SAP has released patches to address a maximum-severity security flaw impacting Commerce Cloud (Data Hub Adapter) that could result in arbitrary code execution. The vulnerability, assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2026-58231, is rated 10.0 on the CVSS scoring system. It has been described as a case of insufficient authorization checks and input validation. "SAP Commerce Cloud allows an
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The security researcher going by the name Chaotic Eclipse (aka INFINITE NIGHTMARE, MSNightmare, and Nightmare-Eclipse) has released a proof-of-concept (PoC) for a new Microsoft zero-day called ShieldBreak. The vulnerability, rooted in Microsoft Defender for Windows, demonstrates a patch bypass for CVE-2026-50656 (CVSS score: 7.8), otherwise known as RoguePlanet. RoguePlanet has been described
Every Signal chat starts the same way: the client asks the Signal server for the public key associated with your contact’s phone number. But how do you know the server gave you the right key? A compromised server could provide a false public key, allowing the client to encrypt messages to an attacker rather than the intended recipient. Until now, the only way to detect such malfeasance was to verify safety numbers with your contact in person or over a trusted channel. Signal recently launched an alternative: Automatic Key Verification , a feature that helps validate that your chats are secure without requiring direct safety number comparison . Trail of Bits built and operates one of the three auditors that make this system trustworthy. Our auditor, which is an independent implementation written from scratch, continuously checks that the Automatic Key Verification system behaves honestly. How key verification works Automatic Key Verification is a form of “key transparency” that makes mismatch attacks harder to hide by creating a globally consistent view of the set of public keys associated with each phone number. The Signal app now performs a periodic self-check to ensure that all keys stored in the global map for your account belong to your devices. If the app is unable to verify the log, or finds that not all keys are expected, the user is presented with a warning that “Automatic Key Verification is currently unavailable for your device.” Automatic Key Verification may also be unavailable for other reasons, as outlined in Signal’s documentation
Cloudflare DDoS Threat Report H1 2026: 1 Tbps attacks soar as DNS floods and geopolitical tensions drive a new wave
Welcome to the 25th edition of Cloudflare's DDoS Threat Report. This is the first half-year edition in the series: rather than publishing separate reports for the first and second quarters of 2026, we have combined our coverage of Q1 and Q2 into a single volume covering January through June 2026. The analysis is produced by Cloudforce One , Cloudflare’s Threat Intelligence organization, providing a comprehensive analysis of the evolving threat landscape of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks based on data from the Cloudflare network . Key insights The 1 Tbps club grew. Cloudflare mitigated a combined 935 network-layer DDoS attacks exceeding 1 Tbps in the first half of 2026 and a +519% quarter-over-quarter surge between Q1 and Q2. The attack-vector center of gravity shifted from botnet floods to reflection and amplification. DNS-based attacks accounted for 34.3% of all network-layer activity in the first half of 2026, with DNS Floods alone climbing from 25.7% to 40.0% of network-layer attacks quarter-over-quarter. CLDAP Floods surged +580% quarter-over-quarter to become the #3 vector in Q2. Geopolitics and global events influence the landscape. Media, Production & Publishing held the #1 most-attacked industry crown in both quarters at 14.2% of all mitigated HTTP DDoS requests as coverage of Iran, Ukraine, and the World Cup drew sustained attention. In para
Mozilla has scrapped the cryptographic key behind Firefox and Thunderbird downloads for Linux after an unencrypted copy of it was committed by mistake to one of the company's own private code repositories. That key is how a user, or a Linux distribution packaging the browser, confirms a downloaded Firefox tarball came from Mozilla and was not tampered with. That decision carries a cost for
Latest
Wednesday, August 12
We found an attack campaign that is using a new Mini Shai-Hulud variant that makes the worm a general Linux post-exploitation payload.
A massive set of 737 free VPN and proxy extensions have been found to mainly target Russian-speaking users seeking access to blocked services with an aim to intercept browser traffic and route them through a proxy infrastructure. The extensions, published across at least 40 Chrome Web Store developer accounts, racked up 75,486 installs. Of those identified, 274 have been found to impersonate 66
Security researchers found that in less than 60 seconds, they could open a hatch on a plane’s exterior, plug in a tiny device, and redirect the aircraft’s autopilot or sabotage its flight plan.
A newly disclosed flaw in the way OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google carried hidden AI reasoning between API calls let researchers recover internal reasoning and secrets from session logs, including API keys and passwords. The weakness affected encrypted reasoning objects used by the providers' reasoning APIs, where a block created in one session could be replayed into another and, during testing,
Enterprise defenses are tuned to catch the attacks that make noise. This year's data shows attackers winning by making none. According to Picus Labs' new Blue Report 2026, which measured more than 338 million real attack simulations across actual client production environments in the first half of 2026, defenses are having one of their strongest years yet. Average prevention effectiveness
Adobe has shipped updates to address multiple critical security vulnerabilities impacting ColdFusion, Commerce, and Campaign Classic that, if successfully exploited, could result in arbitrary code execution and privilege escalation. The most severe of the flaws are listed below - CVE-2026-48362 (CVSS score: 10.0) - An operating system command injection vulnerability in ColdFusion that could
Experts allege that two recent incidents in California show the extreme lengths that criminal organizations are willing to go to to steal servers and other gear meant for data centers.
Chaining 3 CVEs to exfiltrate sensitive ERP data.
Threat actors have begun to actively exploit a recently patched critical security flaw in Broadcom VMware vCenter, according to new findings from QUIRSO. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-59310 (CVSS score: 9.8), a directory-traversal vulnerability in the VMware vCenter server that a malicious actor with network access can exploit to execute arbitrary code. Patches for the flaw were
Presently sponsored by: Report URI: Guarding you from rogue JavaScript! Don’t get pwned; get real-time alerts & prevent breaches #SecureYourSite A little wind noise, a little connectivity flakiness, and a little lip-sync issues from YouTube, but look at that view! 朗 Back to business, it's the Brinks Home FAQ I found most interesting this week. I mean, how do you write your own FAQ then fail to actually answer most of the questions?! Being conscious that they're the target of criminal extortion and are genuinely the victims here, I still struggle to grasp how simple incident response questions can be so lawyer-speaked as to remove all sensible meaning from the responses. But this is how these things tend to play out these days (speaking generically, yet to be seen fully for Brinks): hacker gets data by just calling up and asking for it (vishing -> OAuth), hacker demands money, hacker gets no money so dumps the data, company gets a gazillion class actions overnight and lawyers up to the hilt, customers get notified "where legally required" (which it usually isn't) 路♂️
Two malicious LiteLLM releases sat on PyPI for about 40 minutes in March carrying credential-stealing code capable of harvesting cloud keys, SSH keys, Kubernetes tokens, database passwords, and other secrets from systems that installed them. Threat intelligence firm CloudSEK now says a dataset it obtained, built from roughly 434,000 files the attackers captured, maps potential exposure to more
SAP has released patches to address a maximum-severity security flaw impacting Commerce Cloud (Data Hub Adapter) that could result in arbitrary code execution. The vulnerability, assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2026-58231, is rated 10.0 on the CVSS scoring system. It has been described as a case of insufficient authorization checks and input validation. "SAP Commerce Cloud allows an
The security researcher going by the name Chaotic Eclipse (aka INFINITE NIGHTMARE, MSNightmare, and Nightmare-Eclipse) has released a proof-of-concept (PoC) for a new Microsoft zero-day called ShieldBreak. The vulnerability, rooted in Microsoft Defender for Windows, demonstrates a patch bypass for CVE-2026-50656 (CVSS score: 7.8), otherwise known as RoguePlanet. RoguePlanet has been described
Cisco has warned that a new vulnerability impacting Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) Software has been exploited in the wild. The high-severity flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-20349 (CVSS score: 8.6), is a case of insufficient error checking when processing HTTP requests that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to trigger
When a pentest finding reaches a developer, they may not know what to do. The technical details of the vulnerability finding are not enough. The vulnerability finding is more useful when it has steps to reproduce the problem, evidence of the vulnerability, and information about which parts of the system are affected by the vulnerability finding. It is also helpful to know how bad the impact of the [vulnerability finding](https://www.vulnsy.com/) really is. For people who work with pentest reports or vulnerability reports, what information do you think is most useful when you have to look into a vulnerability finding and fix the vulnerability finding?
Tuesday, August 11
Microsoft today released updates to remedy at least 398 security vulnerabilities in its Windows operating systems and supported software, including one weakness that is already being actively exploited and two others that were publicly detailed prior to today. Image: Shutterstock, Mallika Home Studio. August’s overstuffed bundle of patch joy from Microsoft did not eclipse its recording breaking release of more than 570 security updates last month , but it is double June’s then-record batch of nearly 200 fixes . Microsoft has attributed the recent patch deluge to vulnerability discoveries aided by artificial intelligence, and experts roundly agree that Windows users should get used to the idea of Patch Tuesdays (the second Tuesday of each month) covering hundreds of newly discovered security flaws. Fully 42 of the 398 flaws that Microsoft patched today earned Redmond’s most-dire “critical” rating, meaning they are severe enough that malware or malcontents could exploit them to gain remote control over a Windows computer with little to no help from the user. The sole known 
I registered an expired DMARC reporting domain (gca-emailauth\[.\]org) for $10. It had been published as the aggregate-reporting address in Global Cyber Alliance DMARC training docs going back to a 2019 bootcamp, and at some point it lapsed. Shortly after registration, aggregate DMARC reports for 86 domains across 20+ organizations started arriving. 56 belonged to The Toro Company (NYSE-listed), including myturf\[.\]com, their distributor platform, which sits at p=none. The rest - University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point (14 subdomains), the North Carolina School of Science and Mathematics, Ennis ISD (Texas), Great Prairie AEA (an Iowa education agency serving 35,000 students), two county governments, and several commercial domains. For most of these it was a second rua address sitting behind a working commercial processor (Proofpoint, in Toro's case). Reports still arrived at the primary. GCA's engineers later traced it to a former partner who'd held the domain and let it lapse - the dependency was never written down. As of my last sweep, 65 of the 86 still publish the endpoint. We disclosed to everyone whose reports we were receiving; only 21 domains stopped publishing the endpoint, and almost nobody replied. After 8 months of owning the domain, we coordinated a transfer back to GCA.
Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a new version of the Kimwolf/AISURU Android and Internet of Things (IoT) botnet that comes with significant improvements to improve its operational resilience and conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. The new version, tracked as Kimwolf v7, was discovered by Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 in February 2026. "Kimwolf v7 adds an HTTP/2-based
The Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) has disclosed details of a new social engineering campaign orchestrated by Russian nation-state threat actors targeting IT workers in the country by masquerading as recruiters to trick them into installing malware. CERT-UA pinned the activity on a threat cluster it tracks as UAC-0145, which is a subgroup within Sandworm (aka APT44,
Every Signal chat starts the same way: the client asks the Signal server for the public key associated with your contact’s phone number. But how do you know the server gave you the right key? A compromised server could provide a false public key, allowing the client to encrypt messages to an attacker rather than the intended recipient. Until now, the only way to detect such malfeasance was to verify safety numbers with your contact in person or over a trusted channel. Signal recently launched an alternative: Automatic Key Verification , a feature that helps validate that your chats are secure without requiring direct safety number comparison . Trail of Bits built and operates one of the three auditors that make this system trustworthy. Our auditor, which is an independent implementation written from scratch, continuously checks that the Automatic Key Verification system behaves honestly. How key verification works Automatic Key Verification is a form of “key transparency” that makes mismatch attacks harder to hide by creating a globally consistent view of the set of public keys associated with each phone number. The Signal app now performs a periodic self-check to ensure that all keys stored in the global map for your account belong to your devices. If the app is unable to verify the log, or finds that not all keys are expected, the user is presented with a warning that “Automatic Key Verification is currently unavailable for your device.” Automatic Key Verification may also be unavailable for other reasons, as outlined in Signal’s documentation
Security researchers found a way to enter Microsoft SharePoint servers as any user, including an administrator, with no valid account. A significant part of the work that found it was done through an AI agent. The flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-55040 (CVSS 9.1), affects SharePoint Server Subscription Edition, SharePoint Server 2019, and SharePoint Server 2016. Microsoft's
The ransomware group known as DeadLock has been observed using decentralized infrastructure to facilitate victim communications and data leak operations in a bid to improve operational resilience. "Its recovery ecosystem combines the Session messaging network with blockchain-backed services that store and deliver resources used throughout the extortion process," the Microsoft Threat
[Tool/Writeup] ALPC-Enumerator: A dynamic, userland C++ tool to enumerate ALPC ports and detect ALPC spoofing
Hey everyone For some time now, I've been digging into ALPC, it's a fascinating and deliberately under documented corner of Windows internals. I originally built this userland enumerator to mitigate userland restrictions, but it’s structured as a simple C++ program that can easily be chained to enhance other reverse engineering workflows. To ensure it runs effectively across different Windows builds, I made it completely dynamic, resolving structures at runtime rather than relying on hardcoded offsets. One specific angle that fascinated me during this research was ALPC spoofing. A malicious process can easily spoof its name and path over ALPC, but it *cannot* spoof the type and a signer. This mismatch becomes a highly reliable detection signal for defensive purposes. I've verified the output and every angle using WinDbg, and both logs are available in the GitHub repo. I put together a full technical breakdown detailing the dynamic PPL-aware enumeration approach and the spoofing detection mechanics here:[**https://medium.com/@sphinx\_321/userland-alpc-enumeration-dynamic-ppl-aware-approach-283541194102**](https://medium.com/@sphinx_321/userland-alpc-enumeration-dynamic-ppl-aware-approach-283541194102) I'm planning to broaden this research next to map out the local RPC/ALPC attack surface, so I might drop more tools regarding this soon. I’d love to hear your thoughts or feedback on the implementation!
Author here. We discovered a vulnerability in `docker cp` that allows a malicious container to create or overwrite files on the machine running the Docker CLI. The exploit combines a filesystem race in Docker’s archive creation with unsafe symlink handling during extraction. Depending on the CLI user’s privileges, this can lead to developer-account compromise or root code execution. Docker confirmed that `sbx cp` was also affected. Fixed versions: * Docker Engine/CLI 29.7.2+ * Docker Desktop 4.86.0+ * Docker Sandboxes 0.38.0+ Happy to answer technical questions.
VU#431093: TCG TPM 2.0 reference code found vulnerable to information leakage and timing side-channel attacks
Overview Two vulnerabilities have been identified in the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0 reference implementation: CVE-2026-6726 – Information leakage via falsified TPM keys. CVE-2026-6727 – A timing side-channel vulnerability in RSA OAEP decryption. An attacker with privileged access to a TPM command interface may be able to exploit these vulnerabilities by sending specially crafted TPM commands. Successful exploitation could allow the attacker to decrypt ciphertexts encrypted to affected TPM-managed RSA keys, including the RSA Endorsement Key (EK), or obtain credentials for falsified TPM keys, enabling forged TPM 2.0 attestations. These vulnerabilities are also documented by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) in advisories - TCGVRT010 and TCGVRT0011 : Description Trusted Platform Module (TPM) technology provides hardware-backed cryptographic services for modern computing platforms. TPMs are designed to resist tampering and may be implemented as discrete chips, integrated hardware, firmware-based TPMs (fTPMs), or software implementations used in cloud and virtualized environments. The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) maintains the TPM specifications and publishes a reference implementation to assist vendors in developing TPM-compliant products. Two vulnerabilities were identified in the TPM 2.0 reference implementation. CVE-2026-6727 A timing side-channel vulnerability exists in the RSA OAEP decryption implementation. A privileged local attacker with access to the TPM command interface may be able to exploit timing differ
OpenAI on Monday unveiled a new cybersecurity-focused model called GPT‑5.6‑Cyber that it said is focused on vulnerability research, penetration testing, and incident response. "Built on GPT‑5.6 Sol, it is trained to improve capabilities on several specialized cybersecurity tasks (e.g., finding zero-day vulnerabilities and developing exploit chains) and to reduce refusals for certain higher-risk
Cloudflare DDoS Threat Report H1 2026: 1 Tbps attacks soar as DNS floods and geopolitical tensions drive a new wave
Welcome to the 25th edition of Cloudflare's DDoS Threat Report. This is the first half-year edition in the series: rather than publishing separate reports for the first and second quarters of 2026, we have combined our coverage of Q1 and Q2 into a single volume covering January through June 2026. The analysis is produced by Cloudforce One , Cloudflare’s Threat Intelligence organization, providing a comprehensive analysis of the evolving threat landscape of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks based on data from the Cloudflare network . Key insights The 1 Tbps club grew. Cloudflare mitigated a combined 935 network-layer DDoS attacks exceeding 1 Tbps in the first half of 2026 and a +519% quarter-over-quarter surge between Q1 and Q2. The attack-vector center of gravity shifted from botnet floods to reflection and amplification. DNS-based attacks accounted for 34.3% of all network-layer activity in the first half of 2026, with DNS Floods alone climbing from 25.7% to 40.0% of network-layer attacks quarter-over-quarter. CLDAP Floods surged +580% quarter-over-quarter to become the #3 vector in Q2. Geopolitics and global events influence the landscape. Media, Production & Publishing held the #1 most-attacked industry crown in both quarters at 14.2% of all mitigated HTTP DDoS requests as coverage of Iran, Ukraine, and the World Cup drew sustained attention. In para
Researchers say it took fewer than 20 prompts for a public AI tool to find a flaw (now fixed) allowing anyone on a Zoom call to hijack another participants’ device.
Mozilla has scrapped the cryptographic key behind Firefox and Thunderbird downloads for Linux after an unencrypted copy of it was committed by mistake to one of the company's own private code repositories. That key is how a user, or a Linux distribution packaging the browser, confirms a downloaded Firefox tarball came from Mozilla and was not tampered with. That decision carries a cost for
Security researchers invented a cryptocurrency startup, advertised developer jobs, and hired three people they believe were North Korean operatives. Every virtual machine the company issued was recording. The onboarding paperwork is the part hiring teams can use. The first hire claimed to live in Pasadena, Texas, then sent a California driver's license and a New York bank account. The
RSModsPlus: Digital drop pedal and speaker mode for Rocksmith 2014 which shifts the song to match your guitar's tuning
Windows Plug and Play can be abused to fetch signed vendor software for an emulated USB device and execute privileged installation components that researchers chained to SYSTEM access on a fully updated Windows 11 machine. The same PnP path can be triggered over Remote Desktop without physical hardware when supported Plug and Play or low-level USB redirection is enabled; Microsoft says that
SMAP is Pre-Disarmed: How a Stack Pivot That Shouldn't Work Revealed a Kernel-Wide Design Compromise
While working through a kernel exploit chain on Windows 11, I noticed that a stack pivot into user-mode memory didn't trigger SMAP. I wrote up three experiments to figure out why. Short version: the normal syscall entry path arrives with RFLAGS.AC=1. SMAP is effectively disabled for any code reached through a standard IOCTL dispatch. This aligns with what MSRC documented back in 2020 (the Windows kernel simply wasn't built with SMAP in mind, and retrofitting it would touch \~2,900 locations: [here](https://github.com/microsoft/MSRC-Security-Research/blob/master/papers/2020/Evaluating%20the%20feasibility%20of%20enabling%20SMAP%20for%20the%20Windows%20kernel.pdf)) My conclusion isn't novel here. It's just an experimental confirmation of the architectural compromise on current builds. I just wanted to shine the light on this blind spot.
Most security leaders can report what they spent on bug bounty last year. Far fewer can understand the value being delivered by proving what it actually tested. Open programs show which bugs were reported, not which assets received real, skilled attention. Managed bug bounty closes that gap. Researcher-hour and traffic analytics turn testing depth into evidence you can measure, not an assumption you have to trust, giving you coverage you can hand to a board, an auditor, or a compliance team. The post Managed Bug Bounty: Why Provable Coverage Beats Blind Spend appeared first on Synack .
IP sharing has steadily increased over the past decade, with fewer than 0.2% of domains using a unique IPv4 address and up to millions of domains co-located on single IP addresses. On the client side, traffic is similarly skewed: 5% of client IP addresses account for over half of observed requests
Monday, August 10
I recently released NoiseHound, a project that uses BloodHound attack-path data to look at Active Directory from a detection-engineering perspective. BloodHound is very good at answering: **“What paths exist to a high-value objective?”** NoiseHound adds another question: **“Which of those paths currently has the weakest detection coverage, and why?”** NoiseHound maps BloodHound relationships against their expected detection surface, including: * Windows Security event telemetry * Sysmon visibility * EDR / ITDR visibility * MITRE ATT&CK techniques * audit-policy dependencies * environment-specific detection controls The goal is not to assign a universal “detectability score” to an AD technique. Detection varies significantly depending on audit configuration, endpoint tooling, SIEM content, identity monitoring, and SOC maturity. Because of that, NoiseHound supports environment-specific profiles and measured calibration. For example, the same BloodHound path can rank very differently depending on whether an environment has: * appropriate Windows auditing enabled * Sysmon deployed * PowerShell logging configured * Microsoft Defender for Identity * EDR coverage * relevant SIEM detections * custom detection content The part that may be most interesting from the blue-team side is the defensive analysis mode. Instead of simply ranking attack paths, NoiseHound can analyze the quietest viable paths and identify **what makes them quiet**. That includes identifying: * missing telemetry * audit-policy gaps * weakly monitored BloodHound relationships * detection coverage gaps * controls that would increase the detection cost of an attack path It can also ingest Sigma rules and compare their telemetry / ATT&CK coverage against the BloodHound edge corpus to help identify relationships that currently lack corresponding detection coverage. Current functionality includes: * BloodHound CE ZIP / JSON ingestion * direct Neo4j ingestion * environment-aware path scoring * probability-of-detection ranking * Pareto analysis across detection probability, noise, and hop count * AD CS ESC1–8 path synthesis * Sigma rule coverage analysis * lab-based calibration * measured audit / EDR / SIEM profiles * defensive detection-gap analysis * JSON, text, and standalone HTML reporting One of the ideas behind the project is that attack-path analysis can be useful for more than identifying privilege-escalation routes. If BloodHound shows that an attacker can reach Domain Admin through several different paths, defenders should ideally understand not only that those paths exist, but also **which one their current monitoring stack is least likely to see**. That provides a way to prioritize detection engineering around paths that are both viable and poorly instrumented. NoiseHound does not execute techniques against systems. It analyzes existing BloodHound data and models the detection surface around those relationships. GitHub: [https://github.com/warpedatom/noisehound](https://github.com/warpedatom/noisehound) The scoring model and telemetry mappings are intentionally transparent and extensible. I’d be especially interested in feedback from detection engineers and blue-team practitioners around: * edge-to-event mappings * audit-policy assumptions * Sigma coverage analysis * telemetry gaps I'm missing * how useful this type of attack-path prioritization would be in real detection-engineering workflows
At the beginning of Agents Week, Rita shared that agents represent the next evolution of computing: not only as a new application of AI but also as a new class of software that’s shaping how people interact with technology, and how software interacts with the Internet. Over the last year or so, we set out to explore what this shift means for developers and customers building AI-native apps and the infrastructure needed to support them. As agents become more capable and autonomous, the challenges extend beyond the models themselves — to identity, communication, orchestration, memory, observability, and security. Over the past week we’ve shared how we’re bringing those pieces together across the Cloudflare platform to serve an Agentic Internet. Each day we presented new tools, products, and ideas toward building for an Internet where humans and agents cooperate instead of collide . Monday, August 3 Monday focused on the foundations for building and running intelligent, autonomous apps — the runtime and infrastructure agents rely on. Tuesday, August 4 Tuesday introduced the Agent Development Lifecycle (ADLC) and the primitives that take agentic software from prototype to production. Wednesday, August 5 Wednesday extended Zero Trust from users and devices to agents themselves — and we shared how we’re running it internally at Cloudflare. Thursday, August 6 Thursday defined the Agentic Internet, and how website owners, publishers, and agents can all contribute to an Internet that works for people and agents alike.
Found inside camview.tar.gz on an exposed server: a Docker project used to find, exploit, and stream internet-exposed IP cameras in a browser. The operator's own name for it, from the archive and README, is camview. It is not connected to any legitimate app of the same name. * Built with FastAPI and Uvicorn, Python 3.11 image with FFmpeg, nmap, and masscan baked in * FFmpeg transcodes the camera RTSP feed to MJPEG for display; nmap and masscan provide the initial scan layer * The audit feature is where the exploitation happens: cameras are fingerprinted across a dozen-plus brands, queried over ONVIF, tested against known CVEs, then brute-forced over HTTP and RTSP with a 3,811-entry username:password dictionary * Working credentials and stream URL patterns are written to disk and prioritized on later runs, so it improves per vendor * The exploitation itself is not custom. camview wraps Ingram, a public webcam scanner, mounted in from the host * On a second, unrelated directory, scripts named camworm.py and routerworm.py follow a compromise-then-proxy pattern and contain no actual worm functionality despite the naming We rebuilt the UI in a sealed test environment by running it with empty data. Full analysis in the post: [https://hunt.io/blog/russian-speaking-operator-ukrainian-camera-toolkit](https://hunt.io/blog/russian-speaking-operator-ukrainian-camera-toolkit)
Overview The OpenCart v4.2.0.0 extension installer contains a directory traversal vulnerability. The extension installation process extracts uploaded .zip files then uses the zip entry filenames as filesystem paths, without validating that the resolved path stays inside the intended directory. This vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-18412. Description OpenCart is a free, open‑source e‑commerce solution designed to help businesses build and manage online stores. OpenCart extensions are uploaded as zip files with .ocmod.zip extensions. Upon installation, the OpenCart v4.2.0.0 extension installer extracts these zip files, but does not validate that the extracted paths stay inside the intended extraction directory. An attacker can craft a malicious extension containing file path traversal sequences, such as ../ . With this vulnerability, an attacker can write files, such as a PHP web shell, into the webroot directory. Impact If a user with valid admininistrator credentials installs a malicious extension, it could allow a user to remotely execute code with the same privileges that OpenCart has on the target server. This includes the potential creation of a web shell, which could further enable remote execution of system-level commands. The vulnerability was confirmed against version 4.2.0.0, but other 4.x versions of OpenCart may be affected. Solution Unfortunately, OpenCart could not be reached to coordinate this vulnerability, and a patch is not available at the time of this writing. The CERT/CC recommends that OpenCart users update to the latest version and avoid installing extensions from unknown or untrusted sources. Additionally, OpenCart should be configured to run
Serving the most critical missions: Cloudflare for Government achieves FedRAMP Class D (High) Certified status
We believe the Internet must be a force for good, and that it requires a foundation of trust. Nowhere is that trust more critical than in public service. Government agencies are the stewards of a nation’s most sensitive data. They protect national security, critical infrastructure , and the personal information of every citizen. Cloudflare’s mission is to help build a better Internet. A key part of that mission is giving public sector agencies the best technology to stay secure, fast, and reliable. That means meeting the highest possible standards. Today, we are proud to announce a major milestone: Cloudflare for Government has achieved FedRAMP Class D (High) certification status . We are honored to take this step with our sponsoring agency, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, whose global mission demands the highest level of security. We are also very excited to announce that we are using the new systems we developed for FedRAMP High as the foundation of our commitment to pursuing U.S. Department of Defense Impact Level 4 (DoD IL4) authorization. IL4 is the department’s cybersecurity standard for systems handling controlled, unclassified data. We are confident that bringing our global network to this space will change the pace of innovation in the defense community. What is FedRAMP, and why does being “certified” matter? The Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) is a U.S. government-wide program that provides a rigorous, standardize
i got tired of switching between windbg ida and x64dbg so i built an orchestrator to control them all
To reduce the amount of noise from questions, we have disabled self-posts in favor of a unified questions thread every week. Feel free to ask any question about reverse engineering here. If your question is about how to use a specific tool, or is specific to some particular target, you will have better luck on the [Reverse Engineering StackExchange](http://reverseengineering.stackexchange.com/). See also /r/AskReverseEngineering.
Sunday, August 9
HANDLE Duplication internals : What happens behind the scenes when you call kernelbase! DuplicateHandle( )
Evil Fonts deceive a viewer by rendering a different letter than is actually on the disk. Evil Fonts can poison HTML, DOCX, PDFs, and anywhere else you can bring your own fonts. Works great in Windows corporate networks for bypassing security tooling, initial access through JavaScript free click fix (beats mitm web security tooling), and leaving traps around the network to harvest shells. Imagine thinking you are copying whoami but what is actually on the disk is rm -rf \\\~ Demos: (Use desktop) https://doctoreww.github.io/EvilFontTool/ For the demos, copy and paste the HTML/DOCX to a notepad to remove the evil fonts. For the AI ones imagine your security tooling inspects the benign text on disk, but shows the obviously malicious extortion to the user. Labs: https://github.com/DoctorEww/EvilFontTool/blob/main/labs%2FREADME.md Lab Walkthrough: https://github.com/DoctorEww/EvilFontTool/blob/main/labs%2Fwalkthrough.md Some evil font uses: Tamper homework to make it so students poison AI queries Poison help desk documentation Bypass email filters Clickfix Beat resume AI filters
Saturday, August 8
I recently analyzed a multi-stage PowerShell payload delivery chain involving heavily obfuscated PowerShell loaders and remotely hosted payloads. The analysis covers PowerShell deobfuscation, hidden execution, Base64/XOR decoding, a decoy “Verification complete!” prompt, payload delivery, and IOCs. Initial indicators: `203[.]188[.]171[.]166` `dorenzaa[.]com`
Plus: A judge rules cell tower dumps unconstitutional, water utility hacks spread to a dozen states, a phishing email opens a missile-parts supplier’s inbox, and a ransomware boss gets 16 years.
Two security researchers bought cheap domains—including noreply.net and deleteduser.com—and set up email listening services. Hundreds of companies are sending them corporate secrets.
Yes, given that the legacy SCT protocol has known security vulnerabilities such as sctphantom, the industry strongly recommends deprecating it and migrating to more secure modern standards to ensure system security.
Friday, August 7
The `meetings`collection has no tenant isolation. Any authenticated tl;dv user can query every meeting across every account on the platform. Each meeting record hands you the creator's email address, the conference ID (which is a joinable Google Meet or Teams room), the provider, the recording status, and timestamps. I queried the Firestore `meetings` collection and saw there were **181,874 meeting records** belonging to **84,312 unique users** across **35,003 email domains**.
ByteRay researchers have published a blog on a set of vulnerabilities they are calling TrustFall, and the findings land hard for any company that treats the Trusted Execution Environment as the part of a device you do not have to worry about. OP-TEE is the walled-off Secure World that phones, TVs, cars, and industrial gear lean on to guard keys, DRM, and identity, and the whole point of paying for that hardware isolation is the promise that even a compromised operating system cannot reach inside. TrustFall shows that promise was not as solid as buyers assumed. The researchers found several flaws that let the untrusted side reach into or knock over the Secure World, which is exactly the outcome the design exists to prevent. The bugs have since been fixed upstream, so patched builds are available, but the uncomfortable takeaway for vendors is that the vault they were told to trust had a way in, and "it runs in the TEE" is no longer an answer on its own.
The Internet isn’t a single lane of traffic. For a long time, the rule of thumb in web security was that bots are bad, while humans are good. Of course, we’re far past this generalization. Humans can be fraudulent, and bots can be helpful at different levels. Site owners actively want some automated traffic to interact with our sites to make the Internet functional and discoverable. To complicate things further, the line between "human" and "bot" is blurring more and more. Now, we have a type of “hybrid” traffic where a single session shifts from human to agentic and back again. (Think of a user browsing a store, and then handing off the checkout process to an automated shopping assistant.) So, how do website owners manage this kind of complexity? What matters here is assessing behaviors . Is this behavior abusive? Malicious? What’s the risk presented here, and can I trust this visitor based on their actions? Solving this requires moving beyond static, point-in-time checks. It requires analyzing continuous behaviors to evaluate Trust. In this post, we’ll share an inside look into the strategy of the Web Integrity & Trust team (covering the bots and fraud problem spaces) around detecting and analyzing good and bad behaviors, providing tools to help site owners tackle emerging challenges in the shifting Agentic Internet. We’ll also share findings around agentic traffic since the launch of Precursor , and a simulation where you can see how your own cursor movements would be assessed as human or bot — plus some exciting launch updates to expect in the near future. Defining Risk and Trust Let’s talk about the distinction between Risk and Trust , the way we discuss it within the teams at Cloudflare who work in bot detection. These are often viewed as polar
Since launching in 2020, Cloudflare Radar has provided one-of-a-kind insight into Internet traffic on a global scale. The open data that Radar publishes from our global network is used by a variety of experts in different domains: human rights advocates, journalists, academic researchers, network operators, and more. Today, as part of Agents Week , Radar is beta-launching a new tool: Radar Researcher. Now, if you want to answer a question with Radar’s data, you can just ask in plain language and get an answer back with real, interactive charts, all built on Cloudflare's developer platform. You no longer need to find the right page, choose the right filters, or read the API documentation to write a query. Why we built Radar Researcher Over the past six years, the Radar team has worked to provide clear, accessible, reliable data visualizations of complex datasets. This is not without its challenges: our user base is vast and ranges from curious novices to technical network experts. Even so, we publish as much insight into the Internet as seen from our network as we can: DNS queries from our public resolver 1.1.1.1 , HTTP traffic from across our global network, network quality data collected from Cloudflare Speed Test , and so much more. We also believe in the power of open, public data, which is why everything you see in Radar’s data visualizations is available via our free API . Every year we make more and more of the Internet visible. But as Rad
As a platform for helping build a better Internet, Cloudflare helps turn ideas into real products and experiences around the world. Across communities and backgrounds, developers build with Cloudflare using the tools they love, shaping what comes next for the Internet while inspiring, collaborating with, and teaching others. The community is where some of Cloudflare’s best moments happen. Students show their friends how to deploy Workers for the first time. Discord users answer questions from other developers via working code samples, instead of links to documentation. Open-source contributors build novel solutions to solve their own problems, then share them with the world. Organizers host events that give builders from all backgrounds the space to start building their dream project. All of these represent a community at its best: people helping other people build. This spirit of community is an exciting and vital part of helping to build the Internet. Those who step up to educate and support others, or to invent, build, or maintain tools shared across the ecosystem, make lasting contributions to the health and potential of the Internet. We want to have their backs. That's why today we’re announcing an improved community program, designed to better support, recognize, and empower the people getting involved, while working with them to shape what comes next. The program has two main tracks: Cloudflare Ambassadors: Bringing Cloudflare to their own communities. Cloudflare Community Engineers: Contributing to open-source projects that improve the Internet. We’re launching a new home for the program where you can learn more and get involved: cloudflare.com/community . Cloudflare Ambassadors Cloudflare Ambassadors are people who bring Cloudflare into their own communities. You can probably think
AI Gateway and Workers AI first started as distinct products, but over time, we noticed our users were converging. With AI Gateway, you can proxy requests to any model provider and get built-in observability, logging, access, and security. On Workers AI, we host models on the GPU infrastructure that we manage, exposing an API endpoint you can leverage to access inference-as-a-service. The architecture of these products looks different, but to an end user, it achieves the same goal: connecting you to models with a sophisticated control plane. Today, we're excited to share our plans on how these products converge into one unified path, so you can connect to any model provider (including Workers AI), while managing things like observability, billing, security, and logging from a single control plane. It’s the next step toward some big plans we have — read on to learn what a unified control plane means for the future of model routing. Merging the binding and API We've been hinting at the fact that these products are becoming more unified through our entrypoints: the Workers binding and the REST API. We have an AI binding that you can use to call AI Gateway and Workers AI. There's no concept of a separate AI Gateway and Workers AI binding: it all goes through the same path. We shipped the idea of a “default” gateway a few months ago, so that if you have never set up an AI Gateway before, you could still automatically inherit the AI Gateway observability and logging. Of course, you can still specify your own gateway if you'd like to split up applications into multiple projects. Here's what the binding call looks like, if you are calling Workers AI via AI Gateway: We’ve also announced a single unified REST API — the /ai/ endpoint that allows you to make similar calls to Workers AI via AI Gateway. Doing this allows us to unify the entrypoi
Thursday, August 6
Security researchers tracked and eavesdropped on a WIRED reporter using vulnerabilities in a pink plastic smartwatch. It’s just one piece of a deeply insecure supply chain of GPS-enabled gadgets.
Abusing the trust boundary in Claude Code for RCE. Trust is never broken and that opens up a few avenues for abuse. Simply opening claude code on a PR can be enough to silently trigger attacker payloads.
VU#487613: Alinto SOGo v5.12.7 vulnerable to cross-site scripting via malformed ICS calendar invitations
Overview A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Alinto SOGo v5.12.7 allows attackers to achieve remote code execution by embedding malicious SVG (Scalable Vector Graphics) objects in ICS (iCalendar) invitations. The vulnerability has been actively exploited in the wild, as confirmed by VirusTotal sightings. Description Alinto SOGo is an open-source webmail and groupware platform for email, calendars, contacts, and shared scheduling. It is primarily used by organizations seeking a self-hosted interface solution for existing mail infrastructure. CVE-2026-8496 The vulnerability exists in SOGo’s handling of ICS files, where the DESCRIPTION field is rendered without proper sanitization or Content Security Policy (CSP) enforcement. When a calendar invite contains an SVG payload, such as <animate onrepeat='...'> , with JavaScript event handlers, the browser executes the script in the context of the SOGo webmail interface. This occurs during normal calendar view rendering (e.g., when a user opens or previews the calendar tab), even without explicit interaction. Impact Once an attacker delivers a malicious ICS file via email, any user who views the calendar will execute the embedded XSS payload, granting the attacker full read access to the victim's mailbox. This enables: Credential theft through forced logout/login phishing Password manager autofill hijacking Full exfiltration of email messages, folder contents, and metadata Extraction of contact lists and calendar data Solution Users are recommended to upgrade to SOGo v5.12.8 or newer. v5.12.8 addresses this
A 26-year-old Canadian man once described as one of the most consequential cybercrime threat actors of 2024 has pleaded guilty to computer fraud and conspiracy to hack and extort more than 165 organizations that used the cloud provider Snowflake . Connor Riley Moucka , of Kitchener, Ontario, also admitted to stealing call and text history records of more than 100 million AT&T customers. A surveillance photo of Connor Riley Moucka, a.k.a. “Judische” and “Waifu,” dated Oct 21, 2024, 9 days before Moucka’s arrest. This image was included in an affidavit filed by an investigator with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The U.S. Justice Department said between February and October 2024, Moucka and co-conspirators used stolen login credentials to steal cloud-hosted data belonging to at least 165 customers of a U.S.-based software-as-a-service company. The hackers targeted stolen credentials for Snowflake customer accounts that did not enforce multi-factor authentication, and extorted or attempted to extort a host of well-known companies, including TicketMaster, Lending Tree, Advance Auto Parts and Neiman Marcus. Snowflake responded to the data thefts by increasing password complexity requirements and enforcing multi-factor authentication.
Most of the cyber incidents landing on our desks these days start with someone believing a lie. It’s not a brilliant piece of code that causes most breaches. A convincing email, a confident phone call, and a fake sense of urgency can make people hand over exactly what the attacker needs. Last week I talked […] The post The risk awareness radar. A superpower every MSP needs to train appeared first on Heimdal Security Blog .
Today, we’re excited to announce a few developer experience improvements to Cloudflare AI Search to make it easy to manage a search solution out of the box. Previously, you had to stitch together components of the Cloudflare primitives (Workers AI, AI Gateway, Vectorize, R2, Browser Run) but now, AI Search can do this automatically, and better. Our goal is to give your agents their own search engine, where they can easily find data to provide better answers for themselves and their humans. We’re also sharing an early preview of pricing for customers of AI Search so you can learn how this scales. We modeled pricing in a way that makes it predictable and scalable: embedding and reranking are free when you use the default models, so no need to worry about predicting token count. In AI Search, users can now: Index a collection of data for your agent: Make structured and unstructured data easily accessible for your agent to build with, from individual files to websites you own. (Today, it must be a zone on your Cloudflare account, but with more ways to verify ownership coming soon.) Skip the sitemap for your websites: Previously, AI Search required that websites have a sitemap to use the website integration. Now you can select the “Discover” parsing option to add a website without a sitemap as a source. Get a single public endpoint for searching across a namespace: When you enable public URLs on your namespace, you can get a /search and /mcp endpoint that can search through multiple instances or websites at once without authentication, so you can share easily with your customers. Put your own custom domain over public endpoints: You can now add your own domains over your public URLs, so you can brand your /search
Over the last year and a half, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) has become the universal standard for how agents interact with external services. But one of the main criticisms of MCP was that the protocol required a stateful connection between Client and Server. This evolved from MCP’s origins and the first STDIO transport, designed for local applications . When MCP Servers went remote, it translated the stateful connection that worked so well locally and transposed it onto web infrastructure. Building a well-behaved MCP Server meant managing request routing to sticky sessions, holding open streams, message replay, and generally more overhead and complexity than a traditional web server. This changes now. The latest MCP 2026-07-28 specification was released last week, together with updated TypeScript, Python, Go, and C# SDKs. MCP is now a fully stateless protocol. The specification, interaction model and SDKs have all been rewritten to leverage this new protocol and simplify usage. This means that MCP servers can now run in just a Worker, no stateful infrastructure needed, and customers benefit from the operational simplicity and reduced cost of less moving parts. A new MCP At Cloudflare, our journey with MCP goes back to the very beginning. In March 2025, we released our McpAgent primitive for building MCP servers with Cloudflare Agents SDK . Two months later, we ran an MCP Demo Day s
Your next customer may not find you through a search engine. Instead, they'll ask an AI assistant: "how do I do X?"; "which option is best for someone like me?"; "just handle it for me" and an agent will find the answer, weigh the options, and act on their behalf. Increasingly, the moment that determines whether a customer chooses you happens inside a model's response — before a human ever sees your homepage. This agentic audience is already here: by our count, fewer than half of all HTML page requests now come from a human . Not all of those machines are agents acting for a person, but that share is growing fast, and answer engines, shopping assistants, and research tools will shape which businesses are found and recommended. Discoverability used to mean ranking on a results page. Now it means being found, read, and confidently recommended by the agents that guide your customers. The old metrics, human clicks and page views, no longer paint the full picture. We spent time talking to site owners who were staring at access logs full of AI bots, completely blind to whether those bots were capable of using their site or recommending their products and services to their users. We heard two main questions: Can agents actually use my site? Am I getting recommended? To help site owners answer these questions, we have integrated our previous work on Agent Readiness into the Cloudflare dashboard, and added our new Answer Engine Optimization (AEO) tool as well. These tools treat agents as a core user base for your site, showing you how an agent will see it, and how often you get recommended. The opportunity is big, and the bar is low, because most sites aren't built fo
Should we build our own browser? This is one of those questions that has come up every few months internally at Cloudflare for years. Unsurprisingly, it’s the kind that triggers long threads with multiple reasons and persuasive arguments on why we should do it. The browser is obviously the most important software we use every day on our computers; it’s arguably the operating system of the Internet. We’re a company on a mission to help build a better Internet — who wouldn’t want to take on the challenge of building a new browser? But we never quite found the balance between the technical difficulty of such an endeavour and the unique problems we’d be solving by doing it. And so, the idea was shelved, over and over again. Until now. Something magical happened: we reached a tipping point where a series of powerful technical advancements in our Developer Platform became a reality, while the advent of AI agents and the demand for a new kind of browser became critical at the same time. Running WebAssembly (Wasm) in Workers is now very mature. Primitives like dynamic workers , SQLite-based Durable Objects , Worker-to-worker RPC , service bindings , higher
Today we are launching a developer preview of WebMCP on Cloudflare. Switch it on and browser agents can start working with your site, with no code and nothing changed at your origin. Cloudflare adds a small bridge to your pages, which registers a set of tools for a visitor’s agent to use. The web was built on the assumption that there is a person on the other end: someone to read the page, click buttons, and fill in the forms. But now more and more visits come from AI agents instead, to an Internet made for humans. The usual approach has been crawlers, which copy content back to a server and, too often, give the original site none of the traffic and little of the credit. There is a better way, and it does not involve scraping. WebMCP is a new browser standard, shipping experimentally in Chrome 146, that shows up in the page as document.modelContext . A site can choose to expose a set of tools for agents running in the browser, meaning agents no longer have to guess their way through a page built for humans. This enables agents to have a different browsing experience from the user and use tokens on tasks, not navigation. The catch: the site has to implement it. Cloudflare has been building both ends of this. BrowserRun , our remote browser, already added WebMCP support, so an agent can discover and call the tools a site exposes. Cloudflare Radar will soon offer WebMCP tools of its own. This preview is about the other side: a way to give any site on Cloudflare those tools with a single switch, and no code. A developer preview of WebMCP on Cloudflare Implementing WebMCP by hand is a small project: design the tools to expose, wire them into your interface, and keep them working as the standard evolves. We wanted it to be simple
At the Black Hat security conference, the AI giant revealed new details about how its agents went rogue, hacked several other companies—and did it all right under the company’s nose.
Wednesday, August 5
Researchers at security firm Zenity found more than a dozen flaws in AI browsers—and managed to get OpenAI’s Atlas to make an unauthorized Amazon purchase.
Security researcher James Kettle tried to push the limit of AI’s hacking abilities—and discovered how effective it can be when combined with human expertise.