplicate" Classification** Prior to claiming the issue was out-of-scope, triage initially marked the report as a "Duplicate" simply because the PoC prompt string matched a prompt from another report that I had authored myself. It was a 100% unique, custom prompt created by me, and while one prompt triggered two completely distinct infrastructure bugs across two reports, triage lazily marked the second report as a duplicate based solely on input string matching. Support only re-examined it after an initial post on X, at which point they pivoted to the "intended model behavior" exclusion. **Timeline & Vendor Mitigation** Post on X: I published a thread on X detailing the issue and challenging the classification of an API billing logic flaw as "intended model behavior". Vendor Action: Just a couple of hours after my follow-up post on X calling out HackerOne's triage, xAI sent out an official API pricing update email notifying users about changes to tool-call billing to restrict data fetch volume—initiating mitigation for the exact vector I reported. (A cosmic coincidence, surely?) Full Screenshots & Timeline Proof: [https://imgur.com/a/yTcuqLG](https://imgur.com/a/yTcuqLG) **TL;DR:** Found an API Gateway logic flaw in xAI that bypassed prepaid balance limits, allowing continued requests on a $0 balance and causing billing overdrafts. HackerOne closed it as out-of-scope "intended model behavior" (and initially marked it duplicate purely based on input prompt string matching). The vendor updated their API billing limits just hours after I published a post on X (even with barely any views). Is a gateway/auth-level billing flaw really "model behavior"?
Anthropic has warned that cybercriminals and state-sponsored hackers alike are using its Claude models for cyber attacks, weapons design, propaganda, and mass surveillance between December 2025 and August 2026. The threat actors, which the artificial intelligence (AI) company has branded Generative Threat Groups (GTGs), span state-sponsored groups, financially motivated criminals, commercial
Anthropic on Thursday revealed it disrupted a campaign mounted by a Russian state-sponsored threat actor that abused Claude for developing an AI-assisted workflow to get ahead of the detection curve. The operation has been attributed to a cyber espionage group it calls GTG-20006 (where "GTG" stands for Generative Threat Group), which aligns with broader reporting linking the cluster to Midnight
A live NC town's website is serving cloaked drug spam, and Google's AI Overview is citing it. Is this routine?
I'm a health blogger, not a security person. Found this by accident last week. [stonevillenc.org](http://stonevillenc.org) is the real, working website of Stoneville, North Carolina. It's also serving a farm of cloaked spam pages. Same URL, same minute: curl -A "<googlebot UA>" https://www.stonevillenc.org/sam-sulek-peptide-company-guide/ | wc -c # 85363 curl -A "Mozilla/5.0" <same URL> | wc -c # 1430 Googlebot gets an 85 KB peptide article. Everyone else gets a JS redirect to a random WhatsApp number pre-filled "I want peptide catalog and price list, 30% OFF FIRST ORDER." Yesterday the redirect had three numbers, today nine. Someone is maintaining it. A plain Google search (sam sulek retatrutide) shows ten of these pages on page one, and Google's AI Overview answers from them, cited as "Town of Stoneville, NC." I screen-recorded tapping the AI Overview's citation and landing in a WhatsApp drug chat: [https://youtube.com/shorts/X-9jc9YDqYk](https://youtube.com/shorts/X-9jc9YDqYk) I reported it to the town, MS-ISAC, the host, and Google. The town hasn't replied. Is this sort of thing common? Should I report this somewhere else?
I started a blog series to provide free insights into appsec. It’s mainly to breakdown what application security is all about and it’s mainly targeted towards beginners and startups, so take it as you will. Just want to teach every one interested in appsec my perspective on it from my experience in big tech. I talked about identity last time and the importance of securing applications from the outside in. I talk about authority aka authorization in this post, a nuanced topic that almost every company has a problem with just because it’s a semantic problem and isn’t done properly without understanding your application. Please reach out if you have any questions or would like for me to write on a topic that you’d want to learn more about.
Today, we’re making Cloudflare CASB more powerful than ever by introducing automatic remediation policies. This means security teams can now design event-driven logic to revoke risky file shares and dispatch custom webhooks, without manual intervention. When we launched Cloudflare CASB , a cloud access security broker, we wanted to provide security teams complete visibility into the posture of their SaaS applications before misconfigurations became incidents. With a quick, clientless integration, CASB surfaces risks like overshared files, dormant admin keys and tokens, OAuth apps with excessive permissions — continuously, across users in the organization. For years, SaaS Security Posture Management (SSPM) tools such as Cloudflare CASB have functioned as a passive alarm system. Most SSPM tools tell you what’s wrong but do not help you fix the issue, placing the burden on administrators to manage an ever-growing to-do list. A single misconfigured file-sharing policy across a Google Workspace tenant can generate thousands of findings in seconds, and even a disciplined team faces a window between detection and remediation measured in hours or days — more than enough time for a sensitive file to be downloaded, forwarded, or indexed. With automatic remediation policies, CASB customers can now configure the actions that should be invoked immediately after a new finding is identified. Shifting from reactive to proactive When we launched manual remediation actions earlier this year, we gave security teams the ability to resolve misconfigurations directly from the Cloudflare dashboard. This re
Security teams have become exceptionally talented at finding vulnerabilities. Now, it’s time to turn our attention to optimizing the process for determining which of those vulnerabilities actually create a path to compromise. A critical vulnerability may look alarming on a scanner report, but if it sits behind strong segmentation, identity controls, and other defenses that prevent an attacker
Stop using static integers to hunt for AD CS vulnerabilities. If your cheat sheet says `msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag == 1`, you are missing complex attack paths. Published my field notes on why we need to read the bits, not the integer.
The new joint operation uses laser-based technology capable of detecting, tracking, and disabling commercial drones linked to human and drug trafficking.
CSA Zero Trust Microsegmentation Guidance - formalizes topology-defined vs. connection-defined segmentation models
*Disclosure: I led this workstream at the Cloud Security Alliance.* CSA published new guidance on Zero Trust Microsegmentation. Sharing here because the framing is more precise than most vendor material on this topic, and I think the model split is useful even if you disagree with parts of the paper. **Core definition used throughout:** a communication is "segmented" only if it's explicitly permitted, enforceable, observable, and governable over time - not just blocked by default or isolated by network position. **Two models, formally separated:** * **Topology-defined segmentation:** enforcement based on network position: zones, routes, VLANs, security groups, firewalls, gateways. Controls *where* traffic is allowed to flow. * **Connection-defined segmentation:** enforcement based on session establishment: identity, device posture, entitlement, and context gate whether a session to a service can be created at all. Controls *who/what* can talk to a service, independent of network location. The paper's position is that these are complementary, not competing - connection-defined controls reduce the attack surface before a session exists (relevant for credential theft, insider threat, lateral movement from an already-authenticated foothold), while topology-defined controls provide containment if a session, credential, or system is compromised despite that. Relying on only one leaves a gap the other closes. **Scope beyond the usual east-west/data-center framing:** * IT, OT, IoT, cloud, edge, and agentic AI workloads * macro/micro/nano-segmentation as distinct granularities, not synonyms * enforcement plane choices (host, hypervisor, network, identity/proxy) * governed egress (not just ingress/lateral) * control-plane resilience (what happens when the policy engine or PDP is unreachable) * policy drift detection and exception lifecycle management **Operational model it lays out:** visibility → derive policy from observed legitimate dependencies → simulate/canary → enforce → monitor for drift → retire stale exceptions. Framed explicitly as continuous, not a deployment milestone. There's a separate direction I'm developing - Identity-Defined Reachability, treating reachability as a governed policy outcome rather than something inherited from network topology - but that's out of scope for this paper; the guidance here is the groundwork (segmentation models, enforcement plane tradeoffs, operational practice) rather than that architecture itself. Happy to get into specifics on enforcement plane tradeoffs or policy-drift detection approaches if useful.
Attackers have chained two flaws in JFrog Artifactory, the repository that software build pipelines pull from, to take administrator control of self-hosted servers and plant backdoors, cloud security company Wiz said in a report. Wiz saw the attacks between August 15 and September 8. JFrog had fixed both flaws before then, so only servers that had not been updated were open to them.
PaperCut on Thursday released a new security maintenance release that replaces all previously published emergency patches that were pushed to address two security flaws that have come under active exploitation. The software development company said PaperCut NG/MF versions 26.0.5, 25.0.13 and 24.1.10 are now available for customers to download. "These are Regular Maintenance Releases (MR) that
Thursday, September 10
Researcher: ...Using the API key, anyone is able to find information of the patients that includes their PII and PHI CEO: are you dumb? Researcher: What? ***Blocked*** Proof: [https://imgur.com/Bul0d76](https://imgur.com/Bul0d76) Background: Found an authentication bypass on their platform which was behind auth guard, revealing information on all their tenants, along with the API keys. Excerpt above is the part of the real conversation when tried to bring the issue forward to the CEO. *Posted on YCombinator subreddit as well.*
Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities kept the top spot in the list, followed by SQL injection and cross-site request forgery (CSRF), each up one position from last year. Missing authorization landed fourth in the 2025 CWE Top 25 list, up five positions. Out-of-bounds write placed fifth, dropping two places. P.S: if you thought that AI and quantum computing are the main focus — good news is that XSS and SQL injection is not going anywhere lol
Operating over 680 facilities across the US, AdaptHealth describes itself as a network of medical equipment companies that provides patients with healthcare solutions and medical equipment. The company was hacked in early June, when a threat actor gained access to its cloud-based applications, including internal systems used for patient management and document storage. Overall, hackers stole the electronic protected health information of 2,810,878 individuals, Baylor Genetics told the HHS.
A novel technique for writing ELF shared objects and achieving code execution in Python, Ruby, and Node.js using the sqlite\_dbpage virtual table.
Hey everyone, I just released a major update (v2.1.0) for **ThreatLens**. For this release, the focus was entirely on security hardening, data validation, and core performance. **What's new in v2.1.0?** * **Strict Security:** Blocked Excel/CSV formula injections in generated reports, prevented API key leaks in logs, and enforced strict IOC validation. * **Performance Boost:** Integrated a local SQLite cache to persist investigation data, significantly reducing redundant API calls. * **Smarter Analysis:** Introduced an explainable verdict system with confidence scores. Ambiguous results are now correctly classified as "Unknown" rather than "Clean". * **Resource Management:** Added intelligent API quota planning, connection timeouts, automatic retries, and file size limits. **What is ThreatLens?** For those who haven't seen it before, ThreatLens is an open-source CLI tool built to automate Threat Intelligence and OSINT workflows. It takes Indicators of Compromise (IPs, domains, hashes, CVEs), queries multiple sources simultaneously, and generates structured, safe, and ready-to-use reports. It's completely open-source. I'd love to hear your feedback or feature requests! **Check it out on GitHub:** [https://github.com/AbdaullahAG/ThreatLens](https://github.com/AbdaullahAG/ThreatLens) I’d love to hear your thoughts, feedback, or feature requests!
SonicWall SMA1000 campaign: standalone Linux Impacket secretsdump deployed onto appliances (SHA-256 inside)
Campaign where the operator deployed a standalone Linux build of Impacket's secretsdump directly onto compromised SonicWall SMA1000 appliances and ran credential theft from there. It was pulled to the box with curl to /tmp/secretsdump, made executable, then used against internal domain controllers. Sample: secretsdump, 9,983,640 bytes, SHA-256 690f5031deede7d3357d0ca24c89866ae8c60e6c63b3a2c8bba813a6ac10ae5b, served over HTTP from 95.181.173\[.\]36. The surrounding Python tooling (exploit, LDAP extractor and decryptor, DCSync automation) came from the same open directory. Full toolkit breakdown and IOCs below. [https://hunt.io/blog/sonicwall-sma1000-uk-council-attack](https://hunt.io/blog/sonicwall-sma1000-uk-council-attack)
A lot of this week’s security news has the same awkward answer to one question: “Why was that allowed to work?” An extension asks for access and takes too much. A trusted service becomes part of a phishing chain. An old bug still gets results. An exposed system stays exposed. A package looks useful right up until it isn’t. Different stories, same basic problem: the path in was often already
VU#687587: AOMEI Backupper amwrtdrv.sys local privilege escalation vulnerability allows arbitrary writes to physical disks
Overview An incorrect permissions assignment vulnerability in the amwrtdrv.sys kernel driver, included with AOMEI Backupper 8.4.0, allows an unprivileged local user to perform arbitrary writes to the physical disk. When Secure Boot is disabled, this can be leveraged to execute arbitrary UEFI-level code before the operating system loads. This allows an attacker to bypass OS-level security controls, including HVCI, EDR solutions, and Microsoft Defender. The attack may also enable capture of BitLocker Volume Master Key (VMK) material, depending on the system's BitLocker configuration. Description AOMEI Backupper from AOMEI International Network Limited is designed to provide backup and disaster recovery services. It also helps individuals and businesses to create system images, disk clones, and file backups. AOMEI Backupper is available as a Windows application and can be integrated into enterprise backup workflows or directly used by end users. CVE-2026-12780 : An Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource (CWE-732) vulnerability in the amwrtdrv.sys kernel driver used by AOMEI Backupper 8.4.0 allows an unprivileged local attacker to achieve UEFI-level arbitrary code execution by directly writing to physical disk devices. The driver creates a world-accessible device object without a security descriptor, therefore allowing any user-mode process to open the device and issue unrestricted write requests. Hence, an attacker can modify disk sectors in the pre-partition gap (LBA 34–2047), inject a malicious UEFI payload, and alter the GPT to reference the payload as an EFI System Partition. The payload can then execute during the UEFI Boot Device Selection (BDS) phase, before operating system security mechanisms are loaded. Impact
Bad actors are misusing Google Play's Early Access program to push deceptive apps that claim to offer money, rewards, casino winnings, and premium content. Early Access apps are apps that haven't been released on the official Android app marketplace. The main idea behind the program is for developers to solicit user feedback for new applications or features they may be working on before their
1.1.1.1 now validates DNSSEC signatures made with ML-DSA-44 , a post-quantum signature algorithm standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) . This is a first step toward preparing DNSSEC for a future in which today’s signature algorithms are no longer secure. Cloudflare plans to achieve full post-quantum security by 2029 . Much of the work so far has focused on TLS, but public-key cryptography is used in many other systems, including DNSSEC. While we began experimenting with post-quantum key agreement in TLS in 2019 and enabled support for all customers in 2022, post-quantum signatures have not yet received comparable testing in DNSSEC. There is also some urgency. Widespread client adoption of post-quantum TLS took years, partly because larger messages exposed assumptions and bugs in existing network software. That experience showed why early large-scale testing matters. We cannot wait until quantum computers become an immediate threat. The problem is that post-quantum signatures are large. Each ML-DSA-44 signature is 2,420 bytes, exceeding common DNS-over- UDP limits before the response includes anything else. At the same t
US government adviser Paul Christiano warns of risks to AI industry as he joins OpenAI’s non-profit foundation OpenAI is not on track to reduce the risk of “catastrophic” loss of control to an acceptable level, a member of its non-profit board has said, amid spreading public and political concern that super-advanced AIs could one day wipe out humanity. Paul Christiano, a US government technology adviser, said : “There is a meaningful risk that rapid acceleration in AI capabilities leads to catastrophic and irreversible loss of control in the very near term.” Continue reading...
Check Point has patched two critical vulnerabilities in the way its firewall and management products handle VPN certificates. The company says both could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to run code, but only "under specific conditions" that it has not described. One flaw affects Check Point's Security Gateways, its firewall appliances. The other affects those gateways and the Security
A suspected Russian-speaking cyber actor has been attributed to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to devise exploits targeting a recently disclosed pair of security flaws in PaperCut NG/MF and break into hundreds of instances. According to independent reports from Blackpoint Cyber and GreyNoise, the activity originates from "45.142.193[.]132," an IP address that has been linked to
The Gigabud banking trojan now installs a second Android app that creates a work profile on an infected phone and drops a tampered banking app inside it, security firm Group-IB said in a report published on September 9. A work profile is a separate space that Android typically reserves for employer apps, and what's inside it is kept separate from everything in the personal space. That
InquiryIQ, a previously unreported prototype, tested a model from xAI, maker of Grok, to surface associates, social accounts, and other information about people identified through Clearview.
Nearly one in ten of the internet-facing LiteLLM servers that Wiz Research scanned in February accepted sk-1234, the example admin key in LiteLLM's own setup guide. LiteLLM is an open-source AI gateway, the software a company puts between its applications and the model providers it pays for. That key is the gateway's administrator credential. Anyone who holds it can read every
Anthropic on Wednesday disclosed a fourth incident in which its artificial intelligence (AI) model broke into real third-party systems, marking the latest in a growing list of cases that have raised concerns about the security risks posed by autonomous AI agents. The AI company said the incident dates back to January 2026 and involved an early version of Claude Opus 4.6 that breached "
Wednesday, September 9
The City Attorney’s Office has asked Meta to explain how the harmful ads repeatedly ran on Facebook and Instagram. The company claims the ads are not under the city’s jurisdiction.
The new Apple Watch includes several “intelligent” listening features that have privacy and security baked in. But the protections can’t change the facts of what the tools do.
The U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) on Wednesday announced coordinated actions aimed at an illicit online marketplace called Xinbi Guarantee that offered scam services, including seizing Telegram channels used to run the service, confiscating two cryptocurrency wallets, and deploying the Scam Center Strike Force to Madagascar to help disrupt 13 scam compounds run by Chinese organized crime
Before you sign with a penetration testing vendor, ask precise questions that turn marketing claims into measurable commitments. Confirm exact scope, learn which work is automated, AI-led, or human-led, and require that findings get reproduced and validated before they reach a report. Ask who can access your environment, how testers are vetted, and what the rules of engagement and stop conditions look like. Review sample reports, confirm remediation and retesting terms, and normalize every cost. Place every material promise in the contract rather than a slide deck. The post Questions to Ask a Penetration Testing Vendor Before You Sign appeared first on Synack .
Multiple espionage-motivated threat activity clusters have been found deploying a previously undocumented exploit kit called BlueMoon that chains together multiple vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows and Google Chrome. The first in-the-wild use of BlueMoon has been attributed to the China-aligned state-sponsored group tracked as APT31 (aka Bronze Vinewood, Judgement Panda, JungleBamboo,
A new GTA mod lets you smash and shoot Flock’s automatic license plate readers around the fictional Los Santos.
Update: Attack Shark X6 Linux driver — from DPI-only to button remap, lighting, and emergency reset (Go + Wails)
Piracy CDN renamed .ts video segments to .woff2 to abuse extension-based CDN caching, a byte-level analysis
Cybercriminals are hijacking artificial intelligence (AI) user accounts via information stealer logs to create "stolen keys" that grant illicit access to tools from model providers like Google, Anthropic, and others. Information stealers like Lumma Stealer or Vidar are equipped to harvest a wide range of data from compromised systems. This can include credential, session tokens, and API
We’ve rewritten the module registry in workerd , the core open-source component of the Workers runtime, to be faster, more standards-compliant, and more closely aligned with Node.js' module registry. Over the past few years, we’ve been adding support for more and more Node.js runtime APIs. The Workers runtime now supports every stable API from Node.js that you might want to use in a serverless context, and these APIs are now enabled by default , letting you deploy even larger Node.js apps to Cloudflare (now up to 64 MiB on all plans — we’ve removed the limit on compressed bundle size). But API compatibility alone is not enough: Node.js applications also depend on how the runtime resolves, loads, and caches modules . ESM, CommonJS, and WebAssembly are each types of modules that you can import in your Worker’s code. The system within the runtime that handles all of this is called the module registry. You can start using it today by enabling the new_module_registry compatibility flag in your Worker.
A flaw in DeepSeek Harness, DeepSeek's open-source tool for running AI coding agents on a developer's machine, let a sandboxed agent turn off its own sandbox with a single command. The tool runs an agent's commands inside an operating-system sandbox, so that an agent working on untrusted files cannot write outside its workspace. The agent could remove that limit by calling the tool's own web
Fermat famously claimed to have a “truly marvelous proof” of his Last Theorem , but he never wrote it down, insisting the margin of his page was too narrow to contain it. A few centuries later, Anthropic announced a complete formalization of Fermat’s Last Theorem using 13 million lines of Lean code (clearly not what Fermat intended). Luckily, we found a wonderfully cursed Lean bug , shown below, that suggests the proof may have fit the margin after all. The issue affects all stable versions of Lean up to 4.33.1, and the patch is incorporated in v4.34.0-rc1. A “checked” proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem using Lean 4.33.1 The blue checkmarks in the screenshot above would suggest that Lean considers this proof correct. This seems odd given the amount of work Sir Andrew Wiles put into this problem and the vast size of Claude’s proof. So what is going on? The “proof” clearly doesn’t make any sense and exploits an issue in Lean. We found the issue while using GPT-5.6 to experiment with a new skill for code review. We want to clarify up front that the issue is not a kernel soundness issue , but it happens to nicely fit any discussion of strings, lengths, and substrings. &
I’ve spent enough time around AI adoption now to notice a pattern. Ask a business how AI is going for them and the honest answer is, lately, “we’ve got Copilot, and it’s not great.” That gap between the hype and the reality is exactly where Samantha North operates. Sam runs an AI transformation agency, helping […] The post AI adoption that pays off is built around keeping humans in the driver’s seat appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
Tuesday, September 8
Microsoft Corp. today issued updates to plug at least 974 security holes in its Windows operating systems and other software, by far its biggest single patch batch ever. Microsoft says artificial intelligence is helping to speed the discovery of vulnerabilities, but security experts warn that many organizations already are struggling to prioritize the more human-intensive endeavor of testing and deploying so many fixes each month. Image: Shutterstock.com, Kirill Makarov. This month’s patch bundle obliterates the software giant’s previous record set in July , when it released updates for at least 570 security vulnerabilities. September’s Patch Tuesday brings this year’s total to more than 2,600, more than twice Microsoft’s previous record-setting patch year in 2020 (1,245) and with three more months to go. There are two “zero-day” flaws fixed this month that are being actively exploited: both CVE-2026-81963 and
Designed to compete with OpenClaw and Instinct, the company says Muse can do everything from sell your car to book you a plane ticket.
🔴 Redis cryptomining toolkit recovered from an open directory: XMRig deployment, fileless loader, chr()-encoded WordPress scripts
Researchers pulled 147 files off an open directory that was the operator's live working folder: Python exploit source, campaign logs, a bundled Python 3.11, and two exported Windows registry hives (SAM.save, SYSTEM.save, verified by the regf header). Worth a look: * Main technique abuses replication, not a bug. CONFIG SET dir/dbfilename, SLAVEOF to a rogue master, serve a crafted RDB on +FULLRESYNC. Blob opens with the REDIS0009 magic, then one key/value pair with an embedded newline before the cron text so the payload lands on its own line. Then SLAVEOF NO ONE and restore. * No client library. PING/CONFIG SET/SLAVEOF hand-serialized to raw RESP, length-aware reader, same two functions copied across every script. * Fileless loader is one line in \_boot.py that base64-decodes and exec()s an orchestrator in-process. Generous naming though, it writes the decoded target list and deployer back to disk as plaintext, so only the first stage stays off disk. * chr()-encoded literals in the WordPress scripts (chr(97)+chr(100)+... for "admin"), defeats naive keyword matching, control flow stays readable. * Three generations of verify payloads with bugfix comments left in. Two real bugs documented: a test cron written to a dotfile that run-parts silently skips, and a /dev/tcp payload that fails under dash. * Newest XMRig variant adds --tls-fingerprint pinning the pool cert, absent from earlier gens. SSH-via-AOF and a Lua EVAL sandbox probe are also in the kit, neither produced a confirmed compromise. Full write-up with IOCs and code: [https://hunt.io/blog/redis-cryptomining-botnet-3562-servers](https://hunt.io/blog/redis-cryptomining-botnet-3562-servers)
Overview The UEFI Shell program may expose raw memory access capabilities that, if present in platform firmware for debugging or advanced support use cases, could be abused to undermine UEFI Secure Boot protections. When the UEFI Shell is included in SPI flash, an attacker with the ability to modify UEFI boot configuration may be able to create multiple boot option entries and bypass controls intended to prevent the UEFI Shell from launching while Secure Boot is enabled. This could allow an attacker to modify the pre-boot environment and execute unauthorized software during system startup. Description The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) is a firmware specification that defines the interface between a computing platform's hardware and operating system (OS) during the early boot process before the operating system is loaded. UEFI Secure Boot helps ensure that only trusted and digitally signed software is executed during these early stages of platform initialization. The TianoCore EDK II project provides an open-source reference implementation of the UEFI and Platform Initialization (PI) specifications. The project includes the UEFI Shell , which provides command-line utilities for debugging, diagnostics, and advanced platform management. Many OEM and Independent BIOS Vendor (IBV) firmware implementations include the UEFI Shell in SPI flash for service and support purposes. Because the shell executes in the pre-boot environment, it provides powerful commands such as dmem (display memory) and mm (memory modify) that can access physical memory. Many implementations include a boot entry for the
VU#859658: Skullcandy Dime 3 wireless earbuds contain an unauthenticated Bluetooth pairing vulnerability
Overview Skullcandy Dime 3 wireless earbuds, running firmware version 1.0.0.28, accept a new Bluetooth Classic (BR/EDR) pairing request from an unpaired device without requiring the earbuds to be placed into pairing mode or requiring any physical confirmation or interaction from the owner. Description The Skullcandy Dime 3 (Model S2DCW) wireless earbuds, running firmware version 1.0.0.28, accept a new Bluetooth Classic (BR/EDR) pairing request from a previously unpaired device without the device being placed into pairing mode by the owner and without physical confirmation on the earbuds. The device's Bluetooth PnP modalias identifies the chipset vendor as Airoha Technology Corp. (Bluetooth SIG company ID 0x0094). This vulnerability was previously disclosed in CVE-2025-20701 and is described as: In the Airoha Bluetooth audio SDK, there is a possible way to pair Bluetooth audio device without user consent. This could lead to remote escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. An attacker is required to be within Bluetooth radio range to the target earbuds, but no prior pairing, physical access, or interaction with the earbuds' buttons or case is required to exploit the vulnerability. A direct pairing request to the earbuds' known or discovered Bluetooth Classic address can be sent without a PIN, passkey, or physical confirmation. The pairing/bonding completes without owner action due to the device's NoInputNoOutput I/O capability. The firmware version displayed on the affected Skullcandy Dime 3 wireless earbuds is 1.0.0.28. Impact Once bonded, the attacker's device is added as a trusted device and can reconnect automatically whenever in range. This allows an attacker to est
VU#943094: ONLYOFFICE ownCloud integration plugin contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability
Overview A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in Ascensio System SIA's ONLYOFFICE ownCloud integration plugin (version 9.12). The plugin’s backend endpoint does not adequately validate the user‑supplied document server URL before initiating outbound connections. An authenticated administrator can exploit this flaw to coerce the ownCloud server into issuing arbitrary network requests to attacker‑controlled destinations. Description The ownCloud ecosystem delivers a platform for enterprise file collaboration, providing capabilities for storing, syncing, and sharing data across devices. Ascensio System SIA's ONLYOFFICE provides a connector that integrates with ownCloud, enabling users to open and edit files directly within the cloud storage environment. When configuring the ONLYOFFICE document server within ownCloud, the plugin accepts a document server parameter and attempts to verify the supplied URL by initiating a connection directly from the ownCloud server. As detailed in CVE-2026-84282 , the application does not restrict or sanitize this parameter, allowing an authenticated administrator to provide arbitrary URLs, including internal network hosts or localhost addresses. By submitting crafted configuration requests to the /apps/onlyoffice/ajax/settings/address endpoint, an attacker can instruct the server to make outbound requests to internal systems that are otherwise inaccessible externally. Differences in returned error messages (such as connection failures versus SSL/TLS negotiation errors) enable the attacker to distinguish between open and closed TCP ports, facilitating internal network reconnaissance and port enumeration. The outbound requests originate from the ownCloud server, demonstrating server‑side request execution consistent with an SS
Automatic Key Exchange: faster, post-quantum secure origin handshakes for 45 billion daily connections (and counting)
Every time Cloudflare opens a new TLS 1.3 connection to an origin server, we have to make a guess: the protocol requires us to commit to a key agreement algorithm in the very first packet we send, before the origin has told us anything about itself or what it can support. If we guess right, the handshake completes in one round trip. Guess wrong, and the origin replies with a HelloRetryRequest , we start over, and the connection costs two round trips. For years, our guess was the same for every origin on the Internet: X25519 . Widely supported, but as it turns out, suboptimal for roughly 30% of the origin connections we've since measured. Today we're announcing Automatic Key Exchange , an extension of Automatic SSL/TLS that replaces the guess with a measurement. We probe each origin to learn which key agreement algorithms it supports and prefers, then lead with that algorithm on the first try, preferring the post-quantum hybrid X25519MLKEM768 wherever the origin can speak it. With the ongoing rollout of Automatic Key Exchange across origin connections, HelloRetryRequests fell from roughly 52% to 3.7%, cutting more than 150 ms off connection handshake latency at p90. In addition, as part of our ongoing rollout, hundreds of thousands of domains now
“You’ve been gifted a voucher!”. “Your account will be closed unless you act now”. “Late payment demand. Invoice # 207”. Phishing scams come in many shapes and sizes. And, in 2026, they remain, by far, the most common attack vector targeting both individuals and organizations. To help you understand the scale of the threat, I’ve […] The post Phishing in 2026. Latest statistics and analysis appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
Many security bugs are race conditions, where multi-threaded execution has to occur with the right interleaving for a negative effect to appear. This creates challenges for several use cases: Confirming bug candidates that have been discovered manually or through static analysis. Regression tests: After fixing a race condition bug, there is often no good way to write a regression test that reliably triggers the bug as part of a test suite. Automatic bug discovery, such as fuzzing: It is hard for a fuzzer to exercise all interesting interleavings of concurrent operations, or reach code paths that are only exercised when operations are racing.
At Bug Bounty Village during DEF CON 34, Inti De Ceukelaire delivered a talk on how attackers can abuse today's AI agents in ways most defenders haven't thought about yet, from tricking agents into spilling secrets to forcing them to carry out unauthorized actions on behalf of the victim. This resulted in over $50,000+ in bounties in just a few weekends, without actually poking the target with Burp Suite or any automated scanners.
Monday, September 7
Bose Sleepbuds II: Reverse-engineered the full BLE file-transfer protocol (TUMBLE) — audio codec still unidentified
The core components required to move from automated discovery to proven risk now exist: capable models, controlled execution, scalable orchestration, evidence capture and human judgement. The opportunity is to engineer them as one dependable system rather than treat each as a standalone feature. The post AI Can Find Vulnerabilities. Building a System That Proves Risk Is the Hard Part. appeared first on Synack .
Sunday, September 6
Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite I've started playing around with YouTube's "create video thumbnail", which hopefully will give me back a bit of time in my day (it used to be a manual job in Photoshop) and be a bit more interesting. And on that note, the imagery it's chosen this week is spot on: that Lockwood ES2100 electric strike looks like the perfect solution for my first fully installed Ubiquiti Access door lock. Having the door position sensor built in really simplifies things, and hopefully Ubiquiti will later add support to their hubs for the latch position and strike lock status. Once I'm back from this next round of travel, I should be able to do a full review of what it's like to actually live with.
Saturday, September 5
Plus: Tens of millions of US and Canadian drivers’ licenses go up for sale on the dark web, the US military finally tries to tackle the risk online ad data poses to troops, and more.